Assessing One Health capacities for transboundary zoonotic diseases at the Libya-Tunisia border.

BACKGROUND: The dynamic nature of zoonotic emergence, spillover and spread necessitates multisectoral coordination beyond national borders to encompass cross-boundary and regional cooperation. Designated points of entry (POEs), specifically ground crossings, serve as critical locales for establishing and maintaining robust prevention, detection, notification, coordination, and response mechanisms to transboundary emerging and re-emerging disease threats. In order to better assess One Health capacities for transboundary zoonotic diseases (TZD) prevention, detection and response we adapted an existing tool, One Health Systems Assessment for Priority Zoonoses (OHSAPZ), for a cross-border, POE setting in North Africa. METHODS: The One Health Transboundary Assessment for Priority Zoonoses (OHTAPZ) tool was used to support prioritization of transboundary zoonoses and analyze operational capacities between national and subnational-level human and animal health stakeholders from Libya and Tunisia. Country partners jointly identified and prioritized five TZDs of concern. Case study scenarios for each priority pathogen were used to elicit current disease operations, as well as multisectoral and bilateral engagement networks. Finally, a gap analysis was performed to determine bilateral strengths and weaknesses to TZDs. RESULTS: The five priority TZDs jointly confirmed to undergo One Health assessment were avian influenza (low and high pathogenic strains); brucellosis; Rift Valley fever; Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever; and rabies. Using the qualitative information collected, a transboundary systems map schematic was developed outlining the movement of human patients, animals, diagnostic samples, and routes of communication and coordination both within and between countries for zoonotic diseases. CONCLUSIONS: Analysis of current operations (prevention, detection, surveillance, laboratory capacity, quarantine/isolation, and response) and the resulting transboundary systems map schematic helped identify existing capacity strengths for certain priority pathogens, as well as challenges to timely information-sharing and coordination. We developed targeted recommendations to address these limitations for joint action planning between Libya and Tunisia.

Lost in translation: the importance of addressing language inequities in global health security.

Language inequities in global health stem from colonial legacies, and global health security is no exception. The International Health Regulations (IHRs), a legally binding framework published by the WHO, lay the foundation for global health security and state the roles and responsibilities States Parties are compelled to follow to improve their capabilities to prevent, detect and respond to potential public health emergencies of international concern. It includes the submission of a mandatory status report that assesses a nation's implementation of IHRs. Known as the States Party Self-Assessment Annual Report (SPAR) tool, WHO has made its guidance document available in all six WHO official languages (Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish). The Republic of Iraq (Iraq) experienced significant challenges during the completion and submission of the 2022 SPAR. This experience demonstrated that translation of English materials to other languages, such as Arabic, is not prioritised and further underscored how scoring of a country's global health security capacities can be significantly impacted by users' ability to read and comprehend the materials in English. Not only can this lead to inaccurate SPAR scoring, but it can also lead to the improper allocation of resources and prioritisation of policy developments and/or amendments. By drawing attention to this issue, we aim to inform and advocate for global health security decision-makers to consider opportunities for increasing inclusion and accessibility, especially for requirements under legally binding international instruments.

Public health emergency management capacity building in Guinea: 2014-2019.

Before the Ebola virus disease (EVD) outbreak of 2014-2016, Guinea did not have an emergency management system in place. During the outbreak, Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA) 2014-2019 funds made it possible to rapidly improve the country's capacity to manage epidemics through the development of public health emergency operation centres (PHEOCs) at the national and district levels. Since the end of the response, the infrastructure, staff, and systems of these PHEOCs have been further reinforced and well-integrated in the daily activities of Guinea's National Agency for Health Security, the entity responsible for the management of epidemics. The development of PHEOCs as emergency management tools for epidemics in Guinea would not have been possible without a strong endorsement within the Ministry of Health. Guinea's PHEOC network is well-positioned to serve as a model of excellence for other Ministries in Guinea and Ministries of Health of other countries of West Africa.