Personality and misinformation.

Misinformation poses a significant concern, promoting false beliefs and eroding trust in media. People differ in their susceptibility to believe and to share misinformation. In this article, we reviewed recent research on relationships between personality traits and belief in and sharing of misinformation. Findings show that more extroverted and less conscientious and agreeable people tend to be more susceptible to believing in and sharing misinformation. Additionally, the Dark Triad personality traits of narcissism, psychopathy, and Machiavellianism tend to be positively associated with sharing of misinformation, and narcissism and psychopathy are associated with greater belief in misinformation. Understanding these individual differences can inform interventions to reduce the effects of misinformation.

Partisan bias in false memories for misinformation about the 2021 U.S. Capitol riot.

ABSTRACTMemory for events can be biased. For example, people tend to recall more events that support than oppose their current worldview. The present study examined partisan bias in memory for events related to the January 6, 2021, Capitol riot in the United States. Participants rated their memory for true and false events that were either favourable to their political party or the other major political party in the United States. For both true and false events, participants remembered more events that favoured their political party. Regression analyses showed that the number of false memories that participants reported was positively associated with their tendency to support conspiracy beliefs and with their self-reported engagement with the Capitol riot. These results suggest that Democrats and Republicans remember the Capitol Riot differently and that certain individual difference factors can predict the formation of false memories in this context. Misinformation played an influential role in the Capitol riot and understanding differences in memory for this event is beneficial to avoiding similar tragedies in the future.

Situational factors shape moral judgements in the trolley dilemma in Eastern, Southern and Western countries in a culturally diverse sample.

The study of moral judgements often centres on moral dilemmas in which options consistent with deontological perspectives (that is, emphasizing rules, individual rights and duties) are in conflict with options consistent with utilitarian judgements (that is, following the greater good based on consequences). Greene et al. (2009) showed that psychological and situational factors (for example, the intent of the agent or the presence of physical contact between the agent and the victim) can play an important role in moral dilemma judgements (for example, the trolley problem). Our knowledge is limited concerning both the universality of these effects outside the United States and the impact of culture on the situational and psychological factors affecting moral judgements. Thus, we empirically tested the universality of the effects of intent and personal force on moral dilemma judgements by replicating the experiments of Greene et al. in 45 countries from all inhabited continents. We found that personal force and its interaction with intention exert influence on moral judgements in the US and Western cultural clusters, replicating and expanding the original findings. Moreover, the personal force effect was present in all cultural clusters, suggesting it is culturally universal. The evidence for the cultural universality of the interaction effect was inconclusive in the Eastern and Southern cultural clusters (depending on exclusion criteria). We found no strong association between collectivism/individualism and moral dilemma judgements.

A within-subjects test of ego depletion and potential moderators.

Ego depletion, the finding that initial exertion of self-control hinders performance on subsequent self-control tasks, has become a controversial topic. There have been discrepant results from empirical studies and different conclusions drawn from meta-analyses and multilab studies. We examined ego depletion and three potential moderators in a preregistered experiment using a within-subjects design in order to overcome limitations of the standard between-subjects design. In two sessions separated by 1 week, participants (N = 214) completed an ego depletion or control version of a Stroop task. Each Stroop task was followed by manipulation check questions and an antisaccade task. Participants also completed measures of lay theory of willpower, trait self-control, and action orientation. There was no significant evidence for ego depletion, and Bayes factors strongly favored the null hypotheses that there was no difference in antisaccade performance (accuracy or response time) after ego depletion and control Stroop tasks. Additionally, lay theory willpower, trait self-control, and action orientation were not significantly related to ego depletion effects. Exploratory between-subjects comparisons that omitted participants who responded at lower than chance accuracy levels, however, found significant ego depletion effects. These results provide further evidence that ego depletion effects are elusive.

Individual Differences in Belief in Fake News about Election Fraud after the 2020 U.S. Election.

Fake news is a serious problem because it misinforms people about important issues. The present study examined belief in false headlines about election fraud after the 2020 U.S. presidential election. Belief in election fraud had dangerous consequences, including the deadly insurrection at the U.S. Capitol in January 2021. In the present study, participants rated the truthfulness of true and false headlines about the election, and then completed individual difference measures eight days after the election. Participants with more conservative ideology, greater presidential approval of the outgoing president, greater endorsement of general conspiracy narratives and poorer cognitive reflection demonstrated greater belief in false headlines about election fraud. Additionally, consuming more politically conservative election news was associated with greater belief in false headlines. Identifying the factors related to susceptibility to false claims of election fraud offers a path toward countering the influence of these claims by tailoring interventions aimed at decreasing belief in misinformation and decreasing conspiracy beliefs to those most susceptible.

To which world regions does the valence-dominance model of social perception apply?

Over the past 10 years, Oosterhof and Todorov's valence-dominance model has emerged as the most prominent account of how people evaluate faces on social dimensions. In this model, two dimensions (valence and dominance) underpin social judgements of faces. Because this model has primarily been developed and tested in Western regions, it is unclear whether these findings apply to other regions. We addressed this question by replicating Oosterhof and Todorov's methodology across 11 world regions, 41 countries and 11,570 participants. When we used Oosterhof and Todorov's original analysis strategy, the valence-dominance model generalized across regions. When we used an alternative methodology to allow for correlated dimensions, we observed much less generalization. Collectively, these results suggest that, while the valence-dominance model generalizes very well across regions when dimensions are forced to be orthogonal, regional differences are revealed when we use different extraction methods and correlate and rotate the dimension reduction solution. PROTOCOL REGISTRATION: The stage 1 protocol for this Registered Report was accepted in principle on 5 November 2018. The protocol, as accepted by the journal, can be found at https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.7611443.v1 .

An initial accuracy focus reduces the effect of prior exposure on perceived accuracy of news headlines.

The illusory truth effect occurs when the repetition of a claim increases its perceived truth. Previous studies have demonstrated the illusory truth effect with true and false news headlines. The present study examined the effects that different ratings made during initial exposure have on the illusory truth effect with news headlines. In two experiments, participants (total N = 575) rated a set of news headlines in one of two conditions. Some participants rated how interesting they were, and others rated how truthful they were. Participants later rated the perceived accuracy of a larger set of headlines that included previously rated and new headlines. In both experiments, prior exposure increased perceived accuracy for participants who made initial interest ratings, but not for participants who made initial truthfulness ratings. The increase in perceived accuracy that accompanies repeated exposure was attenuated when participants considered the accuracy of the headlines at initial exposure. Experiment 2 also found evidence for a political bias: participants rated politically concordant headlines as more accurate than politically discordant headlines. The magnitude of this bias was related to performance on a cognitive reflection test; more analytic participants demonstrated greater political bias. These results highlight challenges that fake news presents and suggest that initially encoding headlines' perceived truth can serve to combat the illusion that a familiar headline is a truthful one.

Does the "surprisingly popular" method yield accurate crowdsourced predictions?

The "surprisingly popular" method (SP) of aggregating individual judgments has shown promise in overcoming a weakness of other crowdsourcing methods-situations in which the majority is incorrect. This method relies on participants' estimates of other participants' judgments; when an option is chosen more often than the average metacognitive judgments of that option, it is "surprisingly popular" and is selected by the method. Although SP has been shown to improve group decision making about factual propositions (e.g., state capitals), its application to future outcomes has been limited. In three preregistered studies, we compared SP to other methods of aggregating individual predictions about future events. Study 1 examined predictions of football games, Study 2 examined predictions of the 2018 US midterm elections, and Study 3 examined predictions of basketball games. When applied to judgments made by objectively assessed experts, SP performed slightly better than other aggregation methods. Although there is still more to learn about the conditions under which SP is effective, it shows promise as a means of crowdsourcing predictions of future outcomes.

To detect or not to detect: A replication and extension of the three-stage model.

When faced with a decision, people generally show a bias toward heuristic processing, even if it leads to the incorrect decision, such as in the base-rate neglect task. The crucial question is whether people know that they are biased. Recently, the three-stage model (Pennycook, Fugelsang, & Koehler, 2015) suggested that detecting this bias (conflict detection) is imperfect and a consistent source of bias because some people do not recognize that they are making biased decisions. In Experiment 1, participants completed a base-rate neglect task as replication of Pennycook et al. (2015). In Experiment 2, a conditional reasoning task was added as an extension to test the boundary conditions of the model. Results in Experiment 1 indicated that detection failures were a significant source of bias. However, results in Experiment 2 on the conditional reasoning task indicated that the three-stage model may be incompatible with a complex task such as conditional reasoning, an issue explored in detail in the General discussion.

A Multilab Preregistered Replication of the Ego-Depletion Effect.

Good self-control has been linked to adaptive outcomes such as better health, cohesive personal relationships, success in the workplace and at school, and less susceptibility to crime and addictions. In contrast, self-control failure is linked to maladaptive outcomes. Understanding the mechanisms by which self-control predicts behavior may assist in promoting better regulation and outcomes. A popular approach to understanding self-control is the strength or resource depletion model. Self-control is conceptualized as a limited resource that becomes depleted after a period of exertion resulting in self-control failure. The model has typically been tested using a sequential-task experimental paradigm, in which people completing an initial self-control task have reduced self-control capacity and poorer performance on a subsequent task, a state known as ego depletion Although a meta-analysis of ego-depletion experiments found a medium-sized effect, subsequent meta-analyses have questioned the size and existence of the effect and identified instances of possible bias. The analyses served as a catalyst for the current Registered Replication Report of the ego-depletion effect. Multiple laboratories (k = 23, total N = 2,141) conducted replications of a standardized ego-depletion protocol based on a sequential-task paradigm by Sripada et al. Meta-analysis of the studies revealed that the size of the ego-depletion effect was small with 95% confidence intervals (CIs) that encompassed zero (d = 0.04, 95% CI [-0.07, 0.15]. We discuss implications of the findings for the ego-depletion effect and the resource depletion model of self-control.

Animate Objects are Detected More Frequently than Inanimate Objects in Inattentional Blindness Tasks Independently of Threat.

Inattentional blindness occurs when individuals are engaged in an attention-demanding task and fail to detect unexpected objects in their visual field. Two experiments examined whether certain unexpected objects are more easily detected than others. The unexpected objects were animate and threatening (e.g., snake), animate and nonthreatening (e.g., bird), inanimate and threatening (e.g., gun), or inanimate and nonthreatening (e.g., bed). Three hypotheses were tested: the snake detection hypothesis (snakes will be detected more frequently than all other objects), the animate monitoring hypothesis (animate objects will be detected more frequently than inanimate objects), and the threat superiority hypothesis (threatening objects will be detected more frequently than nonthreatening objects). Only the animate monitoring hypothesis was supported in both experiments. These results suggest that animate objects capture attention in the absence of task-relevant goals and that snakes do not show an advantage over other animate objects in inattentional blindness tasks.

Animacy increases second target reporting in a rapid serial visual presentation task.

Attentional blink occurs when two target items, T1 and T2, are presented within brief moments of each other in a series of rapidly presented items and participants fail to report T2. The purpose of the present study was to examine the effect of characteristics of T2 on T2 reporting. Participants (N = 67) completed 4 blocks of 40 trials. Each trial consisted of 15 images, two of which were designated as T1 and T2. T2 was manipulated in three ways: animacy (animate or inanimate), threat (threatening or nonthreatening), and lag (200 ms or 400 ms after T1). The results indicated that more T2s were reported at the longer lag and that animate objects were reported more often than inanimate objects at both lags. Threat did not have a significant effect on T2 reporting although it interacted with lag: threatening objects were reported more frequently than nonthreatening objects at lag 2 but this trend reversed at lag 4. The results were consistent with the animate monitoring hypothesis, which claims that animate objects, because of their importance in ancestral environments, attract attention more easily than inanimate objects. Animate objects appear to capture attention more easily than inanimate objects as second targets in a rapid serial visual presentation task. This result is similar to animacy advantages reported with other attention tasks and with memory tasks.

The misinformation effect is unrelated to the DRM effect with and without a DRM warning.

The misinformation and Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigms are used to study forms of false memories. Despite the abundance of research using these two paradigms, few studies have examined the relationship between the errors that arise from them. In the present study, 160 participants completed a misinformation task and two DRM tasks, receiving a warning about the effect before the second DRM task. Participants demonstrated misinformation and DRM effects (with and without the warning), but susceptibility to these forms of false memory were not significantly related across individuals. The DRM warning reduced the DRM effect, and signal detection analysis revealed that the DRM warning reduced a liberal response bias in this task. Sensitivity and response bias in both DRM tasks were not significantly related to these measures in the misinformation task. These findings suggest that these two forms of false memories are not interchangeable and they appear to be the result of different cognitive processes.

Individual differences in susceptibility to misinformation effects and hindsight bias.

The present study examined individual differences in susceptibility to two similar forms of memory distortion: the misinformation effect and hindsight bias. The misinformation effect occurs when individuals witness an event, are provided with misinformation, and recall the original event as containing elements of the misinformation. Hindsight bias occurs when individuals make judgments, are provided with feedback, and recall their original judgments as being more similar to the feedback than they actually were. Seventy-five participants completed a misinformation task, a hindsight bias task, and several individual difference measures related to memory distortions. Working memory capacity was negatively correlated with the misinformation effect and hindsight bias, and the misinformation effect and hindsight bias were negatively correlated with one another. Although the misinformation effect and hindsight bias are measured with similar designs, and both are predicted by working memory capacity, the negative correlation between them suggests these phenomena result from somewhat different processes.

Animacy, perceptual load, and inattentional blindness.

Inattentional blindness is the failure to notice unexpected objects in a visual scene while engaging in an attention-demanding task. We examined the effects of animacy and perceptual load on inattentional blindness. Participants searched for a category exemplar under low or high perceptual load. On the last trial, the participants were exposed to an unexpected object that was either animate or inanimate. Unexpected objects were detected more frequently when they were animate rather than inanimate, and more frequently with low than with high perceptual loads. We also measured working memory capacity and found that it predicted the detection of unexpected objects, but only with high perceptual loads. The results are consistent with the animate-monitoring hypothesis, which suggests that animate objects capture attention because of the importance of the detection of animate objects in ancestral hunter-gatherer environments.

Rapid recollection of foresight judgments increases hindsight bias in a memory design.

One component of hindsight bias is memory distortion. This component is measured with a memory design, in which individuals answer questions, learn the correct answers, and recall their original answers. Hindsight bias occurs when participants' recollections are closer to the correct answers than their original judgments actually were. The present study used a memory design to examine the relationship between response time in recalling original answers and the magnitude of hindsight bias. In Experiment 1, participants' response times were negatively correlated with a hindsight bias index. In Experiment 2, half of the participants were instructed to recall their original judgments quickly and the other participants were instructed to take time to recall their judgments. The hindsight bias index was greater among rapidly responding participants than among delayed responding participants. These results, in conjunction with other findings, support a separate components view of hindsight bias. The memory distortion component of hindsight bias appears to occur quickly, and unbiased responding requires time for processing. This finding relates the memory distortion component of hindsight bias to other cognitive biases, such as the belief bias in syllogistic reasoning. The relationship of this hindsight bias component to dual-process models of cognition is discussed, and several avenues for additional research are suggested.

Working memory and the memory distortion component of hindsight bias.

One component of hindsight bias is memory distortion: Individuals' recollections of their predictions are biased towards known outcomes. The present study examined the role of working memory in the memory distortion component of hindsight bias. Participants answered almanac-like questions, completed a measure of working memory capacity, were provided with the correct answers, and attempted to recollect their original judgements in two conditions: with and without a concurrent working memory load. Participants' recalled judgements were more biased by feedback when they recalled these judgements with a concurrent memory load and working memory capacity was negatively correlated with memory distortion. These findings are consistent with reconstruction accounts of the memory distortion component of hindsight bias and, more generally, with dual process theories of cognition. These results also relate the memory distortion component of hindsight bias with other cognitive errors, such as source monitoring errors, the belief bias in syllogistic reasoning and anchoring effects. Implications for the separate components view of hindsight bias are discussed.

Surprise influences hindsight-foresight differences in temporal judgments of animated automobile accidents.

The hindsight bias occurs when people view an outcome as more foreseeable than it actually was. The role of an outcome's initial surprise in the hindsight bias was examined using animations of automobile accidents. Twenty-six participants rated the initial surprise of accidents' occurring in eight animations. An additional 84 participants viewed these animations in one of two conditions: Half stopped the animations when they were certain an accident would occur (i.e., in foresight), and the other half watched the entire animations first and then stopped the animations when they thought that a naïve viewer would be certain that an accident would occur (i.e., in hindsight). When the accidents were low in initial surprise, there were no foresight-hindsight differences; when initial surprise was medium, there was a hindsight bias; and when initial surprise was high, there was a reversed hindsight bias. The results are consistent with a sense-making model of hindsight bias.