Mood fluctuations shift cost-benefit tradeoffs in economic decisions.

Mood effects on economic choice seem blatantly irrational, but might rise from mechanisms adapted to natural environments. We have proposed a theory in which mood helps adapting the behaviour to statistical dependencies in the environment, by biasing the expected value of foraging actions (which involve taking risk, spending time and making effort to get more reward). Here, we tested the existence of this mechanism, using an established mood induction paradigm combined with independent economic choices that opposed small but uncostly rewards to larger but costly rewards (involving either risk, delay or effort). To maximise the sensitivity to mood fluctuations, we developed an algorithm ensuring that choice options were continuously adjusted to subjective indifference points. In 102 participants tested twice, we found that during episodes of positive mood (relative to negative mood), choices were biased towards better rewarded but costly options, irrespective of the cost type. Computational modelling confirmed that the incidental mood effect was best explained by a bias added to the expected value of costly options, prior to decision making. This bias is therefore automatically applied even in artificial environments where it is not adaptive, allowing mood to spill over many sorts of decisions and generate irrational behaviours.

A single case neuroimaging study of tickertape synesthesia.

Reading acquisition is enabled by deep changes in the brain's visual system and language areas, and in the links subtending their collaboration. Disruption of those plastic processes commonly results in developmental dyslexia. However, atypical development of reading mechanisms may occasionally result in ticker-tape synesthesia (TTS), a condition described by Francis Galton in 1883 wherein individuals "see mentally in print every word that is uttered (…) as from a long imaginary strip of paper". While reading is the bottom-up translation of letters into speech, TTS may be viewed as its opposite, the top-down translation of speech into internally visualized letters. In a series of functional MRI experiments, we studied MK, a man with TTS. We showed that a set of left-hemispheric areas were more active in MK than in controls during the perception of normal than reversed speech, including frontoparietal areas involved in speech processing, and the Visual Word Form Area, an occipitotemporal region subtending orthography. Those areas were identical to those involved in reading, supporting the construal of TTS as upended reading. Using dynamic causal modeling, we further showed that, parallel to reading, TTS induced by spoken words and pseudowords relied on top-down flow of information along distinct lexical and phonological routes, involving the middle temporal and supramarginal gyri, respectively. Future studies of TTS should shed new light on the neurodevelopmental mechanisms of reading acquisition, their variability and their disorders.

Learning rules of engagement for social exchange within and between groups.

Globalizing economies and long-distance trade rely on individuals from different cultural groups to negotiate agreement on what to give and take. In such settings, individuals often lack insight into what interaction partners deem fair and appropriate, potentially seeding misunderstandings, frustration, and conflict. Here, we examine how individuals decipher distinct rules of engagement and adapt their behavior to reach agreements with partners from other cultural groups. Modeling individuals as Bayesian learners with inequality aversion reveals that individuals, in repeated ultimatum bargaining with responders sampled from different groups, can be more generous than needed. While this allows them to reach agreements, it also gives rise to biased beliefs about what is required to reach agreement with members from distinct groups. Preregistered behavioral (N = 420) and neuroimaging experiments (N = 49) support model predictions: Seeking equitable agreements can lead to overly generous behavior toward partners from different groups alongside incorrect beliefs about prevailing norms of what is appropriate in groups and cultures other than one's own.

Evidence or Confidence: What Is Really Monitored during a Decision?

Assessing our confidence in the choices we make is important to making adaptive decisions, and it is thus no surprise that we excel in this ability. However, standard models of decision-making, such as the drift-diffusion model (DDM), treat confidence assessment as a post hoc or parallel process that does not directly influence the choice, which depends only on accumulated evidence. Here, we pursue the alternative hypothesis that what is monitored during a decision is an evolving sense of confidence (that the to-be-selected option is the best) rather than raw evidence. Monitoring confidence has the appealing consequence that the decision threshold corresponds to a desired level of confidence for the choice, and that confidence improvements can be traded off against the resources required to secure them. We show that most previous findings on perceptual and value-based decisions traditionally interpreted from an evidence-accumulation perspective can be explained more parsimoniously from our novel confidence-driven perspective. Furthermore, we show that our novel confidence-driven DDM (cDDM) naturally generalizes to decisions involving any number of alternative options - which is notoriously not the case with traditional DDM or related models. Finally, we discuss future empirical evidence that could be useful in adjudicating between these alternatives.

Origins and consequences of mood flexibility: a computational perspective.

A stable and neutral mood (euthymia) is commended by both economic and clinical perspectives, because it enables rational decisions and avoids mental illnesses. Here we suggest, on the contrary, that a flexible mood responsive to life events may be more adaptive for natural selection, because it can help adjust the behavior to fluctuations in the environment. In our model (dubbed MAGNETO), mood represents a global expected value that biases decisions to forage for a particular reward. When flexible, mood is updated every time an action is taken, by aggregating incurred costs and obtained rewards. Model simulations show that, across a large range of parameters, flexible agents outperform cold agents (with stable neutral mood), particularly when rewards and costs are correlated in time, as naturally occurring across seasons. However, with more extreme parameters, simulations generate short manic episodes marked by incessant foraging and lasting depressive episodes marked by persistent inaction. The MAGNETO model therefore accounts for both the function of mood fluctuations and the emergence of mood disorders.

Effort avoidance as a core mechanism of apathy in frontotemporal dementia.

Apathy is a core symptom in patients with behavioural variant frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD). It is defined by the observable reduction in goal-directed behaviour, but the underlying mechanisms are poorly understood. According to decision theory, engagement in goal-directed behaviour depends on a cost-benefit optimization trading off the estimated effort (related to the behaviour) against the expected reward (related to the goal). In this framework, apathy would thus result from either a decreased appetence for reward, or from an increased aversion to effort. Here, we phenotyped the motivational state of 21 patients with bvFTD and 40 matched healthy controls using computational analyses of behavioural responses in a comprehensive series of behavioural tasks, involving both expression of preference (comparing reward value and effort cost) and optimization of performance (adjusting effort production to the reward at stake). The primary finding was an elevated aversion to effort, consistent across preference and performance tasks in patients with bvFTD compared to controls. Within the bvFTD group, effort avoidance was correlated to cortical atrophy in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex and to apathy score measured on a clinical scale. Thus, our results highlight elevated effort aversion (not reduced reward appetence) as a core dysfunction that might generate apathy in patients with bvFTD. More broadly, they provide novel behavioural tests and computational tools to identify the dysfunctional mechanisms producing motivation deficits in patients with brain damage.

Elevated Effort Cost Identified by Computational Modeling as a Distinctive Feature Explaining Multiple Behaviors in Patients With Depression.

BACKGROUND: Motivational deficit is a core clinical manifestation of depression and a strong predictor of treatment failure. However, the underlying mechanisms, which cannot be accessed through conventional questionnaire-based scoring, remain largely unknown. According to decision theory, apathy could result either from biased subjective estimates (of action costs or outcomes) or from dysfunctional processes (in making decisions or allocating resources). METHODS: Here, we combined a series of behavioral tasks with computational modeling to elucidate the motivational deficits of 35 patients with unipolar or bipolar depression under various treatments compared with 35 matched healthy control subjects. RESULTS: The most striking feature, which was observed independent of medication across preference tasks (likeability ratings and binary decisions), performance tasks (physical and mental effort exertion), and instrumental learning tasks (updating choices to maximize outcomes), was an elevated sensitivity to effort cost. By contrast, sensitivity to action outcomes (reward and punishment) and task-specific processes were relatively spared. CONCLUSIONS: These results highlight effort cost as a critical dimension that might explain multiple behavioral changes in patients with depression. More generally, they validate a test battery for computational phenotyping of motivational states, which could orientate toward specific medication or rehabilitation therapy, and thereby help pave the way for more personalized medicine in psychiatry.

Dissecting functional contributions of the social brain to strategic behavior.

Social interactions routinely lead to neural activity in a "social brain network" comprising, among other regions, the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) and the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC). But what is the function of these areas? Are they specialized for behavior in social contexts or do they implement computations required for dealing with any reactive process, even non-living entities? Here, we use fMRI and a game paradigm separating the need for these two aspects of cognition. We find that most social-brain areas respond to both social and non-social reactivity rather than just to human opponents. However, the TPJ shows a dissociation from the dmPFC: its activity and connectivity primarily reflect context-dependent outcome processing and reactivity detection, while dmPFC engagement is linked to implementation of a behavioral strategy. Our results characterize an overarching computational property of the social brain but also suggest specialized roles for subregions of this network.

Bridging across functional models: The OFC as a value-making neural network.

Many functions have been attributed to the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC)-some classical roles, such as signaling the value of action outcomes, being challenged by more recent ones, such as signaling the position of a trial within a task space. In this paper, we propose a unifying neural network architecture, whose function is to generate a value from a set of attributes attached to a particular object. Our model reverses the logic of perceptual choice models, by considering values as outputs of (and not inputs to) the neural network. In doing so, the model explains why univariate value signals have been observed in both likeability rating and economic choice tasks, while the features associated with a particular task trial can be decoded using multivariate analysis. Moreover, simulations show that a globally positive correlation with subjective value at the population level can coexist with a variety of correlation coefficients at the single-unit level, bridging typical observations made in human neuroimaging and monkey electrophysiology studies of OFC activity. To better explain binary choice, we equipped the neural network with recurrent feedback connections that enable simultaneous coding of values associated with currently attended and previously considered objects. Simulations of this augmented model show that virtual lesions produce systematically intransitive preferences, as observed in patients with damage to the OFC. Thus, our neural network model is sufficiently general and flexible to account for a core set of observations and make specific predictions about both OFC activity during value judgment and behavioral consequence of OFC damage. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Trading mental effort for confidence in the metacognitive control of value-based decision-making.

Why do we sometimes opt for actions or items that we do not value the most? Under current neurocomputational theories, such preference reversals are typically interpreted in terms of errors that arise from the unreliable signaling of value to brain decision systems. But, an alternative explanation is that people may change their mind because they are reassessing the value of alternative options while pondering the decision. So, why do we carefully ponder some decisions, but not others? In this work, we derive a computational model of the metacognitive control of decisions or MCD. In brief, we assume that fast and automatic processes first provide initial (and largely uncertain) representations of options' values, yielding prior estimates of decision difficulty. These uncertain value representations are then refined by deploying cognitive (e.g., attentional, mnesic) resources, the allocation of which is controlled by an effort-confidence tradeoff. Importantly, the anticipated benefit of allocating resources varies in a decision-by-decision manner according to the prior estimate of decision difficulty. The ensuing MCD model predicts response time, subjective feeling of effort, choice confidence, changes of mind, as well as choice-induced preference change and certainty gain. We test these predictions in a systematic manner, using a dedicated behavioral paradigm. Our results provide a quantitative link between mental effort, choice confidence, and preference reversals, which could inform interpretations of related neuroimaging findings.

Effective immunity and second waves: a dynamic causal modelling study.

This technical report addresses a pressing issue in the trajectory of the coronavirus outbreak; namely, the rate at which effective immunity is lost following the first wave of the pandemic. This is a crucial epidemiological parameter that speaks to both the consequences of relaxing lockdown and the propensity for a second wave of infections. Using a dynamic causal model of reported cases and deaths from multiple countries, we evaluated the evidence models of progressively longer periods of immunity. The results speak to an effective population immunity of about three months that, under the model, defers any second wave for approximately six months in most countries. This may have implications for the window of opportunity for tracking and tracing, as well as for developing vaccination programmes, and other therapeutic interventions.

Dynamic causal modelling of COVID-19.

This technical report describes a dynamic causal model of the spread of coronavirus through a population. The model is based upon ensemble or population dynamics that generate outcomes, like new cases and deaths over time. The purpose of this model is to quantify the uncertainty that attends predictions of relevant outcomes. By assuming suitable conditional dependencies, one can model the effects of interventions (e.g., social distancing) and differences among populations (e.g., herd immunity) to predict what might happen in different circumstances. Technically, this model leverages state-of-the-art variational (Bayesian) model inversion and comparison procedures, originally developed to characterise the responses of neuronal ensembles to perturbations. Here, this modelling is applied to epidemiological populations-to illustrate the kind of inferences that are supported and how the model per se can be optimised given timeseries data. Although the purpose of this paper is to describe a modelling protocol, the results illustrate some interesting perspectives on the current pandemic; for example, the nonlinear effects of herd immunity that speak to a self-organised mitigation process.

Choosing what we like vs liking what we choose: How choice-induced preference change might actually be instrumental to decision-making.

For more than 60 years, it has been known that people report higher (lower) subjective values for items after having selected (rejected) them during a choice task. This phenomenon is coined "choice-induced preference change" or CIPC, and its established interpretation is that of "cognitive dissonance" theory. In brief, if people feel uneasy about their choice, they later convince themselves, albeit not always consciously, that the chosen (rejected) item was actually better (worse) than they had originally estimated. While this might make sense from an intuitive psychological standpoint, it is challenging from a theoretical evolutionary perspective. This is because such a cognitive mechanism might yield irrational biases, whose adaptive fitness would be unclear. In this work, we consider an alternative possibility, namely that CIPC is -at least partially- due to the refinement of option value representations that occurs while people are pondering about choice options. For example, contemplating competing possibilities during a choice may highlight aspects of the alternative options that were not considered before. In the context of difficult decisions, this would enable people to reassess option values until they reach a satisfactory level of confidence. This makes CIPC the epiphenomenal outcome of a cognitive process that is instrumental to the decision. Critically, our hypothesis implies novel predictions about how observed CIPC should relate to two specific meta-cognitive processes, namely: choice confidence and subjective certainty regarding pre-choice value judgments. We test these predictions in a behavioral experiment where participants rate the subjective value of food items both before and after choosing between equally valued items; we augment this traditional design with both reports of choice confidence and subjective certainty about value judgments. The results confirm our predictions and provide evidence that many quantitative features of CIPC (in particular: its relationship with metacognitive judgments) may be explained without ever invoking post-choice cognitive dissonance reduction explanation. We then discuss the relevance of our work in the context of the existing debate regarding the putative cognitive mechanisms underlying CIPC.

Social behavioural adaptation in Autism.

Autism is still diagnosed on the basis of subjective assessments of elusive notions such as interpersonal contact and social reciprocity. We propose to decompose reciprocal social interactions in their basic computational constituents. Specifically, we test the assumption that autistic individuals disregard information regarding the stakes of social interactions when adapting to others. We compared 24 adult autistic participants to 24 neurotypical (NT) participants engaging in a repeated dyadic competitive game against artificial agents with calibrated reciprocal adaptation capabilities. Critically, participants were framed to believe either that they were competing against somebody else or that they were playing a gambling game. Only the NT participants did alter their adaptation strategy when they held information regarding others' competitive incentives, in which case they outperformed the AS group. Computational analyses of trial-by-trial choice sequences show that the behavioural repertoire of autistic people exhibits subnormal flexibility and mentalizing sophistication, especially when information regarding opponents' incentives was available. These two computational phenotypes yield 79% diagnosis classification accuracy and explain 62% of the severity of social symptoms in autistic participants. Such computational decomposition of the autistic social phenotype may prove relevant for drawing novel diagnostic boundaries and guiding individualized clinical interventions in autism.

Second waves, social distancing, and the spread of COVID-19 across the USA.

We recently described a dynamic causal model of a COVID-19 outbreak within a single region. Here, we combine several of these (epidemic) models to create a (pandemic) model of viral spread among regions. Our focus is on a second wave of new cases that may result from loss of immunity-and the exchange of people between regions-and how mortality rates can be ameliorated under different strategic responses. In particular, we consider hard or soft social distancing strategies predicated on national (Federal) or regional (State) estimates of the prevalence of infection in the population. The modelling is demonstrated using timeseries of new cases and deaths from the United States to estimate the parameters of a factorial (compartmental) epidemiological model of each State and, crucially, coupling between States. Using Bayesian model reduction, we identify the effective connectivity between States that best explains the initial phases of the outbreak in the United States. Using the ensuing posterior parameter estimates, we then evaluate the likely outcomes of different policies in terms of mortality, working days lost due to lockdown and demands upon critical care. The provisional results of this modelling suggest that social distancing and loss of immunity are the two key factors that underwrite a return to endemic equilibrium.

Assessing inter-individual differences with task-related functional neuroimaging.

Explaining and predicting individual behavioural differences induced by clinical and social factors constitutes one of the most promising applications of neuroimaging. In this Perspective, we discuss the theoretical and statistical foundations of the analyses of inter-individual differences in task-related functional neuroimaging. Leveraging a five-year literature review (July 2013-2018), we show that researchers often assess how activations elicited by a variable of interest differ between individuals. We argue that the rationale for such analyses, typically grounded in resource theory, offers an over-large analytical and interpretational flexibility that undermines their validity. We also recall how, in the established framework of the general linear model, inter-individual differences in behaviour can act as hidden moderators and spuriously induce differences in activations. We conclude with a set of recommendations and directions, which we hope will contribute to improving the statistical validity and the neurobiological interpretability of inter-individual difference analyses in task-related functional neuroimaging.

Sour grapes and sweet victories: How actions shape preferences.

Classical decision theory postulates that choices proceed from subjective values assigned to the probable outcomes of alternative actions. Some authors have argued that opposite causality should also be envisaged, with choices influencing subsequent values expressed in desirability ratings. The idea is that agents may increase their ratings of items that they have chosen in the first place, which has been typically explained by the need to reduce cognitive dissonance. However, evidence in favor of this reverse causality has been the topic of intense debates that have not reached consensus so far. Here, we take a novel approach using Bayesian techniques to compare models in which choices arise from stable (but noisy) underlying values (one-way causality) versus models in which values are in turn influenced by choices (two-way causality). Moreover, we examined whether in addition to choices, other components of previous actions, such as the effort invested and the eventual action outcome (success or failure), could also impact subsequent values. Finally, we assessed whether the putative changes in values were only expressed in explicit ratings, or whether they would also affect other value-related behaviors such as subsequent choices. Behavioral data were obtained from healthy participants in a rating-choice-rating-choice-rating paradigm, where the choice task involves deciding whether or not to exert a given physical effort to obtain a particular food item. Bayesian selection favored two-way causality models, where changes in value due to previous actions affected subsequent ratings, choices and action outcomes. Altogether, these findings may help explain how values and actions drift when several decisions are made successively, hence highlighting some shortcomings of classical decision theory.

Why not try harder? Computational approach to motivation deficits in neuro-psychiatric diseases.

Motivation deficits, such as apathy, are pervasive in both neurological and psychiatric diseases. Even when they are not the core symptom, they reduce quality of life, compromise functional outcome and increase the burden for caregivers. They are currently assessed with clinical scales that do not give any mechanistic insight susceptible to guide therapeutic intervention. Here, we present another approach that consists of phenotyping the behaviour of patients in motivation tests, using computational models. These formal models impose a precise and operational definition of motivation that is embedded in decision theory. Motivation can be defined as the function that orients and activates the behaviour according to two attributes: a content (the goal) and a quantity (the goal value). Decision theory offers a way to quantify motivation, as the cost that patients would accept to endure in order to get the benefit of achieving their goal. We then review basic and clinical studies that have investigated the trade-off between the expected cost entailed by potential actions and the expected benefit associated with potential rewards. These studies have shown that the trade-off between effort and reward involves specific cortical, subcortical and neuromodulatory systems, such that it may be shifted in particular clinical conditions, and reinstated by appropriate treatments. Finally, we emphasize the promises of computational phenotyping for clinical purposes. Ideally, there would be a one-to-one mapping between specific neural components and distinct computational variables and processes of the decision model. Thus, fitting computational models to patients' behaviour would allow inferring of the dysfunctional mechanism in both cognitive terms (e.g. hyposensitivity to reward) and neural terms (e.g. lack of dopamine). This computational approach may therefore not only give insight into the motivation deficit but also help personalize treatment.

Reading wild minds: A computational assay of Theory of Mind sophistication across seven primate species.

Theory of Mind (ToM), i.e. the ability to understand others' mental states, endows humans with highly adaptive social skills such as teaching or deceiving. Candidate evolutionary explanations have been proposed for the unique sophistication of human ToM among primates. For example, the Machiavellian intelligence hypothesis states that the increasing complexity of social networks may have induced a demand for sophisticated ToM. This type of scenario ignores neurocognitive constraints that may eventually be crucial limiting factors for ToM evolution. In contradistinction, the cognitive scaffolding hypothesis asserts that a species' opportunity to develop sophisticated ToM is mostly determined by its general cognitive capacity (on which ToM is scaffolded). However, the actual relationships between ToM sophistication and either brain volume (a proxy for general cognitive capacity) or social group size (a proxy for social network complexity) are unclear. Here, we let 39 individuals sampled from seven non-human primate species (lemurs, macaques, mangabeys, orangutans, gorillas and chimpanzees) engage in simple dyadic games against artificial ToM players (via a familiar human caregiver). Using computational analyses of primates' choice sequences, we found that the probability of exhibiting a ToM-compatible learning style is mainly driven by species' brain volume (rather than by social group size). Moreover, primates' social cognitive sophistication culminates in a precursor form of ToM, which still falls short of human fully-developed ToM abilities.