Visual event boundaries restrict anchoring effects in decision-making.

Research on higher-level thought has revealed many principles of reasoning and decision-making but has rarely made contact with how we perceive the world in the first place. Here we show how a lower-level property of perception-the spontaneous and task-irrelevant segmentation of continuous visual stimulation into discrete events-can restrict one of the most notorious biases in decision-making: numerical anchoring. Subjects walked down a long room in an immersive three dimensional (3D) animation and then made a numerical judgment (e.g., of how much a suitcase is worth, or of how many hours of community service a minor crime deserved). Critically, some subjects passed through a doorway (a visual event boundary) during their virtual walk, while others did not-equating time, distance traveled, and visual complexity. The anchoring manipulation was especially innocuous, not appearing to be part of the experiment at all. Before the online trial began, subjects reported the two-digit numerical value from a visually distorted "CAPTCHA" ("to verify that you are human")-where this task-irrelevant anchor was either low (e.g., 29) or high (e.g., 92). With no doorway, we observed reliable anchoring effects: Higher CAPTCHA values produced higher estimates. With the doorway, however, such effects were attenuated or even eliminated. This generalized across tasks involving item valuations, factual questions, and legal judgments and in tests of both incidental and explicit anchoring. This demonstrates how spontaneous visual event segmentation can have profound consequences for higher-level thought.

How to Create Objects With Your Mind: From Object-Based Attention to Attention-Based Objects.

When staring at a blank grid, one can readily "see" simple shapes-a peculiar experience that does not occur when viewing an empty background. But just what does this "seeing" entail? Previous work has explored many cues to object-based attention (e.g., involving continuity and closure), but here we asked whether attention can be object based even when there are no cues to objecthood. Observers viewed simple grids and attended to particular squares until they could effectively "see" shapes such as a capital H or I. During this scaffolded attention, two probes appeared, and observers reported whether they were the same or different. Remarkably, this produced a traditional same-object advantage: In several experiments (including high-powered direct replications), performance was enhanced for probes presented on the same (purely imagined) object, compared with equidistant probes presented on different objects. We conclude that attention not only operates over objects but also can effectively create object representations.

People's thinking plans adapt to the problem they're trying to solve.

Much of our thinking focuses on deciding what to do in situations where the space of possible options is too large to evaluate exhaustively. Previous work has found that people do this by learning the general value of different behaviors, and prioritizing thinking about high-value options in new situations. Is this good-action bias always the best strategy, or can thinking about low-value options sometimes become more beneficial? Can people adapt their thinking accordingly based on the situation? And how do we know what to think about in novel events? Here, we developed a block-puzzle paradigm that enabled us to measure people's thinking plans and compare them to a computational model of rational thought. We used two distinct response methods to explore what people think about-a self-report method, in which we asked people explicitly to report what they thought about, and an implicit response time method, in which we used people's decision-making times to reveal what they thought about. Our results suggest that people can quickly estimate the apparent value of different options and use this to decide what to think about. Critically, we find that people can flexibly prioritize whether to think about high-value options (Experiments 1 and 2) or low-value options (Experiments 3, 4, and 5), depending on the problem. Through computational modeling, we show that these thinking strategies are broadly rational, enabling people to maximize the value of long-term decisions. Our results suggest that thinking plans are flexible: What we think about depends on the structure of the problems we are trying to solve.

What's next?: Time is subjectively dilated not only for 'oddball' events, but also for events immediately after oddballs.

Our experience of time is strikingly plastic: Depending on contextual factors, the same objective duration can seem to fly by or drag on. Perhaps the most direct demonstration of such subjective time dilation is the oddball effect: when seeing identical objects appear one after another, followed by an "oddball" (e.g., a disc that suddenly grows in size, in a sequence of otherwise static discs), observers experience this oddball as having lasted longer than its nonoddball counterparts. Despite extensive work on this phenomenon, a surprisingly foundational question remains unasked: What actually gets dilated? Beyond the oddball, are the objects just before (or just after) the oddball also dilated? As in previous studies, observers viewed sequences of colored discs, one of which could be the oddball-and subsequently reproduced the oddball's duration. Unlike previous studies, however, there were also critical trials in which observers instead reproduced the duration of the disc immediately before or after the oddball. A clear pattern emerged: oddball-induced time dilation extended to the post-oddball disc, but not the pre-oddball disc. Whence this temporal asymmetry? We suggest that an oddball's sudden appearance may induce uncertainty about what will happen next, heightening attention until after the uncertainty is resolved.

Here it comes: Active forgetting triggered even just by anticipation of an impending event boundary.

Visual input arrives in a continuous stream, but we often experience the world as a sequence of discrete events - and the boundaries between events have important consequences for our mental lives. Perhaps the best example of this is that memory not only declines as a function of elapsed time, but is also impaired when crossing an event boundary - as when walking through a doorway. (This impairment may be adaptive, as when one "flushes" a cache in a computer program when completing a function.) But when exactly does this impairment occur? Existing work has not asked this question: based on a reasonable assumption that forgetting occurs when we cross event boundaries, memory has only been tested after this point. Here we demonstrate that even visual cues to an impending event boundary (that one has not yet crossed) suffice to trigger forgetting. Subjects viewed an immersive animation that simulated walking through a room. Before their walk, they saw a list of pseudo-words, and immediately after their walk, their recognition memory was tested. During their walk, some subjects passed through a doorway, while others did not (equating time and distance traveled). Memory was impaired (relative to the "no doorway" condition) not only when they passed through the doorway, but also when they were tested just before they would have crossed the doorway. Additional controls confirmed that this was due to the anticipation of event boundaries (rather than differential surprise or visual complexity). Visual processing may proactively "flush" memory to some degree in preparation for future events.

Excessive teleological thinking is driven by aberrant associations and not by failure of reasoning.

Teleological thought - the tendency to ascribe purpose to objects and events - is useful in some cases (encouraging explanation-seeking), but harmful in others (fueling delusions and conspiracy theories). What drives excessive and maladaptive teleological thinking? In causal learning, there is a fundamental distinction between associative learning versus learning via propositional mechanisms. Here, we propose that directly contrasting the contributions of these two pathways can elucidate the roots of excess teleology. We modified a causal learning task such that we could encourage associative versus propositional mechanisms in different instances. Across three experiments (total N = 600), teleological tendencies were correlated with delusion-like ideas and uniquely explained by aberrant associative learning, but not by learning via propositional rules. Computational modeling suggested that the relationship between associative learning and teleological thinking can be explained by excessive prediction errors that imbue random events with more significance - providing a new understanding for how humans make meaning of lived events.

Memorable beginnings, but forgettable endings: Intrinsic memorability alters our subjective experience of time.

Time is the fabric of experience - yet it is incredibly malleable in the mind of the observer: seeming to drag on, or fly right by at different moments. One of the most influential drivers of temporal distortions is attention, where heightened attention dilates subjective time. But an equally important feature of subjective experience involves not just the objects of attention, but also what information will naturally be remembered or forgotten, independent of attention (i.e. intrinsic image memorability). Here we test how memorability influences time perception. Observers viewed scenes in an oddball paradigm, where the last scene could be a forgettable "oddball" amidst memorable ones, or vice versa. Subjective time dilation occurred only for forgettable oddballs, but not memorable ones - demonstrating an oddball effect where the oddball did not differ in low-level visual features, image category, or even subjective memorability. But more importantly, these results emphasize how memory can interact with temporal experience: forgettable endings amidst memorable sequences dilate our experience of time.

What moves us? The intrinsic memorability of dance.

Our most moving experiences, the ones that "stick," are hardly ever static but are dynamic, like a conversation, a gesture, or a dance. Previous work has shown robust memory for simple actions (e.g., jumping or turning), but it remains an open question how we remember more dynamic sequences of complex and expressive actions. Separately, with static images, previous work has found remarkable consistency in which images are remembered or forgotten across people-that is, an intrinsic "memorability"-but it is unclear whether semantically ambiguous and expressive actions might similarly be consistently remembered, despite the varying interpretations of what they could mean. How do we go from static memories to more memorable dynamic experiences? Using the test case of a rich and abstract series of actions from dance, we discover memorability as an intrinsic attribute of movement. Across genres, some movements were consistently remembered, regardless of the perceiver, and even regardless of the dancer. Among a comprehensive set of memory, movement, and aesthetic attributes, consistency in which movements people remembered was most predicted by subjective memorability, and importantly by both subjective (observer ratings) and objective (optical flow analysis) measures of the scale of motion, such that the less overall motion in a dance segment, the more memorable the movements tended to be. Importantly, we discover that memorability of a sequence is additive, where the memorability of individual snapshots and constituent moments ultimately contribute to the memorability of longer sequences. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Event segmentation structures temporal experience: Simultaneous dilation and contraction in rhythmic reproductions.

We experience the world in terms of both (continuous) time and (discrete) events, but time seems especially primitive-since we cannot perceive events without an underlying temporal medium. It is all the more intriguing, then, to discover that event segmentation can itself influence how we perceive the passage of time. We demonstrated this using a novel "rhythmic reproduction" task, in which people listened to irregular sequences of musical tones, and then immediately reproduced those rhythmic patterns from memory. Each sequence contained a single salient (and entirely task-irrelevant) perceptual event boundary, but the temporal placement of that boundary varied across multiple trials in which people reproduced the same underlying rhythmic pattern. Reproductions were systematically influenced by event boundaries in two complementary ways: tones immediately following event boundaries were delayed (being effectively played "too late" in the reproductions), while tones immediately preceding event boundaries were sped up (being effectively played "too early"). This demonstrates how event segmentation influences time perception in subtle and nonuniform ways that go beyond global temporal distortions-with dilation across events, but contraction within events. Events structure temporal experience, facilitating a give-and-take between the subjective expansion and contraction of time. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Scaffolded attention in time: 'Everyday hallucinations' of rhythmic patterns from regular auditory beats.

A regular grid (e.g. on a piece of graph paper) is made up of squares which (by definition) have no structure. When people stare at such a grid, however, they may nevertheless see a shifting array of structured patterns such as lines, crosses, or even block-letters - something that doesn't occur when staring at a blank page. This is the phenomenon of scaffolded attention, and recent work has demonstrated that this involves the creation of bona fide object representations (e.g. that enjoy 'same-object advantages'). Is this an intrinsically visuospatial phenomenon, or might it rather reflect a much more general effect of perceiving structure from regular scaffolds, which could also occur in other dimensions or modalities? Here we show for the first time that there is also robust scaffolded attention in time: a regular series of tones (as might come from a metronome) has no structure beyond the 'beats' themselves, but people nevertheless hear a shifting array of structured rhythms - a phenomenon that doesn't occur when listening to silence. We demonstrate (in tests of temporal 'same-event advantages') that this (entirely internal) process gives rise to bona fide event representations. Thus the relationship between attention and events is bidirectional: event structure can guide attention, but attention can also create event structure in the first place. In this way we show how 'everyday hallucinations' of rhythmic patterns can arise in the absence of explicit sensory structure.

Hallucinating visual structure: Individual differences in 'scaffolded attention'.

Our percepts usually derive their structure from particular cues in the incoming sensory information, but this is not so in the phenomenon of scaffolded attention - where shifting patterns of attention give rise to 'everyday hallucinations' of visual structure even in the absence of sensory cues. When looking at a piece of graph paper, for example, the squares are all identical - yet many people see a shifting array of structured patterns such as lines, crosses, or even block-letters - something that doesn't occur when staring at a blank page. We have informally noted that scaffolded attention is a widely but not universally shared phenomenon - with some people spontaneously experiencing such percepts (even without instruction), others seeing such 'phantom' structures only when actively trying to so, and still others never having such experiences at all. Accordingly, the present study assessed the prevalence of scaffolded attention - both as an ability, and a spontaneous phenomenon. These results were then correlated with several measures of imagery and attention, in an attempt to explain the nature and origin of such individual differences. 40% of observers experienced scaffolded attention spontaneously, and 78% did so when trying - and these differences were uniquely modulated by certain measures of attention (such as attentional breadth, as measured by the 'functional field of view'), but not by measures of the vividness or spontaneity of mental imagery. These results inspire an explanation for scaffolded attention based on spontaneous perceptual grouping.

Enumeration in time is irresistibly event-based.

One of the most fundamental questions that can be asked about any process concerns the underlying units over which it operates. And this is true not just for artificial processes (such as functions in a computer program that only take specific kinds of arguments) but for mental processes. Over what units does the process of enumeration operate? Recent work has demonstrated that in visuospatial arrays, these units are often irresistibly discrete objects. When enumerating the number of discs in a display, for example, observers underestimate to a greater degree when the discs are spatially segmented (e.g., by connecting pairs of discs with lines): you try to enumerate discs, but your mind can't help enumerating dumbbells. This phenomenon has previously been limited to static displays, but of course our experience of the world is inherently dynamic. Is enumeration in time similarly based on discrete events? To find out, we had observers enumerate the number of notes in quick musical sequences. Observers underestimated to a greater degree when the notes were temporally segmented (into discrete musical phrases, based on pitch-range shifts), even while carefully controlling for both duration and the overall range and heterogeneity of pitches. Observers tried to enumerate notes, but their minds couldn't help enumerating musical phrases - since those are the events they experienced. These results thus demonstrate how discrete events are prominent in our mental lives, and how the units that constitute discrete events are not entirely under our conscious, intentional control.

Did that just happen? Event segmentation influences enumeration and working memory for simple overlapping visual events.

For working memory to be efficient, it is important not only to remember, but also to forget-thus freeing up memory for additional information. But what triggers forgetting? Beyond continuous temporal decay, memory is thought to be effectively 'flushed' to some degree at discrete event boundaries-i.e. when one event ends and another begins. But this framework does not readily apply to real-world visual experience, where events are constantly and asynchronously beginning, unfolding, and ending all around us. In this rush of things always happening, when might memory be flushed? In a series of experiments, we explored this using maximally simple visual events. A number of dots appeared, a subset moved at random speeds in random directions, and observers simply had to estimate the number of dots that moved. Critically, however, these motions could begin and end asynchronously. In general, asynchronous motions led to underestimation, but further experiments demonstrated that this was driven only by endings: regardless of whether dots started moving together or separately, animations with asynchronous endings led to underestimation-even while carefully controlling for both the overall amount of motion and average starting and ending times. (In contrast, no such effect occurred for asynchronous beginnings.) Thus, the ends of events seem to have an outsize influence on working memory-but only in the context of other ongoing events: once a motion ends amidst other unfinished motions, it seems more difficult to recall that particular motion as having occurred as a distinct event.