Different learning aberrations relate to delusion-like beliefs with different contents.

The prediction error account of delusions has had success. However, its explanation of delusions with different contents has been lacking. Persecutory delusions and paranoia are the common unfounded beliefs that others have harmful intentions towards us. Other delusions include believing that one's thoughts or actions are under external control or that events in the world have specific personal meaning. We compare learning in two different cognitive tasks, probabilistic reversal learning and Kamin blocking, that have relationships to paranoid and non-paranoid delusion-like beliefs, respectively. We find that clinical high-risk status alone does not result in different behavioural results in the probabilistic reversal learning task but that an individual's level of paranoia is associated with excessive switching behaviour. During the Kamin blocking task, paranoid individuals learned inappropriately about the blocked cue. However, they also had decreased learning about the control cue, suggesting more general learning impairments. Non-paranoid delusion-like belief conviction (but not paranoia) was associated with aberrant learning about the blocked cue but intact learning about the control cue, suggesting specific impairments in learning related to cue combination. We fit task-specific computational models separately to behavioural data to explore how latent parameters vary within individuals between tasks and how they can explain symptom-specific effects. We find that paranoia is associated with low learning rates in the probabilistic reversal learning task and the blocking task. Non-paranoid delusion-like belief conviction is instead related to parameters controlling the degree and direction of similarity between cue updating during simultaneous cue presentation. These results suggest that paranoia and other delusion-like beliefs involve dissociable deficits in learning and belief updating, which, given the transdiagnostic status of paranoia, might have differential utility in predicting psychosis.

Paranoia, self-deception and overconfidence.

Self-deception, paranoia, and overconfidence involve misbeliefs about the self, others, and world. They are often considered mistaken. Here we explore whether they might be adaptive, and further, whether they might be explicable in Bayesian terms. We administered a difficult perceptual judgment task with and without social influence (suggestions from a cooperating or competing partner). Crucially, the social influence was uninformative. We found that participants heeded the suggestions most under the most uncertain conditions and that they did so with high confidence, particularly if they were more paranoid. Model fitting to participant behavior revealed that their prior beliefs changed depending on whether the partner was a collaborator or competitor, however, those beliefs did not differ as a function of paranoia. Instead, paranoia, self-deception, and overconfidence were associated with participants' perceived instability of their own performance. These data are consistent with the idea that self-deception, paranoia, and overconfidence flourish under uncertainty, and have their roots in low self-esteem, rather than excessive social concern. The model suggests that spurious beliefs can have value-self-deception is irrational yet can facilitate optimal behavior. This occurs even at the expense of monetary rewards, perhaps explaining why self-deception and paranoia contribute to costly decisions which can spark financial crashes and devastating wars.

Belief Updating, Childhood Maltreatment, and Paranoia in Schizophrenia-Spectrum Disorders.

BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS: Exposure to childhood maltreatment-a risk factor for psychosis is associated with paranoia-may impact one's beliefs about the world and how beliefs are updated. We hypothesized that increased exposure to childhood maltreatment is related to volatility-related belief updating, specifically higher expectations of volatility, and that these relationships are strongest for threat-related maltreatment. Additionally, we tested whether belief updating mediates the relationship between maltreatment and paranoia. STUDY DESIGN: Belief updating was measured in 75 patients with schizophrenia-spectrum disorders and 76 nonpsychiatric controls using a 3-option probabilistic reversal learning (3PRL) task. A Hierarchical Gaussian Filter (HGF) was used to estimate computational parameters of belief updating, including prior expectations of volatility (µ03). The Childhood Trauma Questionnaire (CTQ) was used to assess cumulative maltreatment, threat, and deprivation exposure. Paranoia was measured using the Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS) and the revised Green et al. Paranoid Thoughts Scale (R-GPTS). RESULTS: Greater exposure to childhood maltreatment is associated with higher prior expectations of volatility in the whole sample and in individuals with schizophrenia-spectrum disorders. This was specific to threat-related maltreatment, rather than deprivation, in schizophrenia-spectrum disorders. Paranoia was associated with both exposure to childhood maltreatment and volatility priors, but we did not observe a significant indirect effect of volatility priors on the relationship between maltreatment and paranoia. CONCLUSIONS: Our study suggests that individuals with schizophrenia-spectrum disorders who were exposed to threatening experiences during childhood expect their environment to be more volatile, potentially facilitating aberrant belief updating and conferring risk for paranoia.

Lesions to the mediodorsal thalamus, but not orbitofrontal cortex, enhance volatility beliefs linked to paranoia.

Beliefs-attitudes toward some state of the environment-guide action selection and should be robust to variability but sensitive to meaningful change. Beliefs about volatility (expectation of change) are associated with paranoia in humans, but the brain regions responsible for volatility beliefs remain unknown. The orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) is central to adaptive behavior, whereas the magnocellular mediodorsal thalamus (MDmc) is essential for arbitrating between perceptions and action policies. We assessed belief updating in a three-choice probabilistic reversal learning task following excitotoxic lesions of the MDmc (n = 3) or OFC (n = 3) and compared performance with that of unoperated monkeys (n = 14). Computational analyses indicated a double dissociation: MDmc, but not OFC, lesions were associated with erratic switching behavior and heightened volatility belief (as in paranoia in humans), whereas OFC, but not MDmc, lesions were associated with increased lose-stay behavior and reward learning rates. Given the consilience across species and models, these results have implications for understanding paranoia.

Ebola could be eradicated through voluntary vaccination.

Ebola virus disease (EVD) is a severe infection with an extremely high fatality rate spread through direct contact with body fluids. A promising Ebola vaccine (rVSV-ZEBOV) may soon become universally available. We constructed a game-theoretic model of Ebola incorporating individual decisions to vaccinate. We found that if a population adopts selfishly optimal vaccination strategies, then the population vaccination coverage falls negligibly short of the herd immunity level. We concluded that eradication of Ebola is feasible if voluntary vaccination programmes are coupled with focused public education efforts. We conducted uncertainty and sensitivity analysis to demonstrate that our findings do not depend on the choice of the epidemiological model parameters.