Sugar tax and product reformulation proposals reduce the perceived legitimacy of health-promotion institutions: a randomized population-based survey experiment.

BACKGROUND: Structural nutrition interventions like a sugar tax or a product reformulation are strongly supported among the public health community but may cause a considerable backlash (e.g. inspiring aversion to institutions initiating the interventions among citizens). Such a backlash potentially undermines future health-promotion strategies. This study aims to uncover whether such backlash exists. METHODS: We fielded a pre-registered randomized, population-based survey experiment among adults from the Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social Sciences panel (n = 1765; based on a random sampling of the Dutch population register). Participants were randomly allocated to the control condition (brief facts about health-information provision/nudging), or one of two experimental groups (the same facts, expanded with either a proposed sugar tax on or reformulation of sugar-sweetened beverages). Ordinary least squares regression was used to estimate the proposed interventions' effects on four outcome variables: trust in health-promotion institutions involved; perceptions that these institutions have citizens' well-being in mind (i.e. benevolence); perceptions that these institutions' perspectives are similar to those of citizens (i.e. alignment of perspectives); and attitudes toward nutrition information. RESULTS: Trust, perceived benevolence and perceived alignment of perspectives were affected negatively by a proposed sugar tax (-0.24, 95% CI -0.38 to -0.10; -0.15, -0.29 to -0.01; -0.15, -0.30 to 0.00) or product reformulation (-0.32, -0.46 to -0.18; -0.24, -0.37 to -0.11; -0.18, 0.33 to -0.03), particularly among the non-tertiary educated respondents. CONCLUSIONS: Sugar taxes or product reformulations may delegitimize health-promotion institutions, potentially causing public distancing from or opposition to these bodies. This may be exploited by political and commercial parties to undermine official institutions. TRIAL REGISTRATION: https://osf.io/qr9jy/?view_only=5e2e875a1fc348f3b28115b7a3fdfd90. Registered 3 February 2022.

Politicians' high-status signals make less-educated citizens more supportive of aggression against government: A video-vignette survey experiment.

Various branches of the literature suggest that exposure to the high-status appearances and lifestyles of politicians in contemporary "diploma democracies" affects the attitudes and behavior of less-educated citizens because it confronts them with their lower status in the political domain. Informed by this, we theorize that such exposure inspires docility (a lower subjective social status, weaker feelings of political entitlement) and revolt (anger, more support for aggression against government). To investigate this, we conducted an original, pre-registered, video-vignette survey experiment among a representative sample of the Dutch population. While our findings likely generalize to other liberal democracies, the Dutch context is suitable to test our theorizing because low-status and high-status appearances and lifestyles are found across the political arena, irrespective of politicians' substantive positions or use of populist rhetoric. Each less-educated respondent (n = 1390) was presented with a professionally produced video of an actor playing the part of a fictitious politician. This politician signaled either a low or a high status via his appearance and lifestyle. The potentially confounding factors of his substantive positions and populist rhetoric were randomized and controlled for. We find that exposure to the high-status politician increased less-educated citizens' support for aggression against the government. Through exploratory analyses, we assess how the responses of docility and revolt are interrelated, and how they are shaped by less-educated citizens' economic status.

What do stances on immigrants' welfare entitlement mean? Evidence from a correlational class analysis.

Recent in-depth qualitative research indicates that different people ascribe different meanings to their apparently similar stances on immigrants' entitlement to welfare. We are the first to investigate such variation quantitatively among the public-at-large, applying the novel method Correlational Class Analysis to an original survey fielded among a representative sample in the Netherlands (n = 2138). We uncover five ways of looking at immigrants' entitlement to welfare, each including both people who oppose that entitlement and those who support it. People who adhere to these different viewpoints substantially differ when it comes to income, education, religious denomination, and political preference. We interpret these unique findings and discuss them in relation to the extant literature on welfare chauvinism. Moreover, uncovering what people's stances regarding immigrants' entitlement to welfare mean not only advances the scholarly debate on welfare chauvinism, but also provides a stepping stone for meaning-oriented sociological research on public opinion more generally.

An incongruous intervention: Exploring the role of anti-institutionalism in less-educated individual's limited uptake of nutrition information.

Despite many efforts, nutritional health interventions have been largely unable to reduce health inequalities between less- and more-educated individuals, since their effectiveness among the former is often limited. Conventionally, adverse financial circumstances and poorer health literacy are argued to explain this. Drawing on recent sociological insights, we propose a complementing and novel sociocultural explanation based on how contemporary power relations in society breed anti-institutionalism among less-educated individuals. Using a survey of a representative sample of the Dutch population (n = 2398), we focus on the strategic case of the lower uptake of nutrition information among less-educated individuals. We find that two aspects of anti-institutionalism, i.e. institutional distrust and antipaternalism, substantially account for the educational gap in the uptake of nutrition information. This indicates that current nutrition information inspires opposition among less-educated individuals. More generally, it suggests that the development of nutritional health interventions should avoid invoking institutional connotations, to increase their acceptance by those who commonly need these most.

Belief change in times of crisis: Providing facts about COVID-19-induced inequalities closes the partisan divide but fuels intra-partisan polarization about inequality.

Population-based survey research demonstrates that growing economic divides in Western countries have not gone together with increased popular concern about inequality. Extant explanations focus on 'misperception': people generally underestimate the extent of inequality and overestimate society's meritocratic nature. However, scholarly attempts to correct people's misperceptions have produced mixed results. We ask whether COVID-19, by upending everyday life, has made people responsive to information about inequality, even if that entails crossing ideological divides. We field an original survey experiment in the United States, a least-likely case of belief change, given high levels of inequality and partisan polarization. Our informational treatment increases (1) concerns over economic inequality, (2) support for redistribution, and (3) acknowledgement that COVID-19 has especially hurt the most vulnerable. Information provision renders non-significant the partisan gap between moderate Democrats and Republicans but increases that between moderate and strong Republicans. We discuss our findings' implications and suggestions for further research.

"They don't know what it's like to be at the bottom": Exploring the role of perceived cultural distance in less-educated citizens' discontent with politicians.

Why is discontent with politicians highest among less-educated citizens? Supplementing explanations concerning a lack of resources and knowledge, we examine the cultural distance to many a politician perceived by this group. Inspired by qualitative studies mapping the worldviews of people from the lower social strata, we explore less-educated citizens' perceptions of politicians using in-depth (group) interviews carried out in various regions of the Netherlands (n = 26). Our analysis indicates that this group regards politicians as culturally distant "others" and that this perception goes hand in hand with specific negative evaluations of politicians. This improves our understanding of the much-reported political discontent of these citizens. In moving beyond the often mentioned unspecific divide between the "people" and the "elite", our analysis reveals that our interviewees: (i) consider politicians to be insensitive to the lived experiences of the "common" people, and therefore, question their legitimacy and the policies they propose; (ii) resent their communication styles, which they describe as "beating about the bush" and perceive to be emblematic of indecisiveness and a lack of integrity; and (iii) accuse them of superiority signaling, inspiring feelings of misrecognition and opposition. We conclude with detailing the implications of our findings for (future) research.

A revolt of the deplored? The role of perceived cultural distance in the educational gradient in anti-establishment politics.

Anti-establishment politics have become part of contemporary Western democracies. Less-educated citizens in particular have been found to display political distrust and populist attitudes, support populist parties, and abstain from voting. We advance a novel explanation for these patterns, drawing on extant theoretical insights to hypothesize that less- and more-educated citizens differ in the extent to which they perceive politicians to be culturally distant to them. Informed by our earlier in-depth qualitative research, we developed novel indicators of such perceptions and included them in a survey fielded among a high-quality panel representative of the Dutch population. We found: 1) positive associations between perceived cultural distance to politicians and political distrust, populist attitudes, the intention to vote for a populist party, and non-voting; and 2) that, overall, perceived cultural distance contributes substantially more to the educational gradient in anti-establishment political attitudes and behavior than the conventional rationalist and materialist approaches.

Time-varying Effects of Screen Media Exposure in the Relationship Between Socioeconomic Background and Childhood Obesity.

BACKGROUND: We investigated to what extent social inequalities in childhood obesity could be reduced by eliminating differences in screen media exposure. METHODS: We used longitudinal data from the UK-wide Millennium Cohort Study (n = 11,413). The study measured mother's educational level at child's age 5. We calculated screen media exposure as a combination of television viewing and computer use at ages 7 and 11. We derived obesity at age 14 from anthropometric measures. We estimated a counterfactual disparity measure of the unmediated association between mother's education and obesity by fitting an inverse probability-weighted marginal structural model, adjusting for mediator-outcome confounders. RESULTS: Compared with children of mothers with a university degree, children of mothers with education to age 16 were 1.9 (95% confidence interval [CI] = 1.5, 2.3) times as likely to be obese. Those whose mothers had no qualifications were 2.0 (95% CI = 1.5, 2.5) times as likely to be obese. Compared with mothers with university qualifications, the estimated counterfactual disparity in obesity at age 14, if educational differences in screen media exposure at age 7 and 11 were eliminated, was 1.8 (95% CI = 1.4, 2.2) for mothers with education to age 16 and 1.8 (95% CI = 1.4, 2.4) for mothers with no qualifications on the risk ratio scale. Hence, relative inequalities in childhood obesity would reduce by 13% (95% CI = 1%, 26%) and 17% (95% CI = 1%, 33%). Estimated reductions on the risk difference scale (absolute inequalities) were of similar magnitude. CONCLUSIONS: Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that social inequalities in screen media exposure contribute substantially to social inequalities in childhood obesity.

Gender-specific effects of raising Year-1 standards on medical students' academic performance and stress levels.

CONTEXT: Medical schools are challenged to create academic environments that stimulate students to improve their study progress without compromising their well-being. OBJECTIVES: This prospective comparative cohort study investigated the effects of raising Year-1 standards on academic performance and on students' chronic psychological and biological stress levels. METHODS: In a Dutch medical school, students within the last Bachelor's degree cohort (n = 410) exposed to the 40/60 (67%) credit Year-1 standard (67%-credit cohort) were compared with students within the first cohort (n = 413) exposed to a 60/60 (100%) credit standard (100%-credit cohort). Main outcome measures were Year-1 pass rate (academic performance), mean score on the Perceived Stress Scale (PSS, psychological stress) and hair cortisol concentration (HCC, biological stress). RESULTS: Year-1 pass rates were significantly higher in the 100%-credit cohort (odds ratio [OR] 4.65). Interestingly, there was a significant interaction effect (OR 0.46), indicating that raising the standard was more effective for male than for female students. PSS scores (n = 234 [response rate [RR]: 57%] and n = 244 [RR: 59%] in the 67%- and 100%-credit cohorts, respectively) were also significantly higher in the 100%-credit cohort (F(1,474)  = 15.08, P < .001). This applied specifically to female students in the 100%-credit cohort. Levels of HCC (n = 181 [RR: 44%] and n = 162 [RR: 39%] respectively) did not differ between cohorts, but were significantly higher in female students (F(1,332)  = 7.93, P < .01). In separate models including cohort and gender, both PSS score (OR 0.91) and HCC (OR 0.38) were significantly associated with Year-1 performance. Only students with both high PSS scores and high HCC values were significantly at risk of lower Year-1 pass rates (OR 0.27), particularly male students. CONCLUSIONS: Raising the Year-1 performance standard increased academic performance, most notably in male students. However, it also increased levels of perceived stress, especially in female students. In particular, the combination of high levels of perceived stress and biological stress, as measured by long-term cortisol, was related to poor academic performance. The study suggests a relationship between raising performance standards and student well-being, with differential effects in male and female students.

How does cultural capital keep you thin? Exploring unique aspects of cultural class that link social advantage to lower body mass index.

A widely used indicator for cultural class is strongly related to a lower body mass index (BMI): cultural capital measured as 'highbrow' taste. This study's objective was to theorise and measure aspects of cultural class that are more plausibly linked to low BMI, and subsequently explore their relevance. Building on Bourdieusian theory we derive four of those aspects: 'refinement' (valuing form and appearance over function and substance), 'asceticism' (self-imposed constraints), 'diversity' (appreciation of variety in and of itself) and 'reflexivity' (reflexive deliberation and internal dialogue). Using standardised interviews with 597 participants in the Dutch GLOBE study in 2016, we subsequently demonstrate: (i) newly developed survey items can reliably measure four aspects of cultural class: 'asceticism', 'general refinement', 'food refinement' and 'reflexivity' (Cronbach's alphas between 0.67-0.77); (ii) embodied/objectified cultural capital (i.e. 'highbrow' taste) was positively associated with general refinement, food refinement and reflexivity, whereas institutionalised cultural capital (i.e. education) was positively associated with asceticism and reflexivity; (iii) asceticism, general refinement, reflexivity, but not food refinement, were associated with a lower BMI; (iv) asceticism, general refinement and reflexivity together accounted for 52% of the association between embodied/objectified cultural capital and BMI, and 38% of the association between institutionalised cultural capital and BMI.

The Effect of Religiosity on Life Satisfaction in a Secularized Context: Assessing the Relevance of Believing and Belonging.

The positive relationship between religiosity and life satisfaction is well-established. This relationship is, however, likely to vary across cultural contexts and different religious affiliations. Furthermore, research is needed to uncover why religion is relevant for life satisfaction. Addressing these issues, we investigate what dimensions of being religious play a role in the life satisfaction of individuals with different religious affiliations, including the understudied Muslim category, in the highly secularized Dutch context. We examine 'believing', which captures how religion provides meaning and a coherent worldview, and 'belonging', which comprises both cultural benefits of being embedded in a congregation with a shared framework of meaning and structural benefits due to more social ties. Analyses of the NEtherlands Longitudinal Lifecourse Study (n = 5312) first indicate that Muslims display significantly lower life satisfaction than the non-religious, which appears to be due to their underprivileged social position rather than intra-religious factors of believing and belonging. Second, we find that Catholics experience significant life satisfaction benefits compared to those who are not religious, and that only belonging plays a role in this association. Next to the beneficial effect of the structural aspect of belonging, which revolves around social ties, a cultural aspect of religious belonging appears to be salient, suggesting that an important life satisfaction advantage of religious communities lies in their ability to foster a sense of solidarity and commitment through a shared framework of meaning. We make several recommendations for further research based on these findings.

Becoming skeptical towards vaccines: How health views shape the trajectories following health-related events.

Recent studies on skepticism towards childhood vaccination urge scholars to analyse vaccination trajectories. Focusing on a social group that recent studies point out as being especially relevant because of its relatively high level of skepticism toward childhood vaccination, we use in-depth interviews resembling open conversations to explore how more-educated parents' views on vaccination came about. Providing an in-depth understanding of these vaccine-skepticism trajectories, we additionally analyse 1) how health-related events play a role in parents' trajectories, and 2) how these trajectories are shaped by parents' pre-existing health views. Interviews with 31 more-educated Dutch parents reveal that different types of events incite respondents to start questioning vaccinations. Next to more commonly studied events that directly involve parents' or their children's health (e.g., (perceived) adverse effects of treatments), events that are also related to the topic of health or vaccination but do not involve parents' or their children's health (e.g., when health issues come up in a conversation) may incite parents to start questioning vaccination. Moreover, how respondents experience (different types of) health-related events, and how they go through distinct stages after this, proves shaped by their pre-existing health views: parents with nature-oriented health views came to doubt the fundamental principles of vaccination, turning instead to 'alternative' resources and practices; parents with science-oriented views queried the potential risks of vaccination and sought out what they viewed as the most scientifically sound information. We discuss the implications of our findings for scholarly debates and provide suggestions for further research.

Suggested explanations for the (in)effectiveness of nutrition information interventions among adults with a low socioeconomic status: a scoping review.

Unhealthy diets are a major threat to population health and are especially prevalent among those with a low socioeconomic status (SES). Health promotion initiatives often rely on nutrition information interventions (NIIs), but are usually less effective among adults with a low SES than in their high-SES counterparts. Explanations for this lower effectiveness are set out in extant studies. These have been conducted across a wide range of disciplines and subject fields and using a variety of methodological approaches. We have therefore conducted a scoping review to identify and synthesise the following: (1) explanations suggested in studies carried out in high-income countries for why NIIs are (in)effective among adults with a low SES and (2) whether these suggested explanations were studied empirically. Eight databases were searched for relevant studies published since 2009 across various disciplines. This identified 4951 papers, 27 of which were included in our review after screening. Only fifteen of these proposed an explanation for the (in)effectiveness of NIIs among adults with a low SES. The following four main themes were uncovered: health literacy, economic resources, social resources and convenience. Ten studies tested their explanations empirically, but the results were inconsistent. The reasons why NIIs are (in)effective among low-SES adults are therefore still largely unclear. Also, current literature predominantly relies on individualistic explanations, most notably focusing on psychological and economic attributes. Consequently, if the effectiveness of NIIs among low-SES populations is to be improved, future studies should examine a wider range of explanations and test them systematically and empirically.

Why are anti-smoking health-information interventions less effective among low-socioeconomic status groups? A systematic scoping review.

ISSUES: This paper identifies and synthesises explanations proposed in the literature for the (in)effectiveness of institutional anti-smoking health-information interventions (HII) among low-socioeconomic status (SES) adults in high-income countries. APPROACH: We searched eight databases for relevant papers from various disciplines: Studies published in English since 2009, on the effectiveness among low-SES adults of anti-smoking HIIs, aimed at changing knowledge/behaviour, and conducted by official institutions, were included. Through a scoping review, we synthesised: study design, SES indicator, intervention type, intervention source, study population, outcomes, low-SES effects, equity effects, proposed explanations and whether these were studied empirically. KEY FINDINGS: Thirty-eight studies were included in this scoping review. Seventeen suggested explanations for the (in)effectiveness of the HIIs in low-SES adults, but only nine assessed them empirically. Thematic analysis yielded six themes: message engagement, material conditions, cognition, risk perception, social environment and self-efficacy. IMPLICATIONS: Explanations for intervention results are not always present, and empirical evidence for explanations is often not provided. Including such explanations and testing their empirical merits in future research can provide the crucial information needed for developing more effective anti-smoking HIIs for low-SES adults. CONCLUSIONS: To our knowledge, this is the first review to explore the explanations proposed for why anti-smoking HIIs are (in)effective among low-SES adults. It contains insights for future studies aiming to provide empirical evidence on the causes of this (in)effectiveness, and concludes that such research is yet largely missing, but crucial to the quest for more effective and equitable anti-smoking interventions.

Population health, not individual health, drives support for populist parties.

Recent electoral shifts toward populist parties may have been partly driven by deteriorating health, although empirical evidence on this link is primarily confined to ecological designs. We performed both ecological- and individual-level analyses to investigate whether changes in health are associated with changes in the support for populist parties. Data were used on the strategic Dutch case, the only liberal democracy featuring leftist and rightist populist politicians in parliament for over a decade. We used: (a) fixed effects models to examine whether changes in the standardized mortality ratios and self-assessed health (SAH) in municipalities were associated with changes in the populist vote share in four parliamentary elections (2006/2010/2012/2017); and (b) 10 waves of panel data collected in 2008 to 2018 to investigate if changes in individual-level SAH were linked to movement in the sympathy, intention to vote, and actual voting for populist parties. The ecological analyses showed that: changes in municipality mortality ratios were positively linked to changes in the vote share of right-wing populist parties, while changes in the prevalence of less-than-good SAH were negatively associated with changes in the vote share for left-wing populist parties. The individual-level analyses identified no such associations. Our findings imply that support for populist parties may be driven by health concerns at the ecological, but not the individual, level. This suggests that sociotropic (e.g. perceiving population health issues as a social problem), but not egotropic (e.g. relating to personal health issues like experienced stigma), concerns may underlie rising support for populist parties.

Receptive to an authoritative voice? Experimental evidence on how patronizing language and stressing institutional sources affect public receptivity to nutrition information.

Common strategies to make official nutrition information more persuasive include highlighting its institutional sources and using simple and direct language. However, such strategies may be counterproductive, as institutions are no longer self-evidently deemed to be legitimate in contemporary societies and such language can be viewed as patronizing. Our preregistered, population-based survey experiment fielded among a high-quality Dutch probability sample in February 2022 (n = 1947) 1) examines whether these dominant strategies hold up when tested against suggestions of psychological reactance and source derogation, and 2) scrutinizes if such responses are stronger among less-educated citizens. Our experiment mirrored real-life examples of health-information campaigns concerning healthy and unhealthy beverages, with data collected on seven outcome measures to discern receptivity toward the information and its sources. We found that just highlighting institutional sources in the information did not lead to it being perceived more negatively. This was also the case when the language used could be perceived as patronizing, with reactance only present for one outcome measure. Moreover, while less-educated citizens were generally less receptive to nutrition information (six of seven outcome measures), versions that could possibly be perceived as patronizing or/and highlighted institutional sources did not make them less receptive systematically. Importantly, therefore, while our results show that the dominant health-communication strategies do not increase receptivity either, their use will probably not have a negative effect on the general public and so do not need to be discarded.

Medical students' crisis-induced stress and the association with social support.

BACKGROUND: Medical schools are challenged to guard student wellbeing given the potential negative impact of the COVID-19 outbreak combined with an already high prevalence of mental distress. Although social support is generally associated with less crisis-induced stress, it is unknown whether this applies to medical students during the COVID-19 outbreak. OBJECTIVES: The impact of the COVID-19 outbreak on perceived stress of medical students was assessed by comparing their perceived stress levels during the outbreak to both their own baseline and the previous cohort's pre-COVID-19 stress levels. Then, the association between social support and stress during the COVID-19 outbreak was assessed. METHODS: Dutch Year-1 medical students of cohort 2019 (n = 99) completed the 14-item Perceived Stress Scale (PSS-14) at two time points: baseline (pre-COVID-19) and final measurement (COVID-19). Social support-emotional-informational support and club membership-was assessed during the final measurement. PSS and social support scores were compared to similar measurements of cohort 2018 (n = 196). Students' baseline stress levels, gender, and study performance were controlled for when comparing final stress levels. RESULTS: In cohort 2018 (pre-COVID-19), students' perceived stress levels did not differ significantly between the baseline and final measurements. Additionally, baseline stress levels of the two cohorts (2018 and 2019) were not found to be significantly different. Cohort 2019's final stress levels (COVID-19) were significantly higher compared to their baseline stress levels (paired t-test: t = 6.07, p < .001) and cohort 2018's final stress levels (linear regression: B = 4.186, p < .001). Only during the COVID-19 outbreak higher social support levels-i.e., emotional-informational support (B = -0.75, p < .001) and club membership (B = -3.68, p < .01)-were associated with lower stress levels. CONCLUSIONS: During the COVID-19 outbreak, medical students' perceived stress levels were higher-especially for students with lower social support levels. Our results suggest that medical schools should optimize social support to minimize crisis-induced stress.

"Following Your Gut" or "Questioning the Scientific Evidence": Understanding Vaccine Skepticism among More-Educated Dutch Parents.

This study aims to understand vaccine skepticism among a population where it is remarkably prevalent-more-educated Dutch parents-through 31 in-depth interviews. Whereas all respondents ascribe a central role to the individual in obtaining knowledge (i.e., individualist epistemology), this is expressed in two repertoires. A neoromantic one focuses on deriving truth through intuition and following a "natural" path and informs a risk typology: embracing (refusing) "natural" ("unnatural") risks such as "childhood diseases" ("pharmaceutical substances"). A critical-reflexive repertoire centers on scientific methods but is skeptical about the scientific consensus and informs a risk calculation: opting for the choice perceived to bear the smallest risk. Thus, the same vaccine can be rejected because of its perceived harm to natural processes (neoromantic repertoire) or because its scientific basis is deemed insufficient (critical-reflexive repertoire). Moreover, these opposing repertoires are likely to inspire different responses to the same health-related information.

Dutch COVID-19 lockdown measures increased trust in government and trust in science: A difference-in-differences analysis.

Many governments have implemented strict lockdown measures to prevent the transmission of the new coronavirus (SARS-CoV-2). Compliance with these restrictions is vital and depends greatly on the level of trust in the institutions central to their development and implementation. The objectives of this study were to assess: (1) the effects of the Dutch lockdown measures imposed in March 2020 on trust in government and trust in science; and (2) whether these differ across social groups. We draw on unique data from the high-quality Longitudinal Internet Studies for the Social Sciences panel, which comprises a true probability sample of Dutch households (average participation rate: 80.4%). Our data were collected on an ongoing basis from December 2017 to March 2020 (n = 2219). Using the implementation of lockdown measures in mid-March as a natural experiment, we employed difference-in-differences analyses to assess the causal effect of the Dutch lockdown measures on trust in government and trust in science. We estimated that the imposition of the measures caused an 18% increase (95% confidence interval (CI):15%-21%)) in trust in government and a 6% increase (95% CI: 4%-8%) in trust in science. The impact on trust in government was greater among the participants aged 65 and older and those with poor self-assessed health, although the relevant CIs were wide and, in the case of self-assessed health, included the null. No differential effects were observed for trust in science. Our study indicates that the strict public-health measures imposed in the Netherlands during an acute phase of the COVID-19 pandemic generated trust in the institutions involved in drafting and implementing them, especially among those with a higher risk of serious health outcomes. This suggests that, to prevent a major public-health crisis, people appreciate firm government intervention during the acute phase of an infectious disease pandemic.

Populism and Support for Protectionism: The Relevance of Opposition to Trade Openness for Leftist and Rightist Populist Voting in The Netherlands.

Leftist and rightist populist parties in Western Europe both oppose trade openness. Is support for economic protectionism also relevant for their electorates? We assess this in the Netherlands, where both types of populist parties have seats in parliament. Analyses of representative survey data (n = 1,296) demonstrate that support for protectionism drives voting for such parties, as do the well-established determinants of political distrust (both populist constituencies), economic egalitarianism (leftist populist constituency) and ethnocentrism (rightist populist constituency). Surprisingly, support for protectionism does not mediate the relationship between economic egalitarianism and voting for left-wing populists, or the link between political distrust and voting for either left-wing or right-wing populist parties. In contrast, support for protectionism partly mediates the association between ethnocentrism and voting for right-wing populists. We discuss the largely independent role of protectionism in populist voting in relation to the cultural cleavage in politics and electoral competition, and also provide suggestions for future research.