Situational factors shape moral judgements in the trolley dilemma in Eastern, Southern and Western countries in a culturally diverse sample.

The study of moral judgements often centres on moral dilemmas in which options consistent with deontological perspectives (that is, emphasizing rules, individual rights and duties) are in conflict with options consistent with utilitarian judgements (that is, following the greater good based on consequences). Greene et al. (2009) showed that psychological and situational factors (for example, the intent of the agent or the presence of physical contact between the agent and the victim) can play an important role in moral dilemma judgements (for example, the trolley problem). Our knowledge is limited concerning both the universality of these effects outside the United States and the impact of culture on the situational and psychological factors affecting moral judgements. Thus, we empirically tested the universality of the effects of intent and personal force on moral dilemma judgements by replicating the experiments of Greene et al. in 45 countries from all inhabited continents. We found that personal force and its interaction with intention exert influence on moral judgements in the US and Western cultural clusters, replicating and expanding the original findings. Moreover, the personal force effect was present in all cultural clusters, suggesting it is culturally universal. The evidence for the cultural universality of the interaction effect was inconclusive in the Eastern and Southern cultural clusters (depending on exclusion criteria). We found no strong association between collectivism/individualism and moral dilemma judgements.

Do unto others: How cognitive fusion shapes the transmission of moral behavior.

Moral transmission is the concept that moral behaviors can be contagious, spreading from person to person like a pathogen of social influence. We investigated how cognitive fusion-a transdiagnostic vulnerability to diverse mental health problems-influences moral transmission across 3 studies (N = 891) using real behavioral outcomes, including economic game decisions and donations to charity. The findings suggest that cognitively fused individuals are more susceptible to moral transmission because (a) they are more likely to pay forward or pay back moral behavior, and (b) they are more likely to engage in compensatory moral behavior. In fact, (c) our analyses revealed a more direct association between these 2 psychological processes, supporting our argument that moral transmission can integrate a variety of seemingly discrete social phenomena. As predicted, participants with more depression and anxiety symptoms revealed patterns of behavior similar to those high in cognitive fusion. Implications for research in both social and clinical psychology are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record

Social Justice and Social Order: Binding Moralities across the Political Spectrum.

Two studies explored the relationship between political ideology and endorsement of a range of moral principles. Political liberals and conservatives did not differ on intrapersonal or interpersonal moralities, which require self-regulation. However differences emerged on collective moralities, which involve social regulation. Contrary to Moral Foundations Theory, both liberals and conservatives endorsed a group-focused binding morality, specifically Social Justice and Social Order respectively. Libertarians were the group without a binding morality. Although Social Justice and Social Order appear conflictual, analyses based on earlier cross-cultural work on societal tightness-looseness suggest that countries actually benefit in terms of economic success and societal well-being when these group-based moralities co-exist and serve as counterweights in social regulation.

Shared perceptions: morality is embedded in social contexts.

Morality helps make social life possible, but social life is embedded in many social contexts. Research on morality has generally neglected this and instead has emphasized people's general beliefs. We therefore investigated the extent to which different moral principles are perceived as embedded in social contexts. We conducted two studies investigating how diverse social contexts influence beliefs about the operative moral principles in distinct group types. Study 1 examined these perceptions using a within-subjects design, whereas Study 2 utilized a between-subjects design. We found a high degree of consensus among raters concerning the operative moral principles in groups, and each group type was characterized by a qualitatively distinct pattern of applicable moral principles. Political orientation, a focus of past research on morality, had a small influence on beliefs about operative moral principles. The implications of these findings for our understanding of morality and its functional role in groups are discussed.

Motivation and morality: Insights into political ideology.

Our past work linking motivation and morality provides a basis for understanding differences in political ideology and positions across the political spectrum. Conservatism is rooted in avoidance-based proscriptive morality, whereas liberalism is rooted in approach-based prescriptive morality. Two distinct, binding, group moralities reflect these different regulatory systems and emphasize social coordination through Social Order versus social cooperation through Social Justice.

Moral context matters: a reply to Graham.

In response to Graham's comments, we attempt to clarify aspects of the Model of Moral Motives (MMM). The columns of our model represent three primary contexts for morality, involving behaviors focused on the self, another person, and one's group. The rows of MMM represent proscriptive morality and prescriptive morality, which broadly reflect motives to protect (from harm) and provide (help); these general motives have distinct manifestations depending on context (i.e., the columns of MMM). The article addresses misunderstandings in Graham's interpretation of MMM and includes discussions of criteria for categorizing prescriptive versus proscriptive moral motives, the central role of restrictiveness in proscriptive moral regulation, an inconsistency that provides support for the inclusion of group-based Social Justice, and further distinctions between Social Order and Social Justice informed by recent cross-cultural research.

Surveying the moral landscape: moral motives and group-based moralities.

We present a new six-cell Model of Moral Motives that applies a fundamental motivational distinction in psychology to the moral domain. In addition to moral motives focused on the self or another, we propose two group-based moralities, both communal in orientation, but reflecting distinct moral motives (Social Order/Communal Solidarity vs. Social Justice/Communal Responsibility) as well as differences in construals of group entitativity. The two group-based moralities have implications for intragroup homogeneity as well as intergroup conflict. Our model challenges the conclusions of Haidt and colleagues that only conservatives (not liberals) are group oriented and embrace a binding morality. We explore the implications of this new model for politics in particular and for the self-regulation versus social regulation of morality more generally.