Ancestral lineage of SARS-CoV-2 is more stable in human biological fluids than Alpha, Beta and Omicron variants of concern

SARS-CoV-2 is a zoonotic virus which was first identified in 2019, and has quickly spread worldwide. The virus is primarily transmitted through respiratory droplets from infected persons; however, the virus-laden excretions can contaminate surfaces which can serve as a potential source of infection. Since the beginning of the pandemic, SARS-CoV-2 has continued to evolve and accumulate mutations throughout its genome leading to the emergence of variants of concern (VOCs) which exhibit increased fitness, transmissibility, and/or virulence. However, the stability of SARS-CoV-2 VOCs in biological fluids has not been thoroughly investigated so far. The aim of this study was to determine and compare the stability of different SARS-CoV-2 strains in human biological fluids. Here, we demonstrate that the ancestral strain of Wuhan-like lineage A was more stable than the Alpha VOC B.1.1.7, and the Beta VOC B.1.351 strains in human liquid nasal mucus and sputum. In contrast, there was no difference in stability among the three strains in dried biological fluids. Furthermore, we also show that the Omicron VOC B.1.1.529 strain was less stable than the ancestral Wuhan-like strain in liquid nasal mucus. These studies provide insight into the effect of the molecular evolution of SARS-CoV-2 on environmental virus stability, which is important information for the development of countermeasures against SARS-CoV-2. ImportanceGenetic evolution of SARS-CoV-2 leads to the continuous emergence of novel variants, posing a significant concern to global public health. Five of these variants have been classified so far into variants of concern (VOCs); Alpha, Beta, Gamma, Delta, and Omicron. Previous studies investigated the stability of SARS-CoV-2 under various conditions, but there is a gap of knowledge on the survival of SARS-CoV-2 VOCs in human biological fluids which are clinically relevant. Here, we present evidence that Alpha, Beta, and Omicron VOCs were less stable than the ancestral Wuhan-like strain in human biological fluids. Our findings highlight the potential risk of contaminated human biological fluids in SARS-CoV-2 transmission and contribute to the development of countermeasures against SARS-CoV-2.

Infection and transmission of SARS-CoV-2 and its alpha variant in pregnant white-tailed deer

SARS-CoV-2, a novel Betacoronavirus, was first reported circulating in human populations in December 2019 and has since become a global pandemic. Recent history involving SARS-like coronavirus outbreaks (SARS-CoV and MERS-CoV) have demonstrated the significant role of intermediate and reservoir hosts in viral maintenance and transmission cycles. Evidence of SARS-CoV-2 natural infection and experimental infections of a wide variety of animal species has been demonstrated, and in silico and in vitro studies have indicated that deer are susceptible to SARS-CoV-2 infection. White-tailed deer (Odocoileus virginianus) are amongst the most abundant, densely populated, and geographically widespread wild ruminant species in the United States. Human interaction with white-tailed deer has resulted in the occurrence of disease in human populations in the past. Recently, white-tailed deer fawns were shown to be susceptible to SARS-CoV-2. In the present study, we investigated the susceptibility and transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in adult white-tailed deer. In addition, we examined the competition of two SARS-CoV-2 isolates, representatives of the ancestral lineage A (SARS-CoV-2/human/USA/WA1/2020) and the alpha variant of concern (VOC) B.1.1.7 (SARS-CoV-2/human/USA/CA_CDC_5574/2020), through co-infection of white-tailed deer. Next-generation sequencing was used to determine the presence and transmission of each strain in the co-infected and contact sentinel animals. Our results demonstrate that adult white-tailed deer are highly susceptible to SARS-CoV-2 infection and can transmit the virus through direct contact as well as vertically from doe to fetus. Additionally, we determined that the alpha VOC B.1.1.7 isolate of SARS-CoV-2 outcompetes the ancestral lineage A isolate in white-tailed deer, as demonstrated by the genome of the virus shed from nasal and oral cavities from principal infected and contact animals, and from virus present in tissues of principal infected deer, fetuses and contact animals.

SARS-CoV-2 variants of concern have acquired mutations associated with an increased spike cleavage

For efficient cell entry and membrane fusion, SARS-CoV-2 spike (S) protein needs to be cleaved at two different sites, S1/S2 and S2 by different cellular proteases such as furin and TMPRSS2. Polymorphisms in the S protein can affect cleavage, viral transmission, and pathogenesis. Here, we investigated the role of arising S polymorphisms in vitro and in vivo to understand the emergence of SARS-CoV-2 variants. First, we showed that the S:655Y is selected after in vivo replication in the mink model. This mutation is present in the Gamma Variant Of Concern (VOC) but it also occurred sporadically in early SARS-CoV-2 human isolates. To better understand the impact of this polymorphism, we analyzed the in vitro properties of a panel of SARS-CoV-2 isolates containing S:655Y in different lineage backgrounds. Results demonstrated that this mutation enhances viral replication and spike protein cleavage. Viral competition experiments using hamsters infected with WA1 and WA1-655Y isolates showed that the variant with 655Y became dominant in both direct infected and direct contact animals. Finally, we investigated the cleavage efficiency and fusogenic properties of the spike protein of selected VOCs containing different mutations in their spike proteins. Results showed that all VOCs have evolved to acquire an increased spike cleavage and fusogenic capacity despite having different sets of mutations in the S protein. Our study demonstrates that the S:655Y is an important adaptative mutation that increases viral cell entry, transmission, and host susceptibility. Moreover, SARS-COV-2 VOCs showed a convergent evolution that promotes the S protein processing.

Experimental re-infected cats do not transmit SARS-CoV-2

SARS-CoV-2 is the causative agent of COVID-19 and responsible for the current global pandemic. We and others have previously demonstrated that cats are susceptible to SARS-CoV-2 infection and can efficiently transmit the virus to naive cats. Here, we address whether cats previously exposed to SARS-CoV-2 can be re-infected with SARS-CoV-2. In two independent studies, SARS-CoV-2-infected cats were re-challenged with SARS-CoV-2 at 21 days post primary challenge (DPC) and necropsies performed at 4, 7 and 14 days post-secondary challenge (DP2C). Sentinels were co-mingled with the re-challenged cats at 1 DP2C. Clinical signs were recorded, and nasal, oropharyngeal, and rectal swabs, blood, and serum were collected and tissues examined for histologic lesions. Viral RNA was transiently shed via the nasal, oropharyngeal and rectal cavities of the re-challenged cats. Viral RNA was detected in various tissues of re-challenged cats euthanized at 4 DP2C, mainly in the upper respiratory tract and lymphoid tissues, but less frequently and at lower levels in the lower respiratory tract when compared to primary SARS-CoV-2 challenged cats at 4 DPC. Histologic lesions that characterized primary SARS-CoV-2 infected cats at 4 DPC were absent in the re-challenged cats. Naive sentinels co-housed with the re-challenged cats did not shed virus or seroconvert. Together, our results indicate that cats previously infected with SARS-CoV-2 can be experimentally re-infected with SARS-CoV-2; however, the levels of virus shed was insufficient for transmission to co-housed naive sentinels. We conclude that SARS-CoV-2 infection in cats induces immune responses that provide partial, non-sterilizing immune protection against reinfection.