Pandemic influenza and pediatric intensive care.

OBJECTIVE: To assess the adequacy of preparedness planning for an influenza pandemic by modeling the pediatric surge capacity of healthcare facility and pediatric intensive care unit (PICU) requirements over time. Governments and Public Health authorities have planned preparedness activities and training for a flu pandemic. PICU facilities will be the limiting factor in healthcare provision for children but detailed analyses for needs and demands in PICU care have not been published. DESIGN: Based on the Center for Disease Control and Prevention and World Health Organization estimates and published models of the expected evolution of pandemic flu, we modeled the pediatric surge capacity of healthcare facility and PICU requirements over time. Various scenarios with different assumptions were explored. We compared these demands with estimates of maximal PICU capacity factoring in healthcare worker absenteeism as well as reported and more realistic estimates derived from semistructured telephone interviews with key stakeholders in ICUs in the study area. SETTING: All hospitals and intensive care facilities in the Northern Region in The Netherlands with near 1.7 million inhabitants, of whom approximately 25% is <18 yrs. MEASUREMENTS AND MAIN RESULTS: Using well-established modeling techniques, evidence-based medicine, and incorporating estimates from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and World Health Organization, we show that PICU capacity may suffice during an influenza pandemic. Even during the peak of the pandemic, most children requiring PICU admission may be served, even those who have nonflu-related conditions, provided that robust indications and decision rules are maintained, both for admission, as well as continuation (or discontinuation) of life support. CONCLUSIONS: We recommend that a model, with assumptions that can be adapted with new information obtained during early stages of the pandemic that is evolving, be an integral part of a preparedness plan for a pandemic influenza with new human transmissible agent like influenza A virus.

Pandemic influenza and excess intensive-care workload.

In The Netherlands a major part of preparedness planning for an epidemic or pandemic consists of maintaining essential public services, e.g., by the police, fire departments, army personnel, and healthcare workers. We provide estimates for peak demand for healthcare workers, factoring in healthcare worker absenteeism and using estimates from published epidemiologic models on the expected evolution of pandemic influenza in relation to the impact on peak surge capacity of healthcare facilities and intensive care units (ICUs). Using various published scenarios, we estimate their effect in increasing the availability of healthcare workers for duty during a pandemic. We show that even during the peak of the pandemic, all patients requiring hospital and ICU admission can be served, including those who have non-influenza-related conditions. For this rigorous task differentiation, clear hierarchical management, unambiguous communication, and discipline are essential and we recommend informing and training non-ICU healthcare workers for duties in the ICU.

Pandemic influenza and hospital resources.

Using estimates from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the World Health Organization, and published models of the expected evolution of pandemic influenza, we modeled the surge capacity of healthcare facility and intensive care unit (ICU) requirements over time in northern Netherlands (approximately 1.7 million population). We compared the demands of various scenarios with estimates of maximum ICU capacity, factoring in healthcare worker absenteeism as well as reported and realistic estimates derived from semistructured telephone interviews with key management in ICUs in the study area. We show that even during the peak of the pandemic, most patients requiring ICU admission may be served, even those who have non-influenza-related conditions, provided that strong indications and decision-making rules are maintained for admission as well as for continuation (or discontinuation) of life support. Such a model should be integral to a preparedness plan for a pandemic with a new human-transmissible agent.