Regional personality differences predict variation in early COVID-19 infections and mobility patterns indicative of social distancing.

The early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic revealed stark regional variation in the spread of the virus. While previous research has highlighted the impact of regional differences in sociodemographic and economic factors, we argue that regional differences in social and compliance behaviors-the very behaviors through which the virus is transmitted-are critical drivers of the spread of COVID-19, particularly in the early stages of the pandemic. Combining self-reported personality data that capture individual differences in these behaviors (3.5 million people) with COVID-19 prevalence and mortality rates as well as behavioral mobility observations (29 million people) in the United States and Germany, we show that regional personality differences can help explain the early transmission of COVID-19; this is true even after controlling for a wide array of important sociodemographic, economic, and pandemic-related factors. We use specification curve analyses to test the effects of regional personality in a robust and unbiased way. The results indicate that in the early stages of COVID-19, Openness to experience acted as a risk factor, while Neuroticism acted as a protective factor. The findings also highlight the complexity of the pandemic by showing that the effects of regional personality can differ (a) across countries (Extraversion), (b) over time (Openness), and (c) from those previously observed at the individual level (Agreeableness and Conscientiousness). Taken together, our findings support the importance of regional personality differences in the early spread of COVID-19, but they also caution against oversimplified answers to phenomena as complex as a global pandemic. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Neural reference groups: a synchrony-based classification approach for predicting attitudes using fNIRS.

Social neuroscience research has demonstrated that those who are like-minded are also 'like-brained.' Studies have shown that people who share similar viewpoints have greater neural synchrony with one another, and less synchrony with people who 'see things differently.' Although these effects have been demonstrated at the 'group level,' little work has been done to predict the viewpoints of specific 'individuals' using neural synchrony measures. Furthermore, the studies that have made predictions using synchrony-based classification at the individual level used expensive and immobile neuroimaging equipment (e.g. functional magnetic resonance imaging) in highly controlled laboratory settings, which may not generalize to real-world contexts. Thus, this study uses a simple synchrony-based classification method, which we refer to as the 'neural reference groups' approach, to predict individuals' dispositional attitudes from data collected in a mobile 'pop-up neuroscience' lab. Using functional near-infrared spectroscopy data, we predicted individuals' partisan stances on a sociopolitical issue by comparing their neural timecourses to data from two partisan neural reference groups. We found that partisan stance could be identified at above-chance levels using data from dorsomedial prefrontal cortex. These results indicate that the neural reference groups approach can be used to investigate naturally occurring, dispositional differences anywhere in the world.

A functional near infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) replication of the sunscreen persuasion paradigm.

Activity in medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) during persuasive messages predicts future message-consistent behavior change, but there are significant limitations to the types of persuasion processes that can be invoked inside an MRI scanner. For instance, real world persuasion often involves multiple people in conversation. Functional near infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) allows us to move out of the scanner and into more ecologically valid contexts. As a first step, the current study used fNIRS to replicate an existing fMRI persuasion paradigm (i.e. the sunscreen paradigm) to determine if mPFC shows similar predictive value with this technology. Consistent with prior fMRI work, activity in mPFC was significantly associated with message-consistent behavior change, above and beyond self-reported intentions. There was also a difference in this association between previous users and non-users of sunscreen. Activity differences based on messages characteristics were not observed. Finally, activity in a region of right dorsolateral PFC (dlPFC), which has been observed with counterarguing against persuasive messages, correlated negatively with future behavior. The current results suggest it is reasonable to use fNIRS to examine persuasion paradigms that go beyond what is possible in the MRI scanner environment.

Modulating the neural bases of persuasion: why/how, gain/loss, and users/non-users.

Designing persuasive content is challenging, in part because people can be poor predictors of their actions. Medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) activation during message exposure reliably predicts downstream behavior, but past work has been largely atheoretical. We replicated past results on this relationship and tested two additional framing effects known to alter message receptivity. First, we examined gain- vs. loss-framed reasons for a health behavior (sunscreen use). Consistent with predictions from prospect theory, we observed greater MPFC activity to gain- vs. loss-framed messages, and this activity was associated with behavior. This relationship was stronger for those who were not previously sunscreen users. Second, building on theories of action planning, we compared neural activity during messages regarding how vs. why to enact the behavior. We observed rostral inferior parietal lobule and posterior inferior frontal gyrus activity during action planning ("how" messages), and this activity was associated with behavior; this is in contrast to the relationship between MPFC activity during the "why" (i.e., gain and loss) messages and behavior. These results reinforce that persuasion occurs in part via self-value integration-seeing value and incorporating persuasive messages into one's self-concept-and extend this work to demonstrate how message framing and action planning may influence this process.

The Social Regulation of Emotion: An Integrative, Cross-Disciplinary Model.

Research in emotion regulation has largely focused on how people manage their own emotions, but there is a growing recognition that the ways in which we regulate the emotions of others also are important. Drawing on work from diverse disciplines, we propose an integrative model of the psychological and neural processes supporting the social regulation of emotion. This organizing framework, the 'social regulatory cycle', specifies at multiple levels of description the act of regulating another person's emotions as well as the experience of being a target of regulation. The cycle describes the processing stages that lead regulators to attempt to change the emotions of a target person, the impact of regulation on the processes that generate emotions in the target, and the underlying neural systems.

Internalized Impressions: The Link Between Apparent Facial Trustworthiness and Deceptive Behavior Is Mediated by Targets' Expectations of How They Will Be Judged.

Researchers have debated whether a person's behavior can be predicted from his or her face. In particular, it is unclear whether people's trustworthiness can be predicted from their facial appearance. In the present study, we implemented conceptual and methodological advances in this area of inquiry, taking a new approach to capturing trustworthy behavior and measuring targets' own self-expectations as a mediator between consensual appearance-based judgments and the trustworthiness of targets' behavior. Using this novel paradigm to capture 900 observations of targets' behavior (as trustworthy or untrustworthy), we found that face-based judgments predicted trustworthiness. We also found that this effect was mediated by targets' expectations of how other people would perceive them and by their intentions to act in accordance with those expectations. These results are consistent with an internalized-impressions account: Targets internalize other people's appearance-based expectations and act in accordance with them, which leads facial-appearance-based judgments to be accurate.

A High-Resolution National-Scale Hydrologic Forecast System from a Global Ensemble Land Surface Model.

Warning systems with the ability to predict floods several days in advance have the potential to benefit tens of millions of people. Accordingly, large-scale streamflow prediction systems such as the Advanced Hydrologic Prediction Service or the Global Flood Awareness System are limited to coarse resolutions. This article presents a method for routing global runoff ensemble forecasts and global historical runoff generated by the European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts model using the Routing Application for Parallel computatIon of Discharge to produce high spatial resolution 15-day stream forecasts, approximate recurrence intervals, and warning points at locations where streamflow is predicted to exceed the recurrence interval thresholds. The processing method involves distributing the computations using computer clusters to facilitate processing of large watersheds with high-density stream networks. In addition, the Streamflow Prediction Tool web application was developed for visualizing analyzed results at both the regional level and at the reach level of high-density stream networks. The application formed part of the base hydrologic forecasting service available to the National Flood Interoperability Experiment and can potentially transform the nation's forecast ability by incorporating ensemble predictions at the nearly 2.7 million reaches of the National Hydrography Plus Version 2 Dataset into the national forecasting system.

Perceived intent motivates people to magnify observed harms.

Existing moral psychology research commonly explains certain phenomena in terms of a motivation to blame. However, this motivation is not measured directly, but rather is inferred from other measures, such as participants' judgments of an agent's blameworthiness. The present paper introduces new methods for assessing this theoretically important motivation, using tools drawn from animal-model research. We test these methods in the context of recent "harm-magnification" research, which shows that people often overestimate the damage caused by intentional (versus unintentional) harms. A preliminary experiment exemplifies this work and also rules out an alternative explanation for earlier harm-magnification results. Exp. 1 asks whether intended harm motivates blame or merely demonstrates the actor's intrinsic blameworthiness. Consistent with a motivational interpretation, participants freely chose blaming, condemning, and punishing over other appealing tasks in an intentional-harm condition, compared with an unintentional-harm condition. Exp. 2 also measures motivation but with converging indicators of persistence (effort, rate, and duration) in blaming. In addition to their methodological contribution, these studies also illuminate people's motivational responses to intentional harms. Perceived intent emerges as catalyzing a motivated social cognitive process related to social prediction and control.

Tandem anchoring: informational and politeness effects of range offers in social exchange.

We examined whether and why range offers (e.g., "I want $7,200 to $7,600 for my car") matter in negotiations. A selective-attention account predicts that motivated and skeptical offer-recipients focus overwhelmingly on the attractive endpoint (i.e., a buyer would hear, in effect, "I want $7,200"). In contrast, we propose a tandem anchoring account, arguing that offer-recipients are often influenced by both endpoints as they judge the offer-maker's reservation price (i.e., bottom line) as well as how polite they believe an extreme (nonaccommodating) counteroffer would be. In 5 studies, featuring scripted negotiation scenarios and live dyadic negotiations, we find that certain range offers yield improved settlement terms for offer-makers without relational costs, whereas others may yield relationship benefits without deal costs. We clarify the types of range offers that evoke these benefits and identify boundaries to their impact, including range width and extremity. In addition, our studies reveal evidence consistent with 2 proposed mechanisms, one involving an informational effect (both endpoints of range offers can be taken as signals of an offer-maker's reservation price) and another involving a politeness effect (range offers can make extreme counteroffers seem less polite). Our results have implications for models of negotiation behavior and outcomes and, more broadly, for the nature of social exchange. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2015 APA, all rights reserved).

Contextual alignment of cognitive and neural dynamics.

Effective real-world communication requires the alignment of multiple individuals to a common perspective or mental framework. To study how this alignment occurs at the level of the brain, we measured BOLD response during fMRI while participants (n = 24) listened to a series of vignettes either in the presence or absence of a valid contextual cue. The valid contextual cue was necessary to understand the information in each vignette. We then examined where and to what extent the shared valid context led to greater intersubject similarity of neural processing. Regions of the default mode network including posterior cingulate cortex and medial pFC became more aligned when participants shared a valid contextual framework, whereas other regions, including primary sensory cortices, responded to the stimuli reliably regardless of contextual factors. Taken in conjunction with previous research, the present results suggest that default mode regions help the brain to organize incoming verbal information in the context of previous knowledge.

Pushing in the Dark: Causes and Consequences of Limited Self-Awareness for Interpersonal Assertiveness.

Do people know when they are seen as pressing too hard, yielding too readily, or having the right touch? And does awareness matter? We examined these questions in four studies. Study 1 used dyadic negotiations to reveal a modest link between targets' self-views and counterparts' views of targets' assertiveness, showing that those seen as under- and over-assertive were likely to see themselves as appropriately assertive. Surprisingly, many people seen as appropriately assertive by counterparts mistakenly thought they were seen as having been over-assertive, a novel effect we call the line crossing illusion. We speculated that counterparts' orchestrated displays of discomfort might be partly responsible-behaviors we termed strategic umbrage. Study 2 revealed evidence for widespread strategic umbrage in real-world negotiations and Study 3 linked these behaviors to the line crossing illusion in a controlled negotiation. Study 4 showed that this illusion predicted outcomes in a multi-round negotiation.

Emotionally unskilled, unaware, and uninterested in learning more: reactions to feedback about deficits in emotional intelligence.

Despite the importance of self-awareness for managerial success, many organizational members hold overly optimistic views of their expertise and performance-a phenomenon particularly prevalent among those least skilled in a given domain. We examined whether this same pattern extends to appraisals of emotional intelligence (EI), a critical managerial competency. We also examined why this overoptimism tends to survive explicit feedback about performance. Across 3 studies involving professional students, we found that the least skilled had limited insight into deficits in their performance. Moreover, when given concrete feedback, low performers disparaged either the accuracy or the relevance of that feedback, depending on how expediently they could do so. Consequently, they expressed more reluctance than top performers to pursue various paths to self-improvement, including purchasing a book on EI or paying for professional coaching. Paradoxically, it was top performers who indicated a stronger desire to improve their EI following feedback.

Intentional harms are worse, even when they're not.

People and societies seek to combat harmful events. However, because resources are limited, every wrong righted leaves another wrong left unchecked. Responses must therefore be calibrated to the magnitude of the harm. One underappreciated factor that affects this calibration may be people's oversensitivity to intent. Across a series of studies, people saw intended harms as worse than unintended harms, even though the two harms were identical. This harm-magnification effect occurred for both subjective and monetary estimates of harm, and it remained when participants were given incentives to be accurate. The effect was fully mediated by blame motivation. People may therefore focus on intentional harms to the neglect of unintentional (but equally damaging) harms.

Outcome dependency alters the neural substrates of impression formation.

How do people maintain consistent impressions of other people when other people are often inconsistent? The present research addresses this question by combining recent neuroscientific insights with ecologically meaningful behavioral methods. Participants formed impressions of real people whom they met in a personally involving situation. fMRI and supporting behavioral data revealed that outcome dependency (i.e., depending on another person for a desired outcome) alters previously identified neural dynamics of impression formation. Consistent with past research, a functional localizer identified a region of dorsomedial PFC previously linked to social impression formation. In the main task, this ROI revealed the predicted patterns of activity across outcome dependency conditions: greater BOLD response when information confirmed (vs. violated) social expectations if participants were outcome-independent, and the reverse pattern if participants were outcome-dependent. We suggest that, although social perceivers often discount expectancy-disconfirming information as noise, being dependent on another person for a desired outcome focuses impression-formation processing on the most diagnostic information, rather than on the most tractable information.

Medial prefrontal cortex predicts intertemporal choice.

People often make shortsighted decisions to receive small benefits in the present rather than large benefits in the future, that is, to favor their current selves over their future selves. In two studies using fMRI, we demonstrated that people make such decisions in part because they fail to engage in the same degree of self-referential processing when thinking about their future selves. When participants predicted how much they would enjoy an event in the future, they showed less activity in brain regions associated with introspective self-reference--such as the ventromedial pFC (vMPFC)--than when they predicted how much they would enjoy events in the present. Moreover, the magnitude of vMPFC reduction predicted the extent to which participants made shortsighted monetary decisions several weeks later. In light of recent findings that the vMPFC contributes to the ability to simulate future events from a first-person perspective, these data suggest that shortsighted decisions result in part from a failure to fully imagine the subjective experience of one's future self.

Cultural Neuroscience.

Cultural neuroscience issues from the apparently incompatible combination of neuroscience and cultural psychology. A brief literature sampling suggests, instead, several preliminary topics that demonstrate proof of possibilities: cultural differences in both lower-level processes (e.g. perception, number representation) and higher-order processes (e.g. inferring others' emotions, contemplating the self) are beginning to shed new light on both culture and cognition. Candidates for future cultural neuroscience research include cultural variations in the default (resting) network, which may be social; regulation and inhibition of feelings, thoughts, and actions; prejudice and dehumanization; and neural signatures of fundamental warmth and competence judgments.

Not so fast: the (not-quite-complete) dissociation between accuracy and confidence in thin-slice impressions.

After decades of research highlighting the fallibility of first impressions, recent years have featured reports of valid impressions based on surprisingly limited information, such as photos and short videos.Yet beneath mean levels of accuracy lies tremendous variance-some snap judgments are well-founded, others wrongheaded. An essential question for perceivers, therefore, is whether and when to trust their initial intuitions about others. In three studies of first impressions based on photos and videos, the authors examined accuracy for Big Five trait judgments as well as corresponding reports of confidence. Overall, perceivers showed a limited ability to intuit which of their impressions were more accurate than others, although a curvilinear effect emerged: In the relatively few cases where perceivers reported an absolute lack of confidence, their accuracy was indeed comparatively low. Across the studies, judgment confidence was shaped by sources at the judgment level and the judge level that were unrelated to accuracy.

I'll know what you're like when i see how you feel: how and when affective displays influence behavior-based impressions.

Accumulating evidence suggests that targets' displays of emotion shape perceivers' impression of those targets. Prior research has highlighted generalization effects, such as an angry display prompting an impression of hostility. In two studies, we went beyond generalization to examine the interaction of displays and behaviors, finding new evidence of augmenting effects (behavior-correspondent inferences are stronger when behavior is accompanied by positive affect) and discounting effects (such inferences are weaker when behavior is accompanied by negative affect). Thus, the same display can have different effects on impressions depending on the behavior it accompanies. We found evidence that these effects are mediated by ascribed intentions and that they have a boundary: When behaviors and affective displays are repeated, the augmenting and discounting power of displays appears to wane.

Neural correlates of stereotype application.

Recent research has focused on the disparate mechanisms that support the human ability to "mentalize" about the thoughts and feelings of others. One such process may rely on precompiled, semantic beliefs about the characteristics common to members of a social group, that is, on stereotypes; for example, judging that a woman may be more likely than a man to have certain interests or opinions. In the current study, we identified a pattern of neural activity associated with the use of stereotypes to judge another person's psychological characteristics. During fMRI scanning, participants mentalized about the likely responses of a female and male target to a series of questions, some of which were related to gender stereotypes (e.g., "enjoys shopping for new clothes"). Trials on which participants applied a stereotype were segregated from those on which participants avoided stereotype use. The BOLD response in an extensive region of the right frontal cortex differentiated stereotype-applied from -unapplied trials. Moreover, this neural difference was correlated with a behavioral index of gender associations-the Implicit Association Test-administered after scanning. Results suggest that stereotype application may draw on cognitive processes that more generally subserve semantic knowledge about categories.