The value of mere completion.

The positivity of goal completion is reinforced through everyday experiences of social praise and instrumental reward. Here we investigated whether, in line with this self-regulatory emphasis, people value completion opportunities in and of themselves. Across six experiments we found that adding an arbitrary completion opportunity to a lower-reward task increased the likelihood that participants would choose to work on that task over a higher-reward alternative that did not offer a completion opportunity. This occurred for extrinsic reward tradeoffs (Experiments 1, 3, 4, and 5) and intrinsic reward tradeoffs (Experiments 2 and 6), and it persisted even when participants explicitly noted the rewards of each task (Experiment 3). We sought but did not find evidence that the tendency is moderated by participants' stable or momentary level of concern with monitoring multiple responsibilities (Experiments 4 and 5, respectively). We did find that the opportunity to complete the final step in a sequence was particularly attractive: Setting the lower-reward task closer to completion (but with completion still out of reach) did increase its choice share, but setting the lower-reward task with completion distinctly in reach increased its choice share even more (Experiment 6). Together, the experiments imply that people sometimes behave as if they value completion itself. In everyday life, the allure of mere completion may influence the tradeoffs people make when prioritizing their goals. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

People-watching and the environment: Looking for signs of hope while concern outpaces action.

The social landscape of climate change is shifting. As more people acknowledge the urgency of the problem and society's underwhelming response to it, climate despair threatens to become a major contributor to personal inaction. At this moment, people need a reason for hope. Recent research shows that climate hope, where it exists, is largely social: People feel hopeful when they see others taking action. 'People-watching' is therefore critical. But capitalizing on social proof is tricky as long as concern outpaces action. Other recent research elegantly responds to this conundrum by advertising improvements in social norms, setting people up to find cause for hope even when action is low. We close by nominating other possible social paths to increased hope.

People systematically overlook subtractive changes.

Improving objects, ideas or situations-whether a designer seeks to advance technology, a writer seeks to strengthen an argument or a manager seeks to encourage desired behaviour-requires a mental search for possible changes1-3. We investigated whether people are as likely to consider changes that subtract components from an object, idea or situation as they are to consider changes that add new components. People typically consider a limited number of promising ideas in order to manage the cognitive burden of searching through all possible ideas, but this can lead them to accept adequate solutions without considering potentially superior alternatives4-10. Here we show that people systematically default to searching for additive transformations, and consequently overlook subtractive transformations. Across eight experiments, participants were less likely to identify advantageous subtractive changes when the task did not (versus did) cue them to consider subtraction, when they had only one opportunity (versus several) to recognize the shortcomings of an additive search strategy or when they were under a higher (versus lower) cognitive load. Defaulting to searches for additive changes may be one reason that people struggle to mitigate overburdened schedules11, institutional red tape12 and damaging effects on the planet13,14.

If humans design the planet: A call for psychological scientists to engage with climate engineering.

As efforts to control climate change gain momentum, so too does the possibility that some global actor(s) will deploy one or more forms of climate engineering. Climate engineering refers to large-scale and deliberate activities intended to change either the carbon-balance or energy-balance of the planet. Climate engineering approaches are untested, involve deep uncertainty, and have far-reaching consequences. Nevertheless, many scientists expect that, relative to conventional mitigation approaches, some climate-engineering approaches will prove less expensive and will require less coordination. They will also have more potential for unilateral deployment. Decisions to pursue climate engineering involve several psychosocial dimensions related to attitude and preference formation, decision making under uncertainty, interpersonal coordination, and health and well-being. Even the prospect of climate engineering could affect norms, goals, and beliefs. The field of psychological science should prepare to help society responsibly consider climate engineering alongside more conventional climate-change responses. This article lays out some initial questions and issues a call to action. It aims to provide common ground for a conversation between climatologists, policymakers, psychological scientists, and members of the public on the important behavioral touchpoints of climate engineering. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Self-control and the reasons behind our goals.

Motivation derived from a sense of truly valuing or enjoying one's pursuits ("wanting to do it")-as opposed to motivation born of external demands or other people's expectations ("having to do it")-is associated with goal-pursuit success and overall well-being. But what determines the quality of motivation in the first place? Many theoretical perspectives identify features of the task or situation as determinants, but have largely ignored the potential contribution of individual self-regulatory tendencies. We ask here whether individual differences in self-control may be associated with an individual's likelihood of "wanting to" pursue current goals, operationalized as the momentary experience of autonomous motivation. We first describe an exploratory experience-sampling study that documented the association (Study 1) and prompted subsequent development of the hypothesis that trait self-control and autonomous motivation are related. A second experience sampling study replicated the effect (Study 1R) and 2 cross-sectional studies helped hone its interpretation (Studies 2 and 3). We then employed an experimental paradigm to test whether the association between trait self-control and autonomous motivation is goal-dependent. Consistent with an instrumental, self-regulatory account of the association, we found that trait self-control was related to autonomous motivation for a novel task only when an individual expected to continue working on that task (Study 4). Employing an integrative perspective, this work expands our understanding of trait self-control by identifying it as a candidate contributor to motivation quality, and, more generally, helps to integrate otherwise disparate approaches to understanding motivation. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Slow motion increases perceived intent.

To determine the appropriate punishment for a harmful action, people must often make inferences about the transgressor's intent. In courtrooms and popular media, such inferences increasingly rely on video evidence, which is often played in "slow motion." Four experiments (n = 1,610) involving real surveillance footage from a murder or broadcast replays of violent contact in professional football demonstrate that viewing an action in slow motion, compared with regular speed, can cause viewers to perceive an action as more intentional. This slow motion intentionality bias occurred, in part, because slow motion video caused participants to feel like the actor had more time to act, even when they knew how much clock time had actually elapsed. Four additional experiments (n = 2,737) reveal that allowing viewers to see both regular speed and slow motion replay mitigates the bias, but does not eliminate it. We conclude that an empirical understanding of the effect of slow motion on mental state attribution should inform the life-or-death decisions that are currently based on tacit assumptions about the objectivity of human perception.

On rivalry and goal pursuit: Shared competitive history, legacy concerns, and strategy selection.

Seven studies converge to show that prompting people to think about a rival versus a nonrival competitor causes them to view current competitions as more connected to past ones, to be more concerned with long-term legacy, and to pursue personal goals in a more eager, less cautious manner. These results are consistent with a social-cognitive view of rivalry that defines it as a competitive relational schema. A preliminary analysis revealed that people were more likely to appeal to past competitions to explain the importance of current rivalry than nonrivalry contests. Experiment 1 showed that people view rivalry versus nonrivalry competitions as more embedded in an ongoing competitive narrative and that this perception increases legacy concerns. The next 2 experiments used a causal chain approach to examine the possibility of legacy concerns acting as a mediator between rivalry and eagerness. Experiment 2a demonstrated that longer (vs. shorter) competitive histories are associated with increased legacy concerns. Experiment 2b manipulated legacy concerns and found that this shifted regulatory focus toward eagerness. Finally, 3 experiments tested the direct effect of thinking about a rival on eager strategy selection: Thinking about rivals (vs. nonrivals) led people to be more interested in offensive than defensive strategies (Experiment 3), to initiate rather than delay their goal pursuit (Experiment 4), and to rely on spontaneous rather than deliberative reasoning (Experiment 5). We suggest that rivalries affect how people view their goals and the strategies they use for pursuing them, and that these effects are at least partially attributable to the shared history between individuals and their rivals.

Jump-Starting Early Childhood Education at Home: Early Learning, Parent Motivation, and Public Policy.

By the time children begin formal schooling, their experiences at home have already contributed to large variations in their math and language development, and once school begins, academic achievement continues to depend strongly on influences outside of school. It is thus essential that educational reform strategies involve primary caregivers. Specifically, programs and policies should promote and support aspects of caregiver-child interaction that have been empirically demonstrated to boost early learning and should seek to impede "motivational sinkholes" that threaten to undermine caregivers' desires to engage their children effectively. This article draws on cognitive and behavioral science to detail simple, low-cost, and effective tools caregivers can employ to prepare their children for educational success and then describes conditions that can protect and facilitate caregivers' motivation to use those tools. Policy recommendations throughout focus on using existing infrastructure to more deeply engage caregivers in effective early childhood education at home.

Investing in karma: when wanting promotes helping.

People often face outcomes of important events that are beyond their personal control, such as when they wait for an acceptance letter, job offer, or medical test results. We suggest that when wanting and uncertainty are high and personal control is lacking, people may be more likely to help others, as if they can encourage fate's favor by doing good deeds proactively. Four experiments support this karmic-investment hypothesis. When people want an outcome over which they have little control, their donations of time and money increase (experiments 1 and 2), but their participation in other rewarding activities does not (experiment 1b). In addition, at a job fair, job seekers who feel the process is outside (vs. within) their control make more generous pledges to charities (experiment 3). Finally, karmic investments increase optimism about a desired outcome (experiment 4). We conclude by discussing the role of personal control and magical beliefs in this phenomenon.

Instrumentality boosts appreciation: helpers are more appreciated while they are useful.

We propose that in social interactions, appreciation of a helper depends on that helper's instrumentality: The more motivated one is to accomplish a goal, and the more one perceives a helper as able to facilitate that goal, the more appreciation one will feel for that helper. Four experiments supported this instrumentality-boost hypothesis by showing that beneficiaries felt more appreciation of their helpers while they were receiving help toward an ongoing task than after that task was completed or after the helper was deemed no longer instrumental. This finding held for both the positive side of appreciation (gratitude) and the negative side (feelings of indebtedness) and also across a range of relationships (complete strangers, newly acquainted partners, and friends). This pattern of appreciation is counterintuitive for helpers, and so a mismatch arises between the time courses of beneficiaries' experienced appreciation and helpers' expectations of appreciation.

You're having fun when time flies: the hedonic consequences of subjective time progression.

Seven studies tested the hypothesis that people use subjective time progression in hedonic evaluation. When people believe that time has passed unexpectedly quickly, they rate tasks as more engaging, noises as less irritating, and songs as more enjoyable. We propose that felt time distortion operates as a metacognitive cue that people implicitly attribute to their enjoyment of an experience (i.e., time flew, so the experience must have been fun). Consistent with this attribution account, the effects of felt time distortion on enjoyment ratings were moderated by the need for attribution, the strength of the "time flies" naive theory, and the presence of an alternative attribution. These findings suggest a previously unexplored process through which subjective time progression can influence the hedonic evaluation of experiences.

Believers' estimates of God's beliefs are more egocentric than estimates of other people's beliefs.

People often reason egocentrically about others' beliefs, using their own beliefs as an inductive guide. Correlational, experimental, and neuroimaging evidence suggests that people may be even more egocentric when reasoning about a religious agent's beliefs (e.g., God). In both nationally representative and more local samples, people's own beliefs on important social and ethical issues were consistently correlated more strongly with estimates of God's beliefs than with estimates of other people's beliefs (Studies 1-4). Manipulating people's beliefs similarly influenced estimates of God's beliefs but did not as consistently influence estimates of other people's beliefs (Studies 5 and 6). A final neuroimaging study demonstrated a clear convergence in neural activity when reasoning about one's own beliefs and God's beliefs, but clear divergences when reasoning about another person's beliefs (Study 7). In particular, reasoning about God's beliefs activated areas associated with self-referential thinking more so than did reasoning about another person's beliefs. Believers commonly use inferences about God's beliefs as a moral compass, but that compass appears especially dependent on one's own existing beliefs.

In the mood to get over yourself: mood affects theory-of-mind use.

Understanding others' behavior often involves attributing mental states to them by using one's "theory of mind." We argue that using theory of mind to recognize differences between one's own perspective and another's perspective is a deliberate process of inference that may be influenced by incidental mood. Because sadness is associated with more systematic and deliberate processing whereas happiness is associated with more heuristic processing, we predicted that theory-of-mind use would be facilitated by sadness compared with happiness. Two experiments supported this prediction, demonstrating that participants were more likely to utilize knowledge about others to make inferences about their mental states when they were induced to feel sad than when they were induced to feel happy. These results provide both theoretical insight into the psychological mechanisms that govern theory of mind as well as practical insight into a common source of variability in its use.

Reciprocity is not give and take: asymmetric reciprocity to positive and negative acts.

Unlike economic exchange, social exchange has no well-defined "value." It is based on the norm of reciprocity, in which giving and taking are to be repaid in equivalent measure. Although giving and taking are colloquially assumed to be equivalent actions, we demonstrate that they produce different patterns of reciprocity. In five experiments utilizing a dictator game, people reciprocated in like measure to apparently prosocial acts of giving, but reciprocated more selfishly to apparently antisocial acts of taking, even when the objective outcomes of the acts of giving and taking were identical. Additional results demonstrate that acts of giving in social exchanges are perceived as more generous than objectively identical acts of taking, that taking tends to escalate, and that the asymmetry in reciprocity is not due to gaining versus losing resources. Reciprocity appears to operate on an exchange rate that assigns value to the meaning of events, in a fashion that encourages prosocial exchanges.