How Do You Know If You Were Mind Wandering? Dissociating Explicit Memories of Off Task Thought From Subjective Feelings of Inattention.

Mind wandering is a common experience in which your attention drifts away from the task at hand and toward task-unrelated thoughts. To measure mind wandering we typically use experience sampling and retrospective self-reports, which require participants to make metacognitive judgments about their immediately preceding attentional states. In the current study, we aimed to better understand how people come to make such judgments by introducing a novel distinction between explicit memories of off task thought and subjective feelings of inattention. Across two preregistered experiments, we found that participants often indicated they were "off task" and yet had no memory of the content of their thoughts-though, they were less common than remembered experiences. Critically, remembered experiences of mind wandering and subjective feelings of inattention differed in their behavioral correlates. In Experiment 1, we found that only the frequency of remembered mind wandering varied with task demands. In contrast, only subjective feelings of inattention were associated with poor performance (Experiments 1 and 2) and individual differences in executive functioning (Experiment 2). These results suggest that the phenomenology of mind wandering may differ depending on how the experiences are brought about (e.g., executive functioning errors versus excess attentional resources), and provide preliminary evidence of the importance of measuring subjective feelings of inattention when assessing mind wandering.

Proactive and reactive cognitive control in the absence of learning and memory confounds: Evidence from a cross-modal trial-unique Stroop task.

Goal-directed behaviour is typically conceptualized as striking a balance between two antagonistic cognitive control states such as proactive and reactive control, as demonstrated by conflict phenomena such as the list-wide proportion congruency and congruency sequence effects. However, control-based explanations for these phenomena have come under criticism due to low-level associative regularities that are frequently confounded with conflict manipulations within these experimental designs. In the present study, a novel Stroop paradigm referred to as the "trial-unique Stroop task" was developed to examine whether these effects could be observed in the absence of low-level associative regularities. On each trial, participants typed a word they heard spoken aloud while ignoring a word visually displayed on the screen. Importantly, each word only appeared in a single trial throughout the experiment, and because stimuli and responses were never repeated, there were no low-level associative regularities across trials. Using this paradigm, we observed both congruency sequence (Experiment 1) and list-wide proportion congruency (Experiment 2) effects, providing the strongest evidence to date for control-based explanations of these phenomena. Split-half analyses revealed much higher reliability than traditional colour-word Stroop tasks for the congruency effect (rSB = .98), the congruency sequence effect (rSB = .42), and the list-wide proportion congruency effect (rSB = .85). Moreover, the methodological advantages of the trial-unique Stroop task allow for the independent manipulation of task features related to control, learning, and memory processes. The promising results of this study support the application of the trial-unique Stroop task in this context and open new avenues for future research. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Creativity, Boredom Proneness and Well-Being in the Pandemic.

Throughout the course of the pandemic, it has become clear that the strictures of social isolation and various levels of lockdown constraints have impacted people's well-being. Here, our aim was to explore relations between trait dispositions associated with boredom proneness, self-regulation and well-being using data collected early in the pandemic. Specifically, we explored whether the tendency to engage in everyday creative pursuits (e.g., making your own greeting cards) would act as a prophylactic against poor well-being. Results showed that well-being was higher for those individuals who increased engagement with creative pursuits during the early stages of the pandemic. That is, people who engaged more in everyday creative activities also reported higher levels of self-esteem, optimism, and positive affect. In contrast, those who pursued fewer creative outlets had higher levels of depression and anxiety, were higher in boredom proneness, and reported experiencing more negative affect. As we emerge from the pandemic, these data provide a clue as to how people might plan to cope adaptively with the restrictive circumstances this extreme world event engendered. More generally, these data provide support for the notion that everyday creativity (and not necessarily creative expertise) has positive associations for well-being.

On the relation between mind wandering, PTSD symptomology, and self-control.

Here we examined the association between mind wandering, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) symptomology, and self-control. In a large undergraduate sample (N = 5,387), we assessed trait-levels of spontaneous and deliberate mind wandering, self-control, and PTSD symptomology. Results indicated that, while PTSD symptomology was uniquely positively associated with spontaneous mind wandering, it was negatively associated with deliberate mind wandering and self-control. These findings suggest that the mechanism(s) underlying everyday mind wandering may also underlie PTSD symptomology and traumatic intrusions. Moreover, the unique negative association between PTSD symptomatology and self-control suggests that PTSD is characterized not only by impairments in inhibiting unwanted thoughts (as indexed by mind wandering), but also by impairments in inhibiting other unwanted behaviors.

Re-examining the effect of motivation on intentional and unintentional task-unrelated thought: accounting for thought constraint produces novel results.

It has been proposed that motivating participants to perform well on a cognitive task ought to lead to decreases in rates of intentional, but not unintentional, task-unrelated thought (TUT; a commonly studied variety of mind wandering). However, at odds with this prediction, research has found that increasing motivation results in decreases in both intentional and unintentional TUTs. One possible explanation for this surprising finding is that standard assessments of TUT may inadvertently conflate TUTs with another variety of mind wandering: unconstrained thought. If so, then deconfounding task-unrelated and unconstrained varieties of mind wandering might produce the predicted effect of a decrease in intentional, but not unintentional, TUT when motivation is increased. To explore this possibility, in the present study, participants completed a sustained-attention task after receiving standard instructions (normal-motivation condition) or instructions informing them that they could leave the study early if they achieved a certain level of performance (motivated condition). Throughout the task, we assessed rates of TUT (both intentional and unintentional) and unconstrained thoughts. Consistent with prior work, the results indicated that motivated participants reported being on-task significantly more frequently than non-motivated participants. However, unlike previous work, we found that when deconfounding TUTs and unconstrained thoughts, participants in the motivation condition reported significantly fewer bouts of intentional TUT than those in the non-motivation condition, but no differences in rates of unintentional TUT were observed between groups. These results suggest that (a) motivation specifically targets intentional TUT and (b) standard assessments of TUT conflate task-relatedness and thought constraint.

Appealing to the cognitive miser: Using demand avoidance to modulate cognitive flexibility in cued and voluntary task switching.

Current cognitive control accounts view goal-directed behavior as striking a balance between two antagonistic control demands: Stability, on the one hand, reflects a rigid, focused state of control and flexibility, while on the other, reflects a relaxed, distractible state, whereby goals can be rapidly updated to meet unexpected changes in demands. In the current study, we sought to test whether the avoidance of cognitive demand could motivate people to dynamically regulate control along the stability-flexibility continuum. In both cued (Experiment 1) and voluntary (Experiment 2) task-switching paradigms, we selectively associated either task-switches or task-repetitions with high cognitive demand (independent of task identity), and measured changes in performance in a following phase after the demand manipulation was removed. Contrasting performance with a control group, across both experiments, we found that selectively associating cognitive demand with task repetitions increased flexibility, but selectively associating cognitive demand with task switches failed to increase stability. The results of the current study provide novel evidence for avoidance-driven modulations of control regulation along the stability-flexibility continuum, while also highlighting some limitations in using task-switching paradigms to examine motivational influences on control adaptation. Data, analysis code, experiment code, and preprint available at osf.io/7rct9/. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Thought dynamics under task demands: Evaluating the influence of task difficulty on unconstrained thought.

As research on mind wandering has accelerated, the construct's defining features have expanded and researchers have begun to examine different dimensions of mind wandering. Recently, Christoff and colleagues have argued for the importance of investigating a hitherto neglected variety of mind wandering: "unconstrained thought," or, thought that is relatively unguided by executive-control processes. To date, with only a few studies investigating unconstrained thought, little is known about this intriguing type of mind wandering. Across 2 experiments, we examined, for the first time, whether changes in task demand influence rates of constrained versus unconstrained thoughts. In both experiments, participants completed either an easy (0-back) or hard (2-back) task and responded to intermittently presented thought probes that gauged thought constraint throughout the task. In Experiment 1, we found that participants completing the easy task engaged in unconstrained thoughts more frequently than those completing the difficult task. In Experiment 2, we replicated this result and further demonstrated manipulations of unconstrained thought while also measuring task-relatedness (a common dimension of mind wandering). Finally, exploratory analyses showed associations between constrained thought and age, verbal intelligence, and an assessment of flow ('deep effortless concentration'), thereby adding further evidence to indicate a dissociation between task-relatedness and constraint. We discuss the methodological and theoretical applications of our findings to the burgeoning field of research on unconstrained thought. All data, analysis, article, and experiment code can be found at https://osf.io/wr2vk/ (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Boredom proneness, political orientation and adherence to social-distancing in the pandemic.

Research recently showed that boredom proneness was associated with increased social distancing rule-breaking in a sample collected early in the COVID-19 pandemic. Here we explore data collected early in the pandemic to examine what factors might drive this relation. We focus on political affiliation. Given the functional account of boredom as a call to action, we hypothesized that this urge to act may drive individuals towards outlets replete with symbolic value (e.g., ideology, identity). In addition, given the politicization of some social distancing rules (e.g., mask wearing), we explored whether those who adhere to strong political ideologies-particularly conservative ideologies-would be more likely to rule-break. Moderation analyses indicated that boredom proneness and social (but not fiscal) conservatism were indeed predictive of rule-breaking. These results highlight the need for both clear messaging emphasizing the strength of communal identity and action (i.e., that "We are all in this together") and for interventions that emphasize shared collective values in contexts that appeal directly to social conservatives.

Attention need not always apply: Mind wandering impedes explicit but not implicit sequence learning.

According to the attentional resources account, mind wandering (or "task-unrelated thought") is thought to compete with a focal task for attentional resources. Here, we tested two key predictions of this account: First, that mind wandering should not interfere with performance on a task that does not require attentional resources; second, that as task requirements become automatized, performance should improve and depth of mind wandering should increase. Here, we used a serial reaction time task with implicit- and explicit-learning groups to test these predictions. Providing novel evidence for the attentional resource account's first prediction, results indicated that depth of mind wandering was negatively associated with learning in the explicit, but not the implicit, group, indicating that mind wandering is associated with impaired explicit, but not implicit, learning. Corroborating the attention resource account's second prediction, we also found that, overall, performance improved while at the same time depth of mind wandering increased. From an implicit-learning perspective, these results are consistent with the claim that explicit learning is impaired under attentional load, but implicit learning is not. Data, analysis code, manuscript preparation code, and pre-print available at osf.io/qzry7/.

Contextual recruitment of selective attention can be updated via changes in task relevance.

Evidence across a wide variety of attention paradigms shows that environmental cues can trigger adjustments to ongoing priorities for attending to relevant and irrelevant information. This context-specific control over attention suggests that cognitive control can be both automatic and flexible. For instance, in selective attention tasks, congruency effects are larger for items that appear in a context associated with infrequent conflict than in a context associated with frequent conflict. Because the to-be-presented context cannot be predicted or prepared for in advance, attention is assumed to be rapidly updated on-the-fly, triggered by the currently presented context. Context-specific control exemplifies how learning and memory processes can influence attention to enable cognitive flexibility. However, what determines the use of previously learned associations remains unclear. In the current study, we examined whether task relevance would influence the learning and use of context cues in a flanker task. Using a secondary counting task, context dimensions associated with differing levels of conflict were made task-relevant or -irrelevant across the experiment. In short, we found that making new contextual information task-relevant caused participants to suppress a previously learned context-attention association and adopt a new context-specific control strategy--all without changing the experimental stimuli. Furthermore, we found participants did not spontaneously learn about context-specific proportion manipulations (Experiment 2) and explicit instructions were insufficient for producing context-specific effects (Experiment 3). These results suggest that task relevance is a key determinant of context-specific control. All data, analyses, article preparation, and experimental design code is available at https://osf.io/ztcyb/. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Instance theory predicts information theory: Episodic uncertainty as a determinant of keystroke dynamics.

How does prior experience shape skilled performance in structured environments? We use skilled typing of natural text to evaluate correspondence between performance (keystroke timing) and structure in the environment (letter uncertainty). We had ∼350 typists copy-type English text. We reproduced Ostry's (1983) analysis of interkeystroke interval as a function of letter position and word length, that showed prominent first-letter and midword slowing effects. We propose a novel account that letter position and word length effects on keystroke dynamics reflect informational uncertainty about letters in those locations, rather than resource limited planning/buffering processes. We computed positional uncertainty for letters in all positions of words from length one to nine using Google's n-gram database. We show that variance in interkeystroke interval by letter position and word length tracks natural variation in letter uncertainty. Finally, we provide a model showing how a general learning and memory process could acquire sensitivity to patterns of letter uncertainty in natural English. In doing so, we draw an equivalence between Logan's (1988) instance theory of automatization and Shannon's measure of entropy (H) from information theory. Instance theory's predictions for automatization as a function of experience follow exactly the uncertainty in the choice set being automatized. As a result, instance theory stands as a general process model explaining how context-specific experiences in a structured environment tune skilled performance. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Memory-guided selective attention: Single experiences with conflict have long-lasting effects on cognitive control.

Adjustments in cognitive control, as measured by congruency sequence effects, are thought to be influenced by both external stimuli and internal goals. However, this dichotomy has often overshadowed the potential contribution of past experience stored in memory. Here, we examine the role of long-term episodic memory in guiding selective attention. Our aim was to demonstrate new evidence that selective attention can be modulated by long-term retrieval of stimulus-specific attentional control settings. All the experiments used a modified flanker task involving multiple unique stimuli. Critically, each stimulus was only presented twice during the experiment: first as a prime, and second as a probe. Experiments 1 and 2 varied the number of intervening trials between prime and probe and manipulated the amount of conflict using a secondary task. Experiment 3 ensured that specific colors assigned to prime stimuli were not repeated when presented as probes. Across both Experiments 1 and 2, we consistently found smaller congruency effects on probe trials when its associated prime trial was incongruent compared with congruent, demonstrating long-term congruency sequence effects. However, Experiment 3 showed no evidence for long-term effects. These findings suggest long-term preservation of selective attention processing at the episodic level, and implicate a role for memory in updating cognitive control. (PsycINFO Database Record

Reproducing the location-based context-specific proportion congruent effect for frequency unbiased items: A reply to Hutcheon and Spieler (2016).

Stroop effects can be modulated by context-specific cues associated with different levels of proportion congruent, even for items that appear equally frequently in each context. This result has important theoretical implications, because it rules out frequency-driven learning explanations of context-specific proportion congruent (CSPC) effects and leaves open the possibility that a cue-driven retrieval process can reinstate attentional control settings in a rapid online fashion. The purpose of the present work was to address reproducibility concerns that have been raised about this finding. We conducted several reproductions and novel extensions using Amazon's mechanical Turk in both Stroop and flanker tasks. We successfully replicated the central finding that CSPC effects can be observed for frequency-unbiased items. We also provide new Monte Carlo simulation analyses to estimate reproducibility of the phenomena that show important limitations on these designs for measuring contextual control.

Multistable perception of ambiguous melodies and the role of musical expertise.

Whereas visual demonstrations of multistability are ubiquitous, there are few auditory examples. The purpose of the current study was to determine whether simultaneously presented melodies, such as underlie the scale illusion [Deutsch (1975). J. Acoust. Soc. Am. 57(5), 1156-1160], can elicit multiple mutually exclusive percepts, and whether reported perceptions are mediated by musical expertise. Participants listened to target melodies and reported whether the target was embedded in subsequent test melodies. Target sequences were created such that they would only be heard if the listener interpreted the test melody according to various perceptual cues. Critically, and in contrast with previous examinations of the scale illusion, an objective measure of target detection was obtained by including target-absent test melodies. As a result, listeners could reliably identify target sequences from different perceptual organizations when presented with the same test melody on different trials. This result demonstrates an ability to alternate between mutually exclusive percepts of an unchanged stimulus. However, only perceptual organizations consistent with frequency and spatial cues were available and musical expertise did mediate target detection, limiting the organizations available to non-musicians. The current study provides the first known demonstration of auditory multistability using simultaneously presented melodies and provides a unique experimental method for measuring auditory perceptual competition.

Context-specific attentional sampling: Intentional control as a pre-requisite for contextual control.

Recent work suggests that environmental cues associated with previous attentional control settings can rapidly and involuntarily adjust attentional priorities. The current study tests predictions from adaptive-learning and memory-based theories of contextual control about the role of intentions for setting attentional priorities. To extend the empirical boundaries of contextual control phenomena, and to determine whether theoretical principles of contextual control are generalizable we used a novel bi-dimensional stimulus sampling task. Subjects viewed briefly presented arrays of letters and colors presented above or below fixation, and identified specific stimuli according to a dimensional (letter or color) and positional cue. Location was predictive of the cued dimension, but not the position or identity. In contrast to previous findings, contextual control failed to develop through automatic, adaptive-learning processes. Instead, previous experience with intentionally changing attentional sampling priorities between different contexts was required for contextual control to develop.