Epidemiological analysis of African swine fever in the European Union during 2023.

In 2023, 14 Member States were affected by African swine fever (ASF), including Croatia and Sweden where ASF emerged (wild boar outbreaks only) and Greece where ASF re-emerged after being free since 2021. The number of ASF outbreaks among domestic pigs in the EU was five times higher than in 2022, reaching a similar magnitude to that in 2019. This was predominantly driven by the introduction and subsequent spread of ASF in Croatia and its resurgence in Romania, representing 96% of the EU outbreaks. ASF outbreaks in domestic pigs were clearly seasonal in all countries, with 88% of outbreaks reported between July and October. Most of the ASF outbreaks among domestic pigs were detected through clinical suspicion (94%), followed by tracing from affected establishments (3%), and the weekly testing of at least two dead pigs in establishments (3%). In wild boar, a 10% increase in the number of notified outbreaks was observed in the EU in comparison with 2022, with considerable variations between countries. A winter peak was observed only in Poland, Slovakia and Hungary. The epidemiological situation in wild boar improved in Germany and Hungary, as suggested by the decrease in the number of outbreaks and in the proportions of PCR-positive samples from dead wild boar. Overall, 31% of wild boar carcasses found during passive surveillance tested positive by PCR, representing 69% of the ASF outbreaks in wild boar in the EU. In contrast, 0.4% of hunted wild boar tested positive, representing 31% of the outbreaks. Despite the introduction of ASF into new countries and the increase in the number of outbreaks, the size of restricted zones in the EU remained stable, due to the highly clustered outbreaks in Croatia, and the reduction of restricted zones in Poland, Slovakia and Bulgaria (in domestic pigs), and Hungary (in wild boar).

Risk factors for avian influenza in Danish poultry and wild birds during the epidemic from June 2020 to May 2021.

Exploring the risk factors of avian influenza (AI) occurrence helps us to monitor and control the disease. Since late 2020, the number of avian influenza outbreaks in domestic and wild birds has increased in most European countries, including Denmark. This study was conducted to identify potential risk factors for wild birds and poultry during the epidemic in 2020/2021 in Denmark. Using Danish AI surveillance data of actively surveyed poultry and passively surveyed wild birds from June 2020 to May 2021, we calculated geographical attributes for bird locations and assessed the potential risk factors of AI detections using logistic regression analyses. 4% of actively surveyed poultry and 39% of passively surveyed wild birds were detected with AI circulating or ongoing at the time. Of these, 10 and 99% tested positive for the H5/H7 AI subtypes, respectively. Our analyses did not find any statistically significant risk factors for actively surveyed poultry within the dataset. For passively surveyed wild birds, bird species belonging to the Anseriformes order had a higher risk of being AI virus positive than five other taxonomic bird orders, and Galliformes were of higher risk than two other taxonomic bird orders. Besides, every 1 km increase in the distance to wetlands was associated with a 5.18% decrease in the risk of being AI positive (OR (odds ratio) 0.95, 95% CI 0.91, 0.99), when all other variables were kept constant. Overall, bird orders and distance to wetlands were associated with the occurrence of AI. The findings may provide targets for surveillance strategies using limited resources and assist in risk-based surveillance during epidemics.

Using surveillance data for early warning modelling of highly pathogenic avian influenza in Europe reveals a seasonal shift in transmission, 2016-2022.

Avian influenza in wild birds and poultry flocks constitutes a problem for animal welfare, food security and public health. In recent years there have been increasing numbers of outbreaks in Europe, with many poultry flocks culled after being infected with highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI). Continuous monitoring is crucial to enable timely implementation of control to prevent HPAI spread from wild birds to poultry and between poultry flocks within a country. We here utilize readily available public surveillance data and time-series models to predict HPAI detections within European countries and show a seasonal shift that happened during 2021-2022. The output is models capable of monitoring the weekly risk of HPAI outbreaks, to support decision making.

Estimating the impact of low temperature on African swine fever virus transmission through contaminated environments.

African Swine Fever Virus (ASFV) is the cause of an infectious disease in pigs, which is difficult to control. Long viability of ASFV has been shown for several contaminated materials, especially under low temperature. Therefore, when pigs are exposed to a contaminated environment, new infections could occur without the presence of infectious individuals. For example, a contaminated, poorly washed, empty livestock vehicle poses a risk to the next load of pigs. A quantitative stochastic environmental transmission model was applied to simulate the change in environmental contamination levels over time and calculate the epidemic parameters through exposure-based estimation. Due to the lack of experimental data on environmental transmission at low temperatures, we performed a non-linear fit of the decay rate parameter with temperature based on a literature review. Eventually, 16 scenarios were constructed for different temperature (at 20 °C, 10 °C, 0 °C, or -10 °C) and duration of empty periods (1, 3, 5, or 7 days) after the environment had been contaminated. We quantified the variation in the contamination level of the environment over time and the probability of newly added recipients getting infected when exposed to the environment after the empty period. As a result, the transmission rate parameter for ASFV in pigs was estimated to be 1.53 (0.90, 2.45) day-1, the decay rate parameter to be 1.02 (0.73, 1.47) day-1 (at 21 °C), and the excretion rate parameter to be 2.70 (2.51, 3.02) day-1. Without washing and disinfecting, the environment required 9, 14, 24, 54 days to reach a low probability of causing at least one new case (<0.005) at 20 °C, 10 °C, 0 °C, -10 °C, respectively. In addition, the method proposed in this paper enables assessment of the effect of washing and disinfecting on ASFV environmental transmission. We conducted this study to better understand how the viability of ASFV at different temperatures could affect the infectivity in environmental transmission and to improve risk assessment and disease control strategies.

Detection of African Swine Fever Virus and Blood Meals of Porcine Origin in Hematophagous Insects Collected Adjacent to a High-Biosecurity Pig Farm in Lithuania; A Smoking Gun?

A seasonal trend of African swine fever (ASF) outbreaks in domestic pig farms has been observed in affected regions of Eastern Europe. Most outbreaks have been observed during the warmer summer months, coinciding with the seasonal activity pattern of blood-feeding insects. These insects may offer a route for introduction of the ASF virus (ASFV) into domestic pig herds. In this study, insects (hematophagous flies) collected outside the buildings of a domestic pig farm, without ASFV-infected pigs, were analyzed for the presence of the virus. Using qPCR, ASFV DNA was detected in six insect pools; in four of these pools, DNA from suid blood was also identified. This detection coincided with ASFV being reported in the wild boar population within a 10 km radius of the pig farm. These findings show that blood from ASFV-infected suids was present within hematophagous flies on the premises of a pig farm without infected animals and support the hypothesis that blood-feeding insects can potentially transport the virus from wild boars into domestic pig farms.

Landscape effects and spatial patterns of avian influenza virus in Danish wild birds, 2006-2020.

Avian influenza (AI) is a contagious disease of birds with zoonotic potential. AI virus (AIV) can infect most bird species, but clinical signs and mortality vary. Assessing the distribution and factors affecting AI presence can direct targeted surveillance to areas at risk of disease outbreaks, or help identify disease hotspots or areas with inadequate surveillance. Using virus surveillance data from passive and active AIV wild bird surveillance, 2006-2020, we investigated the association between the presence of AIV and a range of landscape factors and game bird release. Furthermore, we assessed potential bias in the passive AIV surveillance data submitted by the public, via factors related to public accessibility. Lastly, we tested the AIV data for possible hot- and cold spots within Denmark. The passive surveillance data was biased regarding accessibility to areas (distance to roads, cities and coast) compared to random locations within Denmark. For both the passive and active AIV surveillance data, we found significant (p < .01) associations with variables related to coast, wetlands and cities, but not game bird release. We used these variables to predict the risk of AIV presence throughout Denmark, and found high-risk areas concentrated along the coast and fjords. For both passive and active surveillance data, low-risk clusters were mainly seen in Jutland and northern Zealand, whereas high-risk clusters were found in Jutland, Zealand, Funen and the southern Isles such as Lolland and Falster. Our results suggest that landscape affects AIV presence, as coastal areas and wetlands attract waterfowl and migrating birds and therefore might increase the potential for AIV transmission. Our findings have enabled us to create risk maps of AIV presence in wild birds and pinpoint high-risk clusters within Denmark. This will aid targeted surveillance efforts within Denmark and potentially aid in planning the location of future poultry farms.

SWOT analysis of risk factors associated with introduction of African Swine Fever through vehicles returning after export of pigs.

Denmark is a major pig exporter and applies a high level of biosecurity, with washing and disinfecting stations for returning livestock vehicles. The introduction of African Swine Fever (ASF) would have significant economic consequences related to loss of export of live pigs and products thereof. In this study, we focused on the role of empty livestock vehicles returning after exports of pigs for the introduction of ASF. Initially, the current components and measures related to export of livestock were described. Next, analyses of strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (SWOT) were conducted, covering the components and measures identified. Then, export of pigs was described either through assembly centers or directly from farms. Washing and disinfection, as required and undertaken at the designated stations, constitutes the most important among all risk-reducing measures identified. Recommendations are to: (1) ensure the quality of washing and disinfection through staff training; (2) find new, safe, and more efficient disinfectants; (3) ensure the required temperature, and therefore effect, of the disinfectant and water. It was impossible to assess, the influence of export through assembly centers compared to direct transport. However, through SWOT analyses we identified the strengths and weaknesses of the two pathways. Moreover, components/measures with risks of unknown sizes are also discussed, such as vehicles undertaking cabotage and the current vehicle quarantine periods.

Potential mosquito vector attraction to- and feeding preferences for pigs in Romanian backyard farms.

Introduction: Mosquitoes either biologically or mechanically transmit various vector-borne pathogens affecting pigs. Mosquito species display a wide variety of host preference, as well as host attraction and behaviours. Mosquito species attraction rates to- and feeding rates on pigs or other potential hosts, as well as the seasonal abundance of the mosquito species affects their pathogen transmission potential. Methods: We caught mosquitoes in experimental cages containing pigs situated in Romanian backyard farms. The host species of blood meals were identified with PCR and sequencing. Results: High feeding preferences for pigs were observed in Aedes vexans (90%), Anopheles maculipennis (80%) and Culiseta annulata (72.7%). However, due to a high abundance in the traps, Culex pipiens/torrentium were responsible for 37.9% of all mosquito bites on pigs in the Romanian backyards, despite low feeding rates on pigs in the cages (18.6%). We also found that other predominantly ornithophilic mosquito species, as well as mosquitoes that are already carrying a blood meal from a different (mammalian) host, were attracted to backyard pigs or their enclosure. Discussion: These results indicate that viraemic blood carrying, for instance, African swine fever virus, West-Nile virus or Japanese encephalitis virus could be introduced to these backyard pig farms and therefore cause an infection, either through subsequent feeding, via ingestion by the pig or by environmental contamination.

Preliminary report of an outbreak of SARS-CoV-2 in mink and mink farmers associated with community spread, Denmark, June to November 2020.

In June-November 2020, SARS-CoV-2-infected mink were detected in 290 of 1,147 Danish mink farms. In North Denmark Region, 30% (324/1,092) of people found connected to mink farms tested SARS-CoV-2-PCR-positive and approximately 27% (95% confidence interval (CI): 25-30) of SARS-CoV-2-strains from humans in the community were mink-associated. Measures proved insufficient to mitigate spread. On 4 November, the government ordered culling of all Danish mink. Farmed mink constitute a potential virus reservoir challenging pandemic control.

Livestock-associated MRSA survival on house flies (Musca domestica) and stable flies (Stomoxys calcitrans) after removal from a Danish pig farm.

We caught stable- and house flies on a Danish LA-MRSA positive pig farm. Stable- and house flies were housed together and culled over time to test for the presence of live LA-MRSA bacteria at 24 h intervals to establish the length of time for which LA-MRSA can persist on flies. On average, 7% of stable flies and 27% of house flies tested positive for LA-MRSA immediately upon removal from the farm. LA-MRSA prevalence decreased over time and estimates based on a Kaplan-Meier time-to-event analysis indicated that the probability of a stable- or house fly testing positive for LA-MRSA was 5.4% and 7.8% after 24 h, 3.5% and 4.3% after 48 h, 3.1% and 2.2% after 72 h and 0.4% and 0% after 96 h of removal from the pig farm, respectively. Simultaneously, we found that caged cultivated house flies became carriers of LA-MRSA, without direct contact with pigs, in the same proportions as wild flies inside the farm. We provide distance distributions of Danish pig farms and residential addresses as well as the calculated maximum dispersal potentials of stable- and house flies, which suggest that there is a potential for stable- and house flies dispersing live LA-MRSA bacteria into the surrounding environment of a pig farm. This potential should therefore be considered when modelling the spread between farms or the risk posed to humans living in close proximity to LA-MRSA pig farm sources.