Risks Related to Chikungunya Infections among European Union Travelers, 2012-2018.

Autochthonous outbreaks of chikungunya have occurred in the European Union (EU) after virus introduction by infected travelers. We reviewed the surveillance data of travel-related cases reported in the EU during 2012-2018 to document factors associated with increased infection rates among travelers and to assess how surveillance data could support preparedness against secondary transmission and timely control of outbreaks. Thirteen EU countries reported 2,616 travel-related chikungunya cases. We observed 3 successive epidemiologic periods; the highest number of cases (75%) occurred during 2014-2015, when most cases were associated with the Caribbean and South America. The highest infection rates among travelers were observed during the same phase. Although surveillance of travel-related cases is relevant for estimating the infection risk for travelers, we could not identify a relationship between the number of infected travelers and a higher likelihood of secondary transmission in the EU.

One Health approach for West Nile virus surveillance in the European Union: relevance of equine data for blood safety.

West Nile virus (WNV) infection is notifiable in humans and equids in the European Union (EU). An area where a human case is detected is considered affected until the end of the mosquito transmission season (week 48) and blood safety measures have to be implemented. We used human and equine case notifications between 2013 and 2017 to define the WNV distribution in the EU and to investigate the relevance of using equine cases as a complementary trigger for blood safety measures. Adding areas with equine cases to the definition of an affected area would have a major impact on blood safety measures. Adding areas with equine cases where human cases have been reported in the past would increase the timeliness of blood safety measures with only a limited impact. Although the occurrence of human and/or equine cases confirms virus circulation in the EU, no evidence was found that occurrence of equine cases leads to human cases and vice versa. We conclude that information about equine data should contribute to raising awareness among public health experts and trigger enhanced surveillance. Further studies are required before extending the definition of affected areas to areas with human and/or equine cases.

The European Medical Corps: first Public Health Team mission and future perspectives.

The 2013-2016 Ebola epidemic in West Africa challenged traditional international mechanisms for public health team mobilisation to control outbreaks. Consequently, in February 2016, the European Union (EU) launched the European Medical Corps (EMC), a mechanism developed in collaboration with the World Health Organization (WHO) to rapidly deploy teams and equipment in response to public health emergencies inside and outside the EU. Public Health Teams (PHTs), a component of the EMC, consist of experts in communicable disease prevention and control from participating countries and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), to support affected countries and WHO in risk assessment and outbreak response. The European Commission's Directorate-General European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations and Directorate-General Health and Food Safety, and ECDC, plan and support deployments. The first EMC-PHT deployment took place in May 2016, with a team sent to Angola for a yellow fever outbreak. The aims were to evaluate transmission risks to local populations and EU citizens in Angola, the risk of regional spread and importation into the EU, and to advise Angolan and EU authorities on control measures. International actors should gain awareness of the EMC, its response capacities and the means for requesting assistance.

Electronic surveillance of outbreaks in Lebanon.

BACKGROUND: This paper describes and assesses the electronic surveillance of outbreaks based on the early warning for four endemic diseases - typhoid fever, amebic dysentery, viral hepatitis A and brucellosis - in Lebanon, for the first 28 weeks of 2005 and first 26 weeks of 2007. METHODS: The electronic early warning system is based on the mandatory notification of 37 targeted diseases. The four target diseases assessed in this paper are based on monthly notification. Standards were set for case definitions and forms. Physicians and hospitals report to the Ministry of Public Health (MOPH), where data is checked and transmitted to a central location for entry into the national database, which stores historical and current data, as well as population estimates based on national surveys. The event date was selected for case dating. Indicators triggering abnormalities include number of cases, rates, and relative ratios. Four relative ratios were selected using the period of 1 week, 4 weeks or 52 weeks for the current and previous years. Screening was conducted on a weekly basis in 2005, and on a daily basis in 2007. Abnormal signals were verified, documented and grouped by alert-episodes for each disease, district, and period. MOPH teams verified and investigated case clustering. RESULTS: During the first 28 weeks of 2005 and the first 26 weeks of 2007, screening operations were 68% and 89%, respectively, for completeness. Detected abnormal signals were 26 and 166 and identified alert-episodes were 11 and 22, respectively. Verified clusters were 7 and 11; positive predictive value for clusters identification was 64% and 50%, respectively. The time interval between first cases and first abnormal signals was on average 4 weeks and 5 weeks, respectively. CONCLUSION: Timely reporting, transmission, data entry, analysis and communication are the elements of timely outbreak detection. The electronic surveillance of outbreaks for epidemic-prone diseases, which are mandatory notified on a monthly basis using indicator-based thresholds, is capable of detecting spatio-temporal clusters and outbreaks; however, with some delay. The national surveillance system needs to be reviewed in order to provide timely data for early warning surveillance and response.

Are rapid population estimates accurate? A field trial of two different assessment methods.

Emergencies resulting in large-scale displacement often lead to populations resettling in areas where basic health services and sanitation are unavailable. To plan relief-related activities quickly, rapid population size estimates are needed. The currently recommended Quadrat method estimates total population by extrapolating the average population size living in square blocks of known area to the total site surface. An alternative approach, the T-Square, provides a population estimate based on analysis of the spatial distribution of housing units taken throughout a site. We field tested both methods and validated the results against a census in Esturro Bairro, Beira, Mozambique. Compared to the census (population: 9,479), the T-Square yielded a better population estimate (9,523) than the Quadrat method (7,681; 95% confidence interval: 6,160-9,201), but was more difficult for field survey teams to implement. Although applicable only to similar sites, several general conclusions can be drawn for emergency planning.

A comparison of cluster and systematic sampling methods for measuring crude mortality.

OBJECTIVE: To compare the results of two different survey sampling techniques (cluster and systematic) used to measure retrospective mortality on the same population at about the same time. METHODS: Immediately following a cluster survey to assess mortality retrospectively in a town in North Darfur, Sudan in 2005, we conducted a systematic survey on the same population and again measured mortality retrospectively. This was only possible because the geographical layout of the town, and the availability of a good previous estimate of the population size and distribution, were conducive to the systematic survey design. RESULTS: Both the cluster and the systematic survey methods gave similar results below the emergency threshold for crude mortality (0.80 versus 0.77 per 10,000/day, respectively). The results for mortality in children under 5 years old (U5MR) were different (1.16 versus 0.71 per 10,000/day), although this difference was not statistically significant. The 95% confidence intervals were wider in each case for the cluster survey, especially for the U5MR (0.15-2.18 for the cluster versus 0.09-1.33 for the systematic survey). CONCLUSION: Both methods gave similar age and sex distributions. The systematic survey, however, allowed for an estimate of the town's population size, and a smaller sample could have been used. This study was conducted in a purely operational, rather than a research context. A research study into alternative methods for measuring retrospective mortality in areas with mortality significantly above the emergency threshold is needed, and is planned for 2006.

Europe makes progress in preparing for influenza pandemic, but further work needed.

Progress has been made in influenza pandemic preparedness in Europe in the past six month.

Safety of the yellow fever vaccine during the September 2001 mass vaccination campaign in Abidjan, Ivory Coast.

In 2001, a vaccination campaign against yellow fever was carried out in Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire. During the campaign and 4 weeks after an active surveillance system for adverse events following immunization (AEFI) was set up. More then 2.6 million doses were administered and 87 AEFI were notified. Eight suspected YF cases were reported after vaccination and considered as AEFI. However, none had IgM for YF and all recovered without sequels. This surveillance system provided reassuring data about the safety of the YF vaccine and proved that it is feasible to set up an active surveillance system during a mass campaign.

Challenges for communicable disease surveillance and control in southern Iraq, April-June 2003.

The recent war in Iraq presents significant challenges for the surveillance and control of communicable diseases. In early April 2003, the World Health Organization (WHO) sent a team of public health experts to Kuwait and a base was established in the southern Iraqi governorate of Basrah on May 3. We present the lessons learned from the communicable disease surveillance and control program implemented in the Basrah governorate in Iraq (population of 1.9 million) in April and May 2003, and we report communicable disease surveillance data through June 2003. Following the war, communicable disease control programs were disrupted, access to safe water was reduced, and public health facilities were looted. Rapid health assessments were carried out in health centers and hospitals to identify priorities for action. A Health Sector Coordination Group was organized with local and international health partners, and an early warning surveillance system for communicable disease was set up. In the first week of May 2003, physicians in hospitals in Basrah suspected cholera cases and WHO formed a cholera control committee. As of June 29, 2003, Iraqi hospital laboratories have confirmed 94 cases of cholera from 7 of the 8 districts of the Basrah governorate. To prevent the transmission of major communicable diseases, restoring basic public health and water/sanitation services is currently a top priority in Iraq. Lack of security continues to be a barrier for effective public health surveillance and response in Iraq.

Rapid assessment of population size by area sampling in disaster situations

In the initial phase of a complex emergency, an immediate population size assessment method, based on area sampling, is vital to provide relief workers with a rapid population estimate in refugee camps. In the past decade, the method has been progressively improved; sis examples are presented in this paper and questions raised about its statiscal validity as well as important issues for further research. There are two stages. The first is to map the camp by registering all of its coordinates. In the second stage, the total camp population is estimated by counting the population living in a limited number of square blocks of known surface area, and by extrapolating average population calculated per block to the total camp surface. In the six camps selected in Asia and Africa, between 1992 and 1994, population figures were estimated within one to two days. After measuring all external limits, surfaces were calculated and ranged between 121300 and 2770000 square meters. In five camps, the mean average population per square was obtained using blocks 25 by 25 meters (625m²), and for another camp with blocks 100 by 100m². In three camps, different population density zones were defined. Total camp populations obtained were 16800 to 113600. Although this method is a valuable public health tool in emergency situations, it has several limitations. Issues related to population density and number and size of blocks to be selected require further research for the method to be better validated (AU)