Blaming the unvaccinated during the COVID-19 pandemic: the roles of political ideology and risk perceptions in the USA.

Individuals unvaccinated against COVID-19 (C19) experienced prejudice and blame for the pandemic. Because people vastly overestimate C19 risks, we examined whether these negative judgements could be partially understood as a form of scapegoating (ie, blaming a group unfairly for an undesirable outcome) and whether political ideology (previously shown to shape risk perceptions in the USA) moderates scapegoating of the unvaccinated. We grounded our analyses in scapegoating literature and risk perception during C19. We obtained support for our speculations through two vignette-based studies conducted in the USA in early 2022. We varied the risk profiles (age, prior infection, comorbidities) and vaccination statuses of vignette characters (eg, vaccinated, vaccinated without recent boosters, unvaccinated, unvaccinated-recovered), while keeping all other information constant. We observed that people hold the unvaccinated (vs vaccinated) more responsible for negative pandemic outcomes and that political ideology moderated these effects: liberals (vs conservatives) were more likely to scapegoat the unvaccinated (vs vaccinated), even when presented with information challenging the culpability of the unvaccinated known at the time of data collection (eg, natural immunity, availability of vaccines, time since last vaccination). These findings support a scapegoating explanation for a specific group-based prejudice that emerged during the C19 pandemic. We encourage medical ethicists to examine the negative consequences of significant C19 risk overestimation among the public. The public needs accurate information about health issues. That may involve combating misinformation that overestimates and underestimates disease risk with similar vigilance to error.

Prosocial motives underlie scientific censorship by scientists: A perspective and research agenda.

Science is among humanity's greatest achievements, yet scientific censorship is rarely studied empirically. We explore the social, psychological, and institutional causes and consequences of scientific censorship (defined as actions aimed at obstructing particular scientific ideas from reaching an audience for reasons other than low scientific quality). Popular narratives suggest that scientific censorship is driven by authoritarian officials with dark motives, such as dogmatism and intolerance. Our analysis suggests that scientific censorship is often driven by scientists, who are primarily motivated by self-protection, benevolence toward peer scholars, and prosocial concerns for the well-being of human social groups. This perspective helps explain both recent findings on scientific censorship and recent changes to scientific institutions, such as the use of harm-based criteria to evaluate research. We discuss unknowns surrounding the consequences of censorship and provide recommendations for improving transparency and accountability in scientific decision-making to enable the exploration of these unknowns. The benefits of censorship may sometimes outweigh costs. However, until costs and benefits are examined empirically, scholars on opposing sides of ongoing debates are left to quarrel based on competing values, assumptions, and intuitions.

Worth the Risk? Greater Acceptance of Instrumental Harm Befalling Men than Women.

Scientific and organizational interventions often involve trade-offs whereby they benefit some but entail costs to others (i.e., instrumental harm; IH). We hypothesized that the gender of the persons incurring those costs would influence intervention endorsement, such that people would more readily support interventions inflicting IH onto men than onto women. We also hypothesized that women would exhibit greater asymmetries in their acceptance of IH to men versus women. Three experimental studies (two pre-registered) tested these hypotheses. Studies 1 and 2 granted support for these predictions using a variety of interventions and contexts. Study 3 tested a possible boundary condition of these asymmetries using contexts in which women have traditionally been expected to sacrifice more than men: caring for infants, children, the elderly, and the ill. Even in these traditionally female contexts, participants still more readily accepted IH to men than women. Findings indicate people (especially women) are less willing to accept instrumental harm befalling women (vs. men). We discuss the theoretical and practical implications and limitations of our findings.

When Do Observers Deprioritize Due Process for the Perpetrator and Prioritize Safety for the Victim in Response to Information-Poor Allegations of Harm?

We examined how observers assess information-poor allegations of harm (e.g., "my word against yours" cases), in which the outcomes of procedurally fair investigations may favor the alleged perpetrator because the evidentiary standards are unmet. Yet this lack of evidence does not mean no harm occurred, and some observers may be charged with deciding whether the allegation is actionable within a collective. On the basis of theories of moral typecasting, procedural justice, and uncertainty management, we hypothesized that observers would be more likely to prioritize the victim's safety (vs. to prioritize due process for the perpetrator) and view the allegation as actionable when the victim-alleged perpetrator dyad members exhibit features that align with stereotypes of victims and perpetrators. We supported our hypothesis with four studies using various contexts, sources of perceived prototypicality, due-process prioritization, and samples (students from New Zealand, Ns = 137 and 114; Mechanical Turk workers from the United States; Ns = 260 and 336).

Leadership in the eye of the beholder: Follower self-esteem is associated with divergent perceptions of leadership ability for dominant and prestigious leaders.

OBJECTIVE: Drawing from dual-strategies theory, leader-member exchange theory, and several theories of self-esteem, we develop and test hypotheses about how followers' self-esteem predicts their perceptions of dominant and prestigious leaders' leadership ability. METHOD: Across four studies (N = 1568), we tested the association between self-esteem and perceptions of leadership ability for dominant and prestigious leaders. RESULTS: Individuals with high self-esteem perceived greater leadership ability in prestigious leaders than did those with low self-esteem and individuals with low self-esteem perceived greater leadership ability in dominant leaders than did those with high self-esteem. These results emerged across ratings of leaders from hypothetical vignettes (Studies 1 and 4), abstract beliefs about what constitutes good leadership (Study 1), past personal experiences with leaders (Study 2) and clips of leaders from reality television (Study 3). In Study 4, we also tested potential mechanisms. Compared with followers with low self-esteem, followers with high self-esteem found prestigious leaders more trustworthy, and they anticipated feeling inauthentic around a dominant leader. CONCLUSIONS: Self-esteem is reliably and robustly related to perceived leadership ability of dominant and prestigious leaders, and these differences might stem from differences in trust in prestigious leaders and anticipated authenticity around dominant leaders.

Artificial Intelligence Can't Be Charmed: The Effects of Impartiality on Laypeople's Algorithmic Preferences.

Over the coming years, AI could increasingly replace humans for making complex decisions because of the promise it holds for standardizing and debiasing decision-making procedures. Despite intense debates regarding algorithmic fairness, little research has examined how laypeople react when resource-allocation decisions are turned over to AI. We address this question by examining the role of perceived impartiality as a factor that can influence the acceptance of AI as a replacement for human decision-makers. We posit that laypeople attribute greater impartiality to AI than human decision-makers. Our investigation shows that people value impartiality in decision procedures that concern the allocation of scarce resources and that people perceive AI as more capable of impartiality than humans. Yet, paradoxically, laypeople prefer human decision-makers in allocation decisions. This preference reverses when potential human biases are made salient. The findings highlight the importance of impartiality in AI and thus hold implications for the design of policy measures.

The dark side of belief in Covid-19 scientists and scientific evidence.

We draw from an interdisciplinary literature on convictions to examine the manifestations and consequences of firmly held beliefs in Covid-19 (C19) science. Across three studies (N = 743), we assess participants' beliefs in C19 experts, and beliefs in supported and unsupported empirical evidence. Study 1 establishes the basic theoretical links and we show that an individual's belief in science on C19 is associated with dispositional belief in science and moralization of C19 mitigation measures. Our subsequent two studies show how stronger belief in C19 science influences distrust in unmasked individuals past the mandates, and greater endorsement of pandemic mitigation authoritarianism. We document the dark side that emerges when belief in C19 science extends beyond the generally desirable scientific literacy and manifests as a conviction that public health experts are the only ones who can handle the pandemic, and that even unsupported claims about C19 are supported by scientific evidence (e.g., risk of outdoor transmission is high). We also highlight our political ideology findings showing that both liberals and conservatives mis-calibrate C19 risks in different ways, and we conclude with discussing how examining the darker side of scientific beliefs can inform our understanding of people's reactions to the pandemic.

Dual pathways to bias: Evaluators' ideology and ressentiment independently predict racial discrimination in hiring contexts.

Despite organizations' professed commitment to fairness, thousands of employees file race-based discrimination claims every year. The current article examines how people deviate from impartiality when evaluating candidates in hiring decisions. Researchers have argued the ideological endorsement of elitism (i.e., scoring high in social dominance orientation) can lead to discrimination against racial minorities. We examined whether an opposing ideological commitment-egalitarianism-can also produce partiality, but in favor of minority applicants. Inspired by dual processing models and Nietzsche's philosophical theorizing, we also forwarded and tested a novel, affective predictor of racial biases in evaluation: ressentiment toward the socially powerful. Across 4 studies, we found evaluators' ideologies and ressentiment independently shaped evaluations of equally qualified candidates in hiring contexts. Participants who endorsed elitism showed a preference for White candidates, whereas those who endorsed egalitarianism evaluated Black candidates more favorably. Individuals who experienced stronger ressentiment toward the social elite also preferred Black over White applicants. Studies 3 and 4 tested and supported a novel intervention-inducing a calculative mindset-as a method for attenuating evaluators' ideological and ressentiment driven impartiality. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Signaling virtuous victimhood as indicators of Dark Triad personalities.

We investigate the consequences and predictors of emitting signals of victimhood and virtue. In our first three studies, we show that the virtuous victim signal can facilitate nonreciprocal resource transfer from others to the signaler. Next, we develop and validate a victim signaling scale that we combine with an established measure of virtue signaling to operationalize the virtuous victim construct. We show that individuals with Dark Triad traits-Machiavellianism, Narcissism, Psychopathy-more frequently signal virtuous victimhood, controlling for demographic and socioeconomic variables that are commonly associated with victimization in Western societies. In Study 5, we show that a specific dimension of Machiavellianism-amoral manipulation-and a form of narcissism that reflects a person's belief in their superior prosociality predict more frequent virtuous victim signaling. Studies 3, 4, and 6 test our hypothesis that the frequency of emitting virtuous victim signal predicts a person's willingness to engage in and endorse ethically questionable behaviors, such as lying to earn a bonus, intention to purchase counterfeit products and moral judgments of counterfeiters, and making exaggerated claims about being harmed in an organizational context. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

What makes professors appear credible: The effect of demographic characteristics and ideological beliefs.

Five studies are conducted to examine how ideology and perceptions regarding gender, race, caste, and affiliation status affect how individuals judge researchers' credibility. Support is found for predictions that individuals judge researcher credibility according to their egalitarian or elitist ideologies and according to status cues including race, gender, caste, and university affiliation. Egalitarians evaluate low-status researchers as more credible than high-status researchers. Elitists show the opposite pattern. Credibility judgments affect whether individuals will interpret subsequent ambiguous events in accordance with the researcher's findings. Effects of diffuse status cues and ideological beliefs may be mitigated when specific status cues are presented to override stereotypes. (PsycINFO Database Record

I don't want the money, I just want your time: How moral identity overcomes the aversion to giving time to prosocial causes.

Four studies show that moral identity reduces people's aversion to giving time-particularly as the psychological costs of doing so increase. In Study 1, we demonstrate that even when the cost of time and money are held equivalent, a moral cue enhances the expected self-expressivity of giving time-especially when it is given to a moral cause. We found that a moral cue reduces time aversion even when giving time was perceived to be unpleasant (Study 2), or when the time to be given was otherwise seen to be scarce (Study 3). Study 4 builds on these studies by examining actual giving while accounting for the real costs of time. In this study, we found that the chronic salience of moral identity serves as a buffer to time aversion, specifically as giving time becomes increasingly costly. These findings are discussed in terms of the time-versus-money literature and the identity literature. We also discuss policy implications for prosocial cause initiatives. (PsycINFO Database Record

The lives of others: Third parties' responses to others' injustice.

This research takes a moral perspective to studying third parties' reactions to injustice as a function of their moral identity. Drawing from theories of deontic justice, moral intuition, moral heuristics, and moral identity, we develop and test a model of the moral underpinnings of third parties' reactions to injustice. First, we compare third parties' responses with interpersonal, distributive, and procedural justice violations. We hypothesize that third parties are more likely to intuit that interpersonal justice violations are morally wrong, compared with distributive and procedural justice violations. As a result, third parties are more likely to experience stronger moral anger and punish violators in response to interpersonal transgressions compared with distributive and procedural justice transgressions. Second, we test the proposition that third parties with a strong moral identity will react more strongly to justice violations than third parties with a comparatively weak moral identity. Results from 3 studies support these predictions.

A decline in prosocial language helps explain public disapproval of the US Congress.

Talking about helping others makes a person seem warm and leads to social approval. This work examines the real world consequences of this basic, social-cognitive phenomenon by examining whether record-low levels of public approval of the US Congress may, in part, be a product of declining use of prosocial language during Congressional debates. A text analysis of all 124 million words spoken in the House of Representatives between 1996 and 2014 found that declining levels of prosocial language strongly predicted public disapproval of Congress 6 mo later. Warm, prosocial language still predicted public approval when removing the effects of societal and global factors (e.g., the September 11 attacks) and Congressional efficacy (e.g., passing bills), suggesting that prosocial language has an independent, direct effect on social approval.

The moral ties that bind . . . Even to out-groups: the interactive effect of moral identity and the binding moral foundations.

Throughout history, principles such as obedience, loyalty, and purity have been instrumental in binding people together and helping them thrive as groups, tribes, and nations. However, these same principles have also led to in-group favoritism, war, and even genocide. Does adhering to the binding moral foundations that underlie such principles unavoidably lead to the derogation of out-group members? We demonstrated that for people with a strong moral identity, the answer is "no," because they are more likely than those with a weak moral identity to extend moral concern to people belonging to a perceived out-group. Across three studies, strongly endorsing the binding moral foundations indeed predicted support for the torture of out-group members (Studies 1a and 1b) and withholding of necessary help from out-group members (Study 2), but this relationship was attenuated among participants who also had a strong moral identity.

When moral identity symbolization motivates prosocial behavior: the role of recognition and moral identity internalization.

This article examines the role of moral identity symbolization in motivating prosocial behaviors. We propose a 3-way interaction of moral identity symbolization, internalization, and recognition to predict prosocial behavior. When moral identity internalization is low, we hypothesize that high moral identity symbolization motivates recognized prosocial behavior due to the opportunity to present one's moral characteristics to others. In contrast, when moral identity internalization is high, prosocial behavior is motivated irrespective of the level of symbolization and recognition. Two studies provide support for this pattern examining volunteering of time. Our results provide a framework for predicting prosocial behavior by combining the 2 dimensions of moral identity with the situational factor of recognition.

An empirical test of forgiveness motives' effects on employees' health and well-being.

Two critical-incident studies were conducted to determine what motivates employees to forgive (or reconcile) with coworkers who offend them. Data from the first study's exploratory factor analysis revealed five types of motives for forgiveness: apology, moral, religious, relationship, and lack of alternatives. Data from the second study on a different sample confirmed the five-factor structure, and structural equation modeling demonstrated differential relationships between the five motives and the outcome variables, stress and health. Individuals who claimed to have forgiven because they believed they had no other alternatives, or who forgave because they believed a higher power (religious) required it, were more likely to report greater stress and poorer health. Positive outcomes of forgiveness were discovered for those employees who forgave because they believed it was the right (moral) thing to do. Those who forgave for moral reasons reported less stress than those who forgave because they believed they had no other choice or because a higher power demanded it. Forgiving for relationship and apology reasons was not significantly related to either stress or general health. Future research directions are discussed.

Moral identity and the experience of moral elevation in response to acts of uncommon goodness.

Four studies using survey and experimental designs examined whether people whose moral identity is highly self-defining are more susceptible to experiencing a state of moral elevation after being exposed to acts of uncommon moral goodness. Moral elevation consists of a suite of responses that motivate prosocial action tendencies. Study 1 showed that people higher (vs. lower) in moral identity centrality reported experiencing more intense elevating emotions, had more positive views of humanity, and were more desirous of becoming a better person after reading about an act of uncommon goodness than about a merely positive situation or an act of common benevolence. Study 2 showed that those high in moral identity centrality were more likely to recall acts of moral goodness and experience moral elevation in response to such events more strongly. These experiences were positively related to self-reported prosocial behavior. Study 3 showed a direct effect on behavior using manipulated, rather than measured, moral identity centrality. Study 4 replicated the effect of moral identity on the states of elevation as well as on self-reported physical sensations and showed that the elevation mediates the relationship between moral identity, witnessing uncommon goodness, and prosocial behavior.

Moral identity and psychological distance: the case of adolescent parental socialization.

A mediation model using a sample of 1059 adolescents (56% girls; M age=16.02, SD=1.37) tested relations between parenting, adolescent moral identity, and the formation of psychological distance towards others. In short, adolescent moral identity mediated relations between parenting and the ways in which adolescents oriented others in their psychological space. Specifically, adolescent-report parenting style dimensions (responsiveness, autonomy-granting, and demandingness) were positively related to the formation of both private and public moral identity dimensions (internalization and symbolization), which were in turn associated with a tendency to construct psychological distance towards others (negatively with social dominance orientation and positively with the circle of moral regard). Therefore, one way parents may be able to influence how adolescents relate to their peers is by fostering a sense of moral identity in their children through authoritative parenting.

Testing a social-cognitive model of moral behavior: the interactive influence of situations and moral identity centrality.

This article proposes and tests a social-cognitive framework for examining the joint influence of situational factors and the centrality of moral identity on moral intentions and behaviors. The authors hypothesized that if a situational factor increases the current accessibility of moral identity within the working self-concept, then it strengthens the motivation to act morally. In contrast, if a situational factor decreases the current accessibility of moral identity, then it weakens the motivation to act morally. The authors also expected the influence of situational factors to vary depending on the extent to which moral identity was central to a person's overall self-conception. Hypotheses derived from the framework were tested in 4 studies. The studies used recalling and reading a list of the Ten Commandments (Study 1), writing a story using morally laden terms (Study 4), and the presence of performance-based financial incentives (Studies 2 and 3) as situational factors. Participants' willingness to initiate a cause-related marketing program (Study 1), lie to a job candidate during a salary negotiation (Studies 2 and 3), and contribute to a public good (Study 4) were examined. Results provide strong support for the proposed framework.

Sexual behavior at work: Fun or folly?

Sexual behavior at work (e.g., sexual jokes and propositions) has been largely portrayed as offensive and harmful. The current research represents the first studies to test whether this is typically the case. Study 1 surveyed manufacturing and social service workers (N = 238) about their psychological well-being, work withdrawal, and exposure to sexual behavior at work. Respondents indicated how often they were exposed to different sexual behaviors and how much they enjoyed or were bothered by them. Study 2 surveyed university staff (N = 1,004) about their psychological well-being, drug use, feelings of being valued at work, and exposure to sexual behavior at work. Fifty-eight percent of employees in Study 1 were exposed to sexual behavior in the past 2 years; 40% of employees in Study 2 were exposed to sexual behavior in the past year. Some women and many men reported enjoying sexual behavior at work. Despite this, exposure to sexual behavior at work predicted negative employee work and psychological well-being, even for employees who said they enjoyed the experience. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2009 APA, all rights reserved).