Do uncontrolled processes contribute to evaluative learning? Insights from a new two-US process dissociation procedure and ambivalence measures.

The contribution of uncontrolled processes to evaluative learning has been examined in evaluative conditioning procedures by comparing evaluations of conditioned stimuli between tasks or within tasks but between learning instruction conditions. In the present research, we introduced a new procedure that keeps both tasks and instructions constant. In addition, we introduced ambivalence measures to address this uncontrollability question. The new procedure involves forming an impression of conditioned stimuli based on their pairing with one unconditioned stimulus while attending but discarding the influence of another unconditioned stimulus holding the same (congruent trials) versus a different (incongruent trials) valence. When the to-be-used and to-be-discarded unconditioned stimuli share the same (vs. a different) valence, controlled and uncontrolled processes should support the same (vs. opposite) responses. We used this approach in two preregistered experiments (Ntotal = 467) using dichotomous evaluative classifications (Experiments 1 and 2), evaluative ratings, and two measures of attitudinal ambivalence: mouse trajectories and felt ambivalence (Experiment 2). While we failed to find evidence for uncontrolled processes in evaluative classification frequencies separately in Experiments 1 and 2, analyses of aggregated classification frequencies across Experiments 1 and 2 suggested a small contribution of uncontrolled processes. In addition, we found larger felt ambivalence for incongruent than congruent trials. Overall, the present findings are mixed but support the possibility of a contribution of uncontrolled processes to evaluative learning, even when control is applied to a focal stimulus and additional influences come from a to-be-disregarded stimulus.

A conditional judgment procedure for probing evaluative conditioning effects in the absence of feelings of remembering.

Attitude research has capitalized on evaluative conditioning procedures to gain insight into how evaluations are formed and may be changed. In evaluative conditioning, a conditioned stimulus (CS; e.g., an unfamiliar soda brand) is paired with an unconditioned stimulus (US) of affective value (e.g., a pleasant picture). Following this pairing, a change in CS liking may be observed (e.g., the soda brand is liked better). A question with far-reaching theoretical and practical implications is whether the change in CS liking is found when participants feel they do not remember the CS-US pairings at the time an evaluation is produced about the CS. Here, we introduce a new conditional judgment procedure-the two-button-sets (TBS) task-for probing evaluative conditioning effects without feelings of remembering about the valence of the US paired with the CS. In three experiments, the TBS is (1) is successfully validated; it is also used to (2) provide preliminary information on the feeling of remembering question, and (3) to examine an affect-consistent bias in memory judgments for CS-US pairings. Results do not support evaluative effects in the absence of feelings of remembering, and they oppose the view that affect-consistent bias is limited to memory uncertainty. We discuss these findings in light of previous evidence and of dual-learning models of attitudes. We also discuss limitations and research avenues related to the new procedure.

People underestimate the influence of repetition on truth judgments (and more so for themselves than for others).

People judge repeated statements as more truthful than new statements: a truth effect. In three pre-registered experiments (N = 463), we examined whether people expect repetition to influence truth judgments more for others than for themselves: a bias blind spot in the truth effect. In Experiments 1 and 2, using moderately plausible and implausible statements, respectively, the test for the bias blind spot did not pass the significance threshold set for a two-step sequential analysis. Experiment 3 considered moderately plausible statements but with a larger sample of participants. Additionally, it compared actual performance after a two-day delay with participants' predictions for themselves and others. This time, we found clear evidence for a bias blind spot in the truth effect. Experiment 3 also showed that participants underestimated the magnitude of the truth effect, especially so for themselves, and that predictions and actual truth effect scores were not significantly related. Finally, an integrative analysis focusing on a more conservative between-participant approach found clear frequentist and Bayesian evidence for a bias blind spot. Overall, the results indicate that people (1) hold beliefs about the effect of repetition on truth judgments, (2) believe that this effect is larger for others than for themselves, (3) and underestimate the effect's magnitude, and (4) particularly so for themselves.

The new measures of interoceptive accuracy: A systematic review and assessment.

Conscious interoception, the perception of internal bodily states, is thought to contribute to fundamental human abilities (e.g., decision-making and emotional regulation). One of its most studied dimensions is interoceptive accuracy: the objective capacity to detect internal bodily signals. In the past few years, several labs across the world have started developing new tasks aimed at overcoming limitations inherent in classical measures of interoceptive accuracy. In this systematic review, we identified these tasks (since 2015) for the cardiac, respiratory, and gastrointestinal domains. For each identified task, we discuss their strengths and weaknesses, and make constructive suggestions for further improvement. In the general discussion, we discuss the (potentially elusive) possibility of reaching high validity in the measurement of interoceptive accuracy. We also point out that interoceptive accuracy may not be the most critical dimension for informing current theories, and we encourage researchers to investigate other dimensions of conscious interoception.

Discrepancies in the Definition and Measurement of Human Interoception: A Comprehensive Discussion and Suggested Ways Forward.

Interoception has been the subject of renewed interest over the past 2 decades. The involvement of interoception in a variety of fundamental human abilities (e.g., decision-making and emotional regulation) has led to the hypothesis that interoception is a central transdiagnostic process that causes and maintains mental disorders and physical diseases. However, interoception has been inconsistently defined and conceptualized. In the first part of this article, we argue that the widespread practice of defining interoception as the processing of signals originating from within the body and limiting it to specific physiological pathways (lamina I spinothalamic afferents) is problematic. This is because, in humans, the processing of internal states is underpinned by other physiological pathways generally assigned to the somatosensory system. In the second part, we explain that the consensual dimensions of interoception are empirically detached from existing measures, the latter of which capture loosely related phenomena. This is detrimental to the replicability of findings across measures and the validity of interpretations. In the general discussion, we discuss the main insights of the current analysis and suggest a more refined way to define interoception in humans and conceptualize its underlying dimensions.

Beware 'persuasive communication devices' when writing and reading scientific articles.

Authors rely on a range of devices and techniques to attract and maintain the interest of readers, and to convince them of the merits of the author's point of view. However, when writing a scientific article, authors must use these 'persuasive communication devices' carefully. In particular, they must be explicit about the limitations of their work, avoid obfuscation, and resist the temptation to oversell their results. Here we discuss a list of persuasive communication devices and we encourage authors, as well as reviewers and editors, to think carefully about their use.

Does co-occurrence information influence evaluations beyond relational meaning? An investigation using self-reported and mouse-tracking measures of attitudinal ambivalence.

People occasionally encounter information of which the structure bears divergent evaluative implications. For instance, when reading that a sunscreen protects against skin cancer, the relational meaning of the information (i.e., "protects against skin cancer") has positive evaluative implications for the sunscreen, whereas the co-occurrence (of "sunscreen" with "skin cancer") is negative. An important theoretical (and practical) issue is whether the co-occurrence information influences people's evaluations beyond the relational meaning of the information. This question has been recently investigated using task comparison procedures (comparing evaluative outcomes on different tasks) and process dissociation procedures (estimating relational and co-occurrence parameters within a given task). In this article, we report four experiments that examined this question by reducing interpretational ambiguities inherent in the two preceding approaches. This was achieved by using self-reported and mouse-tracking measures of ambivalence. We reasoned that when co-occurrence and relational information have divergent (rather than convergent) evaluative implications, more ambivalence should be found. We tested this prediction in experiential (Experiments 1 to 3) and instructed (Experiment 4) procedures. Higher self-reported ambivalence was found in divergent compared to convergent conditions in all experiments. Ambivalence, as estimated with mouse-tracking measures, was higher in divergent than in convergent conditions in the experiential experiments but not in the instructed experiment. Results are discussed with reference to single-process (propositional and episodic) and dual-process attitude learning models. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Sixty Years After Orne's American Psychologist Article: A Conceptual Framework for Subjective Experiences Elicited by Demand Characteristics.

Study participants form beliefs based on cues present in a testing situation (demand characteristics). These beliefs can alter study outcomes (demand effects). Neglecting demand effects can threaten the internal and external validity of studies (including their replication). While demand characteristics garnered much attention following Orne's introduction of this notion, consideration of their effects has become sparse in experimental reports. Moreover, the concept remains confusing. Here, we introduce a conceptual framework for subjective experiences elicited by demand characteristics. The model distinguishes between participants' awareness of the hypothesis, their motivation to comply with it, and the strategy they use to meet situational requirements. We stress that demand characteristics can give rise to genuine experiences. To illustrate, we apply the model to Evaluative Conditioning and the Rubber Hand Illusion. In the General Discussion, we discuss risks and opportunities associated with demand characteristics, and we explain that they remain highly relevant to current research.

Truth by repetition Without repetition: Testing the effect of instructed repetition on truth judgments.

Past research indicates that people judge repeated statements as more true than new ones. An experiential consequence of repetition that may underly this "truth effect" is processing fluency: Processing statements feels easier following their repetition. In three preregistered experiments (N = 684), we examined the effect of merely instructed repetition (i.e., not experienced) on truth judgments. Experiments 1-2 instructed participants that some statements were present (vs. absent) in an exposure phase allegedly undergone by other individuals. We then asked them to rate such statements based on how they thought those individuals would have done. Overall, participants rated repeated statements as more true than new statements. The instruction-based repetition effects were significant but also significantly weaker than those elicited by the experience of repetition (Experiments 1 and 2). Additionally, Experiment 2 clarified that adding a repetition status tag in the experienced repetition condition did not impact truth judgments. Experiment 3 further showed that the instruction-based effect was still detectable when participants provided truth judgments for themselves rather than estimating other people's judgments. We discuss the mechanisms that can explain these effects and their implications for advancing our understanding of the truth effect. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

What do measures of self-report interoception measure? Insights from a systematic review, latent factor analysis, and network approach.

Recent conceptualizations of interoception suggest several facets to this construct, including "interoceptive sensibility" and "self-report interoceptive scales", both of which are assessed with questionnaires. Although these conceptual efforts have helped move the field forward, uncertainty remains regarding whether current measures converge on their measurement of a common construct. To address this question, we first identified -via a systematic review- the most cited questionnaires of interoceptive sensibility. Then, we examined their correlations, their overall factorial structure, and their network structure in a large community sample (n = 1003). The results indicate that these questionnaires tap onto distinct constructs, with low overall convergence and interrelationships between questionnaire items. This observation mitigates the interpretation and replicability of findings in self-report interoception research. We call for a better match between constructs and measures.

Is Earth a perfect square? Repetition increases the perceived truth of highly implausible statements.

A single exposure to statements is typically enough to increase their perceived truth. This Truth-by-Repetition (TBR) effect has long been assumed to occur only with statements whose truth value is unknown to participants. Contrary to this hypothesis, recent research has found that statements contradicting participants' prior knowledge (as established from a first sample of participants) show a TBR effect following their repetition (in a second, independent sample of participants). As for now, however, attempts at finding a TBR effect for blatantly false (i.e., highly implausible) statements have failed. Here, we reasoned that highly implausible statements such as Elephants run faster than cheetahs may show repetition effects, provided a sensitive truth measure is used and statements are repeated more than just once. In a preregistered experiment, participants judged on a 100-point scale the truth of highly implausible statements that were either new to them or had been presented five times before judgment. We observed an effect of repetition: repeated statements were judged more true than new ones, although all judgments were judged below the scale midpoint. Exploratory analyses additionally show that about half the participants showed no or even a reversed effect of repetition. The results provide the first empirical evidence that repetition can increase perceived truth even for highly implausible statements, although not equally so for all participants and not to the point of making the statements look true.

How risk-prone are people when facing a sure loss? Negative interest rates as a convenient conceptual framework.

People occasionally face sure loss prospects. Do they seek risk in search of better outcomes or contend with the sure loss and focus on what is left to be saved? We addressed this question in three experiments akin to a negative interest rate framework. Specifically, we asked participants to allocate money (Experiments 1 and 2) or choose (Experiment 3) between two options: (i) a loss option where, for sure, they would end up with less, or (ii) a mixed gamble with a positive expected outcome, but also the possibility of an even larger loss. Risk aversion (i.e., choosing the sure loss) ranged from 80% to 36% across the three experiments, dependent on varied sizes of sure losses or expected outcomes. However, overall, the majority (> 50%) of allocations and choices were for the sure loss. Our findings indicate a tolerance for sure losses at the expense of mixed gambles yielding much better expected outcomes. We discuss the implications of this sure-loss tolerance for psychological research, its implications in terms of (cumulative) prospect theory, and what the results mean for the implementation of negative interest rates.

Incidental Attitude Formation via the Surveillance Task: A Preregistered Replication of the Olson and Fazio (2001) Study.

Evaluative conditioning is one of the most widely studied procedures for establishing and changing attitudes. The surveillance task is a highly cited evaluative-conditioning paradigm and one that is claimed to generate attitudes without awareness. The potential for evaluative-conditioning effects to occur without awareness continues to fuel conceptual, theoretical, and applied developments. Yet few published studies have used this task, and most are characterized by small samples and small effect sizes. We conducted a high-powered (N = 1,478 adult participants), preregistered close replication of the original surveillance-task study (Olson & Fazio, 2001). We obtained evidence for a small evaluative-conditioning effect when "aware" participants were excluded using the original criterion-therefore replicating the original effect. However, no such effect emerged when three other awareness criteria were used. We suggest that there is a need for caution when using evidence from the surveillance-task effect to make theoretical and practical claims about "unaware" evaluative-conditioning effects.

Repetition increases both the perceived truth and fakeness of information: An ecological account.

People believe repeated statements more compared to new statements - they show a truth by repetition effect. In three pre-registered experiments, we show that repetition may also increase perceptions that statements are used as fake news on social media, irrespective of the factual truth or falsehood of the statements (Experiment 1 & 2), but that repetition reduces perceptions of falsehood when the context of judgment is left unspecified (Experiment 3). On a theoretical level, the findings support an ecological account of repetition effects, as opposed to either a fluency-as-positivity or to an amplification account of these effects. On a practical level, they qualify the influence of repetition on the perception of fake news.

Contribution of Time Estimation and Knowledge to Heartbeat Counting Task Performance under Original and Adapted Instructions.

Interoceptive accuracy is frequently assessed using the Heartbeat Counting Task (HCT), requiring participants to count the number of times their heart beats. The HCT validity has been questioned, as participants may perform the task by estimating, rather than counting, their felt heartbeats. Participants could estimate the time or use their knowledge of their heart rate. Some research ruled out the contribution of time estimation in HCT performance. However, we believe these studies relied on a problematic analytic rationale. We revisited this question by relying on new analytic strategies, and by examining the role of estimation in HCT performance, while varying task instructions. The findings support the role of time and knowledge-based estimations under original instructions. They also highlight the critical impact of instructions on HCT validity. Given the many limitations of the HCT, we urge researchers to test the robustness of published effects and to reconsider the interpretation of replicable results.

Implicit? What Do You Mean? A Comprehensive Review of the Delusive Implicitness Construct in Attitude Research.

This article provides a comprehensive review of divergent conceptualizations of the "implicit" construct that have emerged in attitude research over the past two decades. In doing so, our goal is to raise awareness of the harmful consequences of conceptual ambiguities associated with this terminology. We identify three main conceptualizations of the "implicitness" construct: the procedural conceptualization (implicit-as-indirect), the functional conceptualization (implicit-as-automatic), and the mental theory conceptualization (implicit-as-associative), as well as two hybrid conceptualizations (implicit-as-indirect-and-automatic, implicit-as-driven-by-affective-gut-reactions). We discuss critical limitations associated with each conceptualization and explain that confusion also arises from their coexistence. We recommend discontinuing the usage of the "implicit" terminology in attitude research and research inspired by it. We offer terminological alternatives aimed at increasing both the precision of theorization and the practical value of future research.

A heartfelt response to Zimprich et al. (2020), and Ainley et al. (2020)'s commentaries: Acknowledging issues with the HCT would benefit interoception research.

In two Commentaries, Zimprich et al. (2020), and Ainley et al. (2020) dispute conclusions raised by Zamariola et al. (2018) in a large sample study that questioned the validity of IAcc scores derived from the Heartbeat Counting Task (HCT). After clarifying the reliability of our procedures and the robustness of our main findings, we address the four points of contention discussed in the Commentaries. In doing so, we spell out why research using the HCT faces important interpretational issues, and we call for a theoretical clarification on the construct. In our conclusion, we provide recommendations for improving HCT research and research on interoception in general.

Does it help to feel your body? Evidence is inconclusive that interoceptive accuracy and sensibility help cope with negative experiences.

In four studies (total N = 534), we examined the moderating impact of Interoceptive Accuracy (i.e. IAcc, as measured with the heartbeat counting task) and Interoceptive Sensibility (IS, assessed via questionnaire) on negative affect, following social exclusion or after receiving negative feedback. Results from an integrative data analysis combining the four studies confirmed that the manipulations were successful at inducing negative affect. However, no significant interaction between mood induction (control versus negative affect induction) and interoception on mood measures was observed, and this was true both for objective (i.e. IAcc) and subjective (i.e. IS) measures of interoception. Hence, previous conclusions on the moderating impact of interoception in the relationship between mood induction and self-reported mood were neither replicated nor generalised to this larger sample. We discuss these findings in light of theories of emotion regulation as well as recent concerns raised about the validity of the heartbeat counting task.