The Privileges We Do and Do Not See: The Relative Salience of Interpersonal and Circumstantial Benefits.

People attend more to disadvantages in their lives than to advantages, a phenomenon known as the Headwinds/Tailwinds Asymmetry. In seven studies (N = 1,526), we present an important caveat to this pattern: When people do notice and acknowledge their advantages, they mostly focus on the benefits they receive from other people (i.e., interpersonal benefits), as opposed to benefits they receive because of their demographics, personal traits, and life circumstances (i.e., circumstantial benefits). We demonstrate that people notice and remember others who helped them rather than hurt them and that they notice the help they receive from people more than from favorable, non-interpersonal factors. Finally, we find that the tendency to notice interpersonal advantages is related to a social norm requiring people to acknowledge helpful others (but not other advantages) and that changing the salience of this norm affects people's likelihood of acknowledging the support they have received from others.

Economic Inequality Fosters the Belief That Success Is Zero-Sum.

Ten studies (N = 3,628; including five pre-registered), using correlational and experimental methods and employing various measures and manipulations, reveal that perceived economic inequality fosters zero-sum beliefs about economic success-the belief that one person's gains are inevitably offset by others' losses. As the gap between the rich and the poor expands, American participants increasingly believed that one can only get richer at others' expense. Moreover, perceptions of economic inequality fostered zero-sum beliefs even when the distribution of resources was not strictly zero-sum and did so beyond the effect of various demographics variables (household income, education, subjective socioeconomic status) and individual differences (political ideology, social dominance orientation, interpersonal trust). Finally, I find that zero-sum beliefs account for the effect of inequality on people's view of the world as unjust. The article concludes with a discussion of the theoretical and practical implications of zero-sum beliefs about economic success.

The "hearts-and-minds frame": Not all i-frame interventions are ineffective, but education-based interventions can be particularly bad.

Pitting i-frame policies against s-frame policies inadvertently propagates a false dichotomy that fails to distinguish between effective i-frame policies that directly change behaviors and ineffective education-based i-frame policies that try to change people's hearts and minds. We argue that people's fixation on changing hearts and minds may be an obstacle for behavioral science in policy.

Is status a zero-sum game? Zero-sum beliefs increase people's preference for dominance but not prestige.

Why do people often pursue social rank using coercive and potentially costly dominance-oriented strategies (grounded in fear and intimidation) rather than noncoercive prestige-oriented strategies (grounded in respect and admiration)? In 10 studies (N = 3,372, including a high-powered preregistered replication), we propose that people's beliefs about the nature of social hierarchies shape their preference for dominance strategies. Specifically, we find that zero-sum beliefs about social hierarchies-beliefs that one person's rise in social rank inevitably comes at others' expense-drive the preference for dominance-oriented, but not prestige-oriented, approaches to status. The more participants viewed social hierarchies as zero-sum, the more they were willing to use dominance tactics and the more interested they were in reading books about how to use such tactics. Moreover, we find evidence that zero-sum beliefs about social hierarchies causally increase the preference for dominance-oriented, but not prestige-oriented, strategies for gaining rank, and that both objective factors in the organizational environment and people's subjective interpretations of these environments can trigger this effect. We discuss implications for the intragroup and intergroup dynamics of attaining and retaining high social rank. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

The fear of conflict leads people to systematically avoid potentially valuable zero-sum situations.

From interpersonal interactions to international arms races, game theorists and social scientists have long studied decision-making in zero-sum situations. Yet, what happens when people can freely choose whether to enter zero-sum situations in the first place? Thirteen studies (including five pre-registered) consistently document evidence for zero-sum aversion-the desire to avoid situations that are (or are believed to be) zero-sum. Across different contexts (economic games, market entry decisions, performance reviews, negotiations, job applications), samples (online participant pool, MBA students, community sample), and designs (within- and between-participant, real and hypothetical decisions), people avoid zero-sum situations that inversely link their and others' outcomes as well as refrain from putting others in such situations. Because people fear that zero-sum situations will be rife with conflict, they exhibit zero-sum aversion even when doing so is costly. Finally, we find that people require zero-sum situations to provide substantially higher payoffs (e.g., compensation) to overcome their zero-sum aversion. We conclude with a discussion of the implications for interpersonal and intergroup conflict.

"Do not teach them how to fish": The effect of zero-sum beliefs on help giving.

How do zero-sum beliefs-the beliefs that one person's success is inevitably balanced by others' failure -affect people's willingness to help their peers and colleagues? In nine studies (and 2 supplementary studies, N = 2,324), we find consistent evidence for the relationship between the belief that success is zero-sum and help giving preferences. Across various hypothetical scenarios and actual help giving decisions, and even when the effort required for helping was minimal, zero-sum beliefs negatively predicted participants' willingness to help their colleagues learn how to succeed on their own (i.e., autonomy-oriented help). In contrast, the belief that success can only be achieved at others' expense did not affect participants' willingness to offer the kind of help that would completely solve their colleagues' problems for them (i.e., dependency-oriented help). Moreover, we find that the effect of zero-sum beliefs on the reluctance to give autonomy-oriented help is mediated by concerns about losing one's status to the recipient, and that removing these concerns about status loss mitigates the negative effect of zero-sum beliefs on help giving. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of this robust yet nuanced link between the belief that success is zero-sum and prosocial helping behaviors. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Psychological Science in the Wake of COVID-19: Social, Methodological, and Metascientific Considerations.

The COVID-19 pandemic has extensively changed the state of psychological science from what research questions psychologists can ask to which methodologies psychologists can use to investigate them. In this article, we offer a perspective on how to optimize new research in the pandemic's wake. Because this pandemic is inherently a social phenomenon-an event that hinges on human-to-human contact-we focus on socially relevant subfields of psychology. We highlight specific psychological phenomena that have likely shifted as a result of the pandemic and discuss theoretical, methodological, and practical considerations of conducting research on these phenomena. After this discussion, we evaluate metascientific issues that have been amplified by the pandemic. We aim to demonstrate how theoretically grounded views on the COVID-19 pandemic can help make psychological science stronger-not weaker-in its wake.

How do people make sense of wealth and poverty?

Economic outcomes reflect an intricate mixture of people's internal dispositions and external circumstances that are beyond their control. How, then, do people make sense of wealth and poverty? I suggest that attributions of economic outcomes are susceptible to various influences that can be grouped into two broad categories-who people are (i.e. personal influences) and what people see in the world (i.e. societal influences). Personal influences include people's ideological leanings and worldviews, socioeconomic standing, and experiences of economic success or failure. Societal influences include macroeconomic circumstances, cultural narratives, structural prejudices, and salient consumption behaviors by the rich and the poor. I discuss how these influences shape (and distort) attributions of economic outcomes and lay beliefs about wealth and poverty.

Americans Misperceive Racial Disparities in Economic Mobility.

What do people know about racial disparities in "The American Dream"? Across six studies (N = 1,761), we find that American participants consistently underestimate the Black-White disparity in economic mobility, believing that poor Black Americans are significantly more likely to move up the economic ladder than they actually are. We find that misperceptions about economic mobility are common among both White and Black respondents, and that this undue optimism about the prospect of mobility for Black Americans results from a narrow focus on the progress toward equality that has already been made. Consequently, making economic racial disparities salient, or merely reflecting on the unique hardships that Black Americans face in the United States, calibrates beliefs about economic mobility. We discuss the importance of these findings for understanding lay beliefs about the socioeconomic system, the denial of systemic racism in society, and support for policies aimed at reducing racial economic disparities.

The psychology of asymmetric zero-sum beliefs.

Zero-sum beliefs reflect the perception that one party's gains are necessarily offset by another party's losses. Although zero-sum relationships are, from a strictly theoretical perspective, symmetrical, we find evidence for asymmetrical zero-sum beliefs: The belief that others gain at one's own expense, but not vice versa. Across various contexts (international relations, interpersonal negotiations, political partisanship, organizational hierarchies) and research designs (within- and between-participant), we find that people are more prone to believe that others' success comes at their own expense than they are to believe that their own success comes at others' expense. Moreover, we find that people exhibit asymmetric zero-sum beliefs only when thinking about how their own party relates to other parties but not when thinking about how other parties relate to each other. Finally, we find that this effect is moderated by how threatened people feel by others' success and that reassuring people about their party's strengths eliminates asymmetric zero-sum beliefs. We discuss the theoretical contributions of our findings to research on interpersonal and intergroup zero-sum beliefs and their implications for understanding when and why people view life as zero-sum. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Personal relative deprivation and the belief that economic success is zero-sum.

Why do people view economic success as zero-sum? In seven studies (including a large, nationally representative sample of more than 90,000 respondents from 60 countries), we explore how personal relative deprivation influences zero-sum thinking-the belief that one person's gains can only be obtained at other people's expense. We find that personal relative deprivation fosters a belief that economic success is zero-sum, and that this is true regardless of participants' household income, political ideology, or subjective social class. Moreover, in a large and preregistered study, we find that the effect of personal relative deprivation on zero-sum thinking is mediated by lay perceptions of society. The more people see themselves as having been unfairly disadvantaged relative to others, the more they view the world as unjust and economic success as determined by external forces beyond one's control. In turn, these cynical views of society lead people to believe that economic success is zero-sum. We discuss the implications of these findings for research on social comparisons, the distribution of resources, and the psychological consequences of feeling personally deprived. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Benevolent Conformity: The Influence of Perceived Motives on Judgments of Conformity.

Although people often disapprove of conformity, they also dislike when others deviate from group norms. What explains this ambivalence? We hypothesized that judgments of conformity would be affected by whether people view it as motivated by self-interested or benevolent motives. Four studies (N = 808), using both hypothetical and real-life instances of conformity, support this prediction. We find that people judge those who conform to gain social approval (self-interested conformity) as weak-willed, but those who conform out of concern for their group (benevolent conformity) as competent and possessing strong character. In addition, we predict and find that people view self-interested conformity as "fake" but benevolent conformity as revealing one's true self. Finally, we show that differences in perceived intentions explain how people sustain positive self-regard while succumbing to group pressures and why people judge their own conformity more favorably than others' conformity. We discuss implications for encouraging and discouraging conformity.

The second pugilist's plight: Why people believe they are above average but are not especially happy about it.

People's tendency to rate themselves as above average is often taken as evidence of undue self-regard. Yet, everyday experience is occasioned with feelings of inadequacy and insecurity. How can these 2 experiences be reconciled? Across 12 studies (N = 2,474; including 4 preregistered studies) we argue that although people do indeed believe that they are above average they also hold themselves to standards of comparison that are well above average. Across a host of domains, we find that people's typical standards of comparison are significantly above the level of the "average" person (Studies 1A, 1B, 2A, and 3). We further show that people's tendency to measure themselves against above-average others is due to the increased mental availability of such high-performing standards of comparison (Studies 4A and 4B). Finally, we present evidence that this is not simply the result of self-enhancement by showing that people measure themselves against above-average others even when they feel subjectively inadequate (Study 5A), receive objective information about their poor performance (Study 5B), or evaluate themselves on domains in which they chronically underperform (Study 5C). Even in domains where being above average is undesirable (e.g., rudeness), people bring to mind and compare themselves with above average targets (Studies 2B and 2C). We discuss the implications for self-enhancement research and the importance of examining who people compare themselves to in addition to how people believe they compare with others. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

The politics of zero-sum thinking: The relationship between political ideology and the belief that life is a zero-sum game.

The tendency to see life as zero-sum exacerbates political conflicts. Six studies (N = 3223) examine the relationship between political ideology and zero-sum thinking: the belief that one party's gains can only be obtained at the expense of another party's losses. We find that both liberals and conservatives view life as zero-sum when it benefits them to do so. Whereas conservatives exhibit zero-sum thinking when the status quo is challenged, liberals do so when the status quo is being upheld. Consequently, conservatives view social inequalities-where the status quo is frequently challenged-as zero-sum, but liberals view economic inequalities-where the status quo has remained relatively unchallenged in past decades-as such. Overall, these findings suggest potentially important ideological differences in perceptions of conflict-differences that are likely to have implications for understanding political divides in the United States and the difficulty of reaching bipartisan legislation.

The ideal road not taken: The self-discrepancies involved in people's most enduring regrets.

Research on the structural features of people's most enduring regrets has focused on whether they result from having acted or having failed to act. Here we focus on a different structural feature, their connection to a person's self-concept. In 6 studies, we predict and find that people's most enduring regrets stem more often from discrepancies between their actual and ideal selves than their actual and ought selves. We also provide evidence that this asymmetry is at least partly due to differences in how people cope with regret. People are quicker to take steps to cope with failures to live up to their duties and responsibilities (ought-related regrets) than their failures to live up to their goals and aspirations (ideal-related regrets). As a consequence, ideal-related regrets are more likely to remain unresolved, leaving people more likely to regret not being all they could have been more than all they should have been. (PsycINFO Database Record

Home alone: Why people believe others' social lives are richer than their own.

Although decades of research show that people tend to see themselves in the best possible light, we present evidence that people have a surprisingly grim outlook on their social lives. In 11 studies (N = 3,293; including 3 preregistered), we find that most people think that others lead richer and more active social lives than they do themselves. We show that this bias holds across multiple populations (college students, MTurk respondents, shoppers at a local mall, and participants from a large, income-stratified online panel), correlates strongly with well-being, and is particularly acute for social activities (e.g., the number of parties one attends or proximity to the "inner circle" of one's social sphere). We argue that this pessimistic bias stems from the fact that trendsetters and socialites come most easily to mind as a standard of comparison and show that reducing the availability of extremely social people eliminates this bias. We conclude by discussing implications for research on social comparison and self-enhancement. (PsycINFO Database Record

The headwinds/tailwinds asymmetry: An availability bias in assessments of barriers and blessings.

Seven studies provide evidence of an availability bias in people's assessments of the benefits they've enjoyed and the barriers they've faced. Barriers and hindrances command attention because they have to be overcome; benefits and resources can often be simply enjoyed and largely ignored. As a result of this "headwind/tailwind" asymmetry, Democrats and Republicans both claim that the electoral map works against them (Study 1), football fans take disproportionate note of the challenging games on their team's schedules (Study 2), people tend to believe that their parents have been harder on them than their siblings are willing to grant (Study 3), and academics think that they have a harder time with journal reviewers, grant panels, and tenure committees than members of other subdisciplines (Study 7). We show that these effects are the result of the enhanced availability of people's challenges and difficulties (Studies 4 and 5) and are not simply the result of self-serving attribution management (Studies 6 and 7). We also show that the greater salience of a person's headwinds can lead people to believe they have been treated unfairly and, as a consequence, more inclined to endorse morally questionable behavior (Study 7). Our discussion focuses on the implications of the headwind/tailwind asymmetry for a variety of ill-conceived policy decisions. (PsycINFO Database Record

Building a more mobile America--one income quintile at a time.

A core tenet of the American ethos is that there is considerable economic mobility. Americans seem willing to accept vast financial inequalities as long as they believe that everyone has the opportunity to succeed. We examined whether people's beliefs about the amount of economic mobility in the contemporary United States conform to reality. We found that (a) people believe there is more upward mobility than downward mobility; (b) people overestimate the amount of upward mobility and underestimate the amount of downward mobility; (c) poorer individuals believe there is more mobility than richer individuals; and (d) political affiliation influences perceptions of economic mobility, with conservatives believing that the economic system is more dynamic-with more people moving both up and down the income distribution-than liberals do. We discuss how these findings can shed light on the intensity and nature of political debate in the United States on economic inequality and opportunity.

The meaning of default options for potential organ donors.

Rates of participation in organ donation programs are known to be powerfully influenced by the relevant default policy in effect ("opt-in" vs. "opt-out"). Three studies provide evidence that this difference in participation may occur in part because the requirement to opt-in or opt-out results in large differences in the meaning that individuals attach to participation. American participants in Study 1 rated participation as a significantly more substantial action when agreement was purportedly obtained under opt-in rather than opt-out conditions, and nonagreement as a greater abrogation of responsibility when that decision was made under opt-out rather than under opt-in conditions. Study 2 replicated these findings with respondents who live in Germany, which employs an opt-in donation policy, and in Austria, which has an opt-out policy. Study 3 required American participants to rate various actions that differ in the effort and self-sacrifice they demand. As predicted, the placement of organ donation on the resulting multidimensional scaling dimension differed significantly depending on whether it purportedly was made in an opt-in country (where it was considered roughly akin to giving away half of one's wealth to charity upon one's death) or an opt-out country (where it fell between letting others get ahead of one in line and volunteering some time to help the poor). We discuss the relationship between this change of meaning account and two other mechanisms-behavioral inertia and implicit norms-that we believe underlie the default effect in decision making and other effects of policies designed to influence decision-makers.