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OBJECTIVES: There is growing evidence of intergroup hostility between vaccinated and unvaccinated individuals, a process of polarization that threatens to derail population health efforts. This study explores the moral underpinnings of intergroup antipathy between vaccinated and unvaccinated individuals. DESIGN: A cross-sectional design was employed to investigate the associations between the view of vaccination as a social contract or individual choice, perceived vulnerability to disease, perceptions of outgroup morality, feelings of warmth, and experiences of schadenfreude. METHODS: Data were extracted from an online, quantitative survey of 233 vaccinated and 237 unvaccinated participants collected between June and July 2022. RESULTS: Results revealed that vaccinated people had stronger negative attitudes towards unvaccinated people than vice versa. In line with hypotheses, the extent to which vaccinated people saw vaccination as a social contract was significantly associated with perceiving unvaccinated people as immoral. For unvaccinated people, seeing vaccination as an individual choice (the opposite of a social contract) was significantly associated with perceiving vaccinated people as immoral. Among both groups, viewing the other as immoral was associated with feeling significantly less warmth towards the opposing vaccination group, and more schadenfreude in the face of an outgroup member's suffering. Participants' perceived vulnerability to disease played a relatively small role in explaining polarization between vaccinated and unvaccinated people. CONCLUSIONS: This research builds on previous studies by identifying moral mechanisms associated with intergroup antipathy in the vaccine debate.
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Lay beliefs about human trait heritability are consequential for cooperation and social cohesion, yet there has been no global characterisation of these beliefs. Participants from 30 countries (N = 6128) reported heritability beliefs for intelligence, personality, body weight and criminality, and transnational factors that could influence these beliefs were explored using public nation-level data. Globally, mean lay beliefs differ from published heritability (h2) estimated by twin studies, with a worldwide majority overestimating the heritability of personality and intelligence, and underestimating body weight and criminality. Criminality was seen as substantially less attributable to genes than other traits. People from countries with high infant mortality tended to ascribe greater heritability for most traits, relative to people from low infant mortality countries. This study provides the first systematic foray into worldwide lay heritability beliefs. Future research must incorporate diverse global perspectives to further contextualise and extend upon these findings.
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In the age of misinformation, conspiracy theories can have far-reaching consequences for individuals and society. Social and emotional experiences throughout the life course, such as loneliness, may be associated with a tendency to hold conspiracist worldviews. Here, we present results from a population-based sample of Norwegians followed for almost three decades, from adolescence into midlife (N = 2215). We examine participants' life trajectories of loneliness using latent growth curve modeling. We show that people reporting high levels of loneliness in adolescence, and those who experience increasing loneliness over the life course, are more likely to endorse conspiracy worldviews in midlife.
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Soledad , Soledad/psicología , Humanos , Femenino , Masculino , Persona de Mediana Edad , Adolescente , Adulto , Noruega , Adulto Joven , Estudios LongitudinalesRESUMEN
Cultured meat (also referred to as cultivated, cell-based, or cell-cultured meat) is a novel food technology that is presented as a method of meat production without reliance on large-scale industrial farming. The pro-cultured meat narrative rests, in part, on a moral foundation: cultured meat is purported to alleviate the environmental and animal welfare harms associated with farmed meat. Despite this narrative, no research has examined which moral values underpin attitudes towards cultured meat. To examine this, we surveyed 1861 participants from the United States and Germany about their moral foundations and their attitudes towards cultured meat. In line with predictions, people who more strongly endorse moral values about purity (i.e., had higher scores on the purity subscale of the moral foundations scale) held more negative attitudes towards cultured meat. However, this relationship was much more consistent among participants from the United States than participants from Germany. Against predictions, attitudes towards cultured meat were not reliably associated with the extent to which people focus on harm as a moral foundation. The latter finding was particularly surprising in light of harm-reduction narratives around cultured meat. These findings demonstrate the need for a more nuanced discussion about, and understanding of, consumer concerns around cultured meat and the values that underpin them.
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Actitud , Carne in Vitro , Animales , Humanos , Principios Morales , Carne , Encuestas y CuestionariosRESUMEN
By middle childhood, children become aware that discriminatory behavior is unacceptable; however, the development of their anti-prejudice sentiments is largely unknown. Across two studies, 333 Australian 5- to 10-year-olds (51% female, majority White) were asked how acceptable they thought it was to have prejudicial sentiments toward 25 different targets. Children responded privately through a novel digital paradigm designed to minimize social-desirability biases. With age, children were more likely to display anti-prejudice sentiments toward targets who are prosocial, vulnerable, and of minority race and linguistic backgrounds. In contrast, they judged prejudice as "okay" for targets who are antisocial and negatively regarded in society. These findings suggest that children's perceptions of prejudice become increasingly nuanced and adult-like across the primary school years.
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Juicio , Percepción Social , Adulto , Niño , Humanos , Femenino , Masculino , Australia , Prejuicio , ActitudRESUMEN
Societal problems are not solved by individualistic interventions, but nor are systemic approaches optimal given their neglect of the social psychology underpinning group dynamics. This impasse can be addressed through a group-level analysis (a "g-frame") that social identity theorizing affords. Using a g-frame can make policy interventions more adaptive, inclusive, and engaging.
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Dinámica de Grupo , Política Pública , Humanos , Identificación SocialRESUMEN
We explored the psychology of those who believe in manifestation: the ability to cosmically attract success in life through positive self-talk, visualization, and symbolic actions (e.g., acting as if something is true). In three studies (collective N = 1,023), we developed a reliable and valid measure-the Manifestation Scale-and found over one third of participants endorsed manifestation beliefs. Those who scored higher on the scale perceived themselves as more successful, had stronger aspirations for success, and believed they were more likely to achieve future success. They were also more likely to be drawn to risky investments, have experienced bankruptcy, and to believe they could achieve an unlikely level of success more quickly. We discuss the potential positives and negatives of this belief system in the context of growing public desire for success and an industry that capitalizes on these desires.
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There is a lay assumption that women's sexual desire varies substantially over time, whereas men's is stable. This assumption is mirrored in prominent theories of desire, which posit that women are more variable than men in the extent to which they desire sex, and that women's sexual desire is more contextually sensitive than men's. We tested this assumption across three longitudinal studies. Study 1 assessed desire at 3 time points spanning 13 years (Nobservations = 5562), and Studies 2 and 3 (Nobservations = 11,282) assessed desire moment-to-moment over 7 days. When desire was measured over years, women were more variable in their sexual desire than men (Study 1). However, we found a different pattern of results when desire was measured over the short term. In Studies 2 and 3, we found no significant differences in women's and men's desire variability. The extent to which desire varied as a function of affective states (e.g., happiness) and relationship-oriented states (e.g., partner closeness) was similar for women and men, with some exceptions; women's desire was more negatively associated with tiredness and anger in Study 2. These data qualify existing assumptions about sex differences in sexual desire variability.
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Libido , Hombres , Humanos , Femenino , Masculino , Hombres/psicología , Caracteres Sexuales , Emociones , Felicidad , Conducta Sexual/psicología , Parejas Sexuales/psicologíaRESUMEN
Conspiracy theories are part of mainstream public life, with the potential to undermine governments, promote racism, ignite extremism and threaten public health efforts. Psychological research on conspiracy theories is booming, with more than half of the academic articles on the topic published since 2019. In this Review, we synthesize the literature with an eye to understanding the psychological factors that shape willingness to believe conspiracy theories. We begin at the individual level, examining the cognitive, clinical, motivational, personality and developmental factors that predispose people to believe conspiracy theories. Drawing on insights from social and evolutionary psychology, we then review research examining conspiracy theories as an intergroup phenomenon that reflects and reinforces societal fault lines. Finally, we examine how conspiracy theories are shaped by the economic, political, cultural and socio-historical contexts at the national level. This multilevel approach offers a deep and broad insight into conspiracist thinking that increases understanding of the problem and offers potential solutions.
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The Australian bushfires in 2019-20 triggered massive amounts of charitable giving from the community. This study applied agenda-setting theory to examine if and how disaster news coverage influenced public donations in response to the crisis. A survey of 949 Australians found that people perceived news coverage of the event to be a strong influence on the amount they donated to bushfire appeals, over and above past giving levels. Furthermore, media coverage was more influential in participants' charity selection than both peer influence and direct communications from the charities. Next, a textual analysis of international news coverage of the event (N = 30,239 unique articles) was conducted. Compared to a control corpus of text, news coverage of the disaster used words related to 'money' and 'support' at disproportionately high frequencies. Together, the studies suggest that the media plays an agenda-setting role in determining how and to what extent people give to disaster appeals.
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Desastres , Humanos , Australia , Organizaciones de Beneficencia , Encuestas y Cuestionarios , ComunicaciónRESUMEN
Standard-accented job candidates are perceived as more hireable than non-standard-accented candidates. Two broad perspectives have emerged as to what drives this effect: (a) that it is a pragmatic response to the perception that non-standard accents can impede job-relevant communication (processing fluency explanation) and/or (b) that non-standard accents signal "otherness" and candidates are devalued as a result (prejudice explanation). This meta-analytic integration of 139 effect sizes (N = 4,576) examined these two perspectives. Standard-accented candidates were considered more hireable than non-standard-accented candidates (d = 0.47)-a bias that was stronger for high communication jobs. Other findings, however, are difficult to explain from a processing fluency explanation: candidates' relative comprehensibility was not a significant moderator of hiring bias. Moreover, the degree of accent bias was associated with perceptions of the candidates' social status, and accent bias was particularly pronounced among female candidates and for candidates who spoke in foreign (as compared with regional) accents.
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Despite over 50 years of messaging about the reality of human-caused climate change, substantial portions of the population remain sceptical. Furthermore, many sceptics remain unmoved by standard science communication strategies, such as myth busting and evidence building. To understand this, we examine psychological and structural reasons why climate change misinformation is prevalent. First, we review research on motivated reasoning: how interpretations of climate science are shaped by vested interests and ideologies. Second, we examine climate scepticism as a form of political followership. Third, we examine infrastructures of disinformation: the funding, lobbying and political operatives that lend climate scepticism its power. Guiding this Review are two principles: (1) to understand scepticism, one must account for the interplay between individual psychologies and structural forces; and (2) global data are required to understand this global problem. In the spirit of optimism, we finish by describing six strategies for reducing the destructive influence of climate scepticism.
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Cambio Climático , Comunicación , Humanos , Desinformación , Optimismo , Solución de ProblemasRESUMEN
Failure of individuals to voluntarily observe regulations and recommendations around mitigating COVID-19 (e.g. social distancing; frequent handwashing) is often cited as a reason why some countries struggled to curtail the spread of the virus. Understanding the factors that are associated with people's willingness to comply with COVID-19 regulations and recommendations is an important step in helping policy makers and health officials reduce the impact of this (and future) pandemics. In the current study we examined this question in one of the countries hardest hit by the pandemic: Spain. A large, representative survey (N = 2100) revealed that several factors were positively associated with willingness to comply to COVID-19 regulations and recommendations. In decreasing order of predictive value, these were: (i) perceptions of whether friends and family were complying (i.e. norms), (ii) trust in science as a basis for lawmaking, (iii) perceived effectiveness of regulations and (iv) perception of risk of infection. These results point to the importance of influencing social norms as the primary way to improve adherence to the health regulations of COVID-19; more important than intrapsychic considerations such as efficacy and risk.
Responding effectively to a pandemic such as COVID-19 requires citizens to voluntarily comply with certain recommendations and regulations; for example, social distancing and frequent handwashing. The current study examined a large, representative sample of over 2000 residents of Spain to find out what factors are associated with compliance (or non-compliance) with COVID-19 regulations and recommendations. The factor most closely associated with compliance was perceptions of whether friends and family were complying (i.e. the 'social norm'). The second most important factor was trust in science as a basis for lawmaking. Two psychological factors that are normally considered important in driving health behavioursperceived effectiveness of regulations and perception of risk of infectionhad a much weaker relationship with compliance behaviours. The data suggest that social norms are a more important driver of compliance behaviour than individualistic, cost-benefit analyses such as whether the recommended strategies are perceived to be effective in reducing virus spread, and whether people feel they are personally at risk of contracting SARS-CoV-2. In sum, the results point to the importance of influencing social norms as a key way to improve adherence to health regulations associated with COVID-19.
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COVID-19 , Humanos , COVID-19/prevención & control , España , SARS-CoV-2 , Confianza , Autoinforme , Normas Sociales , PercepciónRESUMEN
Conspiracy beliefs are not just generated by "under-the-skull" individual factors, but are shaped also by cultural, economic, and institutional realities. A scan of the literature-complemented by our own secondary data analyses-suggests a reasonable convergence of evidence that conspiracy beliefs are higher in nations that are more corrupt, more collectivist, and lower in GDP per capita. There is some evidence that conspiracy beliefs may also be shaped by economic inequality, power distance, and authoritarianism, although the evidence base is thin. We also review literature that examines how individual correlates of conspiracy beliefs vary across nations. We discuss challenges associated with conducting international research on conspiracy beliefs and chart a future research agenda for creating truly global insights into conspiracist thinking.
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The COVID-19 pandemic has extensively changed the state of psychological science from what research questions psychologists can ask to which methodologies psychologists can use to investigate them. In this article, we offer a perspective on how to optimize new research in the pandemic's wake. Because this pandemic is inherently a social phenomenon-an event that hinges on human-to-human contact-we focus on socially relevant subfields of psychology. We highlight specific psychological phenomena that have likely shifted as a result of the pandemic and discuss theoretical, methodological, and practical considerations of conducting research on these phenomena. After this discussion, we evaluate metascientific issues that have been amplified by the pandemic. We aim to demonstrate how theoretically grounded views on the COVID-19 pandemic can help make psychological science stronger-not weaker-in its wake.
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COVID-19 , Humanos , Pandemias , SARS-CoV-2RESUMEN
OBJECTIVES: Increasing vaccination hesitancy threatens societies' capacity to contain pandemics and other diseases. One factor that is positively associated with vaccination intentions is a supportive subjective norm (i.e., the perception that close others approve of vaccination). On the downside, there is evidence that negative attitudes toward vaccinations are partly rooted in conspiracy mentality (i.e., the tendency to believe in conspiracies). The objective of this study is to examine the role of subjective norms in moderating the association between conspiracy mentality and vaccine hesitancy. We examined two competing predictions: Are those high in conspiracy mentality immune to subjective norms, or do subjective norms moderate the relationship between conspiracy mentality and vaccination intentions? METHODS: We conducted five studies (total N = 1,280) to test these hypotheses across several vaccination contexts (some real, some fictitious). We measured conspiracy mentality, vaccination intentions, subjective norms, attitudes toward vaccination, and perceived behavioural control. RESULTS: A merged analysis across the studies revealed an interaction effect of conspiracy mentality and subjective norm on vaccination intentions. When subjective norm was high (i.e., when participants perceived that close others approved of vaccines) conspiracy mentality no longer predicted vaccination intentions. This was consistent with the moderating hypothesis of subjective norms and inconsistent with the immunity hypothesis. CONCLUSIONS: The typical negative relationship between conspiracy mentality and vaccination intentions is eliminated among those who perceive pro-vaccination subjective norms. Although correlational, these data raise the possibility that pro-vaccination views of friends and family can be leveraged to reduce vaccine hesitancy.
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Intención , Vacunación , Actitud , Humanos , Pandemias/prevención & control , Encuestas y CuestionariosRESUMEN
We examined whether people who are prone to believe COVID-19 conspiracy theories are characterised by an especially strong concern for others or an especially strong concern for the self, and whether these orientations are associated with willingness to take a COVID-19 vaccine. We surveyed 4,245 participants from eight nations; three months later we re-contacted 1,262 participants from three nations. Belief in COVID-19 conspiracy theories was related to greater concerns about one's own safety, and lower concerns about the safety of close others. Furthermore, conspiracist ideation at Wave 1 predicted reluctance to take a COVID-19 vaccine at Wave 2, mediated through relative concern for self versus others. In sum, people who are high in conspiracy beliefs have relatively higher concern for the self relative to others, with troubling implications for public health.
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Understanding the factors associated with vaccine scepticism is challenging because of the 'small-pockets' problem: The number of highly vaccine-sceptical people is low, and small subsamples such as these can be missed using traditional regression approaches. To overcome this problem, the current study (N = 5,200) used latent profile analysis to uncover six profiles, including two micro-communities of vaccine-sceptical people who have the potential to jeopardize vaccine-led herd immunity. The most vaccine-sceptical group (1.14%) was highly educated and expressed strong liberal tendencies. This group was also the most sceptical about genetically modified crops and nuclear energy, and most likely to receive news about science from the Internet. The second-most vaccine-sceptical group (3.4%) was young, poorly educated, and politically extreme (both left and right). In resolving the small-pockets problem, the current analyses also help reconcile competing theoretical perspectives about the role of education and political ideology in shaping anti-vaccination views.
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Productos Agrícolas , Vacunas , Conocimientos, Actitudes y Práctica en Salud , Humanos , Plantas Modificadas Genéticamente , VacunaciónRESUMEN
There is growing interest in the role of linguistic cues (accents, dialects, language) in driving children's social preferences. This meta-analysis integrated 131 effect sizes involving 2,680 infants and children from 2 days old to 11 years. Overall, children prefer native-accent, native-dialect, and native-language speakers over non-native counterparts (d = 0.57). Meta-regression highlighted that bilinguals (d = 0.93) do not exhibit less native-speaker preference compared to monolinguals (d = 0.62). Children displayed stronger preferences based on accent (d = 1.04) than dialect (d = 0.44) and language (d = 0.39). Children's cultural background, exposure to non-native speech, age, and preference measure were not significant moderators. The data are discussed in light of several theoretical explanations for when and why children show linguistic-based social preferences.