Meta-empirical confirmation: Addressing three points of criticism.

I respond to three points of criticism that have been raised against the concept of meta-empirical confirmation. I argue that meta-empirical confirmation can be set up in a coherent way and is sufficiently discriminating for rendering it a non-trivial indicator of a theory's viability. Moreover, I argue that acknowledging the significance of meta-empirical confirmation provides an argument for the pursuit of alternative research programs rather than for their suppression.

The role of meta-empirical theory assessment in the acceptance of atomism.

The universal acceptance of atomism in physics and chemistry in the early 20th century went along with an altered view on the epistemic status of microphysical conjectures. Contrary to the prevalent understanding during the 19th century, on the new view unobservable objects could be 'discovered'. It is argued in the present paper that this shift can be connected to the implicit integration of elements of meta-empirical theory assessment into the concept of theory confirmation.