People are less myopic about future than past collective outcomes.

Myopia involves giving disproportionate weight to outcomes that occur close to the present. Myopia in people's evaluations of political outcomes and proposals threatens effective policymaking. It can lead to inefficient spending just before elections, cause inaction on important future policy challenges, and create incentives for government interventions aimed at boosting short-term performance at the expense of long-term welfare. But, are people generally myopic? Existing evidence comes mostly from studies that disregard either the future or collective outcomes. Political science characterizes people as myopic based on how they retrospectively evaluate collective outcomes, such as the state of the economy. Behavioral economics and psychology find that people make myopic choices involving future individual outcomes, such as money or personal health. To characterize myopia more generally, we offer two innovations: First, we adapt measurement approaches from behavioral economics and psychology to precisely gauge myopia over politically relevant collective outcomes. Second, we estimate myopia using the same approach for collective political outcomes in both past and future. We conduct two surveys on three different samples (including a large probability-based sample) asking respondents to evaluate national conditions randomly described as past or future while holding constant the domain, information about conditions, and the elicitation method. Results show that prospective evaluations are significantly less myopic than retrospective evaluations. People are often not myopic at all when looking to the future. This surprising pattern calls for more research to probe its robustness and spell out how low prospective myopia might lead to forward-looking policy.

Adaptation to compound climate risks: A systematic global stocktake.

This article provides a stocktake of the adaptation literature between 2013 and 2019 to better understand how adaptation responses affect risk under the particularly challenging conditions of compound climate events. Across 39 countries, 45 response types to compound hazards display anticipatory (9%), reactive (33%), and maladaptive (41%) characteristics, as well as hard (18%) and soft (68%) limits to adaptation. Low income, food insecurity, and access to institutional resources and finance are the most prominent of 23 vulnerabilities observed to negatively affect responses. Risk for food security, health, livelihoods, and economic outputs are commonly associated risks driving responses. Narrow geographical and sectoral foci of the literature highlight important conceptual, sectoral, and geographic areas for future research to better understand the way responses shape risk. When responses are integrated within climate risk assessment and management, there is greater potential to advance the urgency of response and safeguards for the most vulnerable.

Is a Rational Politics of Disaster Possible? Making Useful Decisions for Others in an Experimental Disaster Game.

Disaster responses are political. But can citizens make useful disaster decisions? Potential obstacles are that such decisions are complex, involve public goods, and often affect other people. Theories of political decision-making disagree on whether these problems can be overcome. We used experimental economic games that simulate disaster to test whether people are willing and able to prevent disasters for others. Groups of players face a complex task in which options that might help vary in their riskiness. Importantly, although all options are reasonable, which option is most useful depends on the experimental condition. We find that players will pay to help, can identify which option is most useful across experimental conditions, and will pay to learn how best to help. Thus, players were able to make useful and costly decisions to prevent others from experiencing disaster. This suggests that, in at least some situations, citizens may be able to make good disaster decisions. Supplementary Information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11109-021-09700-2.

Preferences for Prevention: People Assume Expensive Problems Have Expensive Solutions.

People support inefficient spending on preventing disasters, and these preferences are translated into inefficient policies as elected officials try to appeal to their constituents. Here, we find preferences for prevention spending are biased by the "cost conflation" mechanism, where people assume expensive problems have expensive solutions. In this article, we present a formal model of collective action, and illustrate how cost conflation causes people to deviate from the equilibria. We test for these hypothesized deviations using an incentivized experiment. The experimental subjects engage in cost conflation-they believe the costs of disaster prevention are positively related to the costs of disaster damages, even when explicitly told otherwise. As a result, they fail to prevent smaller disasters and pay too much to prevent large disasters when cheap solutions exist. Furthermore, we provide evidence that overemphasizing disaster damages undermines successful disaster prevention because people view these disasters as too big to solve.

Two-wave panel survey dataset on who feels affected by Hurricane Florence.

Feeling affected by climate change related natural disasters is an important predictor of engaging in climate change mitigation behavior. We therefore collected data to identify who felt affected by Hurricane Florence, which made landfall in the United States on September 14th, 2018. In the months before Hurricane Florence, we collected survey responses from a nationally representative sample of United States citizens. We measured their attitudes towards climate change, emotional predispositions, and demographic information. Then, in the days after the hurricane, we re-contacted respondents to identify whether or not they felt personally affected by Hurricane Florence. These data can be used first to identify variables associated with climate change attitudes, and second to identify the traits that predispose individuals to feel affected by climate change related disasters.

The political complexity of attack and defense.

De Dreu and Gross's distinction between attack and defense is complicated in real-world conflicts because competing leaders construe their position as one of defense, and power imbalances place status quo challengers in a defensive position. Their account of defense as vigilant avoidance is incomplete because it avoids a reference to anger which transforms anxious avoidance into collective and unified action.

Beyond market behavior: Evolved cognition and folk political economic beliefs.

Boyer & Petersen (B&P) lay out a compelling theory for folk-economic beliefs, focusing on beliefs about markets. However, societies also allocate resources through mechanisms involving power and group decision-making (e.g., voting), through the political economy. We encourage future work to keep folk political economic beliefs in mind, and sketch an example involving pollution and climate change mitigation policy.