A mechanistic model of gossip, reputations, and cooperation.

Social reputations facilitate cooperation: those who help others gain a good reputation, making them more likely to receive help themselves. But when people hold private views of one another, this cycle of indirect reciprocity breaks down, as disagreements lead to the perception of unjustified behavior that ultimately undermines cooperation. Theoretical studies often assume population-wide agreement about reputations, invoking rapid gossip as an endogenous mechanism for reaching consensus. However, the theory of indirect reciprocity lacks a mechanistic description of how gossip actually generates consensus. Here, we develop a mechanistic model of gossip-based indirect reciprocity that incorporates two alternative forms of gossip: exchanging information with randomly selected peers or consulting a single gossip source. We show that these two forms of gossip are mathematically equivalent under an appropriate transformation of parameters. We derive an analytical expression for the minimum amount of gossip required to reach sufficient consensus and stabilize cooperation. We analyze how the amount of gossip necessary for cooperation depends on the benefits and costs of cooperation, the assessment rule (social norm), and errors in reputation assessment, strategy execution, and gossip transmission. Finally, we show that biased gossip can either facilitate or hinder cooperation, depending on the direction and magnitude of the bias. Our results contribute to the growing literature on cooperation facilitated by communication, and they highlight the need to study strategic interactions coupled with the spread of social information.

Indirect reciprocity with Bayesian reasoning and biases.

Reputations can foster cooperation by indirect reciprocity: if I am good to you then others will be good to me. But this mechanism for cooperation in one-shot interactions only works when people agree on who is good and who is bad. Errors in actions or assessments can produce disagreements about reputations, which can unravel the positive feedback loop between social standing and pro-social behaviour. Cooperators can end up punished and defectors rewarded. Public reputation systems and empathy are two possible mechanisms to promote agreement about reputations. Here we suggest an alternative: Bayesian reasoning by observers. By taking into account the probabilities of errors in action and observation and their prior beliefs about the prevalence of good people in the population, observers can use Bayesian reasoning to determine whether or not someone is good. To study this scenario, we develop an evolutionary game theoretical model in which players use Bayesian reasoning to assess reputations, either publicly or privately. We explore this model analytically and numerically for five social norms (Scoring, Shunning, Simple Standing, Staying, and Stern Judging). We systematically compare results to the case when agents do not use reasoning in determining reputations. We find that Bayesian reasoning reduces cooperation relative to non-reasoning, except in the case of the Scoring norm. Under Scoring, Bayesian reasoning can promote coexistence of three strategic types. Additionally, we study the effects of optimistic or pessimistic biases in individual beliefs about the degree of cooperation in the population. We find that optimism generally undermines cooperation whereas pessimism can, in some cases, promote cooperation.

Strategy evolution on higher-order networks.

Cooperation is key to prosperity in human societies. Population structure is well understood as a catalyst for cooperation, where research has focused on pairwise interactions. But cooperative behaviors are not simply dyadic, and they often involve coordinated behavior in larger groups. Here we develop a framework to study the evolution of behavioral strategies in higher-order population structures, which include pairwise and multi-way interactions. We provide an analytical treatment of when cooperation will be favored by higher-order interactions, accounting for arbitrary spatial heterogeneity and nonlinear rewards for cooperation in larger groups. Our results indicate that higher-order interactions can act to promote the evolution of cooperation across a broad range of networks, in public goods games. Higher-order interactions consistently provide an advantage for cooperation when interaction hyper-networks feature multiple conjoined communities. Our analysis provides a systematic account of how higher-order interactions modulate the evolution of prosocial traits.

Can institutions foster cooperation by wealth redistribution?

Theoretical models prescribe how institutions can promote cooperation in a population by imposing appropriate punishments or rewards on individuals. However, many real-world institutions are not sophisticated or responsive enough to ensure cooperation by calibrating their policies. Or, worse yet, an institution might selfishly exploit the population it governs for its own benefit. Here, we study the evolution of cooperation in the presence of an institution that is autonomous, in the sense that it has its own interests that may or may not align with those of the population. The institution imposes a tax on the population and redistributes a portion of the tax revenue to cooperators, withholding the remaining revenue for itself. The institution adjusts its rates of taxation and redistribution to optimize its own long-term, discounted utility. We consider three types of institutions with different goals, embodied in their utility functions. We show that a prosocial institution, whose goal is to maximize the average payoff of the population, can indeed promote cooperation-but only if it is sufficiently forward-looking. On the other hand, an institution that seeks to maximize welfare among cooperators alone will successfully promote collective cooperation even if it is myopic. Remarkably, even a selfish institution, which seeks to maximize the revenue it withholds for itself, can nonetheless promote cooperation. The average payoff of the population increases when a selfish institution is more forward-looking, so that a population under a selfish regime can sometimes fare better than under anarchy. Our analysis highlights the potential benefits of institutional wealth redistribution, even when an institution does not share the interests of the population it governs.

When do stereotypes undermine indirect reciprocity?

Social reputations provide a powerful mechanism to stimulate human cooperation, but observing individual reputations can be cognitively costly. To ease this burden, people may rely on proxies such as stereotypes, or generalized reputations assigned to groups. Such stereotypes are less accurate than individual reputations, and so they could disrupt the positive feedback between altruistic behavior and social standing, undermining cooperation. How do stereotypes impact cooperation by indirect reciprocity? We develop a theoretical model of group-structured populations in which individuals are assigned either individual reputations based on their own actions or stereotyped reputations based on their groups' behavior. We find that using stereotypes can produce either more or less cooperation than using individual reputations, depending on how widely reputations are shared. Deleterious outcomes can arise when individuals adapt their propensity to stereotype. Stereotyping behavior can spread and can be difficult to displace, even when it compromises collective cooperation and even though it makes a population vulnerable to invasion by defectors. We discuss the implications of our results for the prevalence of stereotyping and for reputation-based cooperation in structured populations.

The distorting effects of producer strategies: Why engagement does not reveal consumer preferences for misinformation.

A great deal of empirical research has examined who falls for misinformation and why. Here, we introduce a formal game-theoretic model of engagement with news stories that captures the strategic interplay between (mis)information consumers and producers. A key insight from the model is that observed patterns of engagement do not necessarily reflect the preferences of consumers. This is because producers seeking to promote misinformation can use strategies that lead moderately inattentive readers to engage more with false stories than true ones-even when readers prefer more accurate over less accurate information. We then empirically test people's preferences for accuracy in the news. In three studies, we find that people strongly prefer to click and share news they perceive as more accurate-both in a general population sample, and in a sample of users recruited through Twitter who had actually shared links to misinformation sites online. Despite this preference for accurate news-and consistent with the predictions of our model-we find markedly different engagement patterns for articles from misinformation versus mainstream news sites. Using 1,000 headlines from 20 misinformation and 20 mainstream news sites, we compare Facebook engagement data with 20,000 accuracy ratings collected in a survey experiment. Engagement with a headline is negatively correlated with perceived accuracy for misinformation sites, but positively correlated with perceived accuracy for mainstream sites. Taken together, these theoretical and empirical results suggest that consumer preferences cannot be straightforwardly inferred from empirical patterns of engagement.

History constrains the evolution of efficient color naming, enabling historical inference.

Color naming in natural languages is not arbitrary: It reflects efficient partitions of perceptual color space [T. Regier, P. Kay, N. Khetarpal, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 104, 1436-1441 (2007)] modulated by the relative needs to communicate about different colors [C. Twomey, G. Roberts, D. Brainard, J. Plotkin, Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 118, e2109237118 (2021)]. These psychophysical and communicative constraints help explain why languages around the world have remarkably similar, but not identical, mappings of colors to color terms. Languages converge on a small set of efficient representations.But languages also evolve, and the number of terms in a color vocabulary may change over time. Here we show that history, i.e. the existence of an antecedent color vocabulary, acts as a nonadaptive constraint that biases the choice of efficient solution as a language transitions from a vocabulary of size [Formula: see text] to [Formula: see text] terms. Moreover, as efficient vocabularies evolve to include more terms they explore a smaller fraction of all possible efficient vocabularies compared to equally sized vocabularies constructed de novo. This path dependence of the cultural evolution of color naming presents an opportunity. Historical constraints can be used to reconstruct ancestral color vocabularies, allowing us to answer long-standing questions about the evolutionary sequences of color words, and enabling us to draw inferences from phylogenetic patterns of language change.

Constructing temporal networks with bursty activity patterns.

Human social interactions tend to vary in intensity over time, whether they are in person or online. Variable rates of interaction in structured populations can be described by networks with the time-varying activity of links and nodes. One of the key statistics to summarize temporal patterns is the inter-event time, namely the duration between successive pairwise interactions. Empirical studies have found inter-event time distributions that are heavy-tailed, for both physical and digital interactions. But it is difficult to construct theoretical models of time-varying activity on a network that reproduce the burstiness seen in empirical data. Here we develop a spanning-tree method to construct temporal networks and activity patterns with bursty behavior. Our method ensures any desired target inter-event time distributions for individual nodes and links, provided the distributions fulfill a consistency condition, regardless of whether the underlying topology is static or time-varying. We show that this model can reproduce burstiness found in empirical datasets, and so it may serve as a basis for studying dynamic processes in real-world bursty interactions.

Pathway-specific alterations in striatal excitability and cholinergic modulation in a SAPAP3 mouse model of compulsive motor behavior.

Deletion of the obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD)-associated gene SAP90/PSD-95-associated protein 3 (Sapap3), which encodes a postsynaptic anchoring protein at corticostriatal synapses, causes OCD-like motor behaviors in mice. While corticostriatal synaptic dysfunction is central to this phenotype, the striatum efficiently adapts to pathological changes, often in ways that expand upon the original circuit impairment. Here, we show that SAPAP3 deletion causes non-synaptic and pathway-specific alterations in dorsolateral striatum circuit function. While somatic excitability was elevated in striatal projection neurons (SPNs), dendritic excitability was exclusively enhanced in direct pathway SPNs. Layered on top of this, cholinergic modulation was altered in opposing ways: striatal cholinergic interneuron density and evoked acetylcholine release were elevated, while basal muscarinic modulation of SPNs was reduced. These data describe how SAPAP3 deletion alters the striatal landscape upon which impaired corticostriatal inputs will act, offering a basis for how pathological synaptic integration and unbalanced striatal output underlying OCD-like behaviors may be shaped.

Evolution of norms for judging social behavior.

Reputations provide a powerful mechanism to sustain cooperation, as individuals cooperate with those of good social standing. But how should someone's reputation be updated as we observe their social behavior, and when will a population converge on a shared norm for judging behavior? Here, we develop a mathematical model of cooperation conditioned on reputations, for a population that is stratified into groups. Each group may subscribe to a different social norm for assessing reputations and so norms compete as individuals choose to move from one group to another. We show that a group initially comprising a minority of the population may nonetheless overtake the entire population-especially if it adopts the Stern Judging norm, which assigns a bad reputation to individuals who cooperate with those of bad standing. When individuals do not change group membership, stratifying reputation information into groups tends to destabilize cooperation, unless individuals are strongly insular and favor in-group social interactions. We discuss the implications of our results for the structure of information flow in a population and for the evolution of social norms of judgment.

Challenges in cybersecurity: Lessons from biological defense systems.

Defending against novel, repeated, or unpredictable attacks, while avoiding attacks on the 'self', are the central problems of both mammalian immune systems and computer systems. Both systems have been studied in great detail, but with little exchange of information across the different disciplines. Here, we present a conceptual framework for structured comparisons across the fields of biological immunity and cybersecurity, by framing the context of defense, considering different (combinations of) defensive strategies, and evaluating defensive performance. Throughout this paper, we pose open questions for further exploration. We hope to spark the interdisciplinary discovery of general principles of optimal defense, which can be understood and applied in biological immunity, cybersecurity, and other defensive realms.

Evolutionary dynamics within and among competing groups.

Biological and social systems are structured at multiple scales, and the incentives of individuals who interact in a group may diverge from the collective incentive of the group as a whole. Mechanisms to resolve this tension are responsible for profound transitions in evolutionary history, including the origin of cellular life, multicellular life, and even societies. Here, we synthesize a growing literature that extends evolutionary game theory to describe multilevel evolutionary dynamics, using nested birth-death processes and partial differential equations to model natural selection acting on competition within and among groups of individuals. We analyze how mechanisms known to promote cooperation within a single group-including assortment, reciprocity, and population structure-alter evolutionary outcomes in the presence of competition among groups. We find that population structures most conducive to cooperation in multiscale systems can differ from those most conducive within a single group. Likewise, for competitive interactions with a continuous range of strategies we find that among-group selection may fail to produce socially optimal outcomes, but it can nonetheless produce second-best solutions that balance individual incentives to defect with the collective incentives for cooperation. We conclude by describing the broad applicability of multiscale evolutionary models to problems ranging from the production of diffusible metabolites in microbes to the management of common-pool resources in human societies.

Reproductive variance can drive behavioral dynamics.

The concept of fitness is central to evolution, but it quantifies only the expected number of offspring an individual will produce. The actual number of offspring is also subject to demographic stochasticity-that is, randomness associated with birth and death processes. In nature, individuals who are more fecund tend to have greater variance in their offspring number. Here, we develop a model for the evolution of two types competing in a population of nonconstant size. The fitness of each type is determined by pairwise interactions in a prisoner's dilemma game, and the variance in offspring number depends upon its mean. Although defectors are preferred by natural selection in classical population models, since they always have greater fitness than cooperators, we show that sufficiently large offspring variance can reverse the direction of evolution and favor cooperation. Large offspring variance produces qualitatively new dynamics for other types of social interactions, as well, which cannot arise in populations with a fixed size or with a Poisson offspring distribution.

Strategy evolution on dynamic networks.

Models of strategy evolution on static networks help us understand how population structure can promote the spread of traits like cooperation. One key mechanism is the formation of altruistic spatial clusters, where neighbors of a cooperative individual are likely to reciprocate, which protects prosocial traits from exploitation. However, most real-world interactions are ephemeral and subject to exogenous restructuring, so that social networks change over time. Strategic behavior on dynamic networks is difficult to study, and much less is known about the resulting evolutionary dynamics. Here we provide an analytical treatment of cooperation on dynamic networks, allowing for arbitrary spatial and temporal heterogeneity. We show that transitions among a large class of network structures can favor the spread of cooperation, even if each individual social network would inhibit cooperation when static. Furthermore, we show that spatial heterogeneity tends to inhibit cooperation, whereas temporal heterogeneity tends to promote it. Dynamic networks can have profound effects on the evolution of prosocial traits, even when individuals have no agency over network structures.

Optimality of intercellular signaling: Direct transport versus diffusion.

Intercellular signaling has an important role in organism development, but not all communication occurs using the same mechanism. Here, we analyze the energy efficiency of intercellular signaling by two canonical mechanisms: Diffusion of signaling molecules and direct transport mediated by signaling cellular protrusions. We show that efficient contact formation for direct transport can be established by an optimal rate of projecting protrusions, which depends on the availability of information about the location of the target cell. The optimal projection rate also depends on how signaling molecules are transported along the protrusion, in particular the ratio of the energy cost for contact formation and molecule synthesis. Also, we compare the efficiency of the two signaling mechanisms, under various model parameters. We find that direct transport is favored over diffusion when transporting a large amount of signaling molecules. There is a critical number of signaling molecules at which the efficiencies of the two mechanisms are the same. The critical number is small when the distance between cells is far, which helps explain why protrusion-based mechanisms are observed in long-range cellular communications.

Mito-nuclear selection induces a trade-off between species ecological dominance and evolutionary lifespan.

Mitochondrial and nuclear genomes must be co-adapted to ensure proper cellular respiration and energy production. Mito-nuclear incompatibility reduces individual fitness and induces hybrid infertility, which can drive reproductive barriers and speciation. Here, we develop a birth-death model for evolution in spatially extended populations under selection for mito-nuclear co-adaptation. Mating is constrained by physical and genetic proximity, and offspring inherit nuclear genomes from both parents, with recombination. The model predicts macroscopic patterns including a community's species diversity, species abundance distribution, speciation and extinction rates, as well as intraspecific and interspecific genetic variation. We explore how these long-term outcomes depend upon the parameters of reproduction: individual fitness governed by mito-nuclear compatibility, constraints on mating compatibility and ecological carrying capacity. We find that strong selection for mito-nuclear compatibility reduces the equilibrium number of species after a radiation, increasing species' abundances and simultaneously increasing both speciation and extinction rates. The negative correlation between species diversity and diversification rates in our model agrees with the broad empirical pattern of lower diversity and higher speciation/extinction rates in temperate regions, compared to the tropics. We conclude that these empirical patterns may be caused in part by latitudinal variation in metabolic demands and corresponding variation in selection for mito-nuclear function.

Nigrostriatal dopamine pathway regulates auditory discrimination behavior.

The auditory striatum, the tail portion of dorsal striatum in basal ganglia, is implicated in perceptual decision-making, transforming auditory stimuli to action outcomes. Despite its known connections to diverse neurological conditions, the dopaminergic modulation of sensory striatal neuronal activity and its behavioral influences remain unknown. We demonstrated that the optogenetic inhibition of dopaminergic projections from the substantia nigra pars compacta to the auditory striatum specifically impairs mouse choice performance but not movement in an auditory frequency discrimination task. In vivo dopamine and calcium imaging in freely behaving mice revealed that this dopaminergic projection modulates striatal tone representations, and tone-evoked striatal dopamine release inversely correlated with the evidence strength of tones. Optogenetic inhibition of D1-receptor expressing neurons and pharmacological inhibition of D1 receptors in the auditory striatum dampened choice performance accuracy. Our study uncovers a phasic mechanism within the nigrostriatal system that regulates auditory decisions by modulating ongoing auditory perception.

Drift as a Driver of Language Change: An Artificial Language Experiment.

Over half a century ago, George Zipf observed that more frequent words tend to be older. Corpus studies since then have confirmed this pattern, with more frequent words being replaced and regularized less often than less frequent words. Two main hypotheses have been proposed to explain this: that frequent words change less because selection against innovation is stronger at higher frequencies, or that they change less because stochastic drift is stronger at lower frequencies. Here, we report the first experimental test of these hypotheses. Participants were tasked with learning a miniature language consisting of two nouns and two plural markers. Nouns occurred at different frequencies and were subjected to treatments that varied drift and selection. Using a model that accounts for participant heterogeneity, we measured the rate of noun regularization, the strength of selection, and the strength of drift in participant responses. Results suggest that drift alone is sufficient to generate the elevated rate of regularization we observed in low-frequency nouns, adding to a growing body of evidence that drift may be a major driver of language change.

Measuring frequency-dependent selection in culture.

The frequency of a cultural trait can influence its tendency to be copied. We develop a maximum-likelihood method to measure such frequency-dependent selection from time series data, and we apply it to baby names and purebred dog preferences over the past century. The form of negative frequency dependence we infer among names explains their diversity patterns, and it replicates across the United States, France, Norway and the Netherlands. We find different growth rates for male versus female names, attributable to different rates of innovation, whereas biblical names enjoy a genuine selective advantage at all frequencies, which explains their predominance among top names. We show how frequency dependence emerges from a host of underlying selective mechanisms, including a preference for novelty that recapitulates boom-bust fads among dog owners. Our analysis of cultural evolution through frequency-dependent selection provides a quantitative account of social pressures to conform or to be different.