The influence of socio-economic status on child temperament and psychological symptom profiles.

The influence of socio-economic status (SES) on child temperament and psychological symptoms was examined using a nationally representative sample in Singapore. Data were available for 2169 children from 1987 families. Caregivers' reports were obtained on children aged 4-6. SES was operationalized as an aggregation of household income per capita, parental education level and housing type. Compared to their counterparts from higher SES families, children from low-SES families tended to exhibit (a) higher negative affectivity but lower effortful control, and (b) higher internalizing and externalizing symptoms. In addition, children with a 'resilient' temperamental profile (i.e. low negative affectivity and high effortful control) were more likely to come from families with much higher SES, relative to children with other profiles. Children with high internalizing symptoms tended to come from low-SES backgrounds, regardless of their externalizing symptoms. Among children with low internalizing symptoms, those with high externalizing symptoms came from lower SES backgrounds compared to those with low externalizing symptoms. Parental warmth and distress mediated the association between SES and child temperament and symptom profiles, with the exception of distress in the SES-temperament link. These findings supported the family stress model and highlighted the novel perspective of SES's influence on configurations of child temperament and symptom characteristics.

Detecting lies through others' eyes: Children use perceptual access cues to evaluate listeners' beliefs about informants' deception.

Children are often third-party observers of conversations between informants and receivers. Although 5- and 6-year-olds can identify and reject informants' false testimony, it remains unclear whether they expect others to do the same. Accurately assessing others' impressions of informants and their testimony in a conversational setting is essential for children's navigation of the social world. Using a novel second-order lie detection task, the current study examined whether 4- to 7-year-olds (N = 74; Mage = 69 months) take receivers' epistemic states into account when predicting whether a receiver would think an informant is truthful or deceptive. We pitted children's firsthand observations of reality against informants' false testimony while manipulating receivers' perceptual access to a sticker-hiding event. Results showed that when the receiver had perceptual access and was knowledgeable, children predicted that the receiver would think the informant is lying. Critically, when the receiver lacked perceptual access and was ignorant, children were significantly more likely to predict that the receiver would think the informant is telling the truth. Second-order theory of mind and executive function strengthened this effect. Findings are interpreted using a dual-process framework and provide new insights into children's understanding of others' selective trust and susceptibility to deception.

Socio-cognitive correlates of primary school children's deceptive behavior toward peers in competitive settings.

Competing for limited resources with peers is common among children from an early age, illustrating their propensity to use deceptive strategies to win. We focused on how primary school-age (6-8 years old) children's strategic deception toward peers is associated with their socio-cognitive development (theory of mind and executive functions). In a novel computerized competitive hide-and-seek game, we manipulated the peer opponents' familiarity (familiar vs. unfamiliar) and actions (following vs. not following children's indications), as well as the stimuli likability (liked vs. disliked cards). Our findings demonstrated that children deceived the familiar opponent less than the unfamiliar one, indicating their determination to preserve positive peer interactions. We showed that theory of mind and executive functions significantly predicted children's willingness to deceive. Notably, second-order false belief understanding and visuospatial working memory positively predicted children's use of truths to deceive, whereas inhibitory control and cognitive flexibility efficacy scores were negatively related to their deceptive performance when using the same strategy. Implications for children's competitive behavior toward peers involving lie-telling are discussed.

Older adults are more approving of blunt honesty than younger adults: a cross-cultural study.

Research has explored age-related and cultural differences in moral evaluations of dishonesty; however, this has not yet been examined in an aging context. The present study provided a novel account of how younger and older adults (in Canada, Singapore, and China; N = 401) morally evaluate adults' truths and lies in antisocial, modesty, and politeness settings. Participants completed a questionnaire assessing how acceptable it is for adults to tell the truth or a lie in given social scenarios, and they reported on their levels of collectivism and individualism. In all countries, older adults provided more favorable evaluations to blunt and immodest truths than younger adults did. Compared with younger adults, older adults provided harsher evaluations to Polite Lies (in Canada and China) and Modesty Lies (in Canada and Singapore). Thus, there may be an age-related increase in the acceptability of direct honesty over good-intentioned lies, and this age effect is somewhat stable across cultures. Older adults were also more lenient in evaluations of an antisocial lie to conceal an affair compared to younger adults. Overall, adults in China tended to rate lies less negatively, and their greater levels of collectivism mediated their greater approval of polite lies. The present results demonstrate that evaluations of (dis)honesty differ as a function of age and culture and these results can assist in developing a more complete lifespan model of the morality of dishonesty. Supplementary Information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s12144-022-03785-6.

Give and take: A microgenetic study of preschoolers' deceptive and prosocial behavior in relation to their socio-cognitive development.

Early on, young children begin to learn the social skills which will help them navigate through an increasingly complex social world. We explored how deceiving for personal gain potentially interacts with sharing the resulting resources and how they both relate to theory of mind (ToM) and inhibitory control in 3- to 5-year-old children (N = 92, 43 girls). Children played a hide-and-seek zero-sum game in which they could win stickers if they discovered how to deceive the experimenter. Then they were prompted to share their stickers in a dictator game paradigm. Using a microgenetic design, we tracked deceptive behavior across ten sessions and sharing behavior across five of these sessions, plus a follow-up session 15 months later. Children polarized into a group who never deceived across all sessions, and a group who constantly deceived above chance levels (around 85 % of the time). Sharing behavior was extremely low (under 6 % of stickers) across the sessions. At follow-up, deceptive behavior was above 80 %, while sharing remained at a low level (under 5 %). The novelty of our findings was that children who initially discovered how to deceive shared less than the children who didn't use this deceptive strategy. Nonetheless, this pattern was reversed at follow-up. Furthermore, ToM positively predicted deceptive behavior across all sessions and improved after the microgenetic sessions but wasn't related with deception at follow-up. Implications for enabling children to deploy the growing understanding of their worlds in a more prosocial way are discussed.

Training young children in strategic deception promotes epistemic vigilance.

Learning from others allows young children to acquire vast amounts of information quickly, but doing so effectively also requires epistemic vigilance. Although preschool-age children have some capacity to engage in such processes, they often have trouble resisting information from misleading informants. The present research takes a novel strategic deception training approach to addressing this limitation. The approach is grounded in theoretical work on children's recognition of self-other equivalences (Meltzoff, 2007) and in the default tendency to view communication as helpful (Mascaro et al., 2017). Eighty 3-year-old Singaporean children (Mage = 39.36 months, 37 girls, 90.0% Chinese) were randomly assigned to either an experimental condition, in which they were trained on strategic deception, or to a conservation training control condition. Findings showed that the strategic deception training was effective in promoting epistemic vigilance on a semantic task that involved object naming and no pointing, although the effect did not extend to performance on an episodic task that involved pointing to object locations. These findings provide the first evidence of a causal link between young children's reasoning about how to deceive others and their resistance to being misled by others. In doing so, they shed light on the mechanisms that come into play when children learn epistemic vigilance. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Linking young children's teaching to their reasoning of mental states: Evidence from Singapore.

To fully participate in the human information-sharing ecosystem that allows for efficient knowledge dissemination and creation, children need to be able to teach others effectively. The current research is the first to investigate links between children's teaching abilities and their developing theory of mind abilities in a non-Western sample. In a sample of 4- to 6-year-old Singaporean children (N = 49), we examined relations between specific components of theory of mind abilities and teaching ability on a social cognitive task. We found that both false belief understanding and the ability to make mental state inferences in a teaching context were associated with effective teaching even after controlling for age and language ability. These findings provide a nuanced picture of the links between mental state reasoning and teaching ability. More broadly, they provide evidence that these links extend beyond Western cultures and generalize to social-cognitive teaching contexts.

Theory of mind, executive function, and lying in children: a meta-analysis.

Scientific research on how children learn to tell lies has existed for more than a century. Earlier studies mainly focused on moral, social, and situational factors contributing to the development of lying. Researchers have only begun to explore the cognitive correlations of children's lying in the last two decades. Cognitive theories suggest that theory of mind (ToM) and executive function (EF) should be closely related to the development of lying since lying is, in essence, ToM and EF in action. Yet, findings from empirical studies are mixed. To address this issue, the current meta-analysis reviewed all prior literature that examined the relations between children's lying and ToM and/or between children's lying and EF. In total, 47 papers consisting of 5099 participants between 2 and 19 years of age were included, which yielded 74 effect sizes for ToM and 94 effect sizes for EF. Statistically significant but relatively small effects were found between children's lying and ToM (r = .17) and between lying and EF (r = .13). Furthermore, EF's correlation with children's initial lies was significantly smaller than its correlation with children's ability to maintain lies. This comprehensive meta-analysis provides a clear picture of the associations between children's ToM/EF and their lying behavior and confirms that ToM and EF indeed play a positive role in children's lying and its development.

The link between parental mental state talk and children's lying: An indirect effect via false belief understanding.

Past research shows that parental mental state talk (MST) is closely associated with children's theory-of-mind (ToM) understanding. The current study extends previous work by investigating whether parental MST is also associated with children's ToM in action (i.e., lying). A total of 90 Singaporean 3- to 5-year-olds participated in this study with their parents. Parental MST was measured using a storytelling task with a wordless picture book. Mediation analysis revealed an indirect effect: Children's ToM understanding served as a mediator in the path between parental MST and children's lying, whereas there was no significant direct effect of parental MST on children's lying. This study is the first to focus on the relation between parental MST and ToM in an applied setting. Our findings suggest that parental MST can help children to develop sociocognitive skills, which in turn can help children to gain the insight that lying may be used as a strategy for personal gain.

The Role of Reward System in Dishonest Behavior: A Functional Near-Infrared Spectroscopy Study.

Previous studies showed that the cortical reward system plays an important role in deceptive behavior. However, how the reward system activates during the whole course of dishonest behavior and how it affects dishonest decisions remain unclear. The current study investigated these questions. One hundred and two participants were included in the final analysis. They completed two tasks: monetary incentive delay (MID) task and an honesty task. The MID task served as the localizer task and the honesty task was used to measure participants' deceptive behaviors. Participants' spontaneous responses in the honesty task were categorized into three conditions: Correct-Truth condition (tell the truth after guessing correctly), Incorrect-Truth condition (tell the truth after guessing incorrectly), and Incorrect-Lie condition (tell lies after guessing incorrectly). To reduce contamination from neighboring functional regions as well as to increase sensitivity to small effects (Powell et al., Devel Sci 21:e12595, 2018), we adopted the individual functional channel of interest (fCOI) approach to analyze the data. Specially, we identified the channels of interest in the MID task in individual participants and then applied them to the honesty task. The result suggested that the reward system showed different activation patterns during different phases: In the pre-decision phase, the reward system was activated with the winning of the reward. During the decision and feedback phase, the reward system was activated when people made the decisions to be dishonest and when they evaluated the outcome of their decisions. Furthermore, the result showed that neural activity of the reward system toward the outcome of their decision was related to subsequent dishonest behaviors. Thus, the present study confirmed the important role of the reward system in deception. These results can also shed light on how one could use neuroimaging techniques to perform lie-detection.

Young Children Selectively Hide the Truth About Sensitive Topics.

Starting in early childhood, children are socialized to be honest. However, they are also expected to avoid telling the truth in sensitive situations if doing so could be seen as inappropriate or impolite. Across two studies (total N = 358), the reasoning of 3- to 5-year-old children in such a scenario was investigated by manipulating whether the information in question would be helpful to the recipient. The studies used a reverse rouge paradigm, in which a confederate with a highly salient red mark on her nose asked children whether she looked okay prior to having her picture taken. In Study 1, children tended to tell the truth only if they were able to observe that the mark was temporary and the confederate did not know it was there. In Study 2, children tended to tell the truth only if they were able to observe that the mark could be concealed with makeup. These findings show that for children as young as age 3, decisions about whether to tell the truth are influenced by the likelihood that the information would be helpful to the recipient.

Identifying Liars Through Automatic Decoding of Children's Facial Expressions.

This study explored whether children's (N = 158; 4- to 9 years old) nonverbal facial expressions can be used to identify when children are being deceptive. Using a computer vision program to automatically decode children's facial expressions according to the Facial Action Coding System, this study employed machine learning to determine whether facial expressions can be used to discriminate between children who concealed breaking a toy(liars) and those who did not break a toy(nonliars). Results found that, regardless of age or history of maltreatment, children's facial expressions could accurately (73%) be distinguished between liars and nonliars. Two emotions, surprise and fear, were more strongly expressed by liars than nonliars. These findings provide evidence to support the use of automatically coded facial expressions to detect children's deception.

Children with Autism Spectrum Disorder's Lying is Correlated with Their Working Memory But Not Theory of Mind.

The present study examined the role of executive function in lying for children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD). The temptation resistance paradigm was used to elicit children's self-protective lies and the Hide-and-seek task was used to elicit children's self-benefiting lies. Results showed that children with ASD told fewer lies in the two deception tasks compared to children with intellectual disability (ID) and typically developing (TD) children. Furthermore, children with ASD's lying were positively correlated with their working memory, but not with their theory of mind. These findings demonstrate that the mechanisms underlying deception for children with ASD are distinct from that of TD children.

The effects of self- and other-awareness on Chinese children's truth-telling.

Several honesty promotion techniques have been established for children living in Western cultures; however, limited research has examined the effectiveness of these techniques among non-Western children. Recently, inducing self-awareness (by looking at oneself in a mirror) was found to be effective in promoting young Western children's honesty. The present investigation compared the effectiveness of this self-awareness technique to a novel other-awareness technique (looking at a photograph of a peer) in promoting young Chinese children's honesty. Chinese children aged 3 and 4 years (N = 121) completed a modified temptation resistance paradigm where they were requested not to peek at a toy in the experimenter's absence. Children were randomly assigned to a Self-Awareness, Peer (other-awareness), or Control condition. When asked whether they peeked at the toy, children in the Self-Awareness condition were significantly more likely to tell the truth compared to those in the Control condition. No significant differences in truth-telling emerged between the Peer and Control conditions. The present results demonstrate the cross-cultural application of self-awareness as an honesty promoting technique with young children. Statement of contribution What is already known on this subject? High rates of dishonesty persist across cultures. Social and cultural values can shape lie-telling behaviours. Inducing self-awareness promotes honesty in Western children. What does this study add? A tool for promoting honesty in non-Western cultures. Inducing self-awareness promotes honesty in Chinese children. Inducing other-awareness was not effective in promoting honesty in Chinese children.

Learning to deceive has cognitive benefits.

Recent evolutionary, cultural, and economic theories have postulated strong connections between human sociality and complex cognition. One prediction derived from this work is that deception should confer cognitive benefits on children. The current research tests this possibility by examining whether learning to deceive during early childhood promotes more advanced theory of mind and executive function skills during a time when these skills are undergoing rapid development. A total of 42 children (Mage = 40.45 months; 22 boys and 20 girls) who showed no initial ability to deceive were randomly assigned to an experimental condition or a control condition. In both conditions, they played a hide-and-seek game against an adult opponent on 4 consecutive days, but only the children in the experimental condition were taught how to deceive the opponent in order to win the game. Unlike children in the control condition, children in the experimental condition significantly improved their executive function and theory of mind skills, providing the first evidence that learning to deceive causally enhances cognitive skills in young children.

Children's second-order lying: Young children can tell the truth to deceive.

The current study investigated the development of second-order lying and its relation to theory of mind and executive function. Previous studies have examined only first-order lying, in which a child makes an untruthful statement to intentionally deceive an unsuspecting opponent. As opposed to first-order lying, second-order lying requires the use of both lies and truths to deceive an opponent because the opponent is fully aware of the liar's deceptive intention. Here, we used a modified hide-and-seek task, in which children were asked to hide a coin in either one of their hands for opponents to find. In this task, the opponents did not consistently look for the coin in the location indicated by the children. Thus, children could not win the desirable reward if they only told lies to deceive; they needed to switch between telling lies and telling truths (i.e., second-order lies) to deceive opponents. The results showed that children could tell second-order lies by 4 years of age, and their ability to do so was significantly related only to the second-order ignorance scores (early second-order theory of mind understanding). The current findings suggest that second-order ignorance, but not second-order false belief understanding, contributes to children's second-order lying.

Young children discover how to deceive in 10 days: a microgenetic study.

We investigated how the ability to deceive emerges in early childhood among a sample of young preschoolers (Mean age = 34.7 months). We did this via a 10-session microgenetic method that took place over a 10-day period. In each session, children played a zero-sum game against an adult to win treats. In the game, children hid the treats and had opportunities (10 trials) to win them by providing deceptive information about their whereabouts to the adult. Although children initially showed little or no ability to deceive, most spontaneously discovered deception and systematically used it to win the game by the tenth day. Both theory of mind and executive function skills were predictive of relatively faster patterns of discovery. These results are the first to provide evidence for the importance of cognitive skills and social experience in the discovery of deception over time in early childhood.

Functional neural networks of honesty and dishonesty in children: Evidence from graph theory analysis.

The present study examined how different brain regions interact with each other during spontaneous honest vs. dishonest communication. More specifically, we took a complex network approach based on the graph-theory to analyze neural response data when children are spontaneously engaged in honest or dishonest acts. Fifty-nine right-handed children between 7 and 12 years of age participated in the study. They lied or told the truth out of their own volition. We found that lying decreased both the global and local efficiencies of children's functional neural network. This finding, for the first time, suggests that lying disrupts the efficiency of children's cortical network functioning. Further, it suggests that the graph theory based network analysis is a viable approach to study the neural development of deception.

Development of Effective Connectivity during Own- and Other-Race Face Processing: A Granger Causality Analysis.

Numerous developmental studies have suggested that other-race effect (ORE) in face recognition emerges as early as in infancy and develops steadily throughout childhood. However, there is very limited research on the neural mechanisms underlying this developmental ORE. The present study used Granger causality analysis (GCA) to examine the development of children's cortical networks in processing own- and other-race faces. Children were between 3 and 13 years. An old-new paradigm was used to assess their own- and other-race face recognition with ETG-4000 (Hitachi Medical Co., Japan) acquiring functional near infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) data. After preprocessing, for each participant and under each face condition, we obtained the causal map by calculating the weights of causal relations between the time courses of [oxy-Hb] of each pair of channels using GCA. To investigate further the differential causal connectivity for own-race faces and other-race faces at the group level, a repeated measure analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed on the GCA weights for each pair of channels with the face race task (own-race face vs. other-race face) as the within-subject variable and the age as a between-subject factor (continuous variable). We found an age-related increase in functional connectivity, paralleling a similar age-related improvement in behavioral face processing ability. More importantly, we found that the significant differences in neural functional connectivity between the recognition of own-race faces and that of other-race faces were modulated by age. Thus, like the behavioral ORE, the neural ORE emerges early and undergoes a protracted developmental course.

Theory-of-Mind Training Causes Honest Young Children to Lie.

Theory of mind (ToM) has long been recognized to play a major role in children's social functioning. However, no direct evidence confirms the causal linkage between the two. In the current study, we addressed this significant gap by examining whether ToM causes the emergence of lying, an important social skill. We showed that after participating in ToM training to learn about mental-state concepts, 3-year-olds who originally had been unable to lie began to deceive consistently. This training effect lasted for more than a month. In contrast, 3-year-olds who participated in control training to learn about physical concepts were significantly less inclined to lie than the ToM-trained children. These findings provide the first experimental evidence supporting the causal role of ToM in the development of social competence in early childhood.