Intrinsic functional connectivity of the frontoparietal network predicts inter-individual differences in the propensity for costly third-party punishment.

Humans are motivated to give norm violators their just deserts through costly punishment even as unaffected third parties (i.e., third-party punishment, TPP). A great deal of individual variability exists in costly punishment; however, how this variability particularly in TPP is represented by the brain's intrinsic network architecture remains elusive. Here, we examined whether inter-individual differences in the propensity for TPP can be predicted based on resting-state functional connectivity (RSFC) combining an economic TPP game with task-free functional neuroimaging and a multivariate prediction framework. Our behavioral results revealed that TPP punishment increased with the severity of unfairness for offers. People with higher TPP propensity punished more harshly across norm-violating scenarios. Our neuroimaging findings showed RSFC within the frontoparietal network predicted individual differences in TPP propensity. Our findings contribute to understanding the neural fingerprint for an individual's propensity to costly punish strangers, and shed some light on how social norm enforcement behaviors are represented by the brain's intrinsic network architecture.

Predicting the knowledge-recklessness distinction in the human brain.

Criminal convictions require proof that a prohibited act was performed in a statutorily specified mental state. Different legal consequences, including greater punishments, are mandated for those who act in a state of knowledge, compared with a state of recklessness. Existing research, however, suggests people have trouble classifying defendants as knowing, rather than reckless, even when instructed on the relevant legal criteria. We used a machine-learning technique on brain imaging data to predict, with high accuracy, which mental state our participants were in. This predictive ability depended on both the magnitude of the risks and the amount of information about those risks possessed by the participants. Our results provide neural evidence of a detectable difference in the mental state of knowledge in contrast to recklessness and suggest, as a proof of principle, the possibility of inferring from brain data in which legally relevant category a person belongs. Some potential legal implications of this result are discussed.

Parsing the Behavioral and Brain Mechanisms of Third-Party Punishment.

UNLABELLED: The evolved capacity for third-party punishment is considered crucial to the emergence and maintenance of elaborate human social organization and is central to the modern provision of fairness and justice within society. Although it is well established that the mental state of the offender and the severity of the harm he caused are the two primary predictors of punishment decisions, the precise cognitive and brain mechanisms by which these distinct components are evaluated and integrated into a punishment decision are poorly understood. Using fMRI, here we implement a novel experimental design to functionally dissociate the mechanisms underlying evaluation, integration, and decision that were conflated in previous studies of third-party punishment. Behaviorally, the punishment decision is primarily defined by a superadditive interaction between harm and mental state, with subjects weighing the interaction factor more than the single factors of harm and mental state. On a neural level, evaluation of harms engaged brain areas associated with affective and somatosensory processing, whereas mental state evaluation primarily recruited circuitry involved in mentalization. Harm and mental state evaluations are integrated in medial prefrontal and posterior cingulate structures, with the amygdala acting as a pivotal hub of the interaction between harm and mental state. This integrated information is used by the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex at the time of the decision to assign an appropriate punishment through a distributed coding system. Together, these findings provide a blueprint of the brain mechanisms by which neutral third parties render punishment decisions. SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENT: Punishment undergirds large-scale cooperation and helps dispense criminal justice. Yet it is currently unknown precisely how people assess the mental states of offenders, evaluate the harms they caused, and integrate those two components into a single punishment decision. Using a new design, we isolated these three processes, identifying the distinct brain systems and activities that enable each. Additional findings suggest that the amygdala plays a crucial role in mediating the interaction of mental state and harm information, whereas the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex plays a crucial, final-stage role, both in integrating mental state and harm information and in selecting a suitable punishment amount. These findings deepen our understanding of how punishment decisions are made, which may someday help to improve them.

The science of justice: The neuropsychology of social punishment.

The social punishment (SP) of norm violations has received much attention across multiple disciplines. However, current models of SP fail to consider the role of motivational processes, and none can explain the observed behavioral and neuropsychological differences between the two recognized forms of SP: second-party punishment (2PP) and third-party punishment (3PP). After reviewing the literature giving rise to the current models of SP, we propose a unified model of SP which integrates general psychological descriptions of decision-making as a confluence of affect, cognition, and motivation, with evidence that SP is driven by two main factors: the amount of harm (assessed primarily in the salience network) and the norm violator's intention (assessed primarily in the default-mode and central-executive networks). We posit that motivational differences between 2PP and 3PP, articulated in mesocorticolimbic pathways, impact final SP by differentially impacting the assessments of harm and intention done in these domain-general large-scale networks. This new model will lead to a better understanding of SP, which might even improve forensic, procedural, and substantive legal practices.

Punishment as a scarce resource: a potential policy intervention for managing incarceration rates.

Scholars have proposed that incarceration rates might be reduced by a requirement that judges justify incarceration decisions with respect to their operational costs (e.g., prison capacity). In an Internet-based vignette experiment (N = 214), we tested this prediction by examining whether criminal punishment judgments (prison vs. probation) among university undergraduates would be influenced by a prompt to provide a justification for one's judgment, and by a brief message describing prison capacity costs. We found that (1) the justification prompt alone was sufficient to reduce incarceration rates, (2) the prison capacity message also independently reduced incarceration rates, and (3) incarceration rates were most strongly reduced (by about 25%) when decision makers were asked to justify their sentences with respect to the expected capacity costs. These effects survived a test of robustness and occurred regardless of whether participants reported that prison costs should influence judgments of incarceration. At the individual crime level, the least serious crimes were most amenable to reconsideration for probation. These findings are important for policymakers attempting to manage high incarceration rates.

Individual differences in harm-related moral values are associated with functional integration of large-scale brain networks of emotional regulation.

Emotions affects moral judgements, and controlled cognitive processes regulate those emotional responses during moral decision making. However, the neurobiological basis of this interaction is unclear. We used a graph theory measurement called participation coefficient ('PC') to quantify the resting-state functional connectivity within and between four meta-analytic groupings (MAGs) associated with emotion generation and regulation, to test whether that measurement predicts individual differences in moral foundations-based values. We found that the PC of one of the MAGs (MAG2) was positively correlated with one of the five recognized moral foundations-the one based on harm avoidance. We also found that increased inter-module connectivity between the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and middle temporal gyrus with other nodes in the four MAGs was likewise associated with higher endorsement of the Harm foundation. These results suggest that individuals' sensitivity to harm is associated with functional integration of large-scale brain networks of emotional regulation. These findings add to our knowledge of how individual variations in our moral values could be reflected by intrinsic brain network organization and deepen our understanding of the relationship between emotion and cognition during evaluations of moral values.

Nudges for Judges: An Experiment on the Effect of Making Sentencing Costs Explicit.

Judges are typically tasked to consider sentencing benefits but not costs. Previous research finds that both laypeople and prosecutors discount the costs of incarceration when forming sentencing attitudes, raising important questions about whether professional judges show the same bias during sentencing. To test this, we used a vignette-based experiment in which Minnesota state judges (N = 87) reviewed a case summary about an aggravated robbery and imposed a hypothetical sentence. Using random assignment, half the participants received additional information about plausible negative consequences of incarceration. As predicted, our results revealed a mitigating effect of cost exposure on prison sentence term lengths. Critically, these findings support the conclusion that policies that increase transparency in sentencing costs could reduce sentence lengths, which has important economic and social ramifications.

An fMRI investigation of the intention-outcome interactions in second- and third-party punishment.

Second-party punishment (SPP) and third-party punishment (TPP) are two basic forms of costly punishment that play an essential role in maintaining social orders. Despite scientific breakthroughs in understanding that costly punishment is driven by an integration of the wrongdoers' intention and the outcome of their actions, so far, few studies have compared the neurocognitive processes associated with the intention-outcome integration between SPP and TPP. Here, we combined economic exchange games measuring SPP and TPP with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to compare the neuropsychological architectures underlying the intention-outcome integration during one-shot interactions with anonymous partners across four types of norm violations (no norm, accidental, attempted, and intentional violations). Our behavioral findings showed that third-parties punished only attempted norm violations less frequently than second-parties. Our neuroimaging findings revealed higher activities in the right temporoparietal junction (TPJ) and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC) for attempted norm violations during TPP relative to SPP; more activities in these regions with less punishment frequency; and enhancement of functional connectivity of the right TPJ with the right dlPFC and dorsomedial PFC. Our findings demonstrated specific psychological and neural mechanisms of intention-outcome interactions between SPP and TPP -helping to unravel the complex neurocognitive processes of costly punishment.

Effective connectivity of brain regions underlying third-party punishment: Functional MRI and Granger causality evidence.

Third-party punishment (TPP) for norm violations is an essential deterrent in large-scale human societies, and builds on two essential cognitive functions: evaluating legal responsibility and determining appropriate punishment. Despite converging evidence that TPP is mediated by a specific set of brain regions, little is known about their effective connectivity (direction and strength of connections). Applying parametric event-related functional MRI in conjunction with multivariate Granger causality analysis, we asked healthy participants to estimate how much punishment a hypothetical perpetrator deserves for intentionally committing criminal offenses varying in levels of harm. Our results confirmed that TPP legal decisions are based on two domain-general networks: the mentalizing network for evaluating legal responsibility and the central-executive network for determining appropriate punishment. Further, temporal pole (TP) and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (PFC) emerged as hubs of the mentalizing network, uniquely generating converging output connections to ventromedial PFC, temporo-parietal junction, and posterior cingulate. In particular, dorsomedial PFC received inputs only from TP and both its activation and its connectivity to dorsolateral PFC correlated with degree of punishment. This supports the hypothesis that dorsomedial PFC acts as the driver of the TPP activation pattern, leading to the decision on the appropriate punishment. In conclusion, these results advance our understanding of the organizational elements of the TPP brain networks and provide better insights into the mental states of judges and jurors tasked with blaming and punishing legal wrongs.

Neuroscience cannot answer these questions: a response to G. and R. Murrow's essay hypothesizing a link between dehumanization, human rights abuses and public policy.

The Murrows' paper, 'A hypothetical link between dehumanization and human rights abuses', in which they propose that neuroscience may answer some difficult public policy questions, including questions about the First Amendment, is an unfortunate foray into law and public policy unjustified by the current state of neuroscience. Neuroscientific insights may one day have important implications for the law, and for some of the folk psychological assumptions embedded in the law, but they will never change the words of the written Constitution, or answer difficult policy questions in the interstices of those words. Suggesting that neuroscience can today inform these questions does a disservice to science, law and the complexity of the human condition.

The Emerging Neuroscience of Third-Party Punishment.

Although it is far too early to say that cognitive neuroscience will have any direct impact on how we sentence criminals, patterns are nevertheless emerging that suggest a neural framework for punishment that could one day have important legal and social consequences.

An fMRI investigation of the effects of belief in free will on third-party punishment.

The relationship between belief in free will (BFW) and third-party punishment (TPP) of criminal norm violations has been the subject of great debate among philosophers, criminologists and neuroscientists. We combined a TPP task with functional magnetic resonance imaging to investigate how lay people's BFW might affect their punishment of hypothetical criminal offenses varying in affective content. Our results revealed that people with strong BFW punished more harshly than people with weak BFW, but only in low affective cases, likely driven by a more robust commitment to moral responsibility. This effect was mirrored by a stronger activation in the right temporo-parietal junction, a region presumably involved in attentional selection to salient stimuli and attribution of temporary intentions and beliefs of others. But, for high affective cases, the BFW-based behavioral and neural differences disappeared. Both groups similarly punished high affective cases and showed higher activation in the right insula. The right insula is typically activated during aversive interoceptive-emotional processing for extreme norm violations. Our results demonstrated that the impact of BFW on TPP is context-dependent; perhaps explaining in part why the philosophical debate between free will and determinism is so stubbornly persistent.

THE CRIMINAL PSYCHOPATH: HISTORY, NEUROSCIENCE, TREATMENT, AND ECONOMICS.

The manuscript surveys the history of psychopathic personality, from its origins in psychiatric folklore to its modern assessment in the forensic arena. Individuals with psychopathic personality, or psychopaths, have a disproportionate impact on the criminal justice system. Psychopaths are twenty to twenty-five times more likely than non-psychopaths to be in prison, four to eight times more likely to violently recidivate compared to non-psychopaths, and are resistant to most forms of treatment. This article presents the most current clinical efforts and neuroscience research in the field of psychopathy. Given psychopathy's enormous impact on society in general and on the criminal justice system in particular, there are significant benefits to increasing awareness of the condition. This review also highlights a recent, compelling and cost-effective treatment program that has shown a significant reduction in violent recidivism in youth on a putative trajectory to psychopathic personality.

The neuroeconomic path of the law.

Advances in evolutionary biology, experimental economics and neuroscience are shedding new light on age-old questions about right and wrong, justice, freedom, the rule of law and the relationship between the individual and the state. Evidence is beginning to accumulate suggesting that humans evolved certain fundamental behavioural predispositions grounded in our intense social natures, that those predispositions are encoded in our brains as a distribution of probable behaviours, and therefore that there may be a core of universal human law.