People underestimate the influence of repetition on truth judgments (and more so for themselves than for others).

People judge repeated statements as more truthful than new statements: a truth effect. In three pre-registered experiments (N = 463), we examined whether people expect repetition to influence truth judgments more for others than for themselves: a bias blind spot in the truth effect. In Experiments 1 and 2, using moderately plausible and implausible statements, respectively, the test for the bias blind spot did not pass the significance threshold set for a two-step sequential analysis. Experiment 3 considered moderately plausible statements but with a larger sample of participants. Additionally, it compared actual performance after a two-day delay with participants' predictions for themselves and others. This time, we found clear evidence for a bias blind spot in the truth effect. Experiment 3 also showed that participants underestimated the magnitude of the truth effect, especially so for themselves, and that predictions and actual truth effect scores were not significantly related. Finally, an integrative analysis focusing on a more conservative between-participant approach found clear frequentist and Bayesian evidence for a bias blind spot. Overall, the results indicate that people (1) hold beliefs about the effect of repetition on truth judgments, (2) believe that this effect is larger for others than for themselves, (3) and underestimate the effect's magnitude, and (4) particularly so for themselves.

"Me" means more than "good": stimuli's self-relevance matters more than valence in shaping evaluative learning via the self.

ABSTRACTStimuli that relate to the self tend to be better liked. The Self-Referencing (SR) task is a paradigm whereby one target categorised through the same action as self-stimuli (i.e. possessive pronouns) is preferred over an alternative target categorised through the same action as other-stimuli. Past studies on the SR showed that valence could not fully account for the observed effect. Here we explored self-relevance as a possible explanation. Across four studies (N = 567), participants selected self-relevant and self-irrelevant adjectives to be used as source stimuli in a Personal-SR task. In that task, the two classes of stimuli were paired with two fictitious brands. We measured automatic (IAT) and self-reported preferences, and identification with the brands. Experiment 1 showed that the brand paired with positive self-relevant adjectives became more positive than the one paired with positive self-irrelevant adjectives. Experiment 2 confirmed this pattern with negative adjectives, and Experiment 3 ruled out the effect of a self-serving bias in the adjectives selection. Experiment 4 showed that the brand related to negative self-relevant adjectives was preferred over the brand related to positive self-irrelevant adjectives. We discussed the implications of our results and the potential mechanisms that might explain self-driven preferences.

Not Just About Faces in Context: Face-Context Relation Moderates the Impact of Contextual Threat on Facial Trustworthiness.

Recent work showed that the attribution of facial trustworthiness can be influenced by the surrounding context in which a face is embedded: contexts that convey threat make faces less trustworthy. In four studies (N = 388, three preregistered) we tested whether face-context integration is influenced by how faces and contexts are encoded relationally. In Experiments 1a to 1c, face-context integration was stronger when threatening stimuli were attributable to the human action. Faces were judged less trustworthy when shown in threatening contexts that were ascribable (vs. non-ascribable) to the human action. In Experiment 2, we manipulated face-context relations using instructions. When instructions presented facial stimuli as belonging to the "perpetrators" of the threatening contexts, no difference with the control (no-instructions) condition was found in face-context integration. Instead, the effect was reduced when faces were presented as "victims." We discussed the importance of considering relational reasoning when studying face-context integration.

Truth by repetition Without repetition: Testing the effect of instructed repetition on truth judgments.

Past research indicates that people judge repeated statements as more true than new ones. An experiential consequence of repetition that may underly this "truth effect" is processing fluency: Processing statements feels easier following their repetition. In three preregistered experiments (N = 684), we examined the effect of merely instructed repetition (i.e., not experienced) on truth judgments. Experiments 1-2 instructed participants that some statements were present (vs. absent) in an exposure phase allegedly undergone by other individuals. We then asked them to rate such statements based on how they thought those individuals would have done. Overall, participants rated repeated statements as more true than new statements. The instruction-based repetition effects were significant but also significantly weaker than those elicited by the experience of repetition (Experiments 1 and 2). Additionally, Experiment 2 clarified that adding a repetition status tag in the experienced repetition condition did not impact truth judgments. Experiment 3 further showed that the instruction-based effect was still detectable when participants provided truth judgments for themselves rather than estimating other people's judgments. We discuss the mechanisms that can explain these effects and their implications for advancing our understanding of the truth effect. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Untrusted under threat: on the superior bond between trustworthiness and threat in face-context integration.

The face is a powerful source to make inferences about one's trustworthiness. Recent studies demonstrated that facial trustworthiness is influenced by the level of threat conveyed by the visual scene in which faces are embedded: untrustworthy-looking faces are more likely judged as untrustworthy when shown in threatening scenes. Here, we explore whether this face-context congruency effect is specific to the negative pole of the threat-trust domain. Experiment 1 (N = 89) focused on the differential impact of positive vs. negative face-context congruency within the domains of threat and trust. Negative congruency (i.e. untrustworthy-looking faces in threatening contexts) led to more extreme attributions as opposed to positive congruency (i.e. trustworthy-looking faces in reassuring contexts). Experiment 2 (N = 120) replicated these findings by further showing their domain-specificity. The negativity bias was found in the threat-trust domain, but not when extroverted- vs. introverted-looking faces appeared in happy vs. sad context scenes. Experiment 3 (N = 154, pre-registered) replicated the pattern observed in Experiment 1 while controlling for the extent to which both threatening and reassuring context stimuli were related to the human action. We discussed the theoretical implications of these results for understanding how contextual information is integrated into the evaluation of facial trustworthiness.

Lateral reading and monetary incentives to spot disinformation about science.

Disinformation about science can impose enormous economic and public health burdens. A recently proposed strategy to help online users recognise false content is to follow the techniques of professional fact checkers, such as looking for information on other websites (lateral reading) and looking beyond the first results suggested by search engines (click restraint). In two preregistered online experiments (N = 5387), we simulated a social media environment and tested two interventions, one in the form of a pop-up meant to advise participants to follow such techniques, the other based on monetary incentives. We measured participants' ability to identify whether information was scientifically valid or invalid. Analysis of participants' search style reveals that both monetary incentives and pop-up increased the use of fact-checking strategies. Monetary incentives were overall effective in increasing accuracy, whereas the pop-up worked when the source of information was unknown. Pop-up and incentives, when used together, produced a cumulative effect on accuracy. We suggest that monetary incentives enhance content relevance, and could be combined with fact-checking techniques to counteract disinformation.

Cross-modal impression updating: Dynamic impression updating from face to voice and the other way around.

Research has shown that faces and voices shape impression formation. Most studies have examined either the impact of faces and voices in isolation or the relative contribution of each source when presented simultaneously. However, only a few studies have questioned whether and how impressions formed via one source can be updated due to incremental information gathered from the alternative source. Yet, cross-modal impression updating is key to shed light on person perception. Thus, we tested whether positive and negative face- and voice-based impressions could be updated by inconsistent cross-modal information. In Experiment 1 (N = 130), we tested whether face-based impressions could be updated by (in)consistent voices. In Experiment 2 (N = 262), we compared face-to-voice and voice-to-face impression updating. In Experiment 3 (N = 242), we favoured a more direct comparison of the two types of stimuli (i.e., the co-occurrence of both cue types when the new information is revealed). Results showed that voices have the greatest updating impact and that the updating effect of faces was halved when voices co-occurred for a second time. We discussed these results as evidence of the dynamical evolution of cross-modal impressions.

The influence of extinction and counterconditioning procedures on operant evaluative conditioning and intersecting regularity effects.

One of the most effective methods of influencing what people like and dislike is to expose them to systematic patterns (or 'regularities') in the environment, such as the repeated presentation of a single stimulus (mere exposure), two or more stimuli (evaluative conditioning (EC)) or to relationships between stimuli and behaviour (approach/avoidance). Hughes et al. (2016) J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 145, 731-754. (doi:10.1037/xge0000100) found that evaluations also emerge when regularities in the environment intersect with one another. In this paper, we examined if evaluations established via operant EC and intersecting regularities can be undermined via extinction or revised via counterconditioning. Across seven pre-registered studies (n = 1071), participants first completed a learning phase designed to establish novel evaluations followed by one of multiple forms of extinction or counterconditioning procedures designed to undo them. Results indicate that evaluations were-in general-resistant to extinction and counterconditioning. Theoretical and practical implications along with future directions are discussed.

The shared features principle: If two objects share a feature, people assume those objects also share other features.

In this article we introduce the shared features principle, which refers to the idea that when 2 stimuli share 1 feature, people often assume that they share other features as well. This principle can be recognized in several known psychological phenomena, most of which were until now never considered to be related in this way. To illustrate the generative power of the principle, we report 8 preregistered studies (n = 1,614) in which participants completed an acquisition phase containing 3 stimuli: a neutral target, a positive source, and a negative source. Our results indicate that behavioral intentions, automatic evaluations, and self-reported ratings of a target object were influenced by the source object with which the target shared a feature. This was even the case when participants were told that there was no relation between source and target objects. Taken together, the shared features principle appears to be general, reliable, and replicable across a range of measures in the attitude domain. We close with a discussion of its theoretical implications, relevance to many areas of psychological science, as well as its heuristic and predictive value. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Dissociations between Learning Phenomena do Not Necessitate Multiple Learning Processes: Mere Instructions about Upcoming Stimulus Presentations Differentially Influence Liking and Expectancy.

Prior research showed that the degree of statistical contingency between the presence of stimuli moderates changes in expectancies about the presence of those stimuli (i.e., expectancy learning) but not changes in the liking of those stimuli (i.e., evaluative conditioning). This dissociation is typically interpreted as evidence for dual process models of associative learning. We tested an alternative account according to which both types of learning rely on a single process propositional learning mechanism but reflect different kinds of propositional beliefs. In line with the idea that changes in liking reflect beliefs about stimulus co-occurrences whereas changes in expectancy reflect beliefs about stimulus contingency, we found that evaluative ratings depended only on instructions about whether a stimulus would co-occur with a positive or negative stimulus whereas expectancy ratings were influenced also by instructions about individual stimulus presentations.

Changing attitudes towards healthy food via self-association or nutritional information: What works best?

Individual attitudes, both implicit and explicit, have been identified as one of the multiple drivers of consumer behaviors, including food-related ones. Building on such evidence, in this contribution we seek at increasing implicit and explicit consumer attitudes towards a healthy food, comparing the effectiveness of two different treatments. The former is based on a self-association task, that aims at inducing changes in the evaluation of an object thanks to its positive association with the self. The latter is based on information provision. We test if attitude formation can be moderated by the individual level of nutritional knowledge and health-concern. Additionally, we explored whether the study conditions applied could ultimately affect consumers' preferences for specific product attributes using a Discrete Choice Experiment. The main findings provide insights for future policy strategies aimed at promoting more healthful food consumption. Indeed, the self-association increased implicit attitudes and consumer preferences' towards healthy food, whereas information, that represents the main target of food policy interventions, seems to have no impact on individual attitudes and choice behaviors.

Examining the impact of distance as a contextual cue in evaluative conditioning.

According to a symbolic perspective on EC, pairings constitute a relational contextual cue in the environment. It is the relationship between stimuli as cued by the pairing (i.e., pairings = similar) that determines the observed change in liking. Across five pre-registered studies (N = 747) we manipulated the absolute or relative distance between different pairs of conditioned (CS) and unconditioned stimuli (US) under the assumption that this would influence the type of relation that the pairings would cue (i.e., close = similar; far = different). In all five studies we obtained repeated and strong evidence that stimulus pairings led to changes in implicit and explicit evaluations. Although we found that these effects were moderated by absolute distance manipulations, evidence did not emerge indicating that those same effects were moderated by relative distance manipulations. These findings fail to provide strong support for a symbolic perspective on EC. We discuss the implications of our findings as well as future research in this area.

How Can Implicit and Explicit Attitudes Both Be Changed? Testing Two Interventions to Promote Consumption of Green Vegetables.

BACKGROUND: Although correlational studies have demonstrated that implicit and explicit attitudes are both important in predicting eating behavior, few studies targeting food choice have attempted to change both types of attitudes. PURPOSE: We tested the impact of (a) an evaluative learning intervention that uses the self to change attitudes (i.e., a Self-Referencing task) and (b) a persuasive communication in modifying implicit and explicit attitudes towards green vegetables and promoting readiness to change. The study targeted individuals who explicitly reported they did not like or only moderately liked green vegetables. METHODS: Participants (N = 273) were randomly allocated to a 2 (self-referencing: present vs. absent) × 2 (persuasive message: present vs. absent) factorial design. The outcomes were implicit and explicit attitudes as well as readiness to increase consumption of green vegetables. RESULTS: Implicit attitudes increased after repeatedly pairing green vegetable stimuli with the self in the self-referencing task but did not change in response to the persuasive communication. The persuasive message increased explicit attitudes and readiness to change, but did not alter implicit attitudes. A three-way interaction with pre-existing explicit attitudes was also observed. In the absence of a persuasive message, the self-referencing task increased on readiness to change among participants with more negative pre-existing explicit attitudes. CONCLUSIONS: This study is the first to demonstrate that a self-referencing task is effective in changing both implicit attitudes and readiness to change eating behavior. Findings indicate that distinct intervention strategies are needed to change implicit and explicit attitudes towards green vegetables.

Narcissistic Traits and Explicit Self-Esteem: The Moderating Role of Implicit Self-View.

Objective: Whilst the relationship between narcissism and self-esteem has been studied for a long time, findings are still controversial. The majority of studies investigated narcissistic grandiosity (NG), neglecting the existence of vulnerable manifestations of narcissism. Moreover, recent studies have shown that grandiosity traits are not always associated with inflated explicit self-esteem. The aim of the present study is to investigate the relationship between narcissistic traits and explicit self-esteem, distinguishing between grandiosity and vulnerability. Moreover, we consider the role of implicit self-esteem in qualifying these associations. Method: Narcissistic traits, explicit and implicit self-esteem measures were assessed among 120 university students (55.8% women, Mage = 22.55, SD = 3.03). Results: Results showed different patterns of association between narcissistic traits and explicit self-esteem, depending on phenotypic manifestations of narcissism. Narcissistic vulnerability (NV) was linked to low explicit self-evaluations regardless of one's levels of implicit self-esteem. On the other hand, the link between NG and explicit self-esteem was qualified by levels of implicit self-views, such that grandiosity was significantly associated with inflated explicit self-evaluations only at either high or medium levels of implicit self-views. Discussion: These findings showed that the relationship between narcissistic traits and explicit self-esteem is not univocal, highlighting the importance of distinguishing between NG and NV. Finally, the study suggested that both researchers and clinicians should consider the relevant role of implicit self-views in conditioning self-esteem levels reported explicitly by individuals with grandiose narcissistic traits.