RESUMEN
Diagnosing sepsis at postmortem is challenging. With respect to meningococcal sepsis, the postmortem microbiological identification of Neisseria meningitidis is nearly always due to true infection, including in cases of decomposition. Previous case series and case reports were able to isolate N. meningitidis in vitreous humor in adult deaths from meningococcal sepsis when blood and/or cerebrospinal fluid was unavailable. It was suggested that vitreous humor polymerase chain reaction (PCR) may be useful in the diagnosis of meningococcal sepsis. We describe a fatal case of meningococcal sepsis in a 5-month-old infant where N. meningitidis was detected in vitreous humor, cerebrospinal fluid, and blood through PCR. The presented case report gives further evidence in the potential use of vitreous PCR analysis in suspected meningococcal sepsis, particularly in the pediatric population.
Asunto(s)
Infecciones Meningocócicas/diagnóstico , Neisseria meningitidis/aislamiento & purificación , Sepsis/microbiología , Cuerpo Vítreo/microbiología , Encéfalo/microbiología , Resultado Fatal , Humanos , Lactante , Masculino , Infecciones Meningocócicas/complicaciones , Reacción en Cadena de la Polimerasa , Bazo/microbiologíaRESUMEN
OBJECTIVES: To assess the risk of transmission of pandemic A/H1N1 2009 influenza (pandemic A/H1N1) from an infected high school group to other passengers on an airline flight and the effectiveness of screening and follow-up of exposed passengers. DESIGN: Retrospective cohort investigation using a questionnaire administered to passengers and laboratory investigation of those with symptoms. SETTING: Auckland, New Zealand, with national and international follow-up of passengers. PARTICIPANTS: Passengers seated in the rear section of a Boeing 747-400 long haul flight that arrived on 25 April 2009, including a group of 24 students and teachers and 97 (out of 102) other passengers in the same section of the plane who agreed to be interviewed. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Laboratory confirmed pandemic A/H1N1 infection in susceptible passengers within 3.2 days of arrival; sensitivity and specificity of influenza symptoms for confirmed infection; and completeness and timeliness of contact tracing. RESULTS: Nine members of the school group were laboratory confirmed cases of pandemic A/H1N1 infection and had symptoms during the flight. Two other passengers developed confirmed pandemic A/H1N1 infection, 12 and 48 hours after the flight. They reported no other potential sources of infection. Their seating was within two rows of infected passengers, implying a risk of infection of about 3.5% for the 57 passengers in those rows. All but one of the confirmed pandemic A/H1N1 infected travellers reported cough, but more complex definitions of influenza cases had relatively low sensitivity. Rigorous follow-up by public health workers located 93% of passengers, but only 52% were contacted within 72 hours of arrival. CONCLUSIONS: A low but measurable risk of transmission of pandemic A/H1N1 exists during modern commercial air travel. This risk is concentrated close to infected passengers with symptoms. Follow-up and screening of exposed passengers is slow and difficult once they have left the airport.