Direct Diagnostic Tests for Lyme Disease.

Borrelia burgdorferi was discovered to be the cause of Lyme disease in 1983, leading to seroassays. The 1994 serodiagnostic testing guidelines predated a full understanding of key B. burgdorferi antigens and have a number of shortcomings. These serologic tests cannot distinguish active infection, past infection, or reinfection. Reliable direct-detection methods for active B. burgdorferi infection have been lacking in the past but are needed and appear achievable. New approaches have effectively been applied to other emerging infections and show promise in direct detection of B. burgdorferi infections.

Advances in Serodiagnostic Testing for Lyme Disease Are at Hand.

The cause of Lyme disease, Borrelia burgdorferi, was discovered in 1983. A 2-tiered testing protocol was established for serodiagnosis in 1994, involving an enzyme immunoassay (EIA) or indirect fluorescence antibody, followed (if reactive) by immunoglobulin M and immunoglobulin G Western immunoblots. These assays were prepared from whole-cell cultured B. burgdorferi, lacking key in vivo expressed antigens and expressing antigens that can bind non-Borrelia antibodies. Additional drawbacks, particular to the Western immunoblot component, include low sensitivity in early infection, technical complexity, and subjective interpretation when scored by visual examination. Nevertheless, 2-tiered testing with immunoblotting remains the benchmark for evaluation of new methods or approaches. Next-generation serologic assays, prepared with recombinant proteins or synthetic peptides, and alternative testing protocols, can now overcome or circumvent many of these past drawbacks. This article describes next-generation serodiagnostic testing for Lyme disease, focusing on methods that are currently available or near-at-hand.

Redefining genomic privacy: trust and empowerment.

Fulfilling the promise of the genetic revolution requires the analysis of large datasets containing information from thousands to millions of participants. However, sharing human genomic data requires protecting subjects from potential harm. Current models rely on de-identification techniques in which privacy versus data utility becomes a zero-sum game. Instead, we propose the use of trust-enabling techniques to create a solution in which researchers and participants both win. To do so we introduce three principles that facilitate trust in genetic research and outline one possible framework built upon those principles. Our hope is that such trust-centric frameworks provide a sustainable solution that reconciles genetic privacy with data sharing and facilitates genetic research.

The knockout mouse project.

Mouse knockout technology provides a powerful means of elucidating gene function in vivo, and a publicly available genome-wide collection of mouse knockouts would be significantly enabling for biomedical discovery. To date, published knockouts exist for only about 10% of mouse genes. Furthermore, many of these are limited in utility because they have not been made or phenotyped in standardized ways, and many are not freely available to researchers. It is time to harness new technologies and efficiencies of production to mount a high-throughput international effort to produce and phenotype knockouts for all mouse genes, and place these resources into the public domain.

Current challenges in de novo plant genome sequencing and assembly.

Genome sequencing is now affordable, but assembling plant genomes de novo remains challenging. We assess the state of the art of assembly and review the best practices for the community.

Tackling antibiotic resistance.

The development and spread of antibiotic resistance in bacteria is a universal threat to both humans and animals that is generally not preventable but can nevertheless be controlled, and it must be tackled in the most effective ways possible. To explore how the problem of antibiotic resistance might best be addressed, a group of 30 scientists from academia and industry gathered at the Banbury Conference Centre in Cold Spring Harbor, New York, USA, from 16 to 18 May 2011. From these discussions there emerged a priority list of steps that need to be taken to resolve this global crisis.