Is trypophobia real?

Approximately 10-18% of the adult population experience some form of anxiety when viewing clusters of small holes. 'Trypophobia' has been the subject of much discussion within the peer-reviewed literature, news outlets, health-related websites and social media. However, there is some scepticism surrounding the phenomenon. It is often stated that the condition is not recognised by the American Psychiatric Association, and not listed as a phobia in the DSM-5. It has also been claimed that trypophobia is no more than a particularly successful internet meme. In this editorial, I argue that such criticisms are misplaced. There is, for instance, no list of phobias in the DSM-5; only criteria that determine phobia classification. Using these criteria, as well as personal testimonials, trypophobia is clearly a phobia. Furthermore, the meme hypothesis cannot account for the fact that the phenomenon existed long before the internet.

The social learning account of trypophobia.

Trypophobia is the condition in which individuals report a range of negative emotions when viewing clusters of small holes. Since the phenomenon was first described in the peer-reviewed literature a decade ago, 49 papers have appeared together with hundreds of news articles. There has also been much discussion on various Internet forums, including medical and health-related websites. In the present article, we examine the degree to which the phenomenon is caused by a form of social learning, specifically, its ubiquitous social media presence. We also examined its prevalence among the broad population. In Experiment 1 (n = 2,558), we assessed whether younger people and females (i.e., greater social media users) are more sensitive to trypophobic stimuli, as predicted by the social media hypothesis. In Experiment 2 (n = 283), we examined whether sensitivity to trypophobic stimuli and rates of trypophobia is greater in people who are aware of the condition's existence, as opposed to those who have never heard of the phenomenon. In line with the social media theory, results showed that younger people and females are indeed more susceptible to trypophobia. However, 24% of trypophobic individuals have never heard of the condition. Overall, these data suggest that both social learning and non-social learning contribute to trypophobia. We also find that the prevalence of trypophobia is approximately 10%.

Evidence for a Weak but Reliable Processing Advantage for False Beliefs Over Similar Nonmental States in Adults.

The ability to understand the mental states of others has sometimes been attributed to a domain-specific mechanism which privileges the processing of these states over similar but nonmental representations. If correct, then others' beliefs should be processed more efficiently than similar information contained within nonmental states. We tested this by examining whether adults would be faster to process others' false beliefs than equivalent "false" photos. Additionally, we tested whether they would be faster to process others' true beliefs about something than their own (matched) personal knowledge about the same event. Across four experiments, we found a small but reliable effect in favor of the first prediction, but no evidence for the second. Results are consistent with accounts positing specialized processes for (false) mental states. The size of the effect does, however, suggest that alternative explanations such as practice effects cannot be ruled out.

Visual Cognition and the Science of Magic.

A number of authors have argued that the art of conjuring can assist the development of theories and knowledge in visual cognition and psychology more broadly. A central assumption of the so-called science of magic is that magicians possess particular insight into human cognition. In a series of experiments, we tested the Insight hypothesis by assessing three factors that magicians argue are important for a popular illusion. Participants viewed videos of a magician performing the French Drop sleight whilst gaze, motion, and muscular tension were manipulated across experiments. Contrary to what the community of conjurers state, results showed that none of these influenced the perceived success of the effect. We also found that a visual priming technique, one suggested of many and used by an eminent magician, does not influence participant responses. Overall, these findings fail to support the Insight hypothesis. We suggest that scientists of magic have erroneously imbued magicians with insights they do not possess.

Teleporting into walls? The irrelevance of the physical world in embodied perspective-taking.

Embodied theories of Level 2 visual perspective-taking usually assume that we imagine ourselves in other real-world locations to take perspectives. We tested this assertion by giving participants an embodied perspective-taking task in which they were instructed to make manual responses based on imagined perspectives. Importantly, on half of the trials, the location of the alternative perspective was not physically possible (i.e., blocked with a wall). Across two experiments, results showed that participants performed just as well for the physically impossible perspectives as for accessible ones. We interpret these data as evidence that embodied perspective-taking is agnostic to local physical features of our environment.

The Stroop Task Sex Difference: Evolved Inhibition or Color Naming?

Previous research shows that women outperform men in the classic Stroop task, but it is not known why this difference occurs. There are currently two main hypotheses: (1) women have enhanced verbal abilities, and (2) women show greater inhibition. In two Stroop experiments, we examined the Inhibition hypothesis by adopting a procedure, often used in visual cognition paradigms, that induces a particular inhibitory component. So-called Negative Priming occurs when a distracting non-target stimulus on one trial becomes the target on the following trial. Results from our experiments showed that the degree to which this type of inhibition occurs within the Stroop effect is no different for men and women. This was the case irrespective of whether participants made a vocal response (Experiment 1; n = 64, 32 men and 32 women) or a manual response (Experiment 2; n = 64, 32 men and 32 women). These results do not therefore support the Inhibition hypothesis. We additionally review findings from a range of paradigms that can be seen as indexing the different components required for the Stroop task (e.g., distractor suppression). This review suggests that the sex effect is due to superior color naming ability in women.

It's Not You, It's Me: A Review of Individual Differences in Visuospatial Perspective Taking.

Visuospatial perspective taking (VSPT) concerns the ability to understand something about the visual relationship between an agent or observation point on the one hand and a target or scene on the other. Despite its importance to a wide variety of other abilities, from communication to navigation, and decades of research, there is as yet no theory of VSPT. Indeed, the heterogeneity of results from different (and sometimes the same) VSPT tasks point to a complex picture suggestive of multiple VSPT strategies, individual differences in performance, and context-specific factors that together have a bearing on both the efficiency and accuracy of outcomes. In this article, we review the evidence in search of patterns in the data. We found a number of predictors of VSPT performance but also a number of gaps in understanding that suggest useful pathways for future research and, possibly, a theory (or theories) of VSPT. Overall, this review makes the case for understanding VSPT by better understanding the perspective taker rather than the target agents or their perception.

A return of mental imagery: The pictorial theory of visual perspective-taking.

The pictorial theory of mental imagery was a central concern of cognitive science during the latter years of the last century. Proponents of the theory argued that images are reinterpreted by the same processes that act upon perceptual inputs. This idea has recently re-emerged within the context of visual perspective-taking. The perceptual simulation theory argues that an observer not only generates an image of what another individual sees but the image is used by the perceptual system in a bottom-up manner. Based on the assumption of Kosslyn and colleagues, we argue that a minimum requirement of a pictorial theory of visual perspective-taking is that observers must faithfully represent relative distance between different points of a scene as would be viewed from an alternative position. The available evidence does not however support this. We conclude that the latest attempt to give mental imagery causal status in a cognitive process is unwarranted.

Visual perspective taking without visual perspective taking.

What happens when an observer takes an agent's visual perspective of a scene? We conducted a series of experiments designed to measure what proportion of adults take a stimulus-centered rather than agent-centered approach to a visual perspective taking task. Adults were presented with images of an agent looking at a number (69). From the perspective of the viewer, the number appeared upside down. We then asked participants what number the agent saw. An agent-centered approach, that is, one that takes into account the other's visual experience, should produce the correct answer "69". Even an egocentric error (i.e., the participant's own perspective) would provide the same correct response. We were interested in what proportion of participants would give the incorrect answer "96", which is best explained by a stimulus-centered rather than agent-centered strategy, namely "flipping" each digit one at a time from left to right. Crucially, such a strategy ignores the alternative visual perspective. We found that, on average, 12-21% of participants made this error. We discuss this finding in the context of the key questions around representation, content, and Theory of Mind in visual perspective taking. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

'Seeing' proximal representations: Testing attitudes to the relationship between vision and images.

Corrections applied by the visual system, like size constancy, provide us with a coherent and stable perspective from ever-changing retinal images. In the present experiment we investigated how willing adults are to examine their own vision as if it were an uncorrected 2D image, much like a photograph. We showed adult participants two lines on a wall, both of which were the same length but one was closer to the participant and hence appeared visually longer. Despite the instruction to base their judgements on appearance specifically, approximately half of the participants judged the lines to appear the same. When they took a photo of the lines and were asked how long they appeared in the image their responses shifted; now the closer line appeared longer. However, when they were asked again about their own view they reverted to their original response. These results suggest that many adults are resistant to imagining their own vision as if it were a flat image. We also place these results within the context of recent views on visual perspective-taking.

Visual perspective-taking and image-like representations: We don't see it.

The ability to represent another agent's visual perspective has recently been attributed to a process called "perceptual simulation", whereby we generate an image-like or "quasi-perceptual" representation of another agent's vision. In an extensive series of experiments we tested this notion. Adult observers were presented with pictures of an agent looking at two horizontal lines, one of which was closer to the agent and hence appeared longer from his/her visual perspective. In each case approximately as many participants judged the closer line to appear shorter as longer (to the agent), i.e., failures to take the agent's perspective. This occurred when clear depth cues were added to emphasise the agent's location relative to the stimuli, when the agent was moved closer to the lines, when the lines were oriented vertically, when judgments could be made while viewing the image, and when participants imagined themselves in the agent's place. It also persisted when we asked participants to imagine what a photo taken from the same location as the agent would show, ruling out a misinterpretation of the instructions. Overall, our data suggest that adults attempt to solve visual perspective-taking problems by drawing upon naïve and often erroneous ideas about how vision works.

Forcing the issue: Little psychological influence in a magician's paradigm.

Forcing is usually described as the effect in which stage magicians covertly influence decisions made by spectators. The phenomenon has been subject to a number of recent articles and is typically placed within the context of social influence, priming, decision making, awareness, free will, and the science of magic. In the present paper I will argue that forcing researchers, when framing and describing the phenomenon, have exaggerated what magicians typically achieve with the technique. Specifically, the magician is said to influence and manipulate the spectator's decision when in fact the vast majority of forces do not include any such influence. The consequence of this misrepresentation is that psychologists will be led to believe that the forcing phenomenon has more to contribute to priming and the psychology of influence than it actually does.

Two independent sources of difficulty in perspective-taking/theory of mind tasks.

Many perspective-taking and theory of mind tasks require participants to pass over the answer that is optimal from the self-perspective. For instance, in the classic change-of-location (false belief) task, participants are required to ignore where they know the object to be, and in the director task participants are required to ignore the best match for the instruction the other, less knowledgeable agent gives them (e.g., 'the top cup'). However, a second but equally critical requirement in such tasks is the ability to select a response which is wrong from the self-perspective; where the object is not, or an object that does not match the instruction (e.g., the middle cup instead of the top cup from one's own perspective). We present the results of an experiment that teases apart these two effects and demonstrate that both contribute independently to the difficulty in taking other perspectives. Reanalyses of data from previous experiments confirm this dual effect. These results suggest a revision of our understanding of egocentricity and difficulty in perspective-taking generally.

Trypophobia: Heart rate, heart rate variability and cortical haemodynamic response.

BACKGROUND: Trypophobia is a common condition in which sufferers are averse to images of small holes arranged in clusters. METHODS: We used photo-plethysmography to examine cardiovascular correlates and near infrared spectroscopy to examine cortical correlates of the phenomenon in order to validate the Trypophobia Questionnaire and explore the several interlinked explanations of the disorder. RESULTS: Trypophobic images were found to increase both heart rate and heart rate variability, but only in individuals with high scores on the Trypophobia Questionnaire. Trypophobic images were also found to elicit larger haemodynamic responses in posterior cortical areas, but again only in individuals with high scores. LIMITATIONS: The results are consistent with a contribution from both parasympathetic and sympathetic systems. CONCLUSION: The data demonstrate the validity of the Trypophobia Questionnaire and show an involvement not only of the autonomic system but cortical mechanisms including cortical hyperexcitability.

Perspective-Taking: In Search of a Theory.

Perspective-taking has been one of the central concerns of work on social attention and developmental psychology for the past 60 years. Despite its prominence, there is no formal description of what it means to represent another's viewpoint. The present article argues that such a description is now required in the form of theory-a theory that should address a number of issues that are central to the notion of assuming another's viewpoint. After suggesting that the mental imagery debate provides a good framework for understanding some of the issues and problems surrounding perspective-taking, we set out nine points that we believe any theory of perspective-taking should consider.

Attribution of vision and knowledge in 'spontaneous perspective taking'.

Theory of mind is a ubiquitous notion that permeates many aspects of social cognition. A recent application has been in the context of 'spontaneous perspective taking' in which responses to target stimuli are facilitated if a human agent, present in a display, sees the same stimuli as an experimental participant. In the present work, we replicated results from a paradigm purporting to show such perspective taking in which participants tend to judge an ambiguous number from the position of an agent. We find, however (in Experiment 1) that this effect still occurs even when the agent cannot see the number due to an occluding object. This, therefore, does not support the perspective-taking hypothesis. An alternative explanation to the theory of mind account is posited in which the agent acts as a reference point that cues the observer to view the critical stimuli from that position and in the direction to which the agent faces. We test this hypothesis in Experiments 2 and 3, and show that non-human reference points can generate perspective-taking-like data. Overall, these results do not support the theory of mind account of previous studies.

The closing of the theory of mind: A critique of perspective-taking.

Theory of mind (ToM) is defined as the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others and is often said to be one of the cornerstones of efficient social interaction. In recent years, a number of authors have suggested that one particular ToM process occurs spontaneously in that it is rapid and outside of conscious control. This work has argued that humans efficiently compute the visual perspective of other individuals. In this article, we present a critique of this notion both on empirical and theoretical grounds. We argue that the experiments and paradigms that purportedly demonstrate spontaneous perspective-taking have not as yet convincingly demonstrated the existence of such a phenomenon. We also suggest that it is not possible to represent the percept of another person, spontaneous or otherwise. Indeed, the perspective-taking field has suggested that humans can represent the visual experience of others. That is, going beyond assuming that we can represent another's viewpoint in anything other than symbolic form. In this sense, the field suffers from the same problem that afflicted the "pictorial" theory in the mental imagery debate. In the last section we present a number of experiments designed to provide a more thorough assessment of whether humans can indeed represent the visual experience of others.

The role of transients in action observation.

A large number of studies have now described the various ways in which the observation of another person's dynamic movement can influence the speed with which the observer is able to prepare a motor action themselves. The typical results are most often explained with reference to theories that link perception and action. Such theories argue that the cognitive structures associated with each share common representations. Consequently, action preparation and action observation are often said to be functionally equivalent. However, the dominance of these theories in explaining action observation effects has masked the potential contribution from processes associated with the detection of low-level "transients" resulting from observing a body movement, such as motion and sound. In the present review, we describe work undertaken in one particular action observation phenomenon ("social inhibition of return") and show that the transient account provides the best explanation of the effect. We argue that future work should consider attention capture and orienting as a potential contributing factor to action observation effects more broadly.

Gatecrashing the visual cocktail party: How visual and semantic similarity modulate the own name benefit in the attentional blink.

The "visual cocktail party effect" refers to superior report of a participant's own name, under conditions of inattention. An early selection account suggests this advantage stems from enhanced visual processing. A late selection account suggests the advantage occurs when semantic information allowing identification as one's own name is retrieved. In the context of inattentional blindness (IB), Mack and Rock showed that the advantage does not generalise to a minor modification of a participant's own name, despite extensive visual similarity, supporting the late selection account. This study applied the name modification manipulation in the context of the attentional blink (AB). Participants were presented with rapid streams of names and identified a white target name, while also reporting the presence of one of two possible probes. The probe names appeared either close (the third item following the target: Lag 3) or far in time from the target (the eighth item following the target: Lag 8). The results revealed a robust AB; reports of the probe were reduced at Lag 3 relative to Lag 8. The AB was also greatly reduced for the own name compared to another name-a visual cocktail party effect. In contrast to the findings of Mack and Rock for IB, the reduced AB extended to the modified own name. The results suggest different loci for the visual cocktail party effect in the AB (word recognition) compared to IB (semantic processing).