Motivation and competition in health care.

Non-pecuniary sources of motivation are a strong feature of the health care sector and the impact of competitive incentives on behavior may be lower where pecuniary motivation is low. This paper measures the marginal utility of income (MUY) of physicians from a stated-choice experiment, and examines whether this measure influences the association between competition faced by physicians and the prices they charge. We find that physicians are more likely to exploit a lack of competition with higher prices if they have a high MUY.

Should I stay or should I go? Hospital emergency department waiting times and demand.

In the absence of the price mechanism, hospital emergency departments rely on waiting times, alongside prioritisation mechanisms, to restrain demand and clear the market. This paper estimates by how much the number of treatments demanded is reduced by a higher waiting time. I use variation in waiting times for low-urgency patients caused by rare and resource-intensive high-urgency patients to estimate the relationship. I find that when waiting times are higher, more low-urgency patients are deterred from treatment and leave the hospital during the waiting period without being treated. The waiting time elasticity of demand for low-urgency patients is approximately -0.25 and is highest for the lowest-urgency patients.

A Theory of Waiting Time Reporting and Quality Signaling.

We develop a theoretical model to study a policy that publicly reports hospital waiting times. We characterize two effects of such a policy: the 'competition effect' that drives hospitals to compete for patients by increasing service rates and reducing waiting times and the 'signaling effect' that allows patients to distinguish a high-quality hospital from a low-quality one. While for a low-quality hospital both effects help reduce waiting time, for a high-quality hospital, they act in opposite directions. We show that the competition effect will outweigh the signaling effect for the high-quality hospital, and consequently, both hospitals' waiting times will be reduced by the introduction of the policy. This result holds in a policy environment where maximum waiting time targets are not binding. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Modelling Nonlinearities and Reference Dependence in General Practitioners' Income Preferences.

This paper tests for the existence of nonlinearity and reference dependence in income preferences for general practitioners. Confirming the theory of reference dependent utility within the context of a discrete choice experiment, we find that losses loom larger than gains in income for Norwegian general practitioners, i.e. they value losses from their current income level around three times higher than the equivalent gains. Our results are validated by comparison with equivalent contingent valuation values for marginal willingness to pay and marginal willingness to accept compensation for changes in job characteristics. Physicians' income preferences determine the effectiveness of 'pay for performance' and other incentive schemes. Our results may explain the relative ineffectiveness of financial incentive schemes that rely on increasing physicians' incomes. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

The effect of community diagnostic centres on volume and waiting time for diagnostic procedures in the UK.

Many health care systems are looking to implement policies to improve productivity and accessibility of health care. In this paper we use data from the English National Health Service to evaluate the effect of introducing new "Community Diagnostic Centres" in 2021 which aim to increase volume, reduce waiting times, and increase accessibility to diagnostic procedures. Our results show an increase in volume of diagnostic procedures associated with the introduction of CDCs at local NHS organisations. We find some evidence the increase is driven by an increase in MRI scans in particular, and this result is larger for CDCs located in more deprived local areas. We find no effect on waiting times which may indicate some demand response to increased availability of tests.

COVID-19, deaths at home and end-of-life cancer care.

During the COVID-19 pandemic there was a period of high excess deaths from cancer at home as opposed to in hospitals or in care homes. In this paper we aim to explore whether healthcare utilisation trajectories of cancer patients in the final months of life during the COVID-19 pandemic reveal any potential unmet healthcare need. We use English hospital records linked to data on all deaths in and out of hospital which identifies the cause and location of death. Our analysis shows that during the periods of peak COVID-19 caseload, patients dying of cancer experienced up to 42% less hospital treatment in their final month of life compared to historical controls. We find reductions in end-of-life hospital care for cancer patients dying in hospitals, care homes/hospices and at home, however the effect is amplified by the shift to more patients dying at home. Through the first year of the pandemic in England, we estimate the number of inpatient bed-days for end-of-life cancer patients in their final month reduced by approximately 282,282, or 25%. For outpatient appointments in the final month of life we find a reduction in face-to-face appointments and an increase in remote appointments which persists through the pandemic year and is not confined only to the periods of peak COVID-19 caseload. Our results suggest reductions in care provision during the COVID-19 pandemic may have led to unmet need, and future emergency reorganisations of health care systems must ensure consistent care provision for vulnerable groups such as cancer patients.

Mixed Methods EvAluation of the high-volume low-complexity Surgical hUb pRogrammE (MEASURE): a mixed methods study protocol.

INTRODUCTION: The waiting list for elective surgery in England recently reached over 7.8 million people and waiting time targets have been missed since 2010. The high-volume low complexity (HVLC) surgical hubs programme aims to tackle the backlog of patients awaiting elective surgery treatment in England. This study will evaluate the impact of HVLC surgical hubs on productivity, patient care and the workforce. METHODS AND ANALYSIS: This 4-year project consists of six interlinked work packages (WPs) and is informed by the Consolidated Framework for Implementation Research. WP1: Mapping current and future HVLC provision in England through document analysis, quantitative data sets (eg, Hospital Episodes Statistics) and interviews with national service leaders. WP2: Exploring the effects of HVLC hubs on key performance outcomes, primarily the volume of low-complexity patients treated, using quasi-experimental methods. WP3: Exploring the impact and implementation of HVLC hubs on patients, health professionals and the local NHS through approximately nine longitudinal, multimethod qualitative case studies. WP4: Assessing the productivity of HVLC surgical hubs using the Centre for Health Economics NHS productivity measure and Lord Carter's operational productivity measure. WP5: Conducting a mixed-methods appraisal will assess the influence of HVLC surgical hubs on the workforce using: qualitative data (WP3) and quantitative data (eg, National Health Service (NHS) England's workforce statistics and intelligence from WP2). WP6: Analysing the costs and consequences of HVLC surgical hubs will assess their achievements in relation to their resource use to establish value for money. A patient and public involvement group will contribute to the study design and materials. ETHICS AND DISSEMINATION: The study has been approved by the East Midlands-Nottingham Research Ethics Committee 23/EM/0231. Participants will provide informed consent for qualitative study components. Dissemination plans include multiple academic and non-academic outputs (eg, Peer-reviewed journals, conferences, social media) and a continuous, feedback-loop of findings to key stakeholders (eg, NHS England) to influence policy development. TRIAL REGISTRATION: Research registry: Researchregistry9364 (https://www.researchregistry.com/browse-the-registry%23home/registrationdetails/64cb6c795cbef8002a46f115/).

Differences in length of stay for hip replacement between public hospitals, specialised treatment centres and private providers: selection or efficiency?

We investigate differences in patients' length of stay between National Health Service (NHS) public hospitals, specialised public treatment centres and private treatment centres that provide elective (non-emergency) hip replacement to publicly funded patients. We find that the specialised public treatment centres and private treatment centres have, on average, respectively 18% and 40% shorter length of stay compared with NHS public hospitals, even after controlling for differences in age, gender, number and type of diagnoses, deprivation and regional variation. Therefore, we interpret such differences as because of efficiency as opposed to selection of less complex patients. Quantile regression suggests that the proportional differences between different provider types are larger at the higher conditional quantiles of length of stay.

The effect of waiting time and distance on hospital choice for English cataract patients.

This paper applies latent-class multinomial logit models to the choice of hospital for cataract operations in the UK NHS. We concentrate on the effects of travel time and waiting time and especially on estimating the waiting time elasticity of demand. Models including hospital fixed effects rely on changes over time in waiting time to indentify coefficients. We show how using a latent-class multinomial logit model characterises the unobserved heterogeneity in GP practices' choice behaviour and affects the estimated elasticities of travel time and waiting time. The models estimate waiting time elasticities of demand of approximately -0.1, comparable with previous waiting time-demand models. For the average waiting time elasticity, the simple multinomial logit models are good approximations of the latent-class logit results.

The effect of financial incentives on the quality of health care provided by primary care physicians.

BACKGROUND: The use of blended payment schemes in primary care, including the use of financial incentives to directly reward 'performance' and 'quality' is increasing in a number of countries. There are many examples in the US, and the Quality and Outcomes Framework (QoF) for general practitioners (GPs) in the UK is an example of a major system-wide reform. Despite the popularity of these schemes, there is currently little rigorous evidence of their success in improving the quality of primary health care, or of whether such an approach is cost-effective relative to other ways to improve the quality of care. OBJECTIVES: The aim of this review is to examine the effect of changes in the method and level of payment on the quality of care provided by primary care physicians (PCPs) and to identify:i) the different types of financial incentives that have improved quality;ii) the characteristics of patient populations for whom quality of care has been improved by financial incentives; andiii) the characteristics of PCPs who have responded to financial incentives. SEARCH STRATEGY: We searched the Cochrane Effective Practice and Organisation of Care (EPOC) Trials Register, Cochrane Central Register of Controlled Trials (CENTRAL) and Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews (CDSR) (The Cochrane Library), MEDLINE, HealthSTAR, EMBASE, CINAHL, PsychLIT, and ECONLIT. Searches of Internet-based economics and health economics working paper collections were also conducted. Finally, studies were identified through the reference lists of retrieved articles, websites of key organisations, and from direct contact with key authors in the field. Articles were included if they were published from 2000 to August 2009. SELECTION CRITERIA: Randomised controlled trials (RCT), controlled before and after studies (CBA), and interrupted time series analyses (ITS) evaluating the impact of different financial interventions on the quality of care delivered by primary healthcare physicians (PCPs). Quality of care was defined as patient reported outcome measures, clinical behaviours, and intermediate clinical and physiological measures. DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS: Two review authors independently extracted data and assessed study quality, in consultation with two other review authors where there was disagreement. For each included study, we reported the estimated effect sizes and confidence intervals. MAIN RESULTS: Seven studies were included in this review. Three of the studies evaluated single-threshold target payments, one examined a fixed fee per patient achieving a specified outcome, one study evaluated payments based on the relative ranking of medical groups' performance (tournament-based pay), one study examined a mix of tournament-based pay and threshold payments, and one study evaluated changing from a blended payments scheme to salaried payment. Three cluster RCTs examined smoking cessation; one CBA examined patients' assessment of the quality of care; one CBA examined cervical screening, mammography screening, and HbA1c; one ITS focused on four outcomes in diabetes; and one controlled ITS (a difference-in-difference design) examined cervical screening, mammography screening, HbA1c, childhood immunisation, chlamydia screening, and appropriate asthma medication. Six of the seven studies showed positive but modest effects on quality of care for some primary outcome measures, but not all. One study found no effect on quality of care. Poor study design led to substantial risk of bias in most studies. In particular, none of the studies addressed issues of selection bias as a result of the ability of primary care physicians to select into or out of the incentive scheme or health plan. AUTHORS' CONCLUSIONS: The use of financial incentives to reward PCPs for improving the quality of primary healthcare services is growing. However, there is insufficient evidence to support or not support the use of financial incentives to improve the quality of primary health care. Implementation should proceed with caution and incentive schemes should be more carefully designed before implementation. In addition to basing incentive design more on theory, there is a large literature discussing experiences with these schemes that can be used to draw out a number of lessons that can be learned and that could be used to influence or modify the design of incentive schemes. More rigorous study designs need to be used to account for the selection of physicians into incentive schemes. The use of instrumental variable techniques should be considered to assist with the identification of treatment effects in the presence of selection bias and other sources of unobserved heterogeneity. In randomised trials, care must be taken in using the correct unit of analysis and more attention should be paid to blinding. Studies should also examine the potential unintended consequences of incentive schemes by having a stronger theoretical basis, including a broader range of outcomes, and conducting more extensive subgroup analysis. Studies should more consistently describe i) the type of payment scheme at baseline or in the control group, ii) how payments to medical groups were used and distributed within the groups, and iii) the size of the new payments as a percentage of total revenue. Further research comparing the relative costs and effects of financial incentives with other behaviour change interventions is also required.

Hospital report cards: Quality competition and patient selection.

Hospital 'report cards' policies involve governments publishing information about hospital quality. Such policies often aim to improve hospital quality by stimulating competition between hospitals. Previous empirical literature lacks a comprehensive theoretical framework for analysing the effects of report cards. We model a report card policy in a market where two hospitals compete for patients on quality under regulated prices. The report card policy improves the accuracy of the quality signal observed by patients. Hospitals may improve their published quality scores by costly quality improvement or by selecting healthier patients to treat. We show that increasing information through report cards always increases quality and only sometimes induces selection. Report cards are more likely to increase patient welfare when quality scores are well risk-adjusted, where the cost of selecting patients is high, and the cost of increasing quality is low.

The effects of an incentive program on quality of care in diabetes management.

An incentive program for general practitioners to encourage systematic and igh-quality care in chronic disease management was introduced in Australia in 1999. There is little empirical evidence and ambiguous theoretical guidance on which effects to expect. This paper evaluates the impact of the incentive program on quality of care in diabetes, as measured by the probability of ordering an HbA1c test. The empirical analysis is conducted with a unique data set and a bivariate probit model to control for the self-selection process of practices into the program. The study finds that the incentive program increased the probability of an HbA1c test being ordered by 20 percentage points and that participation in the program is facilitated by the support of Divisions of General Practice.

Primary care physicians and infant mortality: Evidence from Brazil.

Primary health care has been recognized as a critical strategy for improving population health in developing countries. This paper investigates the effect of primary care physicians on the infant mortality rate in Brazil using a dynamic panel data approach. This method accounts for the endogeneity problem and the persistence of infant mortality over time. The empirical analysis uses an eight-year panel of municipalities between 2005 and 2012. The results indicate that primary care physician supply contributed to the decline of infant mortality in Brazil. An increase of one primary care physician per 10,000 population was associated with 7.08 fewer infant deaths per 10,000 live births. This suggests that, in addition to other determinants, primary care physicians can play an important role in accounting for the reduction of infant mortality rates.

Anatomy of a demand shock: Quantitative analysis of crowding in hospital emergency departments in Victoria, Australia during the 2009 influenza pandemic.

OBJECTIVE: An infectious disease outbreak such as the 2009 influenza pandemic is an unexpected demand shock to hospital emergency departments (EDs). We analysed changes in key performance metrics in (EDs) in Victoria during this pandemic to assess the impact of this demand shock. DESIGN AND SETTING: Descriptive time-series analysis and longitudinal regression analysis of data from the Victorian Emergency Minimum Dataset (VEMD) using data from the 38 EDs that submit data to the state's Department of Health and Human Services. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Daily number of presentations, influenza-like-illness (ILI) presentations, daily mean waiting time (time to first being seen by a doctor), daily number of patients who did-not-wait and daily number of access-blocked patients (admitted patients with length of stay >8 hours) at a system and hospital-level. RESULTS: During the influenza pandemic, mean waiting time increased by up to 25%, access block increased by 32% and did not wait presentations increased by 69% above pre-pandemic levels. The peaks of all three crowding variables corresponded approximately to the peak in admitted ILI presentations. Longitudinal fixed-effects regression analysis estimated positive and statistically significant associations between mean waiting times, did not wait presentations and access block and ILI presentations. CONCLUSIONS: This pandemic event caused excess demand leading to increased waiting times, did-not-wait patients and access block. Increases in admitted patients were more strongly associated with crowding than non-admitted patients during the pandemic period, so policies to divert or mitigate low-complexity non-admitted patients are unlikely to be effective in reducing ED crowding.

Do rural incentives payments affect entries and exits of general practitioners?

Many countries use financial incentive programs to attract physicians to work in rural areas. This paper examines the effectiveness of a policy reform in Australia that made some locations newly eligible for financial incentives and increased incentives for locations already eligible. The analysis uses panel data (2008-2014) on all Australian general practitioners (GPs) aggregated to small areas. We use a difference-in-differences approach to examine if the policy change affected GP entry or exit to the 755 newly eligible locations and the 787 always eligible locations relative to 2249 locations which were never eligible. The policy change increased the entry of newly-qualified GPs to newly eligible locations but had no effect on the entry and exit of other GPs. Our results suggest that location incentives should be targeted at newly qualified GPs.

Improving Chinese primary care providers' recruitment and retention: a discrete choice experiment.

INTRODUCTION: Local primary care facilities in China struggle to recruit and retain doctors and nurses. Implementing policies to address this issue requires detailed knowledge of the preferences of primary care workers. The aim of this study is to find out which job attributes affect Chinese primary care providers' choice of job and whether there are any differences in these job preferences between doctors and nurses. METHODS: A discrete choice experiment was used to analyse the job preferences of 517 primary care providers, including 282 doctors and 235 nurses. RESULTS: Chinese primary care providers in Community Health Organizations (CHOs) considered monetary factors and non-monetary factors when choosing a job. Doctors' and nurses' preferences over job attributes were similar. Though income was important, Chinese primary care providers had strongest preferences for sufficient welfare benefits, sufficient essential equipment and respect from the community. Younger primary care providers were more likely to value training and career development opportunities. CONCLUSION: In order to retain skilled primary care providers to work in CHOs, policymakers in China need to improve primary care providers' income, benefits and working conditions to fulfil their basic needs. Policymakers also need to invest in CHOs' infrastructure and strengthen training programmes for primary care providers in order to raise the community's confidence in the services provided by CHOs.

Junior doctors' preferences for specialty choice.

A number of studies suggest that there is an over-supply of specialists and an under-supply of general practitioners in many developed countries. Previous econometric studies of specialty choice from the US suggest that although income plays a role, other non-pecuniary factors may be important. This paper presents a novel application of a choice experiment to identify the effects of expected future earnings and other attributes on specialty choice. We find the implied marginal wage estimated from our discrete choice model is close to the actual wages of senior specialists, but much higher than those of senior GPs. In a policy simulation we find that increasing GPs' earnings by $50,000, or increasing opportunities for procedural or academic work can increase the number of junior doctors choosing general practice by between 8 and 13 percentage points. The simulation implies an earnings elasticity of specialty choice of 0.95.

Imperfect information in a quality-competitive hospital market.

We examine the implications of policies to improve information about the qualities of profit-seeking duopoly hospitals which face the same regulated price and compete on quality. We show that if hospital costs of quality are similar then better information increases the quality of both hospitals. However, if the costs are sufficiently different improved information will reduce the quality of both hospitals. Moreover, even when quality increases, better information may increase or decrease patient welfare depending on whether an ex post or ex ante view of welfare is taken.

Are English treatment centres treating less complex patients?

Activity-based funding involves remunerating healthcare providers a fixed price per patient in each payment category. However, no categorisation system can account perfectly for differences in patient complexity. Differences may be systematic if providers routinely attract high-risk patients or engage in patient selection. Such differences may be evident in the English National Health Service (NHS) following the introduction of treatment centres that concentrate on providing a small number of high-volume procedures. We analyse data for more than 3.3 million patients to assess whether the complexity of those treated in hospitals and treatment centres differs within twenty-nine payment categories, defined by Healthcare Resource Groups (HRGs). We find that patients treated in hospitals were more likely to come from more deprived areas, to have more diagnoses and to undergo significantly more procedures than patients seen by treatment centres, suggesting that hospitals are treating more complex cases. If these observed differences between hospitals and treatment centres drive costs, then payments should be refined to ensure fair reimbursement.

Implementing pay-for-performance in Australian primary care: lessons from the United Kingdom and the United States.

We identify key lessons learned from the international experience of pay-for-performance and use them to formulate questions for Australia to consider before such a scheme is introduced. Discussion of lessons learned is based on a narrative review of the literature. We examined international evidence on factors to consider when designing pay-for-performance schemes, and the impact of these schemes on primary care practitioner behaviour and on primary care funding. Pay-for-performance schemes evolve over time, and usually involve several complex interventions including accreditation, education, quality improvement programs, investment in information technology and data collection systems, professional support and regional structures. These are all necessary conditions for linking financial incentives to quality of care. There is a strong argument for changing the existing service incentive payments program and investing the resources into revised outcome payments that provide rewards for annual improvements in numbers of patients receiving completed cycles of care. If pay-for-performance is to be introduced in Australia, several key lessons should be learned from the experiences of other countries. Pay-for-performance should be used as part of a wider strategy for quality improvement; it should not be seen as a panacea. Pay-for-performance should be used to drive quality improvement, not simply to reward those who are already providing high-quality care.