Resolving selfish and spiteful interdependent conflict.

Interdependence occurs when individuals have a stake in the success or failure of others, such that the outcomes experienced by one individual also generate costs or benefits for others. Discussion on this topic has typically focused on positive interdependence (where gains for one individual result in gains for another) and on the consequences for cooperation. However, interdependence can also be negative (where gains for one individual result in losses for another), which can spark conflict. In this article, we explain when negative interdependence is likely to arise and, crucially, the role played by (mis)perception in shaping an individual's understanding of their interdependent relationships. We argue that, owing to the difficulty in accurately perceiving interdependence with others, individuals might often be mistaken about the stake they hold in each other's outcomes, which can spark needless, resolvable forms of conflict. We then discuss when and how reducing misperceptions can help to resolve such conflicts. We argue that a key mechanism for resolving interdependent conflict, along with better sources of exogenous information, is to reduce reliance on heuristics such as stereotypes when assessing the nature of our interdependent relationships.

The rising entropy of English in the attention economy.

We present evidence that the word entropy of American English has been rising steadily since around 1900. We also find differences in word entropy between media categories, with short-form media such as news and magazines having higher entropy than long-form media, and social media feeds having higher entropy still. To explain these results we develop an ecological model of the attention economy that combines ideas from Zipf's law and information foraging. In this model, media consumers maximize information utility rate taking into account the costs of information search, while media producers adapt to technologies that reduce search costs, driving them to generate higher entropy content in increasingly shorter formats.

Correction to "When fairness is not enough: The disproportionate contributions of the poor in a collective action problem" by Malthouse et al. (2023).

Reports an error in "When fairness is not enough: The disproportionate contributions of the poor in a collective action problem" by Eugene Malthouse, Charlie Pilgrim, Daniel Sgroi and Thomas T. Hills (Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 2023[Nov], Vol 152[11], 3229-3242). The third and final research question in The Collective-Risk Social Dilemma section now appears as follows: 3. If what people perceive as fair is insufficient to solve the problem, under what conditions do groups still manage to succeed? All versions of this article have been corrected. (The following abstract of the original article appeared in record 2023-92402-001.) Many of our most pressing challenges, from combating climate change to dealing with pandemics, are collective action problems: situations in which individual and collective interests conflict with each other. In such situations, people face a dilemma about making individually costly but collectively beneficial contributions to the common good. Understanding which factors influence people's willingness to make these contributions is vital for the design of policies and institutions that support the attainment of collective goals. In this study, we investigate how inequalities, and different causes of inequalities, impact individual-level behavior and group-level outcomes. First, we find that what people judged to be fair was not enough to solve the collective action problem: if they acted according to what they thought was fair, they would collectively fail. Second, the level of wealth (rich vs. poor) altered what was judged to be a fair contribution to the public good more than the cause of wealth (merit vs. luck vs. uncertain). Contributions during the game reflected these fairness judgments, with poorer individuals consistently contributing a higher proportion of their wealth than richer participants, which further increased inequality-particularly in successful groups. Finally, the cause of one's wealth was largely irrelevant, mattering most only when it was uncertain, as opposed to resulting from merit or luck. We discuss implications for policymakers and international climate change negotiations. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Confirmation bias emerges from an approximation to Bayesian reasoning.

Confirmation bias is defined as searching for and assimilating information in a way that favours existing beliefs. We show that confirmation bias emerges as a natural consequence of boundedly rational belief updating by presenting the BIASR model (Bayesian updating with an Independence Approximation and Source Reliability). In this model, an individual's beliefs about a hypothesis and the source reliability form a Bayesian network. Upon receiving information, an individual simultaneously updates beliefs about the hypothesis in question and the reliability of the information source. If the individual updates rationally then this introduces numerous dependencies between beliefs, the tracking of which represents an unrealistic demand on memory. We propose that human cognition overcomes this memory limitation by assuming independence between beliefs, evidence for which is provided in prior research. We show how a Bayesian belief updating model incorporating this independence approximation generates many types of confirmation bias, including biased evaluation, biased assimilation, attitude polarisation, belief perseverance and confirmation bias in the selection of sources.

When fairness is not enough: The disproportionate contributions of the poor in a collective action problem.

Many of our most pressing challenges, from combating climate change to dealing with pandemics, are collective action problems: situations in which individual and collective interests conflict with each other. In such situations, people face a dilemma about making individually costly but collectively beneficial contributions to the common good. Understanding which factors influence people's willingness to make these contributions is vital for the design of policies and institutions that support the attainment of collective goals. In this study, we investigate how inequalities, and different causes of inequalities, impact individual-level behavior and group-level outcomes. First, we find that what people judged to be fair was not enough to solve the collective action problem: if they acted according to what they thought was fair, they would collectively fail. Second, the level of wealth (rich vs. poor) altered what was judged to be a fair contribution to the public good more than the cause of wealth (merit vs. luck vs. uncertain). Contributions during the game reflected these fairness judgments, with poorer individuals consistently contributing a higher proportion of their wealth than richer participants, which further increased inequality-particularly in successful groups. Finally, the cause of one's wealth was largely irrelevant, mattering most only when it was uncertain, as opposed to resulting from merit or luck. We discuss implications for policymakers and international climate change negotiations. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Bias in Zipf's law estimators.

The prevailing maximum likelihood estimators for inferring power law models from rank-frequency data are biased. The source of this bias is an inappropriate likelihood function. The correct likelihood function is derived and shown to be computationally intractable. A more computationally efficient method of approximate Bayesian computation (ABC) is explored. This method is shown to have less bias for data generated from idealised rank-frequency Zipfian distributions. However, the existing estimators and the ABC estimator described here assume that words are drawn from a simple probability distribution, while language is a much more complex process. We show that this false assumption leads to continued biases when applying any of these methods to natural language to estimate Zipf exponents. We recommend that researchers be aware of the bias when investigating power laws in rank-frequency data.

Organisational Social Influence on Directed Hierarchical Graphs, from Tyranny to Anarchy.

Coordinated human behaviour takes place within a diverse range of social organisational structures, which can be thought of as power structures with "managers" who influence "subordinates". A change in policy in one part of the organisation can cause cascades throughout the structure, which may or may not be desirable. As organisations change in size, complexity and structure, the system dynamics also change. Here, we consider majority rule dynamics on organisations modelled as hierarchical directed graphs, where the directed edges indicate influence. We utilise a topological measure called the trophic incoherence parameter, q, which effectively gauges the stratification of power structure in an organisation. We show that this measure bounds regimes of behaviour. There is fast consensus at low q (e.g. tyranny), slow consensus at mid q (e.g. democracy), and no consensus at high q (e.g. anarchy). These regimes are investigated analytically, numerically and empirically with diverse case studies in the Roman Army, US Government, and a healthcare organisation. Our work demonstrates the usefulness of the trophic incoherence parameter when considering models of social influence dynamics, with widespread consequences in the design and analysis of organisations.