Caching at a distance: a cache protection strategy in Eurasian jays.

A fundamental question about the complexity of corvid social cognition is whether behaviours exhibited when caching in front of potential pilferers represent specific attempts to prevent cache loss (cache protection hypothesis) or whether they are by-products of other behaviours (by-product hypothesis). Here, we demonstrate that Eurasian jays preferentially cache at a distance when observed by conspecifics. This preference for a 'far' location could be either a by-product of a general preference for caching at that specific location regardless of the risk of cache loss or a by-product of a general preference to be far away from conspecifics due to low intra-species tolerance. Critically, we found that neither by-product account explains the jays' behaviour: the preference for the 'far' location was not shown when caching in private or when eating in front of a conspecific. In line with the cache protection hypothesis we found that jays preferred the distant location only when caching in front of a conspecific. Thus, it seems likely that for Eurasian jays, caching at a distance from an observer is a specific cache protection strategy.

Eurasian jays (Garrulus glandarius) conceal caches from onlookers.

Animals that cache food risk having their stored food pilfered by conspecifics. Previous research has shown that a number of food-caching species of corvid use strategies that decrease the probability of conspecifics pilfering their caches. In this experiment, we investigated whether Eurasian jays (Garrulus glandarius) would choose between caching behind an opaque and caching behind a transparent barrier whilst being observed by a conspecific. If caching in out-of-sight locations is a strategy to prevent conspecifics from pilfering these caches, then the jays should place a greater proportion of caches behind the opaque barrier when being observed than when caching in private. In accordance with this prediction, jays cached a greater proportion of food behind the opaque barrier when they were observed than when they cached in private. These results suggest that Eurasian jays may opt to cache in out-of-view locations to reduce the likelihood of conspecifics pilfering their caches.

Can male Eurasian jays disengage from their own current desire to feed the female what she wants?

Humans' predictions of another person's behaviour are regularly influenced by what they themselves might know or want. In a previous study, we found that male Eurasian jays (Garrulus glandarius) could cater for their female partner's current desire when sharing food with her. Here, we tested the extent to which the males' decisions are influenced by their own current desire. When the males' and female's desires matched, males correctly shared the food that was desired by both. When the female's desire differed from their own, the males' decisions were not entirely driven by their own desires, suggesting that males also took the female's desire into account. Thus, the male jays' decisions about their mates' desires are partially biased by their own desire and might be based upon similar processes as those found in humans.

Reporting and interpreting non-significant results in animal cognition research.

How statistically non-significant results are reported and interpreted following null hypothesis significance testing is often criticized. This issue is important for animal cognition research because studies in the field are often underpowered to detect theoretically meaningful effect sizes, i.e., often produce non-significant p-values even when the null hypothesis is incorrect. Thus, we manually extracted and classified how researchers report and interpret non-significant p-values and examined the p-value distribution of these non-significant results across published articles in animal cognition and related fields. We found a large amount of heterogeneity in how researchers report statistically non-significant p-values in the result sections of articles, and how they interpret them in the titles and abstracts. Reporting of the non-significant results as "No Effect" was common in the titles (84%), abstracts (64%), and results sections (41%) of papers, whereas reporting of the results as "Non-Significant" was less common in the titles (0%) and abstracts (26%), but was present in the results (52%). Discussions of effect sizes were rare (<5% of articles). A p-value distribution analysis was consistent with research being performed with low power of statistical tests to detect effect sizes of interest. These findings suggest that researchers in animal cognition should pay close attention to the evidence used to support claims of absence of effects in the literature, and-in their own work-report statistically non-significant results clearly and formally correct, as well as use more formal methods of assessing evidence against theoretical predictions.

Where was I? Taking alternative visual perspectives can make us (briefly) misplace our own.

How do we imagine what the world looks like from another visual perspective? The two most common proposals-embodiment and array rotation-imply that we must briefly imagine either movement of the self (embodiment) or movement of the scene (array rotation). What is not clear is what this process might mean for our real, egocentric perspective of the world. We present a novel task in which participants had to locate a target from an alternative perspective but make a manual response consistent with their own. We found that when errors occurred they were usually manual responses that would have been correct from the computed alternative perspective. This was the case both when participants were instructed to find the target from another perspective and when they were asked to imagine the scene itself rotated. We interpret this as direct evidence that perspective-taking leads to the brief adoption of a computed perspective-a new imagined relationship between ourselves and the scene-to the detriment of our own, egocentric point of view.

Is Language Required to Represent Others' Mental States? Evidence From Beliefs and Other Representations.

An important part of our Theory of Mind-the ability to reason about other people's unobservable mental states-is the ability to attribute false beliefs to others. We investigated whether processing these false beliefs, as well as similar but nonmental representations, is reliant on language. Participants watched videos in which a protagonist hides a gift and either takes a photo of it or writes a text about its location before a second person inadvertently moves the present to a different location, thereby rendering the belief and either the photo or text false. At the same time, participants performed either a concurrent verbal interference task (rehearsing strings of digits) or a visual interference task (remembering a visual pattern). Results showed that performance on false belief trials did not decline under verbal interference relative to visual interference. We interpret these findings as further support for the view that language does not form an essential part of the process of reasoning online ("in the moment") about false beliefs.

Difficulties when using video playback to investigate social cognition in California scrub-jays (Aphelocoma californica).

Previous research has suggested that videos can be used to experimentally manipulate social stimuli. In the present study, we used the California scrub-jays' cache protection strategies to assess whether video playback can be used to simulate conspecifics in a social context. In both the lab and the field, scrub-jays are known to exhibit a range of behaviours to protect their caches from potential pilferage by a conspecific, for example by hiding food in locations out of the observer's view or by re-caching previously made caches once the observer has left. Here, we presented scrub-jays with videos of a conspecific observer as well as two non-social conditions during a caching period and assessed whether they would cache out of the observer's "view" (Experiment 1) or would re-cache their caches once the observer was no longer present (Experiment 2). In contrast to previous studies using live observers, the scrub-jays' caching and re-caching behaviour was not influenced by whether the observer was present or absent. These findings suggest that there might be limitations in using video playback of social agents to mimic real-life situations when investigating corvid decision making.

Egocentric bias across mental and non-mental representations in the Sandbox Task.

In the Sandbox Task, participants indicate where a protagonist who has a false belief about the location of an object will look for that object in a trough filled with a substrate that conceals the hidden object's location. Previous findings that participants tend to indicate a location closer to where they themselves know the object to be located have been interpreted as evidence of egocentric bias when attributing mental states to others. We tested the assumption that such biases occur as a result of reasoning about mental states specifically. We found that participants showed more egocentric bias when reasoning from a protagonist's false belief than from their own memory, but found equivalent levels of bias when they were asked to indicate where a false film would depict the object as when they were asked about a protagonist's false belief. Our findings suggest that that egocentric biases found in adult false belief tasks are more likely due to a general difficulty with reasoning about false representations than a specialised difficulty with reasoning about false mental states.

The unreliability of egocentric bias across self-other and memory-belief distinctions in the Sandbox Task.

Humans are often considered egocentric creatures, particularly (and ironically) when we are supposed to take another person's perspective over our own (i.e. when we use our theory of mind). We investigated the underlying causes of this phenomenon. We gave young adult participants a false belief task (Sandbox Task) in which objects were first hidden at one location by a protagonist and then moved to a second location within the same space but in the protagonist's absence. Participants were asked to indicate either where the protagonist remembered the item to be (reasoning about another's memory), believed it to be (reasoning about another's false belief), or where the protagonist would look for it (action prediction of another based on false belief). The distance away from Location A (the original one) towards Location B (the new location) was our measure of egocentric bias. We found no evidence that egocentric bias varied according to reasoning type, and no evidence that participants actually were more biased when reasoning about another person than when simply recalling the first location from memory. We conclude that the Sandbox Task paradigm may not be sensitive enough to draw out consistent effects related to mental state reasoning in young adults.

Error rate on the director's task is influenced by the need to take another's perspective but not the type of perspective.

Adults are prone to responding erroneously to another's instructions based on what they themselves see and not what the other person sees. Previous studies have indicated that in instruction-following tasks participants make more errors when required to infer another's perspective than when following a rule. These inference-induced errors may occur because the inference process itself is error-prone or because they are a side effect of the inference process. Crucially, if the inference process is error-prone, then higher error rates should be found when the perspective to be inferred is more complex. Here, we found that participants were no more error-prone when they had to judge how an item appeared (Level 2 perspective-taking) than when they had to judge whether an item could or could not be seen (Level 1 perspective-taking). However, participants were more error-prone in the perspective-taking variants of the task than in a version that only required them to follow a rule. These results suggest that having to represent another's perspective induces errors when following their instructions but that error rates are not directly linked to errors in inferring another's perspective.

Current desires of conspecific observers affect cache-protection strategies in California scrub-jays and Eurasian jays.

Many corvid species accurately remember the locations where they have seen others cache food, allowing them to pilfer these caches efficiently once the cachers have left the scene [1]. To protect their caches, corvids employ a suite of different cache-protection strategies that limit the observers' visual or acoustic access to the cache site [2,3]. In cases where an observer's sensory access cannot be reduced it has been suggested that cachers might be able to minimise the risk of pilfering if they avoid caching food the observer is most motivated to pilfer [4]. In the wild, corvids have been reported to pilfer others' caches as soon as possible after the caching event [5], such that the cacher might benefit from adjusting its caching behaviour according to the observer's current desire. In the current study, observers pilfered according to their current desire: they preferentially pilfered food that they were not sated on. Cachers adjusted their caching behaviour accordingly: they protected their caches by selectively caching food that observers were not motivated to pilfer. The same cache-protection behaviour was found when cachers could not see on which food the observers were sated. Thus, the cachers' ability to respond to the observer's desire might have been driven by the observer's behaviour at the time of caching.

Desire-state attribution: Benefits of a novel paradigm using the food-sharing behavior of Eurasian jays (Garrulus glandarius).

In recent years, we have investigated the possibility that Eurasian jay food sharing might rely on desire-state attribution. The female's desire for a particular type of food can be decreased by sating her on it (specific satiety) and the food sharing paradigm can be used to test whether the male's sharing pattern reflects the female's current desire. Our previous findings show that the male shares the food that the female currently wants. Here, we consider 3 simpler mechanisms that might explain the male's behavior: behavior reading, lack of self-other differentiation and behavioral rules. We illustrate how we have already addressed these issues and how our food sharing paradigm can be further adapted to answer outstanding questions. The flexibility with which the food sharing paradigm can be applied to rule out alternative mechanisms makes it a useful tool to study desire-state attribution in jays and other species that share food.

Experimenter expectancy bias does not explain Eurasian jays' (Garrulus glandarius) performance in a desire-state attribution task.

Male Eurasian jays have been found to adjust the type of food they share with their female partner after seeing her eat 1 type of food to satiety. One interpretation of this behavior is that the male encoded the female's decreased desire for the food she was sated on, and adjusted his behavior accordingly. However, in these studies, the male's actions were scored by experimenters who knew on which food the female was sated. Thus, it is possible that the experimenters' expectations (subconsciously) affected their behavior during tests that, in turn, inadvertently could have influenced the males' actions. Here, we repeated the original test with an experimenter who was blind to the food on which the female was sated. This procedure yielded the same results as the original studies: The male shared food with the female that was in line with her current desire. Thus, our results rule out the possibility that the Eurasian jay males' actions in the food sharing task could be explained by the effects of an experimenter expectancy bias. (PsycINFO Database Record