Emotion as a source of moral understanding in conservation.

Recent debates around the meaning and implications of compassionate conservation suggest that some conservationists consider emotion a false and misleading basis for moral judgment and decision making. We trace these beliefs to a long-standing, gendered sociocultural convention and argue that the disparagement of emotion as a source of moral understanding is both empirically and morally problematic. According to the current scientific and philosophical understanding, reason and emotion are better understood as partners, rather than opposites. Nonetheless, the two have historically been seen as separate, with reason elevated in association with masculinity and emotion (especially nurturing emotion) dismissed or delegitimated in association with femininity. These associations can be situated in a broader, dualistic, and hierarchical logic used to maintain power for a dominant male (White, able-bodied, upper class, heterosexual) human class. We argue that emotion should be affirmed by conservationists for the novel and essential insights it contributes to conservation ethics. We consider the specific example of compassion and characterize it as an emotional experience of interdependence and shared vulnerability. This experience highlights conservationists' responsibilities to individual beings, enhancing established and widely accepted beliefs that conservationists have a duty to protect populations, species, and ecosystems (or biodiversity). We argue compassion, thus understood, should be embraced as a core virtue of conservation.

El Sentimiento como Fuente de Entendimiento Moral en la Conservación Resumen Los debates recientes en torno al significado y las implicaciones de la conservación compasiva sugieren que algunos conservacionistas consideran al sentimiento como una base falsa y engañosa para el juicio moral y la toma de decisiones. Seguimos estas creencias hasta una convención sociocultural prolongada y relacionada con el género y argumentamos que el menosprecio por el sentimiento como fuente del entendimiento moral es problemático empírica y moralmente. De acuerdo con el conocimiento científico y filosófico actual, la razón y el sentimiento se entienden de mejor manera como pareja, en lugar de como opuestos. Sin embargo, ambos conceptos han estado históricamente separados, con la razón como concepto elevado asociado con la masculinidad y el sentimiento (especialmente el sentimiento de crianza) rechazado o deslegitimado en asociación con la feminidad. Estas asociaciones pueden situarse dentro de una lógica más general, dualista y jerárquica usada para mantener el poder de la clase humana del macho dominante (blanco, sin discapacidades, de clase alta, heterosexual). Sostenemos que el sentimiento debería ser ratificado por los conservacionistas por el conocimiento novedoso y esencial que contribuye a la ética de la conservación. Consideramos el ejemplo específico de la compasión y lo caracterizamos como una experiencia emocional de la interdependencia y la vulnerabilidad compartida. Esta experiencia resalta las responsabilidades que los conservacionistas tienen con los individuos, fortaleciendo las creencias establecidas y ampliamente aceptadas de que los conservacionistas tienen el deber de proteger a las poblaciones, especies y ecosistemas (o a la biodiversidad). Sostenemos que la compasión, entendida así, debería ser aceptada como una virtud nuclear de la conservación.

The moral residue of conservation.

Should conservationists use lethal management to control introduced wildlife populations? Should they kill individual animals to protect endangered species? Are trade-offs that prioritize some values at the expense of others morally appropriate? These sorts of ethical questions are common in conservation. In debating such questions, conservationists often seem to presume 1 of 2 possible answers: the act in question is right or it is wrong. But morality in conservation is considerably more complex than this simple binary suggests. A robust conservation ethic requires a vocabulary that gives voice to the uncertainty and unease that arise when what seems to be the best available course of action also seems to involve a measure of wrongdoing. The philosophical literature on moral residue and moral dilemmas supplies this vocabulary. Moral dilemmas arise when one must neglect certain moral requirements to fulfill others. Under such circumstances, even the best possible decision leaves a moral residue, which is experienced emotionally as some form of grief. Examples of conservation scenarios that leave a moral residue include management of introduced rabbits in Australia, trophy hunting in Africa, and forest management trade-offs in the Pacific Northwest. Moral residue is integral to the moral experience of conservationists today, and grief is an appropriate response to many decisions conservationists must make. Article impact statement: Defensible conservation decisions may neglect moral requirements, leaving a moral residue; conservationists should respond with grief.

El Residuo Moral de la Conservación Resumen ¿Los conservacionistas deberían usar técnicas de manejo letal para controlar las poblaciones de fauna introducida? ¿Deberían matar animales individuales para proteger a las especies en peligro? Este tipo de preguntas éticas son comunes en la conservación. Cuando se debaten dichas preguntas, los conservacionistas parecen suponer una de dos respuestas posibles; la acción cuestionada está bien o está mal, pero la moral en la conservación es considerablemente más compleja de lo que sugiere esta simple respuesta binaria. Una firme ética de la conservación requiere un vocabulario que le proporcione voz a la incertidumbre y a la inquietud que surgen cuando lo que parece ser el mejor plan de acción disponible también parece involucrar medidas indebidas. La literatura filosófica sobre el residuo y los dilemas morales suministra este vocabulario. Los dilemas morales emergen cuando se deben desatender ciertos requerimientos morales para cumplir con otros. Bajo dichas circunstancias, incluso la mejor decisión posible deja un residuo moral, el cual se vive como alguna manifestación de aflicción. Algunos ejemplos de escenarios de conservación que dejan un residuo moral son el manejo de conejos introducidos en Australia, la caza deportiva en África y las compensaciones del manejo de bosques en el noroeste del Pacífico. El residuo moral es muy importante para la experiencia moral de los conservacionistas hoy en día, y la aflicción es una respuesta adecuada a muchas decisiones que los conservacionistas deben tomar.

When all life counts in conservation.

Conservation science involves the collection and analysis of data. These scientific practices emerge from values that shape who and what is counted. Currently, conservation data are filtered through a value system that considers native life the only appropriate subject of conservation concern. We examined how trends in species richness, distribution, and threats change when all wildlife count by adding so-called non-native and feral populations to the International Union for Conservation of Nature Red List and local species richness assessments. We focused on vertebrate populations with founding members taken into and out of Australia by humans (i.e., migrants). We identified 87 immigrant and 47 emigrant vertebrate species. Formal conservation accounts underestimated global ranges by an average of 30% for immigrants and 7% for emigrants; immigrations surpassed extinctions in Australia by 52 species; migrants were disproportionately threatened (33% of immigrants and 29% of emigrants were threatened or decreasing in their native ranges); and incorporating migrant populations into risk assessments reduced global threat statuses for 15 of 18 species. Australian policies defined most immigrants as pests (76%), and conservation was the most commonly stated motivation for targeting these species in killing programs (37% of immigrants). Inclusive biodiversity data open space for dialogue on the ethical and empirical assumptions underlying conservation science.

Cuando Toda la Vida Importa en la Conservación Resumen La ciencia de la conservación involucra la recolección y el análisis de datos. Estas prácticas científicas emergen de los valores que forman quién y qué se cuenta. Actualmente, los datos de conservación son filtrados a través de un sistema de valores que considera a la vida nativa como el único sujeto apropiado para el interés de la conservación. Examinamos cómo cambian las tendencias de riqueza de especies, distribución y amenazas cuando se considera a toda la vida silvestre con la adición de las poblaciones denominadas como no nativas y ferales a la Lista Roja de la Unión Internacional para la Conservación de la Naturaleza y a las evaluaciones de riqueza local de especies. Nos enfocamos en las poblaciones de vertebrados que cuentan con miembros fundadores llevados y extraídos de Australia (es decir, migrantes). Identificamos 87 especies inmigrantes de vertebrados y 47 especies emigrantes. Los informes formales de conservación subestimaron los rangos globales por un promedio del 30% para las especies inmigrantes y del 7% para las especies emigrantes; las inmigraciones rebasaron las extinciones en Australia por 52 especies; las especies migrantes estuvieron amenazadas de manera desproporcionada (33% de las especies inmigrantes y 29% de las especies emigrantes estaban amenazadas o declinando en sus distribuciones nativas); y la incorporación de las poblaciones migrantes a las evaluaciones de riesgo redujeron el estado mundial de amenaza para 15 de las 18 especies. Las políticas australianas definen a la mayoría de las especies inmigrantes como plagas (76%) y se citó a la conservación como la principal motivación para enfocarse en estas especies durante los programas de erradicación (37% de las especies inmigrantes). La información inclusiva de conservación genera un espacio para el diálogo sobre las suposiciones éticas y empíricas subyacentes en la ciencia de la conservación.

The Ethics of Eliminating Harmful Species: The Case of the Tsetse Fly.

Wildlife species harmful to humans are often targets of control and elimination programs. A contemporary example is the tsetse fly, a vector of sleeping sickness and African animal trypanosomosis. Tsetse flies have recently been targeted by a pan-African eradication campaign. If it is successful, the campaign could push the entire tsetse family to extinction. With the emergence of effective and efficient elimination technologies, ethical assessment of proposed elimination campaigns is urgently needed. We examine the ethics of tsetse fly elimination by considering arguments predicated on both the instrumental and the intrinsic values of the species at local and global scales. We conclude that, although global eradication of tsetse flies is not ethically justified, localized elimination campaigns targeting isolated populations are ethically defensible. We urge assessments of this kind be conducted regularly and in context, so that all relevant factors underlying decisions on species elimination are routinely laid bare for evaluation.

Cautioning against overemphasis of normative constructs in conservation decision making.

Questions around how to conserve nature are increasingly leading to dissonance in conservation planning and action. While science can assist in unraveling the nature of conservation challenges, conservation responses rely heavily on normative positions and constructs to order actions, aid interpretations, and provide motivation. However, problems can arise when norms are mistaken for science or when they stymy scientific rigor. To highlight these potential pitfalls, we used the ethics-based tool of argument analysis to assess a controversial conservation intervention, the Pelorus Island Goat Control Program. The program proponents' argument for restorative justice was unsound because it relied on weak logical construction overly entrenched in normative assumptions. Overreliance on normative constructs, particularly the invocation of tragedy, creates a sense of urgency that can subvert scientific and ethical integrity, obscure values and assumptions, and increase the propensity for flawed logic. This example demonstrates how the same constructs that drive biodiversity conservation can also drive poor decision making, spur public backlash, and justify poor animal welfare outcomes. To provide clarity, a decision-making flowchart we devised demonstrates how values, norms, and ethics influence one another. We recommend practitioners follow 3 key points to improve decision making: be aware of values, as well as normative constructs and ethical theories that those values inform; be mindful of overreliance on either normative constructs or ethics when deciding action is justified; and be logically sound and transparent when building justifications. We also recommend 5 key attributes that practitioners should be attentive to when making conservation decisions: clarity, transparency, scientific integrity, adaptiveness, and compassion. Greater attention to the role of norms in decision making will improve conservation outcomes and garner greater public support for actions.

Advertencias contra el Énfasis Excesivo de los Constructos Normativos en la Toma de Decisiones de Conservación Resumen Cada vez más, las dudas en torno a cómo conservar la naturaleza llevan a la disonancia en la acción y planeación de la conservación. Mientras que la ciencia puede asistir en el entendimiento de la naturaleza de los retos de conservación, las respuestas de conservación dependen enormemente de posiciones y constructos normativos para ordenar acciones, apoyar a las interpretaciones y proporcionar motivación. Sin embargo, pueden surgir problemas cuando se confunde a las normas con la ciencia o cuando obstaculizan el rigor científico. Con el objetivo de resaltar estos potenciales inconvenientes, usamos el análisis de argumentos, una herramienta basada en la ética, para evaluar una controversial intervención de conservación: el Programa de Control de Cabras en Isla Pelorus. El argumento de justicia restaurativa de quienes propusieron el programa era irracional pues dependía de una débil construcción lógica demasiado arraigada en suposiciones normativas. La sobredependencia de constructos normativos, particularmente la invocación de la tragedia, genera una sensación de urgencia que puede subvertir la integridad científica y ética, oscurecer los valores y las suposiciones e incrementar la tendencia hacia la lógica defectuosa. Este ejemplo demuestra cómo los mismos constructos que guían la conservación de la biodiversidad también pueden llevar a una toma pobre de decisiones, incitar a respuestas negativas del público y a justificar los malos resultados de bienestar animal. Para proporcionar claridad, diseñamos un diagrama de flujo de toma de decisiones que demuestra cómo los valores, las normas y la ética influyen unas sobre las otras. Les recomendamos a los practicantes que sigan tres puntos clave para mejorar la toma de decisiones: tener conciencia de los valores, así como de los constructos normativos y las teorías éticas a las que esos valores informan; estar consciente de la sobredependencia tanto de los constructos normativos como de la ética cuando se decide si una acción está justificada; y ser racional y transparente de manera lógica cuando se construyan las justificaciones. También recomendamos cinco atributos clave a los cuales los practicantes deben estar atentos cuando se toman decisiones de conservación: claridad, transparencia, integridad científica, adaptabilidad y compasión. Una mayor atención al papel de las normas en la toma de decisiones mejorará los resultados de conservación y acumulará un mayor respaldo del público para las acciones.

Summoning compassion to address the challenges of conservation.

Conservation practice is informed by science, but it also reflects ethical beliefs about how humanity ought to value and interact with Earth's biota. As human activities continue to drive extinctions and diminish critical life-sustaining ecosystem processes, achieving conservation goals becomes increasingly urgent. However, the determination to react decisively can drive conservationists to handle complex challenges without due deliberation, particularly when wildlife individuals are sacrificed for the so-called greater good of wildlife collectives (populations, species, ecosystems). With growing recognition of the widespread sentience and sapience of many nonhuman animals, standard conservation practices that categorically prioritize collectives without due consideration for the well-being of individuals are ethically untenable. Here we highlight 3 overarching ethical orientations characterizing current and historical practices in conservation that suppress compassion: instrumentalism, collectivism, and nativism. We examine how establishing a commitment to compassion could reorient conservation in more ethically expansive directions that incorporate recognition of the intrinsic value of wildlife, the sentience of nonhuman animals, and the values of novel ecosystems, introduced species, and their members. A compassionate conservation approach allays practices that intentionally and unnecessarily harm wildlife individuals, while aligning with critical conservation goals. Although the urgency of achieving effective outcomes for solving major conservation problems may enhance the appeal of quick and harsh measures, the costs are too high. Continuing to justify moral indifference when causing the suffering of wildlife individuals, particularly those who possess sophisticated capacities for emotion, consciousness, and sociality, risks estranging conservation practice from prevailing, and appropriate, social values. As conservationists and compassionate beings, we must demonstrate concern for both the long-term persistence of collectives and the well-being of individuals by prioritizing strategies that do both.

Mainstreaming the social sciences in conservation.

Despite broad recognition of the value of social sciences and increasingly vocal calls for better engagement with the human element of conservation, the conservation social sciences remain misunderstood and underutilized in practice. The conservation social sciences can provide unique and important contributions to society's understanding of the relationships between humans and nature and to improving conservation practice and outcomes. There are 4 barriers-ideological, institutional, knowledge, and capacity-to meaningful integration of the social sciences into conservation. We provide practical guidance on overcoming these barriers to mainstream the social sciences in conservation science, practice, and policy. Broadly, we recommend fostering knowledge on the scope and contributions of the social sciences to conservation, including social scientists from the inception of interdisciplinary research projects, incorporating social science research and insights during all stages of conservation planning and implementation, building social science capacity at all scales in conservation organizations and agencies, and promoting engagement with the social sciences in and through global conservation policy-influencing organizations. Conservation social scientists, too, need to be willing to engage with natural science knowledge and to communicate insights and recommendations clearly. We urge the conservation community to move beyond superficial engagement with the conservation social sciences. A more inclusive and integrative conservation science-one that includes the natural and social sciences-will enable more ecologically effective and socially just conservation. Better collaboration among social scientists, natural scientists, practitioners, and policy makers will facilitate a renewed and more robust conservation. Mainstreaming the conservation social sciences will facilitate the uptake of the full range of insights and contributions from these fields into conservation policy and practice.

Moral dimensions of human-wildlife conflict.

Despite increasing support for conservation globally, controversy over specific conservation policies persists among diverse stakeholders. Investigating the links between morals in relation to conservation can help increase understanding about why humans support or oppose policy, especially related to human-wildlife conflict or human conflict over wildlife. Yet the moral dimension of human-wildlife conflict has mostly gone unconsidered and unmeasured; thus, policy and programmatic efforts to reduce controversy may be missing a key part of the equation. We conducted a web-based survey (n = 1239 respondents) in Michigan (U.S.A.) to investigate cognitive and emotional influences on the value-behavior relationship. Respondents were identified by their interest and involvement in Michigan wolf management. The survey consisted of questions about values, emotions, cognitions, and behaviors relative to wolves in Michigan. We used path analysis to explore whether emotions and cognitions mediated the relationship between value and behavior. Most respondents attributed intrinsic value to wolves (n = 734) and all life (n = 773) and engaged in behaviors that benefited wolf populations and ecosystems regardless of stakeholder group (e.g., environmentalist, farmer). Attributing intrinsic value to wolves was positively related to favorable emotions toward wolves and cognitive assessments that hunting and trapping of wolves is unacceptable. Despite similarities in attribution of intrinsic value, groups differed in emotions and cognitions about wolf hunting. These differences provide a useful way to predict stakeholder behavior. Our findings may inform interventions aimed at increasing support for wolf management policies and positive interactions among stakeholders and wildlife. Leveraging agreement over intrinsic value may foster cooperation among stakeholders and garner support for controversial conservation policy.

Evaluating whether nature's intrinsic value is an axiom of or anathema to conservation.

That at least some aspects of nature possess intrinsic value is considered by some an axiom of conservation. Others consider nature's intrinsic value superfluous or anathema. This range of views among mainstream conservation professionals potentially threatens the foundation of conservation. One challenge in resolving this disparity is that disparaging portrayals of nature's intrinsic value appear rooted in misconceptions and unfounded presumptions about what it means to acknowledge nature's intrinsic value. That acknowledgment has been characterized as vacuous, misanthropic, of little practical consequence to conservation, adequately accommodated by economic valuation, and not widely accepted in society. We reviewed the philosophical basis for nature's intrinsic value and the implications for acknowledging that value. Our analysis is rooted to the notion that when something possesses intrinsic value it deserves to be treated with respect for what it is, with concern for its welfare or in a just manner. From this basis, one can only conclude that nature's intrinsic value is not a vacuous concept or adequately accommodated by economic valuation. Acknowledging nature's intrinsic value is not misanthropic because concern for nature's welfare (aside from its influence on human welfare) does not in any way preclude also being concerned for human welfare. The practical import of acknowledging nature's intrinsic value rises from recognizing all the objects of conservation concern (e.g., many endangered species) that offer little benefit to human welfare. Sociological and cultural evidence indicates the belief that at least some elements of nature possess intrinsic value is widespread in society. Our reasoning suggests the appropriateness of rejecting the assertion that nature's intrinsic value is anathema to conservation and accepting its role as an axiom.