Awareness during general anaesthesia in the first 4,000 incidents reported to webAIRS.

The aim of this study was to analyse the incidents related to awareness during general anaesthesia in the first 4,000 cases reported to webAIRS-an anaesthetic incident reporting system established in Australia and New Zealand in 2009. Included incidents were those in which the reporter selected "neurological" as the main category and "awareness/dreaming/nightmares" as a subcategory, those where the narrative report included the word "awareness" and those identified by the authors as possibly relevant to awareness. Sixty-one awareness-related incidents were analysed: 16 were classified as "awareness", 31 were classified as "no awareness but increased risk of awareness" and 14 were classified as "no awareness and no increased risk of awareness". Among 47 incidents in the former two categories, 42 (89%) were associated with low anaesthetic delivery and 24 (51%) were associated with signs of intraoperative wakefulness. Memory of intraoperative events caused significant ongoing distress for five of the 16 awareness patients. Patients continue to be put at risk of awareness by a range of well-described errors (such as syringe swaps) but also by some new errors related to recently introduced anaesthetic equipment, such as electronic anaesthesia workstations.

Patient and procedural factors associated with an increased risk of harm or death in the first 4,000 incidents reported to webAIRS.

This report describes an analysis of patient and procedural factors associated with a higher proportion of harm or death versus no harm in the first 4,000 incidents reported to webAIRS. The report is supplementary to a previous cross-sectional report on the first 4,000 incidents reported to webAIRS. The aim of this analysis was to identify potential patient or procedural factors that are more common in incidents resulting in harm or death than in incidents with more benign outcomes. There was a >50% higher proportion of harm (versus no harm) for incidents in which the patient's body mass index (BMI) was <18.5 kg/m2, for incidents in post-anaesthesia care units and non-theatre procedural areas, and for incidents under the main category of cardiovascular or neurological. The proportion of incidents associated with death was also higher (risk ratio >1.5) for BMI <18.5 kg/m2, incidents in non-theatre procedural areas, and incidents under the main category of cardiovascular or neurological. In addition, the proportion of incidents associated with death was higher for incidents in which the patient's age was >80 years, the American Society of Anesthesiologists physical status was 4 or 5, incidents involving non-elective procedures, and incidents occurring after hours (1800 to 0800 hours). When faced with incidents with these potential risk factors, anaesthetists should consider earlier interventions and request assistance at an earlier stage. Educational strategies on incident prevention and management should place even further emphasis on scenarios involving these factors.

Bow-tie diagrams for risk management in anaesthesia.

Bow-tie analysis is a risk analysis and management tool that has been readily adopted into routine practice in many high reliability industries such as engineering, aviation and emergency services. However, it has received little exposure so far in healthcare. Nevertheless, its simplicity, versatility, and pictorial display may have benefits for the analysis of a range of healthcare risks, including complex and multiple risks and their interactions. Bow-tie diagrams are a combination of a fault tree and an event tree, which when combined take the shape of a bow tie. Central to bow-tie methodology is the concept of an undesired or 'Top Event', which occurs if a hazard progresses past all prevention controls. Top Events may also occasionally occur idiosyncratically. Irrespective of the cause of a Top Event, mitigation and recovery controls may influence the outcome. Hence the relationship of hazard to outcome can be viewed in one diagram along with possible causal sequences or accident trajectories. Potential uses for bow-tie diagrams in anaesthesia risk management include improved understanding of anaesthesia hazards and risks, pre-emptive identification of absent or inadequate hazard controls, investigation of clinical incidents, teaching anaesthesia risk management, and demonstrating risk management strategies to third parties when required.