Campylobacter contamination in broiler carcasses and correlation with slaughterhouses operational hygiene inspection.

This study investigates factors associated with Campylobacter contamination of broiler carcasses, using survey data collected from nine Belgian slaughterhouses in 2008 in accordance with a European Union baseline study. Campylobacter were detected in 51.9% (202/389) (95% confidence interval, 46.8%-56.9%) of broiler carcasses. Campylobacter concentration was <10 CFU/g in 49.6% of carcasses, while 20.6% were contaminated with ≥ 1000 CFU/g. The mean Campylobacter concentration, as calculated by maximum likelihood estimation for left-censored data, was 1.8 log(10) CFU/g, with a standard deviation of 1.9 log(10) CFU/g. There was statistically significant variation among slaughterhouses in prevalence and concentrations of Campylobacter in their sampled carcasses. Campylobacter prevalence (but not concentrations) was positively associated with increase in broilers age. Both Campylobacter prevalence and concentration were significantly higher in carcasses sampled during June and September (but not in July and August) than carcasses sampled in January. We also investigated the correlation (Spearman's rank correlation test) between the scores of official control inspections and Campylobacter prevalence for eight out of the nine slaughterhouses. The control inspections were routinely performed by the Belgian Federal Agency for the Safety of the Food Chain, and the concluded inspection scores were used as a general numerical indicator for the status of operational hygiene and quality of management in the slaughterhouses. Ranking of slaughterhouses based on their inspection scores was statistically correlated (Spearman's correlation coefficient = 0.857) with their ranking based on prevalence of Campylobacter. In the present study we demonstrate how the outcomes from a routine baseline survey could be coupled with other readily available data from national control authorities in order to enable a better insight over Campylobacter contamination status in broiler slaughterhouses. Findings from this work call for subsequent in-depth investigations on technical and hygiene management factors that could impact Campylobacter contamination across broiler slaughterhouses.

Semi-quantitative risk assessment by expert elicitation of potential introduction routes of African swine fever from wild reservoir to domestic pig industry and subsequent spread during the Belgian outbreak (2018-2019).

Since the introduction in Georgia in 2007 of an African swine fever (ASF) genotype 2 virus strain, the virus has rapidly spread to both Western European and Asian countries. It now constitutes a major threat for the global swine industry. The ongoing European transmission cycle has been related to the 'wild boar habitat' with closed transmission events between wild boar populations and incidental spillovers to commercial and non-commercial (backyard) pig holdings. During the epidemic in Belgium, only wild boar were infected and although the introduction route has not yet been elucidated, the 'human factor' is highly suspected. While ASF was successfully contained in a small region in the Southern part of Belgium without affecting domestic pigs, the risk of spillover at the wild/domestic interface remains poorly assessed. In this study, we used a semi-quantitative method, involving national and international experts, to assess the risk associated with different transmission routes for ASF introduction from wild boar to domestic pig holdings and subsequent dissemination between holdings in the Belgian epidemiological context. Qualitative responses obtained by our questionnaire were numerically transformed and statistically processed to provide a semi-quantitative assessment of the occurrence of the hazard and a ranking of all transmission routes. 'Farmer', 'bedding material', 'veterinarian' and 'professionals from the pig sector' were considered as the most important transmission routes for ASF introduction from the wild reservoir to pig holdings. 'Animal movements', 'farmer', 'veterinarian', 'iatrogenic', 'animal transport truck' and 'animal care equipment' were considered as the most important transmission routes posing a risk of ASF spread between pig holdings. Combined with specific biosecurity checks in the holdings, this assessment helps in prioritizing risk mitigation measures against ASF introduction and further spread in the domestic pig industry, particularly while the ASF situation in Western Europe is worsening.

Evidence-based semiquantitative methodology for prioritization of foodborne zoonoses.

OBJECTIVES: To prioritize an extended list of food- and water-borne zoonoses to allow food safety authorities to focus on the most relevant hazards in the food chain. METHODS: An evidence-based semiquantitative methodology was developed. Scores were given by 35 scientific experts in the field of animal and public health, food, and clinical microbiology and epidemiology to 51 zoonotic agents according to five criteria related to public health (severity and occurrence in humans), animal health (severity of disease coupled with economic consequences and occurrence in animals), and food (occurrence in food). The scoring procedure was standardized and evidence-based as experts were provided, for each zoonotic agent, a same set of up-to-date help information data related to the five criteria. Independently, the relative importance of the five criteria was weighted by seven food chain risk managers. The zoonotic agents were ranked based on overall weighted scores and were grouped in four statistically different levels of importance. RESULTS: The following foodborne zoonotic pathogens were classified as "most important": Salmonella spp., Campylobacter spp., Listeria monocytogenes, and verocytotoxigenic Escherichia coli. A second group of "significant importance" included Toxoplasma gondii, the agent of bovine spongiform encephalopathy, Clostridium botulinum, Staphylococcus aureus, Cryptosporidium parvum, Mycobacterium bovis, Echinococcus granulosus, Streptococcus spp., Echinococcus multilocularis, Yersinia enterocolitica, Mycobacterium avium, Fasciola hepatica, Giardia intestinalis, and Rotavirus. CONCLUSIONS: This methodology allowed to rank 51 zoonotic agents with objectivity and taking account of a combined input from risk assessors and risk managers. APPLICATIONS: These results support food safety policy makers to establish the multiannual monitoring program of foodborne zoonoses. They also enable to identify knowledge gaps on specific zoonotic agents and to formulate key research questions. Principally, this method of prioritization is of general interest as it can be applied for any other ranking exercise and in any country.

Measuring general animal health status: Development of an animal health barometer.

The development of an animal health barometer, an instrument to measure the general health of the Belgian livestock population on a yearly basis and to monitor its evolution over time, is described. The elaboration of a set of 13 animal health indicators (AHIs) as the basis for the animal health barometer is discussed. These indicators were weighted by experts - including scientists, policy makers and agro-industrial representatives - to determine their relative weight in the barometer. The result of the barometer is expressed as a comparison with a previous year. Based on the results of the 13 AHIs, it is concluded that general animal health in Belgium shows a positive evolution since 2008. The animal health barometer provides a composite view of the status of livestock health in Belgium and is a tool to communicate in an intelligible, comprehensible manner on aspects of animal health to consumers and professional stakeholders in the animal production and food chain. Together with the food safety barometer (Baert et al., 2011. Food Res. Int. 44, 940) and the plant health barometer (Wilmart et al., 2014. Eur. J. Plant Pathol. doi: 10.1007/s10658-014-0547-x), the animal health barometer is one of the three instruments to provide a holistic view on the overall status of the safety of the food chain in Belgium.

Antimicrobial resistance in the food chain: a review.

Antimicrobial resistant zoonotic pathogens present on food constitute a direct risk to public health. Antimicrobial resistance genes in commensal or pathogenic strains form an indirect risk to public health, as they increase the gene pool from which pathogenic bacteria can pick up resistance traits. Food can be contaminated with antimicrobial resistant bacteria and/or antimicrobial resistance genes in several ways. A first way is the presence of antibiotic resistant bacteria on food selected by the use of antibiotics during agricultural production. A second route is the possible presence of resistance genes in bacteria that are intentionally added during the processing of food (starter cultures, probiotics, bioconserving microorganisms and bacteriophages). A last way is through cross-contamination with antimicrobial resistant bacteria during food processing. Raw food products can be consumed without having undergone prior processing or preservation and therefore hold a substantial risk for transfer of antimicrobial resistance to humans, as the eventually present resistant bacteria are not killed. As a consequence, transfer of antimicrobial resistance genes between bacteria after ingestion by humans may occur. Under minimal processing or preservation treatment conditions, sublethally damaged or stressed cells can be maintained in the food, inducing antimicrobial resistance build-up and enhancing the risk of resistance transfer. Food processes that kill bacteria in food products, decrease the risk of transmission of antimicrobial resistance.