Creating a Safety Officer Program to Enhance Staff Safety During the Care of COVID-19 Patients.

Staff safety is paramount when managing an infectious disease event. However, early data from the COVID-19 pandemic suggested that staff compliance with personal protective equipment and other safety protocols was poor. In response to patient surges, many hospitals created dedicated "biomode" units to provide care for patients infected with SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19. To enhance staff safety on biomode units and during patient transports, our hospital created a safety officer/transport safety officer (SO/TSO) program. The first SOs/TSOs were nurses, clinical technicians, and other support staff who were redeployed from their home units when the units closed during the initial surge. During subsequent COVID-19 surges, dedicated SOs/TSOs were hired to maintain the program. SOs/TSOs provided just-in-time personal protective equipment training and helped staff safely enter and exit COVID-19 clinical units. SOs/TSOs participated in the transport of over 1,000 COVID-19 patients with no safety incidents reported. SOs/TSOs conducted safety audits throughout the hospital and observed 86% compliance with COVID-19 precautions across 32,500 activities. During contact tracing of frontline staff who became infected with SARS-CoV-2, potential deviations from COVID-19 precautions were identified in only 7.7% of cases. The SO/TSO program contributed to a culture of safety in the biomode units and helped to enhance infection prevention throughout the hospital. This program can serve as a model for other health systems during the response to the current pandemic and during future infectious disease threats.

Effect of an Intervention Package and Teamwork Training to Prevent Healthcare Personnel Self-contamination During Personal Protective Equipment Doffing.

BACKGROUND: More than 28 000 people were infected with Ebola virus during the 2014-2015 West African outbreak, resulting in more than 11 000 deaths. Better methods are needed to reduce the risk of self-contamination while doffing personal protective equipment (PPE) to prevent pathogen transmission. METHODS: A set of interventions based on previously identified failure modes was designed to mitigate the risk of self- contamination during PPE doffing. These interventions were tested in a randomized controlled trial of 48 participants with no prior experience doffing enhanced PPE. Contamination was simulated using a fluorescent tracer slurry and fluorescent polystyrene latex spheres (PLSs). Self-contamination of scrubs and skin was measured using ultraviolet light visualization and swabbing followed by microscopy, respectively. Doffing sessions were videotaped and reviewed to score standardized teamwork behaviors. RESULTS: Participants in the intervention group contaminated significantly fewer body sites than those in the control group (median [interquartile range], 6 [3-8] vs 11 [6-13], P = .002). The median contamination score was lower for the intervention group than the control group when measured by ultraviolet light visualization (23.15 vs 64.45, P = .004) and PLS swabbing (72.4 vs 144.8, P = .001). The mean teamwork score was greater in the intervention group (42.2 vs 27.5, P < .001). CONCLUSIONS: An intervention package addressing the PPE doffing task, tools, environment, and teamwork skills significantly reduced the amount of self-contamination by study participants. These elements can be incorporated into PPE guidance and training to reduce the risk of pathogen transmission.

Development and Comparison of Complementary Methods to Study Potential Skin and Inhalational Exposure to Pathogens During Personal Protective Equipment Doffing.

BACKGROUND: Fluorescent tracers are often used with ultraviolet lights to visibly identify healthcare worker self-contamination after doffing of personal protective equipment (PPE). This method has drawbacks, as it cannot detect pathogen-sized contaminants nor airborne contamination in subjects' breathing zones. METHODS: A contamination detection/quantification method was developed using 2-µm polystyrene latex spheres (PSLs) to investigate skin contamination (via swabbing) and potential inhalational exposure (via breathing zone air sampler). Porcine skin coupons were used to estimate the PSL swabbing recovery efficiency and limit of detection (LOD). A pilot study with 5 participants compared skin contamination levels detected via the PSL vs fluorescent tracer methods, while the air sampler quantified potential inhalational exposure to PSLs during doffing. RESULTS: Average PSL skin swab recovery efficiency was 40% ± 29% (LOD = 1 PSL/4 cm2 of skin). In the pilot study, all subjects had PSL and fluorescent tracer skin contamination. Two subjects had simultaneously located contamination of both types on a wrist and hand. However, for all other subjects, the PSL method enabled detection of skin contamination that was not detectable by the fluorescent tracer method. Hands/wrists were more commonly contaminated than areas of the head/face (57% vs 23% of swabs with PSL detection, respectively). One subject had PSLs detected by the breathing zone air sampler. CONCLUSIONS: This study provides a well-characterized method that can be used to quantitate levels of skin and inhalational contact with simulant pathogen particles. The PSL method serves as a complement to the fluorescent tracer method to study PPE doffing self-contamination.

Human factors-based risk analysis to improve the safety of doffing enhanced personal protective equipment.

OBJECTIVE: To systematically assess enhanced personal protective equipment (PPE) doffing safety risks. DESIGN: We employed a 3-part approach to this study: (1) hierarchical task analysis (HTA) of the PPE doffing process; (2) human factors-informed failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA); and (3) focus group sessions with a convenience sample of infection prevention (IP) subject matter experts. SETTING: A large academic US hospital with a regional Special Pathogens Treatment Center and enhanced PPE doffing protocol experience.ParticipantsEight IP experts. METHODS: The HTA was conducted jointly by 2 human-factors experts based on the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention PPE guidelines. The findings were used as a guide in 7 focus group sessions with IP experts to assess PPE doffing safety risks. For each HTA task step, IP experts identified failure mode(s), assigned priority risk scores, identified contributing factors and potential consequences, and identified potential risk mitigation strategies. Data were recorded in a tabular format during the sessions. RESULTS: Of 103 identified failure modes, the highest priority scores were associated with team members moving between clean and contaminated areas, glove removal, apron removal, and self-inspection while preparing to doff. Contributing factors related to the individual (eg, technical/ teamwork competency), task (eg, undetected PPE contamination), tools/technology (eg, PPE design characteristics), environment (eg, inadequate space), and organizational aspects (eg, training) were identified. Participants identified 86 types of risk mitigation strategies targeting the failure modes. CONCLUSIONS: Despite detailed guidelines, our study revealed 103 enhanced PPE doffing failure modes. Analysis of the failure modes suggests potential mitigation strategies to decrease self-contamination risk during enhanced PPE doffing.