Implementing Joint External Evaluations of the International Health Regulations (2005) capacities in all countries in the WHO African region: process challenges, lessons learnt and perspectives for the future.

Following the West Africa Ebola virus disease outbreak (2013-2016), the Joint External Evaluation (JEE) is one of the three voluntary components recommended by the WHO for evaluating the International Health Regulations (2005) capacities in countries. Here, we share experience implementing JEEs in all 47 countries in the WHO African region. In February 2016, the United Republic of Tanzania (Mainland) was the first country globally to conduct a JEE. By April 2022, JEEs had been conducted in all 47 countries plus in the island of Zanzibar. A total of 360 subject matter experts (SMEs) from 88 organisations were deployed 607 times. Despite availability of guidelines, the process had to be contextualised while avoiding jeopardising the quality and integrity of the findings. Key challenges were: inadequate understanding of the process by in-country counterparts; competing country priorities; limited time for validating subnational capacities; insufficient availability of SMEs for biosafety and biosecurity, antimicrobial resistance, points of entry, chemical events and radio-nuclear emergencies; and inadequate financing to fill gaps identified. Key points learnt were: importance of country leadership and ownership; conducting orientation workshops before the self-assessment; availability of an external JEE expert to support the self-assessment; the skills, attitudes and leadership competencies of the team lead; identifying national experts as SMEs for future JEEs to promote capacity building and experience sharing; the centrality of involving One Health stakeholders from the beginning to the end of the process; and the need for dedicated staff for planning, coordination, implementation and timely report writing. Moving forward, it is essential to draw from this learning to plan future JEEs. Finally, predictable financing is needed immediately to fill gaps identified.

Investing in preparedness for rapid detection and control of epidemics: analysis of health system reforms and their effect on 2021 Ebola virus disease epidemic response in Guinea.

The 2014-2016 West Africa Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) Epidemic devastated Guinea's health system and constituted a public health emergency of international concern. Following the crisis, Guinea invested in the establishment of basic health system reforms and crucial legal instruments for strengthening national health security in line with the WHO's recommendations for ensuring better preparedness for (and, therefore, a response to) health emergencies. The investments included the scaling up of Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response; Joint External Evaluation of International Health Regulation capacities; National Action Plan for Health Security; Simulation Exercises; One Health platforms; creation of decentralised structures such as regional and prefectural Emergency Operation Centres; Risk assessment and hazard identification; Expanding human resources capacity; Early Warning Alert System and community preparedness. These investments were tested in the subsequent 2021 EVD outbreak and other epidemics. In this case, there was a timely declaration and response to the 2021 EVD epidemic, a lower-case burden and mortality rate, a shorter duration of the epidemic and a significant reduction in the cost of the response. Similarly, there was timely detection, response and containment of other epidemics including Lassa fever and Marburg virus disease. Findings suggest the utility of the preparedness activities for the early detection and efficient containment of outbreaks, which, therefore, underlines the need for all countries at risk of infectious disease epidemics to invest in similar reforms. Doing so promises to be not only cost-effective but also lifesaving.

How prepared is the world? Identifying weaknesses in existing assessment frameworks for global health security through a One Health approach.

The COVID-19 pandemic has exposed faults in the way we assess preparedness and response capacities for public health emergencies. Existing frameworks are limited in scope, and do not sufficiently consider complex social, economic, political, regulatory, and ecological factors. One Health, through its focus on the links among humans, animals, and ecosystems, is a valuable approach through which existing assessment frameworks can be analysed and new ways forward proposed. Although in the past few years advances have been made in assessment tools such as the International Health Regulations Joint External Evaluation, a rapid and radical increase in ambition is required. To sufficiently account for the range of complex systems in which health emergencies occur, assessments should consider how problems are defined across stakeholders and the wider sociopolitical environments in which structures and institutions operate. Current frameworks do little to consider anthropogenic factors in disease emergence or address the full array of health security hazards across the social-ecological system. A complex and interdependent set of challenges threaten human, animal, and ecosystem health, and we cannot afford to overlook important contextual factors, or the determinants of these shared threats. Health security assessment frameworks should therefore ensure that the process undertaken to prioritise and build capacity adheres to core One Health principles and that interventions and outcomes are assessed in terms of added value, trade-offs, and cobenefits across human, animal, and environmental health systems.

Framing the future of the COVID-19 response operations in 2022 in the WHO African region.

BACKGROUND: With the evolving epidemiological parameters of COVID-19 in Africa, the response actions and lessons learnt during the pandemic's past two years, SARS-COV 2 will certainly continue to circulate in African countries in 2022 and beyond. As countries in the African continent need to be more prepared and plan to 'live with the virus' for the upcoming two years and after and at the same time mitigate risks by protecting the future most vulnerable and those responsible for maintaining essential services, WHO AFRO is anticipating four interim scenarios of the evolution of the pandemic in 2022 and beyond in the region. OBJECTIVE: In preparation for the rollout of response actions given the predicted scenarios, WHO AFRO has identified ten strategic orientations and areas of focus for supporting member states and partners in responding to the COVID-19 pandemic in Africa in 2022 and beyond. METHODS: WHO analysed trends of the transmissions since the first case in the African continent and reviewed lessons learnt over the past months. RESULTS: Establishing a core and agile team solely dedicated to the COVID-19 response at the WHO AFRO, the emergency hubs, and WCOs will improve the effectiveness of the response and address identified challenges. The team will collaborate with the various clusters of the regional office, and other units and subunits in the WCOs supported with good epidemics intelligence. COVID-19 pandemic has afflicted global humanity at unprecedented levels. CONCLUSION: Two years later and while starting the third year of the COVID-19 response, we now need to change and adapt our strategies, tools and approaches in responding timely and effectively to the pandemic in Africa and save more lives.

Assessment of COVID-19 pandemic responses in African countries: thematic synthesis of WHO intra-action review reports.

OBJECTIVES: We conducted a review of intra-action review (IAR) reports of the national response to the COVID-19 pandemic in Africa. We highlight best practices and challenges and offer perspectives for the future. DESIGN: A thematic analysis across 10 preparedness and response domains, namely, governance, leadership, and coordination; planning and monitoring; risk communication and community engagement; surveillance, rapid response, and case investigation; infection prevention and control; case management; screening and monitoring at points of entry; national laboratory system; logistics and supply chain management; and maintaining essential health services during the COVID-19 pandemic. SETTING: All countries in the WHO African Region were eligible for inclusion in the study. National IAR reports submitted by March 2021 were analysed. RESULTS: We retrieved IAR reports from 18 African countries. The COVID-19 pandemic response in African countries has relied on many existing response systems such as laboratory systems, surveillance systems for previous outbreaks of highly infectious diseases and a logistics management information system. These best practices were backed by strong political will. The key challenges included low public confidence in governments, inadequate adherence to infection prevention and control measures, shortages of personal protective equipment, inadequate laboratory capacity, inadequate contact tracing, poor supply chain and logistics management systems, and lack of training of key personnel at national and subnational levels. CONCLUSION: These findings suggest that African countries' response to the COVID-19 pandemic was prompt and may have contributed to the lower cases and deaths in the region compared with countries in other regions. The IARs demonstrate that many technical areas still require immediate improvement to guide decisions in subsequent waves or future outbreaks.

A large epidemic of a necrotic skin infection in the Democratic Republic of São Tomé and Principe: an epidemiological study.

INTRODUCTION: In 2016-18, the Democratic Republic of São Tomé and Príncipe suffered a necrotic skin infection epidemic. METHODS: A surveillance system was established after increased hospitalisations for this infection. Microbiology results were available for samples analysed in December 2016 and March 2017 using whole genome sequencing and metagenomics. Negative binomial regression was used to study the association of weather conditions with monthly case counts in a time-series analysis. RESULTS: From October 2016 to October 2018, the epidemic cumulative attack rate was 1.5%. The first peak lasted 5 months, accounting for one-third of total cases. We could not conclusively identify the aetiological agent(s) due to the country's lack of microbiology capacity. Increased relative humidity was associated with increased monthly cases (incidence rate ratio (IRR) 1.05, 95% CI 1.02-1.09), and higher precipitation in the previous month with a higher number of cases in the following month (months with 0-49 mm rainfall compared with months with 50-149 mm and ≥150 mm: IRR 1.44, 95 % CI 1.13-1.78 and 1.50, 95% CI 1.12-1.99, respectively). DISCUSSION: This epidemic was favoured by increased relative humidity and precipitation, potentially contributing to community-based transmission of ubiquitous bacterial strains superinfecting skin wounds. FUNDING: World Health Organization Regional Office for Africa, Ministry of Health.

Public Health Program for Decreasing Risk for Ebola Virus Disease Resurgence from Survivors of the 2013-2016 Outbreak, Guinea.

At the end of the 2013-2016 Ebola virus disease outbreak in Guinea, we implemented an alert system for early detection of Ebola resurgence among survivors. Survivors were asked to report health alerts in their household and provide body fluid specimens for laboratory testing. During April-September 2016, a total of 1,075 (88%) of 1,215 survivors participated in the system; follow up occurred at a median of 16 months after discharge (interquartile range 14-18 months). Of these, 784 acted as focal points and reported 1,136 alerts (including 4 deaths among survivors). A total of 372 (91%) of 408 eligible survivors had >1 semen specimen tested; of 817 semen specimens, 5 samples from 4 survivors were positive up to 512 days after discharge. No lochia (0/7) or breast milk (0/69) specimens tested positive. Our findings underscore the importance of long-term monitoring of survivors' semen samples in an Ebola-affected country.

Joint external evaluation of the International Health Regulation (2005) capacities: current status and lessons learnt in the WHO African region.

The International Health Regulations (IHR, 2005) are an essential vehicle for addressing global health security. Here, we report the IHR capacities in the WHO African from independent joint external evaluation (JEE). The JEE is a voluntary component of the IHR monitoring and evaluation framework. It evaluates IHR capacities in 19 technical areas in four broad themes: 'Prevent' (7 technical areas, 15 indicators); 'Detect' (4 technical areas, 13 indicators); 'Respond' (5 technical areas, 14 indicators), points of entry (PoE) and other IHR hazards (chemical and radiation) (3 technical areas, 6 indicators). The IHR capacity scores are graded from level 1 (no capacity) to level 5 (sustainable capacity). From February 2016 to March 2019, 40 of 47 WHO African region countries (81% coverage) evaluated their IHR capacities using the JEE tool. No country had the required IHR capacities. Under the theme 'Prevent', no country scored level 5 for 12 of 15 indicators. Over 80% of them scored level 1 or 2 for most indicators. For 'Detect', none scored level 5 for 12 of 13 indicators. However, many scored level 3 or 4 for several indicators. For 'Respond', none scored level 5 for 13 of 14 indicators, and less than 10% had a national multihazard public health emergency preparedness and response plan. For PoE and other IHR hazards, most countries scored level 1 or 2 and none scored level 5. Countries in the WHO African region are commended for embracing the JEE to assess their IHR capacities. However, major gaps have been identified. Urgent collective action is needed now to protect the WHO African region from health security threats.

Subsequent mortality in survivors of Ebola virus disease in Guinea: a nationwide retrospective cohort study.

BACKGROUND: A record number of people survived Ebola virus infection in the 2013-16 outbreak in west Africa, and the number of survivors has increased after subsequent outbreaks. A range of post-Ebola sequelae have been reported in survivors, but little is known about subsequent mortality. We aimed to investigate subsequent mortality among people discharged from Ebola treatment units. METHODS: From Dec 8, 2015, Surveillance Active en ceinture, the Guinean national survivors' monitoring programme, attempted to contact and follow-up all survivors of Ebola virus disease who were discharged from Ebola treatment units. Survivors were followed up until Sept 30, 2016, and deaths up to this timepoint were recorded. Verbal autopsies were done to gain information about survivors of Ebola virus disease who subsequently died from their closest family members. We calculated the age-standardised mortality ratio compared with the general Guinean population, and assessed risk factors for mortality using survival analysis and a Cox proportional hazards regression model. FINDINGS: Of the 1270 survivors of Ebola virus disease who were discharged from Ebola treatment units in Guinea, information was retrieved for 1130 (89%). Compared with the general Guinean population, survivors of Ebola virus disease had a more than five-times increased risk of mortality up to Dec 31, 2015 (age-standardised mortality ratio 5·2 [95% CI 4·0-6·8]), a mean of 1 year of follow-up after discharge. Thereafter (ie, from Jan 1-Sept 30, 2016), mortality did not differ between survivors of Ebola virus disease and the general population. (0·6 [95% CI 0·2-1·4]). Overall, 59 deaths were reported, and the cause of death was tentatively attributed to renal failure in 37 cases, mostly on the basis of reported anuria. Longer stays (ie, equal to or longer than the median stay) in Ebola treatment units were associated with an increased risk of late death compared with shorter stays (adjusted hazard ratio 2·62 [95% CI 1·43-4·79]). INTERPRETATION: Mortality was high in people who recovered from Ebola virus disease and were discharged from Ebola treatment units in Guinea. The finding that survivors who were hospitalised for longer during primary infection had an increased risk of death, could help to guide current and future survivors' programmes and in the prioritisation of funds in resource-constrained settings. The role of renal failure in late deaths after recovery from Ebola virus disease should be investigated. FUNDING: WHO, International Medical Corps, and the Guinean Red Cross.

Ebola Virus Transmission Caused by Persistently Infected Survivors of the 2014-2016 Outbreak in West Africa.

The 2014-2016 Ebola virus (EBOV) disease outbreak affected over 29000 people and left behind the biggest cohort (over 17000 individuals) of Ebola survivors in history. Although the persistence of EBOV in body fluids of survivors was reported before the recent outbreak, new evidence revealed that the virus can be detected up to 18 months in the semen, which represents the biggest risk of Ebola resurgence in affected communities. In this study, we review the knowledge on the Ebola flare-ups that occurred after the peak of the 2014-2016 Ebola epidemic in West Africa.

Lessons learned by surveillance during the tail-end of the Ebola outbreak in Guinea, June-October 2015: a case series.

BACKGROUND: By the end of the 2013­2016 West African Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) outbreaks, a total of 3814 cases (probable and confirmed) and 2544 deaths were reported in Guinea. Clearly, surveillance activities aiming at stopping human-to-human transmission have been the breakthrough of EVD outbreak management, but their application has been at times easier said than done. This article presents five confirmed or probable EVD cases that arose in Conakry towards the end of the Guinea epidemic, which demonstrate flaws in surveillance and follow-up. CASE PRESENTATION: For case 1, safe burial requirements were not followed. For cases 1 and 2, negative Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) results were interpreted as no infection. For the first case, the sample may have not been taken properly while for the second the disease was possibly at its early stage. Case 3 was stopped at a border health checkpoint and despite her high temperature she was allowed to continue the bus journey. For case 4, an oral swab sample was supposedly taken after death but could not be found for retrospective testing. Despite characteristic symptomatology, case 5 was not identified as a suspect case for as long as 3 weeks. CONCLUSION: In epidemic contexts, health systems must be able to track all samples of suspect cases and deaths, regardless of their laboratory results. Social mobilization in communities and training in health care facilities must be strengthened at the tail of an outbreak, to avoid the natural slackening of disease surveillance, in particular for long-lasting and deadly epidemics.