Representational geometry of perceptual decisions in the monkey parietal cortex.

Lateral intraparietal (LIP) neurons represent formation of perceptual decisions involving eye movements. In circuit models for these decisions, neural ensembles that encode actions compete to form decisions. Consequently, representation and readout of the decision variables (DVs) are implemented similarly for decisions with identical competing actions, irrespective of input and task context differences. Further, DVs are encoded as partially potentiated action plans through balance of activity of action-selective ensembles. Here, we test those core principles. We show that in a novel face-discrimination task, LIP firing rates decrease with supporting evidence, contrary to conventional motion-discrimination tasks. These opposite response patterns arise from similar mechanisms in which decisions form along curved population-response manifolds misaligned with action representations. These manifolds rotate in state space based on context, indicating distinct optimal readouts for different tasks. We show similar manifolds in lateral and medial prefrontal cortices, suggesting similar representational geometry across decision-making circuits.

Decoding and perturbing decision states in real time.

In dynamic environments, subjects often integrate multiple samples of a signal and combine them to reach a categorical judgment1. The process of deliberation can be described by a time-varying decision variable (DV), decoded from neural population activity, that predicts a subject's upcoming decision2. Within single trials, however, there are large moment-to-moment fluctuations in the DV, the behavioural significance of which is unclear. Here, using real-time, neural feedback control of stimulus duration, we show that within-trial DV fluctuations, decoded from motor cortex, are tightly linked to decision state in macaques, predicting behavioural choices substantially better than the condition-averaged DV or the visual stimulus alone. Furthermore, robust changes in DV sign have the statistical regularities expected from behavioural studies of changes of mind3. Probing the decision process on single trials with weak stimulus pulses, we find evidence for time-varying absorbing decision bounds, enabling us to distinguish between specific models of decision making.

Shifting attention to accuracy can reduce misinformation online.

In recent years, there has been a great deal of concern about the proliferation of false and misleading news on social media1-4. Academics and practitioners alike have asked why people share such misinformation, and sought solutions to reduce the sharing of misinformation5-7. Here, we attempt to address both of these questions. First, we find that the veracity of headlines has little effect on sharing intentions, despite having a large effect on judgments of accuracy. This dissociation suggests that sharing does not necessarily indicate belief. Nonetheless, most participants say it is important to share only accurate news. To shed light on this apparent contradiction, we carried out four survey experiments and a field experiment on Twitter; the results show that subtly shifting attention to accuracy increases the quality of news that people subsequently share. Together with additional computational analyses, these findings indicate that people often share misinformation because their attention is focused on factors other than accuracy-and therefore they fail to implement a strongly held preference for accurate sharing. Our results challenge the popular claim that people value partisanship over accuracy8,9, and provide evidence for scalable attention-based interventions that social media platforms could easily implement to counter misinformation online.

A unified framework for perceived magnitude and discriminability of sensory stimuli.

The perception of sensory attributes is often quantified through measurements of sensitivity (the ability to detect small stimulus changes), as well as through direct judgments of appearance or intensity. Despite their ubiquity, the relationship between these two measurements remains controversial and unresolved. Here, we propose a framework in which they arise from different aspects of a common representation. Specifically, we assume that judgments of stimulus intensity (e.g., as measured through rating scales) reflect the mean value of an internal representation, and sensitivity reflects a combination of mean value and noise properties, as quantified by the statistical measure of Fisher information. Unique identification of these internal representation properties can be achieved by combining measurements of sensitivity and judgments of intensity. As a central example, we show that Weber's law of perceptual sensitivity can coexist with Stevens' power-law scaling of intensity ratings (for all exponents), when the noise amplitude increases in proportion to the representational mean. We then extend this result beyond the Weber's law range by incorporating a more general and physiology-inspired form of noise and show that the combination of noise properties and sensitivity measurements accurately predicts intensity ratings across a variety of sensory modalities and attributes. Our framework unifies two primary perceptual measurements-thresholds for sensitivity and rating scales for intensity-and provides a neural interpretation for the underlying representation.

Systematic testing of three Language Models reveals low language accuracy, absence of response stability, and a yes-response bias.

Humans are universally good in providing stable and accurate judgments about what forms part of their language and what not. Large Language Models (LMs) are claimed to possess human-like language abilities; hence, they are expected to emulate this behavior by providing both stable and accurate answers, when asked whether a string of words complies with or deviates from their next-word predictions. This work tests whether stability and accuracy are showcased by GPT-3/text-davinci-002, GPT-3/text-davinci-003, and ChatGPT, using a series of judgment tasks that tap on 8 linguistic phenomena: plural attraction, anaphora, center embedding, comparatives, intrusive resumption, negative polarity items, order of adjectives, and order of adverbs. For every phenomenon, 10 sentences (5 grammatical and 5 ungrammatical) are tested, each randomly repeated 10 times, totaling 800 elicited judgments per LM (total n = 2,400). Our results reveal variable above-chance accuracy in the grammatical condition, below-chance accuracy in the ungrammatical condition, a significant instability of answers across phenomena, and a yes-response bias for all the tested LMs. Furthermore, we found no evidence that repetition aids the Models to converge on a processing strategy that culminates in stable answers, either accurate or inaccurate. We demonstrate that the LMs' performance in identifying (un)grammatical word patterns is in stark contrast to what is observed in humans (n = 80, tested on the same tasks) and argue that adopting LMs as theories of human language is not motivated at their current stage of development.

Deriving the number of salience maps an observer has from the number and quality of concurrent centroid judgments.

[C. Koch, S. Ullman, Hum. Neurobiol.4, 219-227 (1985)] proposed a 2D topographical salience map that took feature-map outputs as its input and represented the importance "saliency" of the feature inputs at each location as a real number. The computation on the map, "winner-take-all," was used to predict action priority. We propose that the same or a similar map is used to compute centroid judgments, the center of a cloud of diverse items. [P. Sun, V. Chu, G. Sperling, Atten. Percept. Psychophys.83, 934-955 (2021)] demonstrated that following a 250-msec exposure of a 24-dot array of 3 intermixed colors, subjects could accurately report the centroid of each dot color, thereby indicating that these subjects had at least three salience maps. Here, we use a postcue, partial-report paradigm to determine how many more salience maps subjects might have. In 11 experiments, subjects viewed 0.3-s flashes of 28 to 32 item arrays composed of M, M = 3,...,8, different features followed by a cue to mouse-click the centroid of items of just the post-cued feature. Ideal detector response analyses show that subjects utilized at least 12 to 17 stimulus items. By determining whether a subject's performance in (M-1)-feature experiments could/could-not predict performance in M-feature experiments, we conclude that one subject has at least 7 and the other two have at least five salience maps. A computational model shows that the primary performance-limiting factors are channel capacity for representing so many concurrently presented groups of items and working-memory capacity for so many computed centroids.

Generically partisan: Polarization in political communication.

American political parties continue to grow more polarized, but the extent of ideological polarization among the public is much less than the extent of perceived polarization (what the ideological gap is believed to be). Perceived polarization is concerning because of its link to interparty hostility, but it remains unclear what drives this phenomenon. We propose that a tendency for individuals to form broad generalizations about groups on the basis of inconsistent evidence may be partly responsible. We study this tendency by measuring the interpretation, endorsement, and recall of category-referring statements, also known as generics (e.g., "Democrats favor affirmative action"). In study 1 (n = 417), perceived polarization was substantially greater than actual polarization. Further, participants endorsed generics as long as they were true more often of the target party (e.g., Democrats favor affirmative action) than of the opposing party (e.g., Republicans favor affirmative action), even when they believed such statements to be true for well below 50% of the relevant party. Study 2 (n = 928) found that upon receiving information from political elites, people tended to recall these statements as generic, regardless of whether the original statement was generic or not. Study 3 (n = 422) found that generic statements regarding new political information led to polarized judgments and did so more than nongeneric statements. Altogether, the data indicate a tendency toward holding mental representations of political claims that exaggerate party differences. These findings suggest that the use of generic language, common in everyday speech, enables inferential errors that exacerbate perceived polarization.

The Geometry of Low- and High-Level Perceptual Spaces.

Low-level features are typically continuous (e.g., the gamut between two colors), but semantic information is often categorical (there is no corresponding gradient between dog and turtle) and hierarchical (animals live in land, water, or air). To determine the impact of these differences on cognitive representations, we characterized the geometry of perceptual spaces of five domains: a domain dominated by semantic information (animal names presented as words), a domain dominated by low-level features (colored textures), and three intermediate domains (animal images, lightly texturized animal images that were easy to recognize, and heavily texturized animal images that were difficult to recognize). Each domain had 37 stimuli derived from the same animal names. From 13 participants (9F), we gathered similarity judgments in each domain via an efficient psychophysical ranking paradigm. We then built geometric models of each domain for each participant, in which distances between stimuli accounted for participants' similarity judgments and intrinsic uncertainty. Remarkably, the five domains had similar global properties: each required 5-7 dimensions, and a modest amount of spherical curvature provided the best fit. However, the arrangement of the stimuli within these embeddings depended on the level of semantic information: dendrograms derived from semantic domains (word, image, and lightly texturized images) were more "tree-like" than those from feature-dominated domains (heavily texturized images and textures). Thus, the perceptual spaces of domains along this feature-dominated to semantic-dominated gradient shift to a tree-like organization when semantic information dominates, while retaining a similar global geometry.

Intracranial Recordings of the Human Orbitofrontal Cortical Activity during Self-Referential Episodic and Valenced Self-Judgments.

We recorded directly from the orbital (oPFC) and ventromedial (vmPFC) subregions of the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) in 22 (9 female, 13 male) epilepsy patients undergoing intracranial electroencephalography (iEEG) monitoring during an experimental task in which the participants judged the accuracy of self-referential autobiographical statements as well as valenced self-judgments (SJs). We found significantly increased high-frequency activity (HFA) in ∼13% of oPFC sites (10/18 subjects) and 16% of vmPFC sites (4/12 subjects) during both of these self-referential thought processes, with the HFA power being modulated by the content of self-referential stimuli. The location of these activated sites corresponded with the location of fMRI-identified limbic network. Furthermore, the onset of HFA in the vmPFC was significantly earlier than that in the oPFC in all patients with simultaneous recordings in both regions. In 11 patients with available depression scores from comprehensive neuropsychological assessments, we documented diminished HFA in the OFC during positive SJ trials among individuals with higher depression scores; responses during negative SJ trials were not related to the patients' depression scores. Our findings provide new temporal and anatomical information about the mode of engagement in two important subregions of the OFC during autobiographical memory and SJ conditions. Our findings from the OFC support the hypothesis that diminished brain activity during positive self-evaluations, rather than heightened activity during negative self-evaluations, plays a key role in the pathophysiology of depression.

Value Estimation versus Effort Mobilization: A General Dissociation between Ventromedial and Dorsomedial Prefrontal Cortex.

Deciding on a course of action requires both an accurate estimation of option values and the right amount of effort invested in deliberation to reach sufficient confidence in the final choice. In a previous study, we have provided evidence, across a series of judgment and choice tasks, for a dissociation between the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC), which would represent option values, and the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC), which would represent the duration of deliberation. Here, we first replicate this dissociation and extend it to the case of an instrumental learning task, in which 24 human volunteers (13 women) choose between options associated with probabilistic gains and losses. According to fMRI data recorded during decision-making, vmPFC activity reflects the sum of option values generated by a reinforcement learning model and dmPFC activity the deliberation time. To further generalize the role of the dmPFC in mobilizing effort, we then analyze fMRI data recorded in the same participants while they prepare to perform motor and cognitive tasks (squeezing a handgrip or making numerical comparisons) to maximize gains or minimize losses. In both cases, dmPFC activity is associated with the output of an effort regulation model, and not with response time. Taken together, these results strengthen a general theory of behavioral control that implicates the vmPFC in the estimation of option values and the dmPFC in the energization of relevant motor and cognitive processes.

Adaptive adjustment after conflict with group opinion: evidence from neural electrophysiology.

Individuals inherently seek social consensus when making decisions or judgments. Previous studies have consistently indicated that dissenting group opinions are perceived as social conflict that demands attitude adjustment. However, the neurocognitive processes of attitude adjustment are unclear. In this electrophysiological study, participants were recruited to perform a face attractiveness judgment task. After forming their own judgment of a face, participants were informed of a purported group judgment (either consistent or inconsistent with their judgment), and then, critically, the same face was presented again. The neural responses to the second presented faces were measured. The second presented faces evoked a larger late positive potential after conflict with group opinions than those that did not conflict, suggesting that more motivated attention was allocated to stimulus. Moreover, faces elicited greater midfrontal theta (4-7 Hz) power after conflict with group opinions than after consistency with group opinions, suggesting that cognitive control was initiated to support attitude adjustment. Furthermore, the mixed-effects model revealed that single-trial theta power predicted behavioral change in the Conflict condition, but not in the No-Conflict condition. These findings provide novel insights into the neurocognitive processes underlying attitude adjustment, which is crucial to behavioral change during conformity.

Distinct neural markers of evidence accumulation index metacognitive processing before and after simple visual decisions.

Perceptual decision-making is affected by uncertainty arising from the reliability of incoming sensory evidence (perceptual uncertainty) and the categorization of that evidence relative to a choice boundary (categorical uncertainty). Here, we investigated how these factors impact the temporal dynamics of evidence processing during decision-making and subsequent metacognitive judgments. Participants performed a motion discrimination task while electroencephalography was recorded. We manipulated perceptual uncertainty by varying motion coherence, and categorical uncertainty by varying the angular offset of motion signals relative to a criterion. After each trial, participants rated their desire to change their mind. High uncertainty impaired perceptual and metacognitive judgments and reduced the amplitude of the centro-parietal positivity, a neural marker of evidence accumulation. Coherence and offset affected the centro-parietal positivity at different time points, suggesting that perceptual and categorical uncertainty affect decision-making in sequential stages. Moreover, the centro-parietal positivity predicted participants' metacognitive judgments: larger predecisional centro-parietal positivity amplitude was associated with less desire to change one's mind, whereas larger postdecisional centro-parietal positivity amplitude was associated with greater desire to change one's mind, but only following errors. These findings reveal a dissociation between predecisional and postdecisional evidence processing, suggesting that the CPP tracks potentially distinct cognitive processes before and after a decision.

Neural mechanisms of sequential dependence in time perception: the impact of prior task and memory processing.

Our perception and decision-making are susceptible to prior context. Such sequential dependence has been extensively studied in the visual domain, but less is known about its impact on time perception. Moreover, there are ongoing debates about whether these sequential biases occur at the perceptual stage or during subsequent post-perceptual processing. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging, we investigated neural mechanisms underlying temporal sequential dependence and the role of action in time judgments across trials. Participants performed a timing task where they had to remember the duration of green coherent motion and were cued to either actively reproduce its duration or simply view it passively. We found that sequential biases in time perception were only evident when the preceding task involved active duration reproduction. Merely encoding a prior duration without reproduction failed to induce such biases. Neurally, we observed activation in networks associated with timing, such as striato-thalamo-cortical circuits, and performance monitoring networks, particularly when a "Response" trial was anticipated. Importantly, the hippocampus showed sensitivity to these sequential biases, and its activation negatively correlated with the individual's sequential bias following active reproduction trials. These findings highlight the significant role of memory networks in shaping time-related sequential biases at the post-perceptual stages.

Atypical neural encoding of faces in individuals with autism spectrum disorder.

Individuals with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) experience pervasive difficulties in processing social information from faces. However, the behavioral and neural mechanisms underlying social trait judgments of faces in ASD remain largely unclear. Here, we comprehensively addressed this question by employing functional neuroimaging and parametrically generated faces that vary in facial trustworthiness and dominance. Behaviorally, participants with ASD exhibited reduced specificity but increased inter-rater variability in social trait judgments. Neurally, participants with ASD showed hypo-activation across broad face-processing areas. Multivariate analysis based on trial-by-trial face responses could discriminate participant groups in the majority of the face-processing areas. Encoding social traits in ASD engaged vastly different face-processing areas compared to controls, and encoding different social traits engaged different brain areas. Interestingly, the idiosyncratic brain areas encoding social traits in ASD were still flexible and context-dependent, similar to neurotypicals. Additionally, participants with ASD also showed an altered encoding of facial saliency features in the eyes and mouth. Together, our results provide a comprehensive understanding of the neural mechanisms underlying social trait judgments in ASD.

Metacognition and Confidence: A Review and Synthesis.

Determining the psychological, computational, and neural bases of confidence and uncertainty holds promise for understanding foundational aspects of human metacognition. While a neuroscience of confidence has focused on the mechanisms underpinning subpersonal phenomena such as representations of uncertainty in the visual or motor system, metacognition research has been concerned with personal-level beliefs and knowledge about self-performance. I provide a road map for bridging this divide by focusing on a particular class of confidence computation: propositional confidence in one's own (hypothetical) decisions or actions. Propositional confidence is informed by the observer's models of the world and their cognitive system, which may be more or less accurate-thus explaining why metacognitive judgments are inferential and sometimes diverge from task performance. Disparate findings on the neural basis of uncertainty and performance monitoring are integrated into a common framework, and a new understanding of the locus of action of metacognitive interventions is developed.

What Goes into Patient Selection for Lung Cancer Screening? Factors Associated with Clinician Judgments of Suitability for Screening.

Rationale: Achieving the net benefit of lung cancer screening (LCS) depends on optimizing patient selection. Objective: To identify factors associated with clinician assessments that a patient was unlikely to benefit from LCS ("LCS-inappropriate") because of comorbidities or limited life expectancy. Methods: Retrospective analysis of patients assessed for LCS at 30 Veterans Health Administration facilities from January 1, 2015 to February 1, 2021. We conducted hierarchical mixed-effects logistic regression analyses to determine factors associated with clinicians' designations of LCS inappropriateness (primary outcome), accounting for 3-year predicted probability (i.e., competing risk) of non-lung cancer death. Measurements and Main Results: Among 38,487 LCS-eligible patients, 1,671 (4.3%) were deemed LCS-inappropriate by clinicians, whereas 4,383 (11.4%) had an estimated 3-year competing risk of non-lung cancer death greater than 20%. Patients with higher competing risks of non-lung cancer death were more likely to be deemed LCS-inappropriate (odds ratio [OR], 2.66; 95% confidence interval [CI], 2.32-3.05). Older patients (ages 75-80; OR, 1.45; 95% CI, 1.18-1.78) and those with interstitial lung disease (OR, 1.98; 95% CI, 1.51-2.59) were more likely to be deemed LCS-inappropriate than would be explained by competing risk of non-lung cancer death, whereas patients currently smoking (OR, 0.65; 95% CI, 0.58-0.73) were less likely to be deemed LCS-inappropriate, suggesting that clinicians over- or underweighted these factors. The probability of being deemed LCS-inappropriate varied from 0.4% to 74%, depending on the clinician making the assessment (median OR, 3.07; 95% CI, 2.89-3.25). Conclusion: Concerningly, the likelihood that a patient is deemed LCS-inappropriate is more strongly associated with the clinician making the assessment than with patient characteristics. Patient selection may be optimized by providing decision support to help clinicians assess net LCS benefit.

Coordination and expertise foster legal textualism.

A cross-cultural survey experiment revealed a dominant tendency to rely on a rule's letter over its spirit when deciding which behaviors violate the rule. This tendency varied markedly across (k = 15) countries, owing to variation in the impact of moral appraisals on judgments of rule violation. Compared with laypeople, legal experts were more inclined to disregard their moral evaluations of the acts altogether and consequently exhibited stronger textualist tendencies. Finally, we evaluated a plausible mechanism for the emergence of textualism: in a two-player coordination game, incentives to coordinate in the absence of communication reinforced participants' adherence to rules' literal meaning. Together, these studies (total n = 5,794) help clarify the origins and allure of textualism, especially in the law. Within heterogeneous communities in which members diverge in their moral appraisals involving a rule's purpose, the rule's literal meaning provides a clear focal point-an identifiable point of agreement enabling coordinated interpretation among citizens, lawmakers, and judges.

Deep models of superficial face judgments.

The diversity of human faces and the contexts in which they appear gives rise to an expansive stimulus space over which people infer psychological traits (e.g., trustworthiness or alertness) and other attributes (e.g., age or adiposity). Machine learning methods, in particular deep neural networks, provide expressive feature representations of face stimuli, but the correspondence between these representations and various human attribute inferences is difficult to determine because the former are high-dimensional vectors produced via black-box optimization algorithms. Here we combine deep generative image models with over 1 million judgments to model inferences of more than 30 attributes over a comprehensive latent face space. The predictive accuracy of our model approaches human interrater reliability, which simulations suggest would not have been possible with fewer faces, fewer judgments, or lower-dimensional feature representations. Our model can be used to predict and manipulate inferences with respect to arbitrary face photographs or to generate synthetic photorealistic face stimuli that evoke impressions tuned along the modeled attributes.

Breakdown of utilitarian moral judgement after basolateral amygdala damage.

Most of us would regard killing another person as morally wrong, but when the death of one saves multiple others, it can be morally permitted. According to a prominent computational dual-systems framework, in these life-and-death dilemmas, deontological (nonsacrificial) moral judgments stem from a model-free algorithm that emphasizes the intrinsic value of the sacrificial action, while utilitarian (sacrificial) moral judgments are derived from a model-based algorithm that emphasizes the outcome of the sacrificial action. Rodent decision-making research suggests that the model-based algorithm depends on the basolateral amygdala (BLA), but these findings have not yet been translated to human moral decision-making. Here, in five humans with selective, bilateral BLA damage, we show a breakdown of utilitarian sacrificial moral judgments, pointing at deficient model-based moral decision-making. Across an established set of moral dilemmas, healthy controls frequently sacrifice one person to save numerous others, but BLA-damaged humans withhold such sacrificial judgments even at the cost of thousands of lives. Our translational research confirms a neurocomputational hypothesis drawn from rodent decision-making research by indicating that the model-based algorithm which underlies outcome-based, utilitarian moral judgements in humans critically depends on the BLA.