RESUMEN
A well-developed theoretical literature - dating back at least to Nordhaus (1969) - has analyzed optimal patent policy design. We re-present the core trade-off of the Nordhaus model and highlight an empirical question which emerges from the Nordhaus framework as a key input into optimal patent policy design: namely, what is the elasticity of R&D investment with respect to the patent term? We then review the - surprisingly small - body of empirical evidence that has been developed on this question over the nearly half century since the publication of Nordhaus's book.
RESUMEN
We investigate whether private research investments are distorted away from long-term projects. Our theoretical model highlights two potential sources of this distortion: short-termism and the fixed patent term. Our empirical context is cancer research, where clinical trials--and hence, project durations--are shorter for late-stage cancer treatments relative to early-stage treatments or cancer prevention. Using newly constructed data, we document several sources of evidence that together show private research investments are distorted away from long-term projects. The value of life-years at stake appears large. We analyze three potential policy responses: surrogate (non-mortality) clinical-trial endpoints, targeted R&D subsidies, and patent design.
Asunto(s)
Ensayos Clínicos como Asunto/economía , Inversiones en Salud , Proyectos de Investigación , Factores de Tiempo , Antineoplásicos/uso terapéutico , Biomarcadores , Quimioprevención , Ensayos Clínicos como Asunto/métodos , Ensayos Clínicos como Asunto/estadística & datos numéricos , Financiación Gubernamental , Humanos , Inversiones en Salud/economía , Inversiones en Salud/estadística & datos numéricos , Modelos Teóricos , Neoplasias/tratamiento farmacológico , Neoplasias/economía , Neoplasias/prevención & control , Patentes como Asunto , Sector Privado , Tasa de Supervivencia , Estados Unidos , Valor de la VidaRESUMEN
We investigate whether private research investments are distorted away from long-term projects. Our theoretical model highlights two potential sources of this distortion: short-termism and the fixed patent term. Our empirical context is cancer research, where clinical trials - and hence, project durations - are shorter for late-stage cancer treatments relative to early-stage treatments or cancer prevention. Using newly constructed data, we document several sources of evidence that together show private research investments are distorted away from long-term projects. The value of life-years at stake appears large. We analyze three potential policy responses: surrogate (non-mortality) clinicaltrial endpoints, targeted R&D subsidies, and patent design.