The policy and politics of healthcare corporatisation: The case of the English NHS.

RATIONALE: Few accounts of healthcare corporatisation examine the effects of the 2008 financial crisis. New Politics of the Welfare State (NPWS) theories recognise the relevance of crises but give more attention to programmatic than systemic (structural) retrenchment, and little to healthcare corporatisation. OBJECTIVE: To examine what changes the 2008 financial crisis produced in the pattern of healthcare corporatisation, and the implications for NPWS theories. METHODS: Using administrative data from the English NHS during 1995-2019 we formulated a multi-dimensional index of corporatisation, tested its validity, and used it to analyse longitudinally how the financial crisis affected the balance between the responsibilization of management and re-commodification (introduction of market-like practices) in provider corporatisation. RESULTS: The financial crisis influenced NHS corporatisation through the fiscal austerity with which governments responded. The re-commodification of NHS providers stalled but not the responsibilization of NHS managers. CONCLUSIONS: The corporatisation of NHS providers faltered after the financial crisis. These findings corroborate parts of NPWS theory but also reveal scope for further elaborating its accounts of systemic retrenchment in health systems.

Developing architecture of system management in the English NHS: evidence from a qualitative study of three Integrated Care Systems.

OBJECTIVE: Integrated Care Systems (ICSs) mark a change in the English National Health Service to more collaborative interorganisational working. We explored how effective the ICS form of collaboration is in achieving its goals by investigating how ICSs were developing, how system partners were balancing organisational and system responsibilities, how partners could be held to account and how local priorities were being reconciled with ICS priorities. DESIGN: We carried out detailed case studies in three ICSs, each consisting of a system and its partners, using interviews, documentary analysis and meeting observations. SETTING/PARTICIPANTS: We conducted 64 in-depth, semistructured interviews with director-level representatives of ICS partners and observed eight meetings (three in case study 1, three in case study 2 and two in case study 3). RESULTS: Collaborative working was welcomed by system members. The agreement of local governance arrangements was ongoing and challenging. System members found it difficult to balance system and individual responsibilities, with concerns that system priorities could run counter to organisational interests. Conflicts of interest were seen as inherent, but the benefits of collaborative decision-making were perceived to outweigh risks. There were multiple examples of work being carried out across systems and 'places' to share resources, change resource allocation and improve partnership working. Some interviewees reported reticence addressing difficult issues collaboratively, and that organisations' statutory accountabilities were allowing a 'retreat' from the confrontation of difficult issues facing systems, such as agreeing action to achieve financial sustainability. CONCLUSIONS: There remain significant challenges regarding agreeing governance, accountability and decision-making arrangements which are particularly important due to the recent Health and Care Act 2022 which gave ICSs allocative functions for the majority of health resources for local populations. An arbiter who is independent of the ICS may be required to resolve disputes, along with increased support for shaping governance arrangements.

Scale and spread of innovation in health and social care: Insights from the evaluation of the New Care Model/Vanguard programme in England.

OBJECTIVE: Little is known about how to achieve scale and spread beyond the early local adoption of an innovative health care programme. We use the New Care Model - or 'Vanguard' - programme in the English National Health Service to illuminate the process, assessing why only one of five Vanguard programmes was successfully scaled up. METHODS: We interviewed a wide range of stakeholders involved in the Vanguard programme, including programme leads, provider organisations, and policymakers. We also consulted relevant documentation. RESULTS: A lack of direction near the end of the Vanguard programme, a lack of ongoing resources, and limited success in providing real-time monitoring and evaluation may all have contributed to the failure to scale and spread most of the Vanguard models. CONCLUSIONS: This programme is an example of the 'scale and spread paradox', in which localism was a key factor influencing the successful implementation of the Vanguards but ultimately limited their scale and spread.

What makes a socially skilled leader? Findings from the implementation and operation of New Care Models (Vanguards) in England.

PURPOSE: The article aims to argue that the concept of "distributed leadership" lacks the specificity required to allow a full understanding of how change happens. The authors therefore utilise the "Strategic Action Field Framework" (SAF) (Moulton and Sandfort, 2017) as a more sensitive framework for understanding leadership in complex systems. The authors use the New Care Models (Vanguard) Programme as an exemplar. DESIGN/METHODOLOGY/APPROACH: Using the SAF framework, the authors explored factors affecting whether and how local Vanguard initiatives were implemented in response to national policy, using a qualitative case study approach. The authors apply this to data from the focus groups and interviews with a variety of respondents in six case study sites, covering different Vanguard types between October 2018 and July 2019. FINDINGS: While literature already acknowledges that leadership is not simply about individual leaders, but about leading together, this paper emphasises that a further interdependence exists between leaders and their organisational/system context. This requires actors to use their skills and knowledge within the fixed and changing attributes of their local context, to perform the roles (boundary spanning, interpretation and mobilisation) necessary to allow the practical implementation of complex change across a healthcare setting. ORIGINALITY/VALUE: The SAF framework was a useful framework within which to interrogate the data, but the authors found that the category of "social skills" required further elucidation. By recognising the importance of an intersection between position, personal characteristics/behaviours, fixed personal attributes and local context, the work is novel.

When technology precedes regulation: the challenges and opportunities of e-pharmacy in low-income and middle-income countries.

The recent growth of medicine sales online represents a major disruption to pharmacy markets, with COVID-19 encouraging this trend further. While e-pharmacy businesses were initially the preserve of high-income countries, in the past decade they have been growing rapidly in low-income and middle-income countries (LMICs). Public health concerns associated with e-pharmacy include the sale of prescription-only medicines without a prescription and the sale of substandard and falsified medicines. There are also non-health-related risks such as consumer fraud and lack of data privacy. However, e-pharmacy may also have the potential to improve access to medicines. Drawing on existing literature and a set of key informant interviews in Kenya, Nigeria and India, we examine the e-pharmacy regulatory systems in LMICs. None of the study countries had yet enacted a regulatory framework specific to e-pharmacy. Key regulatory challenges included the lack of consensus on regulatory models, lack of regulatory capacity, regulating sales across borders and risks of over-regulation. However, e-pharmacy also presents opportunities to enhance medicine regulation-through consolidation in the sector, and the traceability and transparency that online records offer. The regulatory process needs to be adapted to keep pace with this dynamic landscape and exploit these possibilities. This will require exploration of a range of innovative regulatory options, collaboration with larger, more compliant businesses, and engagement with global regulatory bodies. A key first step must be ensuring that national regulators are equipped with the necessary awareness and technical expertise to actively oversee this e-pharmacy activity.

Challenges of maintaining accountability in networks of health and care organisations: A study of developing Sustainability and Transformation Partnerships in the English National Health Service.

The English National Health Service (NHS) constitutes a unique institutional context, which combines elements of hierarchy, markets and networks. This has always raised issues about competing forms of accountability. Recent policy has emphasised a move from quasi market competition towards collaboration in the form of new regional organisational arrangements known as Sustainability and Transformation Partnerships (STPs). We explore accountability relationships in STPs, focusing on the challenges of increasing horizontal accountability given existing vertical accountabilities, most notably to national regulators. We utilize a case study approach concentrated on three Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs) in urban and rural settings in England. We conducted in-person interviews with 22 managers from NHS organisations and local authorities and examined local documents to obtain information on governance and accountability structures. The fieldwork was undertaken between November 2017 and July 2018. We analysed results by considering which actors were accountable to what forums and the nature of the obligation (vertical or horizontal). We found that individual organisations still retained vertical accountabilities and were reluctant to be held accountable for the whole STP, given they were responsible for only part of the joint effort. Moreover, organisations did not feel accountable to STPs and instead highlighted vertical accountabilities upwards to their own boards and to national regulators; and downwards to the public. But while local commissioning organisations, CCGs engaged with their members and the public, STPs failed to engage adequately with the public. Nevertheless, there were indications that horizontal accountability was starting to develop. This could become complementary to vertical accountability by facilitating mutual learning and peer review to anticipate and defer regulatory intervention. While vertical accountability is necessary to provide oversight and apply sanctions, it is not sufficient and should be accompanied by horizontal accountability.

Agreeing the allocation of scarce resources in the English NHS: Ostrom, common pool resources and the role of the state.

A challenge facing health systems such as the English National Health Service (NHS), which operate in a context of diversity of provision and scarcity of financial resources, is how organisations engaged in the provision of services can be encouraged to adopt collective resource utilisation strategies to ensure limited resources are utilised in the interests of service users and, in the case of tax funded services, the general public. In this paper the authors apply Elinor Ostrom's work concerning communities' self-governance of common pool resources to the development of collective approaches to the utilisation of resources for the provision of health services. Focusing on the establishment of Sustainability and Transformation Partnerships (STPs) in the English NHS, and drawing on interviews with senior managers in English NHS purchaser and provider organisations, we use Ostrom's work as a frame to analyse STPs, as vehicles to agree and enact shared rules governing the allocation of financial resources, and the role of the state in relation to the development of this collective governance. While there was an unwillingness to use STPs to agree collective rules for resource allocation, we found that local actors were discussing and agreeing collective approaches regarding how resources should be utilised to deliver health services in order to make best use of scarce resources. State influence on the development of collective approaches to resource allocation through the STP was viewed by some as coercive, but also provided a necessary function to ensure accountability. Our analysis suggests Ostrom's notion of resource 'appropriation' should be extended to capture the nuances of resource utilisation in complex production chains, such as those involved in the delivery of health services where the extraction of funds is not an end in itself, but where the value of resources depends on how they are utilised.

The regulation of competition and procurement in the National Health Service 2015-2018: enduring hierarchical control and the limits of juridification.

Since 1990, market mechanisms have occurred in the predominantly hierarchical National Health Service (NHS). The Health and Social Care Act 2012 led to concerns that market principles had been irrevocably embedded in the NHS and that the regulators would acquire unwarranted power compared with politicians (known as 'juridification'). To assess this concern, we analysed regulatory activity in the period from 2015 to 2018. We explored how economic regulation of the NHS had changed in light of the policy turn back to hierarchy in 2014 and the changes in the legislative framework under Public Contracts Regulations 2015. We found the continuing dominance of hierarchical modes of control was reflected in the relative dominance and behaviour of the sector economic regulator. But there had also been a limited degree of juridification involving the courts. Generally, the regulatory decisions were consistent with the 2014 policy shift away from market principles and with the enduring role of hierarchy in the NHS, but the existing legislative regime did allow the incursion of pro market regulatory decision making, and instances of such decisions were identified.

How do they measure up? Differences in stakeholder perceptions of quality measures used in English community nursing.

OBJECTIVES: To establish how quality indicators used in English community nursing are selected and applied, and their perceived usefulness to service users, commissioners and service providers. METHODS: A qualitative multi-site case study was conducted with five commissioning organizations and their service providers. Participants included commissioners, provider organization managers, nurses and service users. RESULTS: Indicator selection and application often entail complex processes influenced by wider health system and cross-organizational factors. All participants felt that current indicators, while useful for accountability and management purposes, fail to reflect the true quality of community nursing care and may sometimes indirectly compromise care. CONCLUSIONS: Valuable resources may be better used for comprehensive system redesign, to ensure that patient, carer and nurse priorities are given equivalence with those of other stakeholders.

Exploring the impacts of the 2012 Health and Social Care Act reforms to commissioning on clinical activity in the English NHS: a mixed methods study of cervical screening.

OBJECTIVES: Explore the impact of changes to commissioning introduced in England by the Health and Social Care Act 2012 (HSCA) on cervical screening activity in areas identified empirically as particularly affected organisationally by the reforms. METHODS: Qualitative followed by quantitative methods. Qualitative: semi-structured interviews (with NHS commissioners, managers, clinicians, senior administrative staff from Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs), local authorities, service providers), observations of commissioning meetings in two metropolitan areas of England. Quantitative: triple-difference analysis of national administrative data. Variability in the expected effects of HSCA on commissioning was measured by comparing CCGs working with one local authority with CCGs working with multiple local authorities. To control for unmeasured confounders, differential changes over time in cervical screening rates (among women, 25-64 years) between CCGs more and less likely to have been affected by HSCA commissioning organisational change were compared with another outcome-unassisted birth rates-largely unaffected by HSCA changes. RESULTS: Interviewees identified that cervical screening commissioning and provision was more complex and 'fragmented', with responsibilities less certain, following the HSCA. Interviewees predicted this would reduce cervical screening rates in some areas more than others. Quantitative findings supported these predictions. Areas where CCGs dealt with multiple local authorities experienced a larger decline in cervical screening rates (1.4%) than those dealing with one local authority (1.0%). Over the same period, unassisted deliveries decreased by 1.6% and 2.0%, respectively, in the two groups. CONCLUSIONS: Arrangements for commissioning and delivering cervical screening were disrupted and made more complex by the HSCA. Areas most affected saw a greater decline in screening rates than others. The fact that this was identified qualitatively and then confirmed quantitatively strengthens this finding. The study suggests large-scale health system reforms may have unintended consequences, and that complex commissioning arrangements may be problematic.

How are clinical commissioning groups managing conflicts of interest under primary care co-commissioning in England? A qualitative analysis.

OBJECTIVES: From April 2015, NHS England (NHSE) started to devolve responsibility for commissioning primary care services to clinical commissioning groups (CCGs). The aim of this paper is to explore how CCGs are managing potential conflicts of interest associated with groups of GPs commissioning themselves or their practices to provide services. DESIGN: We carried out two telephone surveys using a sample of CCGs. We also used a qualitative case study approach and collected data using interviews and meeting observations in four sites (CCGs). SETTING/PARTICIPANTS: We conducted 57 telephone interviews and 42 face-to-face interviews with general practitioners (GPs) and CCG staff involved in primary care co-commissioning and observed 74 meetings of CCG committees responsible for primary care co-commissioning. RESULTS: Conflicts of interest were seen as an inevitable consequence of CCGs commissioning primary care. Particular problems arose with obtaining unbiased clinical input for new incentive schemes and providing support to GP provider federations. Participants in meetings concerning primary care co-commissioning declared conflicts of interest at the outset of meetings. Different approaches were pursued regarding GPs involvement in subsequent discussions and decisions with inconsistency in the exclusion of GPs from meetings. CCG senior management felt confident that the new governance structures and policies dealt adequately with conflicts of interest, but we found these arrangements face limitations. While the revised NHSE statutory guidance on managing conflicts of interest (2016) was seen as an improvement on the original (2014), there still remained some confusion over various terms and concepts contained therein. CONCLUSIONS: Devolving responsibility for primary care co-commissioning to CCGs created a structural conflict of interest. The NHSE statutory guidance should be refined and clarified so that CCGs can properly manage conflicts of interest. Non-clinician members of committees involved in commissioning primary care require training in order to make decisions requiring clinical input in the absence of GPs.

The spatial politics of place and health policy: Exploring Sustainability and Transformation Plans in the English NHS.

This paper explores how 'place' is conceptualised and mobilized in health policy and considers the implications of this. Using the on-going spatial reorganizing of the English NHS as an exemplar, we draw upon relational geographies of place for illumination. We focus on the introduction of 'Sustainability and Transformation Plans' (STPs): positioned to support improvements in care and relieve financial pressures within the health and social care system. STP implementation requires collaboration between organizations within 44 bounded territories that must reach 'local' consensus about service redesign under conditions of unprecedented financial constraint. Emphasising the continued influence of previous reorganizations, we argue that such spatialized practices elude neat containment within coherent territorial geographies. Rather than a technical process financially and spatially 'fixing' health and care systems, STPs exemplify post-politics-closing down the political dimensions of policy-making by associating 'place' with 'local' empowerment to undertake highly resource-constrained management of health systems, distancing responsibility from national political processes. Relational understandings of place thus provide value in understanding health policies and systems, and help to identify where and how STPs might experience difficulties.

Commissioning through competition and cooperation in the English NHS under the Health and Social Care Act 2012: evidence from a qualitative study of four clinical commissioning groups.

OBJECTIVE: The Health and Social Care Act 2012 ('HSCA 2012') introduced a new, statutory, form of regulation of competition into the National Health Service (NHS), while at the same time recognising that cooperation was necessary. NHS England's policy document, The Five Year Forward View ('5YFV') of 2014 placed less emphasis on competition without altering the legislation. We explored how commissioners and providers understand the complex regulatory framework, and how they behave in relation to competition and cooperation. DESIGN: We carried out detailed case studies in four clinical commissioning groups, using interviews and documentary analysis to explore the commissioners' and providers' understanding and experience of competition and cooperation. SETTING/PARTICIPANTS: We conducted 42 interviews with senior managers in commissioning organisations and senior managers in NHS and independent provider organisations (acute and community services). RESULTS: Neither commissioners nor providers fully understand the regulatory regime in respect of competition in the NHS, and have not found that the regulatory authorities have provided adequate guidance. Despite the HSCA 2012 promoting competition, commissioners chose mainly to use collaborative strategies to effect major service reconfigurations, which is endorsed as a suitable approach by providers. Nevertheless, commissioners are using competitive tendering in respect of more peripheral services in order to improve quality of care and value for money. CONCLUSIONS: Commissioners regard the use of competition and cooperation as appropriate in the NHS currently, although collaborative strategies appear more helpful in respect of large-scale changes. However, the current regulatory framework contained in the HSCA 2012, particularly since the publication of the 5YFV, is not clear. Better guidance should be issued by the regulatory authorities.

The regulation of competition in the National Health Service (NHS): what difference has the Health and Social Care Act 2012 made?

This article examines the impact of the Health and Social Care Act 2012 on the regulation of competition in the English National Health Service (NHS), by focussing on the change it marked from a system of sector-specific regulation to one which is clearly based in competition law. It has been suggested that the Act and its associated reforms would significantly alter accountability in the NHS, and would change decisions from the remit of public policy to that of the law. To assess the impact the Act has had in practice, the article compares the interpretation of the rules regarding competition in the NHS by the regulators of competition immediately before, and following, the passing of the Act. It argues that, whilst the reforms have the potential significantly to alter the way competition in the NHS is regulated, the impact of the reforms in this area is limited by the development of systems within the NHS to manage and resolve issues internally where possible.

A qualitative study of diverse providers' behaviour in response to commissioners, patients and innovators in England: research protocol.

INTRODUCTION: The variety of organisations providing National Health Service (NHS)-funded services in England is growing. Besides NHS hospitals and general practitioners (GPs), they include corporations, social enterprises, voluntary organisations and others. The degree to which these organisational types vary, however, in the ways they manage and provide services and in the outcomes for service quality, patient experience and innovation, remains unclear. This research will help those who commission NHS services select among the different types of organisation for different tasks. RESEARCH QUESTIONS: The main research questions are how organisationally diverse NHS-funded service providers vary in their responsiveness to patient choice, NHS commissioning and policy changes; and their patterns of innovation. We aim to assess the implications for NHS commissioning and managerial practice which follow from these differences. METHODS AND ANALYSIS: Systematic qualitative comparison across a purposive sample (c.12) of providers selected for maximum variety of organisational type, with qualitative studies of patient experience and choice (in the same sites). We focus is on NHS services heavily used by older people at high risk of hospital admission: community health services; out-of-hours primary care; and secondary care (planned orthopaedics or ophthalmology). The expected outputs will be evidence-based schemas showing how patterns of service development and delivery typically vary between different organisational types of provider. ETHICS, BENEFITS AND DISSEMINATION: We will ensure informants' organisational and individual anonymity when dealing with high profile case studies and a competitive health economy. The frail elderly is a key demographic sector with significant policy and financial implications. For NHS commissioners, patients, doctors and other stakeholders, the main outcome will be better knowledge about the relative merits of different kinds of healthcare provider. Dissemination will make use of strategies suggested by patient and public involvement, as well as DH and service-specific outlets.

Increasing autonomy in publically owned services.

PURPOSE: The purpose of this paper is to explore government efforts to enhance the autonomy of community health services (CHS) in England through the creation of Foundation Trusts status. It considers why some CHS elected to become nascent Community Foundation Trusts (CFTs) while others had not and what advantages they thought increased levels of autonomy offered. DESIGN/METHODOLOGY/APPROACH: Data are drawn from the evaluation of the Department of Health's CFT pilot programme. Participants were purposively selected from pilot sites, as well as from comparator non-pilot organisations. A total of 44 staff from 14 organisations were interviewed. FINDINGS: The data reveals that regardless of the different pathways that organisations were on, they all shared the same goal, a desire for greater autonomy, but specifically within the NHS. Additionally, irrespective of their organisational form most organisations were considering an almost identical set of initiatives as a means to improve service delivery and productivity. RESEARCH LIMITATIONS/IMPLICATIONS: Despite the expectations of policy makers no CFTs were established during the course of the study, so it is not possible to find out what the effect of such changes were. Nevertheless, the authors were able to investigate the attitudes of all the providers of CHS to the plans to increase their managerial autonomy, whether simply by separating from PCTs or by becoming CFTs. ORIGINALITY/VALUE: As no CFTs have yet been formed, this study provides the only evidence to date about increasing autonomy for CHS in England.

Development of a framework for prospective payment for child mental health services.

OBJECTIVES: There is a need to develop a payment system for services for children with mental health problems that allows more targeted commissioning based on fairness and need. This is currently constrained by lack of clinical consensus on the best way forward, wide variation in practice, and lack of data about activity and outcomes. In the context of a national initiative in England our aim was to develop a basis for an improved payment system. METHODS: Three inter-related studies: a qualitative consultation with child and adolescent mental health services (CAMHS) stakeholders on what the key principles for establishing a payment system should be, via online survey (n = 180) and two participatory workshops (n = 91); review of relevant national clinical guidelines (n = 15); and a quantitative study of the relationship between disorders and resource use (n = 1774 children from 23 teams). RESULTS: CAMHS stakeholders stressed the need for a broader definition of need than only diagnosis, including the measurement of indirect service activities and appropriate outcome measurement. National clinical guidance suggested key aspects of best practice for care packages but did not include consideration of contextual factors such as complexity. Modelling data on cases found that problem type and degree of impairment independently predicted resource use, alongside evidence for substantial service variation in the allocation of resources for similar problems. CONCLUSIONS: A framework for an episode-based payment system for CAMHS should include consideration of: complexity and indirect service activities; evidence-based care packages; different needs in terms of impairment and symptoms; and outcome measurement as a core component.

Views of NHS commissioners on commissioning support provision. Evidence from a qualitative study examining the early development of clinical commissioning groups in England.

OBJECTIVE: The 2010 healthcare reform in England introduced primary care-led commissioning in the National Health Service (NHS) by establishing clinical commissioning groups (CCGs). A key factor for the success of the reform is the provision of excellent commissioning support services to CCGs. The Government's aim is to create a vibrant market of competing providers of such services (from both for-profit and not-for-profit sectors). Until this market develops, however, commissioning support units (CSUs) have been created from which CCGs are buying commissioning support functions. This study explored the attitudes of CCGs towards outsourcing commissioning support functions during the initial stage of the reform. DESIGN: The research took place between September 2011 and June 2012. We used a case study research design in eight CCGs, conducting in-depth interviews, observation of meetings and analysis of policy documents. SETTING/PARTICIPANTS: We conducted 96 interviews and observed 146 meetings (a total of approximately 439 h). RESULTS: Many CCGs were reluctant to outsource core commissioning support functions (such as contracting) for fear of losing local knowledge and trusted relationships. Others were disappointed by the absence of choice and saw CSUs as monopolies and a recreation of the abolished PCTs. Many expressed doubts about the expectation that outsourcing of commissioning support functions will result in lower administrative costs. CONCLUSIONS: Given the nature of healthcare commissioning, outsourcing vital commissioning support functions may not be the preferred option of CCGs. Considerations of high transaction costs, and the risk of fragmentation of services and loss of trusted relationships involved in short-term contracting, may lead most CCGs to decide to form long-term partnerships with commissioning support suppliers in the future. This option, however, limits competition by creating 'network closure' and calls into question the Government's intention to create a vibrant market of commissioning support provision.