A counterexample to secularization theory? Assessing the Georgian religious revival.

Secularization theory allows for transitory religious revivals under certain conditions, such as extreme societal crises or state weakness. The country of Georgia has witnessed the largest religious revival of Orthodox countries and one of the most striking religious resurgences worldwide. This paper gives both a statistical and historical description of this revival and asks whether it is a counterexample to secularization theory. We show that the main thrust of the religious revival in Georgia lasted 25 years and seized the entire society in what was mainly a period effect. The most significant cause for the revival was a major societal and economic crisis starting in 1985 combined with a very weak state, creating massive individual insecurity. In these circumstances, the Georgian Orthodox Church was able to provide identity for individuals and legitimacy for governments. Other possible causes of the revival-state funding, too rapid modernization, or emigration-can be excluded as primary drivers of the process. The Georgian case shows a situation in which secularization theory expects transitory revivals and is thus not a counterexample.

Does disestablishment lead to religious vitality? The case of Switzerland.

Economists and sociologists of religion have claimed that religious establishment dampens religious vitality, leading to lower recruitment efforts, low attendance, declining membership within established congregations, and the 'crowding out' of non-established congregations. Conversely, these authors have told us, disestablishment will lead to more religious vitality. Remarkably, even though these claims rest on the connection between establishment and the organizational and membership behaviour of local religious congregations, no research has directly examined that connection. We use the 2008 Swiss National Congregations Study as well as historical data to assess the effect of different levels of religious establishment on both established and non-established congregations. We find that established congregations do indeed show less religious vitality than non-established congregations. Contrary to the claims of the economic literature, however, these covariations are not caused by differences in religious establishment on the cantonal level. Both our quantitative and historical analyses show that disestablishment has not led to religious vitality for either established or non-established congregations. The only clear effect of disestablishment is a dramatic decrease of income for established congregations. Based on quantitative and historical evidence, we suggest that differences between established and non-established congregations are produced by differences in religious tradition and immigration flows, not by differences in levels of establishment.

Explaining religiosity: towards a unified theoretical model.

The article presents a unified theoretical model, explaining differences in Christian and 'alternative' religiosity at individual and collective levels. The model reconstructs and integrates the most important theories explaining religiosity (deprivation, regulation, socialization, cultural production, and ethnicity) as complementary causal mechanisms in a rational-action based framework. It is maintained that the mechanisms of the various theories are not exclusive, but complementary, and that integration into the general model is both theoretically and empirically beneficial. The model is tested on representative data from Switzerland. Substantively, I find for the Swiss case that Christian religiosity can be best explained by a religious socialization mechanism. The most important mechanisms accounting for alternative religiosity involve deprivation, gender, and age.