Perception of experience influences altruism and perception of agency influences trust in human-machine interactions.

As robots become increasingly integrated into social economic interactions, it becomes crucial to understand how people perceive a robot's mind. It has been argued that minds are perceived along two dimensions: experience, i.e., the ability to feel, and agency, i.e., the ability to act and take responsibility for one's actions. However, the influence of these perceived dimensions on human-machine interactions, particularly those involving altruism and trust, remains unknown. We hypothesize that the perception of experience influences altruism, while the perception of agency influences trust. To test these hypotheses, we pair participants with bot partners in a dictator game (to measure altruism) and a trust game (to measure trust) while varying the bots' perceived experience and agency, either by manipulating the degree to which the bot resembles humans, or by manipulating the description of the bots' ability to feel and exercise self-control. The results demonstrate that the money transferred in the dictator game is influenced by the perceived experience, while the money transferred in the trust game is influenced by the perceived agency, thereby confirming our hypotheses. More broadly, our findings support the specificity of the mind hypothesis: Perceptions of different dimensions of the mind lead to different kinds of social behavior.

Co-evolution of conditional cooperation and social norm.

The co-evolution of conditional cooperation and social norms has garnered significant attention, yet the underlying mechanisms remain elusive. Social norms result from empirical expectations, individual expectations of group behavior, and normative expectations, the population's expectations of individual behavior. Aligning these expectations aids in norm formation, but diverse individual reactions to observed behavior and their sensitivity to norm conformity can be challenging. In our study, the agents are initially endowed with diverse conditional expectations, which mirror their anticipations regarding group behavior and their inherent inclination to conform to social norms, indicative of their sensitivity to psychic costs. These agents engage in a repeated public goods game, where their decisions to cooperate are shaped by their conditional expectations and the observed levels of cooperation within their group. Concurrently, free riders experience psychic costs determined by the overall level of cooperation, contribution costs, and the individual's inclination to adhere to social norms. Remarkably, our simulations unveil that agents commencing with random conditional expectations and a propensity to conform to norms can adapt to lower conditional expectations and moderate their propensity to conform to norms when initial cooperation levels are high and the contribution cost is reduced. Interestingly, increasing contribution costs intensify the population's response to norm enforcement, but this doesn't always result in a corresponding increase in cooperation. By incorporating population diversity and accounting for empirical and normative expectations within our model, we gain valuable insights into the intricate relationship between conditional cooperation and the emergence of social norms.

Perception, performance, and detectability of conversational artificial intelligence across 32 university courses.

The emergence of large language models has led to the development of powerful tools such as ChatGPT that can produce text indistinguishable from human-generated work. With the increasing accessibility of such technology, students across the globe may utilize it to help with their school work-a possibility that has sparked ample discussion on the integrity of student evaluation processes in the age of artificial intelligence (AI). To date, it is unclear how such tools perform compared to students on university-level courses across various disciplines. Further, students' perspectives regarding the use of such tools in school work, and educators' perspectives on treating their use as plagiarism, remain unknown. Here, we compare the performance of the state-of-the-art tool, ChatGPT, against that of students on 32 university-level courses. We also assess the degree to which its use can be detected by two classifiers designed specifically for this purpose. Additionally, we conduct a global survey across five countries, as well as a more in-depth survey at the authors' institution, to discern students' and educators' perceptions of ChatGPT's use in school work. We find that ChatGPT's performance is comparable, if not superior, to that of students in a multitude of courses. Moreover, current AI-text classifiers cannot reliably detect ChatGPT's use in school work, due to both their propensity to classify human-written answers as AI-generated, as well as the relative ease with which AI-generated text can be edited to evade detection. Finally, there seems to be an emerging consensus among students to use the tool, and among educators to treat its use as plagiarism. Our findings offer insights that could guide policy discussions addressing the integration of artificial intelligence into educational frameworks.

Cooperation without punishment.

A fundamental question in social and biological sciences is whether self-governance is possible when individual and collective interests are in conflict. Free riding poses a major challenge to self-governance, and a prominent solution to this challenge has been altruistic punishment. However, this solution is ineffective when counter-punishments are possible and when social interactions are noisy. We set out to address these shortcomings, motivated by the fact that most people behave like conditional cooperators-individuals willing to cooperate if a critical number of others do so. In our evolutionary model, the population contains heterogeneous conditional cooperators whose decisions depend on past cooperation levels. The population plays a repeated public goods game in a moderately noisy environment where individuals can occasionally commit mistakes in their cooperative decisions and in their imitation of the role models' strategies. We show that, under moderate levels of noise, injecting a few altruists into the population triggers positive reciprocity among conditional cooperators, thereby providing a novel mechanism to establish stable cooperation. More broadly, our findings indicate that self-governance is possible while avoiding the detrimental effects of punishment, and suggest that society should focus on creating a critical amount of trust to harness the conditional nature of its members.

Evolution of altruistic punishments among heterogeneous conditional cooperators.

It has been known that altruistic punishments solve the free rider problem in public goods games. Considering spatial structure and considering pure strategies significant advances have been made in understanding the evolution of altruistic punishments. However, these models have not considered key behavior regularities observed in experimental and field settings, where the individuals behave like conditional cooperators who are more willing to donate and are also more willing to punish free riders. Considering these behavioral regularities, without imposing a spatial structure on the population, I propose an evolutionary agent-based model in which agents behave like conditional cooperators, each agent's donation conditional on the difference between the number of donations in the past and the threshold value and the propensity value of the agent. Altruistic punishment depends on the difference between the threshold value of the focal agent and the randomly matched another agent. The simulations show that, for certain inflicted costs of punishments, generous altruistic punishments evolve and stabilize cooperation. The results show that, unlike previous models, it is not necessary to punish all free riders equally; it is necessary to do so in the case of the selfish free riders but not in the case of negative reciprocators.

Evolution of conditional cooperation in public good games.

Cooperation declines in repeated public good games because individuals behave as conditional cooperators. This is because individuals imitate the social behaviour of successful individuals when their payoff information is available. However, in human societies, individuals cooperate in many situations involving social dilemmas. We hypothesize that humans are sensitive to both success (payoffs) and how that success was obtained, by cheating (not socially sanctioned) or good behaviour (socially sanctioned and adds to prestige or reputation), when information is available about payoffs and prestige. We propose and model a repeated public good game with heterogeneous conditional cooperators where an agent's donation in a public goods game depends on comparing the number of donations in the population in the previous round and with the agent's arbitrary chosen conditional cooperative criterion. Such individuals imitate the social behaviour of role models based on their payoffs and prestige. The dependence is modelled by two population-level parameters: affinity towards payoff and affinity towards prestige. These affinities influence the degree to which agents value the payoff and prestige of role models. Agents update their conditional strategies by considering both parameters. The simulations in this study show that high levels of cooperation are established in a population consisting of heterogeneous conditional cooperators for a certain range of affinity parameters in repeated public good games. The results show that social value (prestige) is important in establishing cooperation.

Evolution of Cooperation with Heterogeneous Conditional Cooperators.

Conditional cooperation declines over time if heterogeneous ideal conditional agents are involved in repeated interactions. With strict assumptions of rationality and a population consisting of ideal conditional agents who strictly follow a decision rule, cooperation is not expected. However, cooperation is commonly observed in human societies. Hence, we propose a novel evolutionary agent-based model where agents rely on social information. Each agent interacts only once either as a donor or as a receiver. In our model, the population consists of either non-ideal or ideal heterogeneous conditional agents. Their donation decisions are stochastically based on the comparison between the number of donations in the group and their conditional cooperative criterion value. Non-ideal agents occasionally cooperate even if the conditional rule of the agent is not satisfied. The stochastic decision and selection rules are controlled with decision intensity and selection intensity, respectively. The simulations show that high levels of cooperation (more than 90%) are established in the population with non-ideal agents for a particular range of parameter values. The emergence of cooperation needs non-ideal agents and a heterogeneous population. The current model differs from existing models by relying on social information and not on individual agent's prior history of cooperation.

Ambiguity in pictorial depth.

Pictorial space is the 3-D impression that one obtains when looking 'into' a 2-D picture. One is aware of 3-D 'opaque' objects. 'Pictorial reliefs' are the surfaces of such pictorial objects in 'pictorial space'. Photographs (or any pictures) do in no way fully specify physical scenes. Rather, any photograph is compatible with an infinite number of possible scenes that may be called 'metameric scenes'. If pictorial relief is one of these metameric scenes, the response may be considered 'veridical'. The conventional usage is more restrictive and is indeed inconsistent. Thus the observer has much freedom in arriving at such a 'veridical' response. To address this ambiguity, we determined the pictorial reliefs for eight observers, six pictures, and two psychophysical methods. We used 'methods of cross-sections' to operationalise pictorial reliefs. We find that linear regression of the depths of relief at corresponding locations in the picture for different observers often lead to very low (even insignificant) R2s. Thus the responses are idiosyncratic to a large degree. Perhaps surprisingly, we also observed that multiple regression of depth and picture coordinates at corresponding locations often lead to very high R2s. Often R2s increased from insignificant up to almost 1. Apparently, to a large extent 'depth' is irrelevant as a psychophysical variable, in the sense that it does not uniquely account for the relation of the response to the pictorial structure. This clearly runs counter to the bulk of the literature on pictorial 'depth perception'. The invariant core of interindividual perception proves to be of an 'affine' rather than a Euclidean nature; that is to say, 'pictorial space' is not simply the picture plane augmented with a depth dimension.