10 years of Bayesian theories of autism: A comprehensive review.

Ten years ago, Pellicano and Burr published one of the most influential articles in the study of autism spectrum disorders, linking them to aberrant Bayesian inference processes in the brain. In particular, they proposed that autistic individuals are less influenced by their brains' prior beliefs about the environment. In this systematic review, we investigate if this theory is supported by the experimental evidence. To that end, we collect all studies which included comparisons across diagnostic groups or autistic traits and categorise them based on the investigated priors. Our results are highly mixed, with a slight majority of studies finding no difference in the integration of Bayesian priors. We find that priors developed during the experiments exhibited reduced influences more frequently than priors acquired previously, with various studies providing evidence for learning differences between participant groups. Finally, we focus on the methodological and computational aspects of the included studies, showing low statistical power and often inconsistent approaches. Based on our findings, we propose guidelines for future research.

No increased circular inference in adults with high levels of autistic traits or autism.

Autism spectrum disorders have been proposed to arise from impairments in the probabilistic integration of prior knowledge with sensory inputs. Circular inference is one such possible impairment, in which excitation-to-inhibition imbalances in the cerebral cortex cause the reverberation and amplification of prior beliefs and sensory information. Recent empirical work has associated circular inference with the clinical dimensions of schizophrenia. Inhibition impairments have also been observed in autism, suggesting that signal reverberation might be present in that condition as well. In this study, we collected data from 21 participants with self-reported diagnoses of autism spectrum disorders and 155 participants with a broad range of autistic traits in an online probabilistic decision-making task (the fisher task). We used previously established Bayesian models to investigate possible associations between autistic traits or autism and circular inference. There was no correlation between prior or likelihood reverberation and autistic traits across the whole sample. Similarly, no differences in any of the circular inference model parameters were found between autistic participants and those with no diagnosis. Furthermore, participants incorporated information from both priors and likelihoods in their decisions, with no relationship between their weights and psychiatric traits, contrary to what common theories for both autism and schizophrenia would suggest. These findings suggest that there is no increased signal reverberation in autism, despite the known presence of excitation-to-inhibition imbalances. They can be used to further contrast and refine the Bayesian theories of schizophrenia and autism, revealing a divergence in the computational mechanisms underlying the two conditions.