RESUMO
Group decision making under uncertainty often requires groups to balance exploration of their environment with exploitation of the seemingly best option. In order to succeed at this collective induction, groups need to merge the knowledge of all group members and combine goal-oriented and social motivations (i.e., group cohesion). This paper presents three studies that investigate whether more cohesive groups perform worse at collective induction tasks as they spend less time exploring possible options. Study 1 simulates group decision making with the ε-greedy algorithm in order to identify suitable manipulations of group cohesion and investigate how differing exploration lengths can affect outcomes of group decisions. Study 2 (N = 108, 18 groups á 6 participants) used an experimental manipulation of group cohesion in a simple card choice task to investigate how group cohesion might affect group decision making when only limited social information is available. Study 3 (N = 96, 16 groups á 6 participants) experimentally manipulated group cohesion and used the HoneyComb paradigm, a movement-based group experiment platform, to investigate which group processes would emerge during decision making and how these processes would affect the relationships between group cohesion, exploration length, and group decision making. Study 1 found that multiplicative cohesion rewards have detrimental effects on group decision making, while additive group rewards could ameliorate negative effects of the cohesion reward, especially when reported separately from task rewards. Additionally, exploration length was found to profoundly affect decision quality. Studies 2 and 3 showed that groups could identify the best reward option successfully, regardless of group cohesion manipulation. This effect is interpreted as a ceiling effect as the decision task was likely too easy to solve. Study 3 identified that spatial group cohesion on the playing field correlated with self-reported entitativity and leader-/followership emerged spontaneously in most groups and correlated with self-reported perceptions of leader-/followership in the game. We discuss advantages of simulation studies, possible adaptations to the ε-greedy algorithm, and methodological aspects of measuring behavioral group cohesion and leadership to inform empirical studies investigating group decision making under uncertainty.
