Autonomous behaviour and the limits of human volition.

Humans and some other animals can autonomously generate action choices that contribute to solving complex problems. However, experimental investigations of the cognitive bases of human autonomy are challenging, because experimental paradigms typically constrain behaviour using controlled contexts, and elicit behaviour by external triggers. In contrast, autonomy and freedom imply unconstrained behaviour initiated by endogenous triggers. Here we propose a new theoretical construct of adaptive autonomy, meaning the capacity to make behavioural choices that are free from constraints of both immediate external triggers and of routine response patterns, but nevertheless show appropriate coordination with the environment. Participants (N = 152) played a competitive game in which they had to choose the right time to act, in the face of an opponent who punished (in separate blocks) either choice biases (such as always responding early), sequential patterns of action timing across trials (such as early, late, early, late…), or predictable action-outcome dependence (such as win-stay, lose-shift). Adaptive autonomy was quantified as the ability to maintain performance when each of these influences on action selection was punished. We found that participants could become free from habitual choices regarding when to act and could also become free from sequential action patterns. However, they were not able to free themselves from influences of action-outcome dependence, even when these resulted in poor performance. These results point to a new concept of autonomous behaviour as flexible adaptation of voluntary action choices in a way that avoids stereotypy. In a sequential analysis, we also demonstrated that participants increased their reliance on belief learning in which they attempt to understand the competitor's beliefs and intentions, when transition bias and reinforcement bias were punished. Taken together, our study points to a cognitive mechanism of adaptive autonomy in which competitive interactions with other agents could promote both social cognition and volition in the form of non-stereotyped action choices.

Metacognition and sense of agency.

Intelligent agents need to understand how they can change the world, and how they cannot change it, in order to make rational decisions for their forthcoming actions, and to adapt to their current environment. Previous research on the sense of agency, based largely on subjective ratings, failed to dissociate the sensitivity of sense of agency (i.e., the extent to which individual sense of agency tracks actual instrumental control over external events) from judgment criteria (i.e., the extent to which individuals self-attribute agency independent of their actual influence over external events). Furthermore, few studies have examined whether individuals have metacognitive access to the internal processes underlying the sense of agency. We developed a novel two-alternative-forced choice (2FAC) control detection task, in which participants identified which of two visual objects was more strongly controlled by their voluntary movement. The actual level of control over the target object was manipulated by adjusting the proportion of its motion that was driven by the participant's movement, compared to the proportion driven by a pre-recorded movement by another agent, using a staircase to hold 2AFC control detection accuracy at 70%. Participants identified which of the two visual objects they controlled, and also made a binary confidence judgment regarding their control detection judgment. We calculated a bias-free measure of first-order sensitivity (d') for detection control at any given level of participant's own movement. The proportion of pre-recorded movements determined by the stairecase could then be used as an index of control detection ability. We identified two distinct processes underlying first-order detection of control: one based on instantaneous sensory predictions for the current movement, and one based on detection of a regular motor-visual relation across a series of movements. Further, we found large individual differences across 40 particpants in metacognitive sensitivity (meta-d') even though first-order sensitivity of control detection was well controlled. Using structural equation modelling (SEM), we showed that metacognition was negatively correlated with the predictive process component of detection of control. This result is inconsistent with previous hypotheses that detection of control relies on metacognitive monitoring of a predictive circuit. Instead, it suggests that predictive mechanisms that compute sense of agency may operate unconsciously.

Paradoxical evidence weighting in confidence judgments for detection and discrimination.

When making discrimination decisions between two stimulus categories, subjective confidence judgments are more positively affected by evidence in support of a decision than negatively affected by evidence against it. Recent theoretical proposals suggest that this "positive evidence bias" may be due to observers adopting a detection-like strategy when rating their confidence-one that has functional benefits for metacognition in real-world settings where detectability and discriminability often go hand in hand. However, it is unknown whether, or how, this evidence-weighting asymmetry affects detection decisions about the presence or absence of a stimulus. In four experiments, we first successfully replicate a positive evidence bias in discrimination confidence. We then show that detection decisions and confidence ratings paradoxically suffer from an opposite "negative evidence bias" to negatively weigh evidence even when it is optimal to assign it a positive weight. We show that the two effects are uncorrelated and discuss our findings in relation to models that account for a positive evidence bias as emerging from a confidence-specific heuristic, and alternative models where decision and confidence are generated by the same, Bayes-rational process.

Mistaking opposition for autonomy: psychophysical studies on detecting choice bias.

Do people know when they act freely and autonomously versus when their actions are influenced? While the human aspiration to freedom is widespread, little research has investigated how people perceive whether their choices are biased. Here, we explored how actions congruent or incongruent with suggestions are perceived as influenced or free. Across three experiments, participants saw directional stimuli cueing left or right manual responses. They were instructed to follow the cue's suggestion, oppose it or ignore it entirely to make a 'free' choice. We found that we could bias participants' 'free responses' towards adherence or opposition, by making one instruction more frequent than the other. Strikingly, participants consistently reported feeling less influenced by cues to which they responded incongruently, even when response habits effectively biased them towards such opposition behaviour. This effect was so compelling that cues that were frequently presented with the Oppose instruction became systematically judged as having less influence on behaviour, artificially increasing the sense of freedom of choice. Taken together, these findings demonstrate that acting contrarian distorts the perception of autonomy. Crucially, we demonstrate the existence of a novel illusion of freedom evoked by trained opposition. Our results have important implications for understanding mechanisms of persuasion.

Should microbiological samples be taken routinely when performing revision surgery for post-surgical hematoma after hip or knee replacement? Retrospective study of 78 cases of surgically drained hematoma with a minimum follow-up of 2 years.

INTRODUCTION: The relationship between the occurrence of a periprosthetic hip or knee joint infection, a post-surgical hematoma and the time to surgical revision, along with the need to take samples for microbiology analysis has not been clearly defined. This led us to perform a retrospective study to: 1) define the rate of infected hematoma and subsequent infection after surgical revision for hematoma and 2) analyze in which time frame the hematoma was likely to be infected. HYPOTHESIS: The more time elapsed before the postoperative hematoma is drained surgically after hip or knee replacement, the higher the hematoma infection rate and the late infection rate. PATIENTS AND METHODS: Between 2013 and 2021, 78 patients (48 hip and 30 knee replacements) who had a postoperative hematoma without signs of infection upon draining were included in the study. Surgeons decided whether samples for microbiology were collected (33/78 patients (42%)). The data compiled consisted of the patient's demographics, the risk factors for infection, number of infected hematomas, number of subsequent infections at a minimum follow-up of 2 years, and the time to revision surgery (lavage). RESULTS: Of the 27 samples collected from the hematoma during the first lavage, 12/27 (44%) were infected. Of the 51 that did not have samples collected initially, 6/51 (12%) had them collected during the second lavage; 5 were infected and 1 was sterile. Overall, 17/78 (22%) of the hematomas were infected. Conversely, there were no late infections at a mean follow-up of 3.8 years (min 2, max 8) after the hematoma was drained in any of the 78 patients. The median time to revision was 4 days (Q1=2, Q3=14) for non-infected hematomas that were drained surgically versus 15 days (Q1=9, Q3=20) for hematomas that were found to be infected (p=0.005). No hematoma was infected when it was drained surgically within 72hours post-arthroplasty (0/19 (0%)). The infection rate went up to 2/16 (12.5%) when it was drained 3 to 5 days later and 15/43 (35%) when it was drained after more than 5 days (p=0.005). We believe this justifies collecting microbiology samples immediately when the hematoma is drained more than 72hours after the joint replacement procedure. Diabetes was more prevalent in patients who had an infected hematoma (8/17 [47%] versus 7/61 [11.5%], p=0.005). The infection was due to a single bacterium in 65% of cases (11/17); S. epidermidis was found in 59% (10/17) of infections. CONCLUSION: The occurrence of a hematoma after hip or knee replacement that requires surgical revision is associated with increased risk of infection, since the hematoma infection rate was 22%. Since hematomas drained within 72hours are less likely to be infected, samples do not need to be collected for microbiology at that time. Conversely, any hematomas being drained surgically beyond this time point should be considered as infected, thus microbiology samples should be collected, and empirical postoperative antibiotic therapy initiated. Early revision may prevent the occurrence of late infections. The standard treatment of infected hematomas appears to resolve the infection at a minimum follow-up of 2 years. LEVEL OF EVIDENCE: Level IV Retrospective study.

Consensus Goals in the Field of Visual Metacognition.

Despite the tangible progress in psychological and cognitive sciences over the last several years, these disciplines still trail other more mature sciences in identifying the most important questions that need to be solved. Reaching such consensus could lead to greater synergy across different laboratories, faster progress, and increased focus on solving important problems rather than pursuing isolated, niche efforts. Here, 26 researchers from the field of visual metacognition reached consensus on four long-term and two medium-term common goals. We describe the process that we followed, the goals themselves, and our plans for accomplishing these goals. If this effort proves successful within the next few years, such consensus building around common goals could be adopted more widely in psychological science.

Disruption of Conscious Access in Psychosis Is Associated with Altered Structural Brain Connectivity.

According to global neuronal workspace (GNW) theory, conscious access relies on long-distance cerebral connectivity to allow a global neuronal ignition coding for conscious content. In patients with schizophrenia and bipolar disorder, both alterations in cerebral connectivity and an increased threshold for conscious perception have been reported. The implications of abnormal structural connectivity for disrupted conscious access and the relationship between these two deficits and psychopathology remain unclear. The aim of this study was to determine the extent to which structural connectivity is correlated with consciousness threshold, particularly in psychosis. We used a visual masking paradigm to measure consciousness threshold, and diffusion MRI tractography to assess structural connectivity in 97 humans of either sex with varying degrees of psychosis: healthy control subjects (n = 46), schizophrenia patients (n = 25), and bipolar disorder patients with (n = 17) and without (n = 9) a history of psychosis. Patients with psychosis (schizophrenia and bipolar disorder with psychotic features) had an elevated masking threshold compared with control subjects and bipolar disorder patients without psychotic features. Masking threshold correlated negatively with the mean general fractional anisotropy of white matter tracts exclusively within the GNW network (inferior frontal-occipital fasciculus, cingulum, and corpus callosum). Mediation analysis demonstrated that alterations in long-distance connectivity were associated with an increased masking threshold, which in turn was linked to psychotic symptoms. Our findings support the hypothesis that long-distance structural connectivity within the GNW plays a crucial role in conscious access, and that conscious access may mediate the association between impaired structural connectivity and psychosis.

Exploring the relationship between effort perception and poststroke fatigue.

OBJECTIVE: To test the hypothesis that poststroke fatigue, a chronic, pathologic fatigue condition, is driven by altered effort perception. METHODS: Fifty-eight nondepressed, mildly impaired stroke survivors with varying severity of fatigue completed the study. Self-reported fatigue (trait and state), perceived effort (PE; explicit and implicit), and motor performance were measured in a handgrip task. Trait fatigue was measured with the Fatigue Severity Scale-7 and Neurologic Fatigue Index. State fatigue was measured with a visual analog scale (VAS). Length of hold at target force, overshoot above target force, and force variability in handgrip task were measures of motor performance. PE was measured with a VAS (explicit PE) and line length estimation, a novel implicit measure of PE. RESULTS: Regression analysis showed that 11.6% of variance in trait fatigue was explained by implicit PE (R = 0.34; p = 0.012). Greater fatigue was related to longer length of hold at target force (R = 0.421, p < 0.001). A backward regression showed that length of hold explained explicit PE in the 20% force condition (R = 0.306, p = 0.021) and length of hold and overshoot above target force explained explicit PE in the 40% (R = 0.399, p = 0.014 and 0.004) force condition. In the 60% force condition, greater explicit PE was explained by higher force variability (R = 0.315, p = 0.017). None of the correlations were significant for state fatigue. CONCLUSION: Trait fatigue, but not state fatigue, correlating with measures of PE and motor performance, may suggest that altered perception may lead to high fatigue mediated by changes in motor performance. This finding furthers our mechanistic understanding of poststroke fatigue.

Evidence for metacognitive bias in perception of voluntary action.

Studies of metacognition often measure confidence in perceptual decisions. Much less is known about metacognition of action, and specifically about how people estimate the success of their own actions. In the present study, we compare metacognitive abilities between voluntary actions, passive movements matched to those actions, and purely visual signals. Participants reported their confidence in judging whether a brief visual probe appeared ahead or behind of their finger during simple flexion/extension movement. The finger could be moved voluntarily, or could be moved passively by a robot replaying their own previous movements. In a third condition, participants did not move, but a visual cursor replayed their previous voluntary movements. Metacognitive sensitivity was comparable when judging active movements, during passive finger displacement and visual cursor reply. However, a progressive metacognitive bias was found, with active movements leading to overconfidence in first-level judgement relative to passive movements, at equal levels of actual evidence. Further, both active and passive movements produced overconfidence relative to visual signals. Taken together, our results may partly explain some of the peculiarities that arise when one judges one's own actions.

Feeling free: External influences on endogenous behaviour.

When we are presented with two equally appealing options, how does the brain break the symmetry between them and make a choice? Recent research has proposed that when no clear information can guide decisions, we use irrelevant noise to tip the scale in favour of one alternative and decide how to act. In the present study, we investigated this issue exploring how human decisions were influenced by noise in a visual signal that cued instructed or free choice. Participants were presented with random-dot kinematograms, moving unidirectionally either upwards or downwards (in instructed trials) or both upwards and downwards simultaneously (free-choice trials). By varying the coherence of dot motion, we were able to test how moment-to-moment fluctuations in motion energy could influence action selection processes. We also measured participants' awareness of such influence. Our results revealed three novel findings: Participants' choices tended to follow fluctuations in dot motion, showing that sensory noise biased "free" selection between actions, irrespective of the clarity of the free cue. However, participants appeared to remain unaware of that influence, because subjective ratings of freedom did not correlate with the degree of sensory biasing. In one exception to this general rule, we found that, when participants resisted the bias and made a choice opposite to the one suggested by the stimulus, they reported strong subjective sense of having chosen independently of the stimulation. This result suggests that inhibitory control is tightly linked to the sense of freedom of choice.

Dynamic sources of evidence supporting confidence judgments and error detection.

Our decisions are accompanied by a subjective sense of confidence about whether the choices we have made are correct or erroneous. We investigate the information on which these confidence judgments are based, and how they relate to the decision itself, by studying how fluctuations in perceptual information influence decisions and second-order metacognitive evaluations of confidence and accuracy. Human participants judged which of two dynamically changing stimuli contained more dots, under instructions emphasizing either speed or accuracy. Crucially, stimuli remained visible for one second after the decision, before participants rated their confidence in their choice. We found that confidence and error detection depended on the balance of stimulus evidence accumulated in the periods both preceding and following the initial decision, regardless of whether instructions emphasized speed or accuracy. These findings suggest a shared computational basis for error detection and confidence judgments, with implications for current models of metacognitive evaluation of decision processes. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved).

Conscious and unconscious performance monitoring: Evidence from patients with schizophrenia.

The ability to detect our own errors is an essential component of action monitoring. Using a masking paradigm in normal adults, we recently discovered that some error-detection processes can proceed without awareness, while other markers of performance monitoring such as the Error-Related Negativity (ERN) are tightly linked to conscious perception. Interestingly, research on cognitive deficit in schizophrenia has shown that the ERN is altered in these patients. In the present study, we therefore tested if the error detection impairment in schizophrenia is specific to conscious perception or is also found under non-conscious conditions, probing whether these performance monitoring processes are truly distinct. Thirteen patients with schizophrenia and thirteen age-matched healthy control subjects performed a speeded number comparison task on masked stimuli while EEG and MEG signals were recorded. Conscious perception and error-detection were assessed on a trial-by-trial basis using subjective reports of visibility and confidence. We found that patients with schizophrenia presented altered cingulate error-detection responses in conscious trials, as reflected by a decreased ERN. By contrast, on unconscious trials, both controls and schizophrenia patients performed above chance in evaluating the likelihood of having made an error. This dissociation confirms the existence of two distinct performance monitoring systems, and suggests that conscious metacognition in schizophrenia is specifically altered while non-conscious performance monitoring remains preserved.

Distinct cortical codes and temporal dynamics for conscious and unconscious percepts.

The neural correlates of consciousness are typically sought by comparing the overall brain responses to perceived and unperceived stimuli. However, this comparison may be contaminated by non-specific attention, alerting, performance, and reporting confounds. Here, we pursue a novel approach, tracking the neuronal coding of consciously and unconsciously perceived contents while keeping behavior identical (blindsight). EEG and MEG were recorded while participants reported the spatial location and visibility of a briefly presented target. Multivariate pattern analysis demonstrated that considerable information about spatial location traverses the cortex on blindsight trials, but that starting ≈270 ms post-onset, information unique to consciously perceived stimuli, emerges in superior parietal and superior frontal regions. Conscious access appears characterized by the entry of the perceived stimulus into a series of additional brain processes, each restricted in time, while the failure of conscious access results in the breaking of this chain and a subsequent slow decay of the lingering unconscious activity.

Toward a computational theory of conscious processing.

The study of the mechanisms of conscious processing has become a productive area of cognitive neuroscience. Here we review some of the recent behavioral and neuroscience data, with the specific goal of constraining present and future theories of the computations underlying conscious processing. Experimental findings imply that most of the brain's computations can be performed in a non-conscious mode, but that conscious perception is characterized by an amplification, global propagation and integration of brain signals. A comparison of these data with major theoretical proposals suggests that firstly, conscious access must be carefully distinguished from selective attention; secondly, conscious perception may be likened to a non-linear decision that 'ignites' a network of distributed areas; thirdly, information which is selected for conscious perception gains access to additional computations, including temporary maintenance, global sharing, and flexible routing; and finally, measures of the complexity, long-distance correlation and integration of brain signals provide reliable indices of conscious processing, clinically relevant to patients recovering from coma.

Decoding the dynamics of action, intention, and error detection for conscious and subliminal stimuli.

How do we detect our own errors, even before we receive any external feedback? One model hypothesizes that error detection results from the confrontation of two signals: a fast and unconscious motor code, based on a direct sensory-motor pathway; and a slower conscious intention code that computes the required response given the stimulus and task instructions. To test this theory and assess how the chain of cognitive processes leading to error detection is modulated by consciousness, we applied multivariate decoding methods to single-trial magnetoencephalography and electroencephalography data. Human participants performed a fast bimanual number comparison task on masked digits presented at threshold, such that about half of them remained unseen. By using both erroneous and correct trials, we designed orthogonal decoders for the actual response (left or right), the required response (left or right), and the response accuracy (correct or incorrect). While perceptual stimulus information and the actual response hand could be decoded on both conscious and non-conscious trials, the required response could only be decoded on conscious trials. Moreover, whether the current response was correct or incorrect could be decoded only when the target digits were conscious, at a time and with a certainty that varied with the amount of evidence in favor of the correct response. These results are in accordance with the proposed dual-route model of conscious versus nonconscious evidence accumulation, and suggest that explicit error detection is possible only when the brain computes a conscious representation of the desired response, distinct from the ongoing motor program.

Distinct brain mechanisms for conscious versus subliminal error detection.

Metacognition, the ability to monitor one's own cognitive processes, is frequently assumed to be univocally associated with conscious processing. However, some monitoring processes, such as those associated with the evaluation of one's own performance, may conceivably be sufficiently automatized to be deployed non-consciously. Here, we used simultaneous electro- and magneto-encephalography (EEG/MEG) to investigate how error detection is modulated by perceptual awareness of a masked target digit. The Error-Related Negativity (ERN), an EEG component occurring ~100 ms after an erroneous response, was exclusively observed on conscious trials: regardless of masking strength, the amplitude of the ERN showed a step-like increase when the stimulus became visible. Nevertheless, even in the absence of an ERN, participants still managed to detect their errors at above-chance levels under subliminal conditions. Error detection on conscious trials originated from the posterior cingulate cortex, while a small response to non-conscious errors was seen in dorsal anterior cingulate. We propose the existence of two distinct brain mechanisms for metacognitive judgements: a conscious all-or-none process of single-trial response evaluation, and a non-conscious statistical assessment of confidence.

Perceptual awareness and categorical representation of faces: evidence from masked priming.

How internal categories influence how we perceive the world is a fundamental question in cognitive sciences. Yet, the relation between perceptual awareness and perceptual categorization has remained largely uncovered so far. Here, we addressed this question by focusing on face perception during subliminal and conscious perception. We used morphed continua between two face identities and we assessed, through a masked priming paradigm, the perceptual processing of these morphed faces under subliminal and supraliminal conditions. We found that priming from subliminal faces followed linearly the information present in the primes, while priming from visible faces revealed a non-linear profile, indicating a categorical processing of face identities. Our results thus point to a special relation between perceptual awareness and categorical processing of faces, and support the dissociation between two modes of information processing: a subliminal mode involving analog treatment of stimuli information, and a supraliminal mode relying on discrete representation.

Triple dissociation of faces, bodies, and objects in extrastriate cortex.

Neuroscientists have long debated whether focal brain regions perform specific cognitive functions [1-5], and the issue remains central to a current debate about visual object recognition. The distributed view of cortical function suggests that object discrimination depends on dispersed but functionally overlapping representations spread across visual cortex [6-8]. The modular view claims different categories of objects are discriminated in functionally segregated and specialized cortical areas [9-11]. To test these competing theories, we delivered transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) over three adjacent functionally localized areas in extrastriate cortex. In three experiments, participants performed discrimination tasks involving faces, bodies, and objects while TMS was delivered over the right occipital face area (rOFA) [12], the right extrastriate body area (rEBA) [13], or the right lateral occipital area (rLO) [14]. All three experiments showed a task selective dissociation with performance impaired only by stimulation at the site selective for that category: TMS over rOFA impaired discrimination of faces but not objects or bodies; TMS over rEBA impaired discrimination of bodies but not faces or objects; TMS over rLO impaired discrimination of objects but not faces or bodies. The results support a modular account in which category-selective areas contribute solely to discrimination of their preferred categories.