Antigenic Characterization of Circulating and Emerging SARS-CoV-2 Variants in the U.S. throughout the Delta to Omicron Waves.

Severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) has evolved into numerous lineages with unique spike mutations and caused multiple epidemics domestically and globally. Although COVID-19 vaccines are available, new variants with the capacity for immune evasion continue to emerge. To understand and characterize the evolution of circulating SARS-CoV-2 variants in the U.S., the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) initiated the National SARS-CoV-2 Strain Surveillance (NS3) program and has received thousands of SARS-CoV-2 clinical specimens from across the nation as part of a genotype to phenotype characterization process. Focus reduction neutralization with various antisera was used to antigenically characterize 143 SARS-CoV-2 Delta, Mu and Omicron subvariants from selected clinical specimens received between May 2021 and February 2023, representing a total of 59 unique spike protein sequences. BA.4/5 subvariants BU.1, BQ.1.1, CR.1.1, CQ.2 and BA.4/5 + D420N + K444T; BA.2.75 subvariants BM.4.1.1, BA.2.75.2, CV.1; and recombinant Omicron variants XBF, XBB.1, XBB.1.5 showed the greatest escape from neutralizing antibodies when analyzed against post third-dose original monovalent vaccinee sera. Post fourth-dose bivalent vaccinee sera provided better protection against those subvariants, but substantial reductions in neutralization titers were still observed, especially among BA.4/5 subvariants with both an N-terminal domain (NTD) deletion and receptor binding domain (RBD) substitutions K444M + N460K and recombinant Omicron variants. This analysis demonstrated a framework for long-term systematic genotype to antigenic characterization of circulating and emerging SARS-CoV-2 variants in the U.S., which is critical to assessing their potential impact on the effectiveness of current vaccines and antigen recommendations for future updates.

Avian influenza A(H5) virus circulation in live bird markets in Vietnam, 2017-2022.

BACKGROUND: Highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5) human infections are a global concern, with many A(H5) human cases detected in Vietnam, including a case in October 2022. Using avian influenza virus surveillance from March 2017-September 2022, we described the percent of pooled samples that were positive for avian influenza A, A(H5), A(H5N1), A(H5N6), and A(H5N8) viruses in live bird markets (LBMs) in Vietnam. METHODS: Monthly at each LBM, 30 poultry oropharyngeal swab specimens and five environmental samples were collected. Samples were pooled in groups of five and tested for influenza A, A(H5), A(H5N1), A(H5N6), and A(H5N8) viruses by real-time reverse-transcription polymerase chain reaction. Trends in the percent of pooled samples that were positive for avian influenza were summarized by LBM characteristics and time and compared with the number of passively detected avian influenza outbreaks using Spearman's rank correlation. RESULTS: A total of 25,774 pooled samples were collected through active surveillance at 167 LBMs in 24 provinces; 36.9% of pooled samples were positive for influenza A, 3.6% A(H5), 1.9% A(H5N1), 1.1% A(H5N6), and 0.2% A(H5N8). Influenza A(H5) viruses were identified January-December and at least once in 91.7% of sampled provinces. In 246 A(H5) outbreaks in poultry; 20.3% were influenza A(H5N1), 60.2% A(H5N6), and 19.5% A(H5N8); outbreaks did not correlate with active surveillance. CONCLUSIONS: In Vietnam, influenza A(H5) viruses were detected by active surveillance in LBMs year-round and in most provinces sampled. In addition to outbreak reporting, active surveillance for A(H5) viruses in settings with high potential for animal-to-human spillover can provide situational awareness.

First human infection of avian influenza A(H5N6) virus reported in Lao People's Democratic Republic, February-March 2021.

In March 2021, Lao People's Democratic Republic (Laos) reported an avian influenza A(H5N6) virus infection in a 5-year-old child identified through sentinel surveillance. This was the first human A(H5N6) infection reported outside of China. A multidisciplinary investigation undertook contact tracing and enhanced human and animal surveillance in surrounding villages and live bird markets. Seven Muscovy ducks tested positive for highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N6) viruses. Sequenced viruses belonged to clade 2.3.4.4h and were closely related to viruses detected in poultry in Vietnam and to previous viruses detected in Laos. Surveillance and coordinated outbreak response remain essential to global health security.

Detection of oseltamivir-resistant zoonotic and animal influenza A viruses using the rapid influenza antiviral resistance test.

Mutations in the influenza virus neuraminidase (NA) that cause reduced susceptibility to the NA inhibitor (NAI) oseltamivir may occur naturally or following antiviral treatment. Currently, detection uses either a traditional NA inhibition assay or gene sequencing to identify known markers associated with reduced inhibition by oseltamivir. Both methods are laborious and require trained personnel. The influenza antiviral resistance test (iART), a prototype system developed by Becton, Dickinson and Company for research use only, offers a rapid and simple method to identify such viruses. This study investigated application of iART to influenza A viruses isolated from non-human hosts with a variety of NA subtypes (N1-N9).

Increased Number of Human Cases of Influenza Virus A(H5N1) Infection, Egypt, 2014-15.

During November 2014-April 2015, a total of 165 case-patients with influenza virus A(H5N1) infection, including 6 clusters and 51 deaths, were identified in Egypt. Among infected persons, 99% reported poultry exposure: 19% to ill poultry and 35% to dead poultry. Only 1 person reported wearing personal protective equipment while working with poultry.

Generation and Characterization of Live Attenuated Influenza A(H7N9) Candidate Vaccine Virus Based on Russian Donor of Attenuation.

BACKGROUND: Avian influenza A (H7N9) virus has emerged recently and continues to cause severe disease with a high mortality rate in humans prompting the development of candidate vaccine viruses. Live attenuated influenza vaccines (LAIV) are 6:2 reassortant viruses containing the HA and NA gene segments from wild type influenza viruses to induce protective immune responses and the six internal genes from Master Donor Viruses (MDV) to provide temperature sensitive, cold-adapted and attenuated phenotypes. METHODOLOGY/PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: LAIV candidate A/Anhui/1/2013(H7N9)-CDC-LV7A (abbreviated as CDC-LV7A), based on the Russian MDV, A/Leningrad/134/17/57 (H2N2), was generated by classical reassortment in eggs and retained MDV temperature-sensitive and cold-adapted phenotypes. CDC-LV7A had two amino acid substitutions N123D and N149D (H7 numbering) in HA and one substitution T10I in NA. To evaluate the role of these mutations on the replication capacity of the reassortants in eggs, the recombinant viruses A(H7N9)RG-LV1 and A(H7N9)RG-LV2 were generated by reverse genetics. These changes did not alter virus antigenicity as ferret antiserum to CDC-LV7A vaccine candidate inhibited hemagglutination by homologous A(H7N9) virus efficiently. Safety studies in ferrets confirmed that CDC-LV7A was attenuated compared to wild-type A/Anhui/1/2013. In addition, the genetic stability of this vaccine candidate was examined in eggs and ferrets by monitoring sequence changes acquired during virus replication in the two host models. No changes in the viral genome were detected after five passages in eggs. However, after ten passages additional mutations were detected in the HA gene. The vaccine candidate was shown to be stable in the ferret model; post-vaccination sequence data analysis showed no changes in viruses collected in nasal washes present at day 5 or day 7. CONCLUSIONS/SIGNIFICANCE: Our data indicate that the A/Anhui/1/2013(H7N9)-CDC-LV7A reassortant virus is a safe and genetically stable candidate vaccine virus that is now available for distribution by WHO to vaccine manufacturers.