Anticipated affect predicts moral praise and character judgments.

In four preregistered studies (total N = 5,067), we investigated whether people use their own anticipated affective responses to a situation to make judgments about the praiseworthiness of helping and the moral character of helpers. We found that helpers in more affectively arousing scenarios were seen as more morally motivated, received greater praise, and were seen as having more positive moral character, even when controlling for the perceived benefits of helping. Describing helpers as unemotional reduced the effect of observers' anticipated affect on character judgments. These results suggest that when making praise and character judgments, people not only consider the consequences of a helper's actions but also the emotions they experience when engaging in them-and that they use their own anticipated emotional experience to do this. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Ethical reasoning versus empathic bias: a false dichotomy?

Does empathy necessarily impede equity in altruism? Emerging findings from cognitive and affective science suggest that rationality and empathy are mutually compatible, contradicting some earlier, prominent arguments that empathy impedes equitable giving. We propose alternative conceptualizations of relationships among empathy, rationality, and equity, drawing on interdisciplinary advances in altruism research.

Neural responses underlying extraordinary altruists' generosity for socially distant others.

Most people are much less generous toward strangers than close others, a bias termed social discounting. But people who engage in extraordinary real-world altruism, like altruistic kidney donors, show dramatically reduced social discounting. Why they do so is unclear. Some prior research suggests reduced social discounting requires effortfully overcoming selfishness via recruitment of the temporoparietal junction. Alternatively, reduced social discounting may reflect genuinely valuing strangers' welfare more due to how the subjective value of their outcomes is encoded in regions such as rostral anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) and amygdala. We tested both hypotheses in this pre-registered study. We also tested the hypothesis that a loving-kindness meditation (LKM) training intervention would cause typical adults' neural and behavioral patterns to resemble altruists. Altruists and matched controls (N = 77) completed a social discounting task during functional magnetic resonance imaging; 25 controls were randomized to complete LKM training. Neither behavioral nor imaging analyses supported the hypothesis that altruists' reduced social discounting reflects effortfully overcoming selfishness. Instead, group differences emerged in social value encoding regions, including rostral ACC and amygdala. Activation in these regions corresponded to the subjective valuation of others' welfare predicted by the social discounting model. LKM training did not result in more generous behavioral or neural patterns, but only greater perceived difficulty during social discounting. Our results indicate extraordinary altruists' generosity results from the way regions involved in social decision-making encode the subjective value of others' welfare. Interventions aimed at promoting generosity may thus succeed to the degree they can increase the subjective valuation of others' welfare.

Moral foundations, values, and judgments in extraordinary altruists.

Donating a kidney to a stranger is a rare act of extraordinary altruism that appears to reflect a moral commitment to helping others. Yet little is known about patterns of moral cognition associated with extraordinary altruism. In this preregistered study, we compared the moral foundations, values, and patterns of utilitarian moral judgments in altruistic kidney donors (n = 61) and demographically matched controls (n = 58). Altruists expressed more concern only about the moral foundation of harm, but no other moral foundations. Consistent with this, altruists endorsed utilitarian concerns related to impartial beneficence, but not instrumental harm. Contrary to our predictions, we did not find group differences between altruists and controls in basic values. Extraordinary altruism generally reflected opposite patterns of moral cognition as those seen in individuals with psychopathy, a personality construct characterized by callousness and insensitivity to harm and suffering. Results link real-world, costly, impartial altruism primarily to moral cognitions related to alleviating harm and suffering in others rather than to basic values, fairness concerns, or strict utilitarian decision-making.