On the proportion of patients who experience a prodrome prior to psychosis onset: A systematic review and meta-analysis.

BACKGROUND: Preventing or delaying the onset of psychosis requires identification of those at risk for developing psychosis. For predictive purposes, the prodrome - a constellation of symptoms which may occur before the onset of psychosis - has been increasingly recognized as having utility. However, it is unclear what proportion of patients experience a prodrome or how this varies based on the multiple definitions used. METHODS: We conducted a systematic review and meta-analysis of studies of patients with psychosis with the objective of determining the proportion of patients who experienced a prodrome prior to psychosis onset. Inclusion criteria included a consistent prodrome definition and reporting the proportion of patients who experienced a prodrome. We excluded studies of only patients with a prodrome or solely substance-induced psychosis, qualitative studies without prevalence data, conference abstracts, and case reports/case series. We searched Ovid MEDLINE, Embase (Ovid), APA PsycInfo (Ovid), Web of Science Core Collection (Clarivate), Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews, Cochrane Central Register of Controlled Trials, APA PsycBooks (Ovid), ProQuest Dissertation & Thesis, on March 3, 2021. Studies were assessed for quality using the Critical Appraisal Checklist for Prevalence Studies. Narrative synthesis and proportion meta-analysis were used to estimate prodrome prevalence. I2 and predictive interval were used to assess heterogeneity. Subgroup analyses were used to probe sources of heterogeneity. (PROSPERO ID: CRD42021239797). RESULTS: Seventy-one articles were included, representing 13,774 patients. Studies varied significantly in terms of methodology and prodrome definition used. The random effects proportion meta-analysis estimate for prodrome prevalence was 78.3% (95% CI = 72.8-83.2); heterogeneity was high (I2 97.98% [95% CI = 97.71-98.22]); and the prediction interval was wide (95% PI = 0.411-0.936). There were no meaningful differences in prevalence between grouped prodrome definitions, and subgroup analyses failed to reveal a consistent source of heterogeneity. CONCLUSIONS: This is the first meta-analysis on the prevalence of a prodrome prior to the onset of first episode psychosis. The majority of patients (78.3%) were found to have experienced a prodrome prior to psychosis onset. However, findings are highly heterogenous across study and no definitive source of heterogeneity was found despite extensive subgroup analyses. As most studies were retrospective in nature, recall bias likely affects these results. While the large majority of patients with psychosis experience a prodrome in some form, it is unclear if the remainder of patients experience no prodrome, or if ascertainment methods employed in the studies were not sensitive to their experiences. Given widespread investment in indicated prevention of psychosis through prospective identification and intervention during the prodrome, a resolution of this question as well as a consensus definition of the prodrome is much needed in order to effectively direct and organize services, and may be accomplished through novel, densely sampled and phenotyped prospective cohort studies that aim for representative sampling across multiple settings.

Experiencing hallucinations in daily life: The role of metacognition.

BACKGROUND: Hallucinations have been linked to failures in metacognitive reflection suggesting an association between hallucinations and overestimation of performance, although the cross-sectional findings are inconsistent. This inconsistency may relate to the fluctuating hallucinatory experiences that are not captured in cross-sectional studies. Ecological Momentary Assessment (EMA) captures in-the-moment experiences over time so can identify causal relationships between variables such as the associations between metacognition and hallucinatory experience in daily life and overcome problems in cross-sectional designs. METHODS: Participants (N = 41) experiencing daily hallucinations completed baseline questionnaires and smartphone surveys 7 times per day for 14 days. They were prompted to identify a task they would complete in the next 4 h and to make metacognitive predictions around the likelihood of completing the task, the difficulty of the task, and how well they would complete it (standard of completion). RESULTS: 76 % finished the 14-days of assessment with an average of 42.2 % survey completion. Less accurate metacognition was associated with more hallucinations, but less accurate likelihood and standard of completion was associated with fewer hallucinations. Using a cross-lagged analysis, metacognitive predictions around the likelihood of completion (p < .001) and standard of completion (p = .01) predicted hallucination intensity at the following timepoint, and metacognitive predictions regarding likelihood of completion (p = .02) predicted hallucination control at the following timepoint. DISCUSSION: Interventions that aim to improve metacognitive ability in-the-moment may serve to reduce the intensity and increase the control of hallucinations.

Metacognition and psychosis-spectrum experiences: A study of objective and subjective measures.

BACKGROUND: Metacognition refers to appraising one's thoughts and behaviours. Deficits in metacognition are associated with psychosis-spectrum experiences, such as hallucinations and delusions, in both clinical and non-clinical populations. Assessments of metacognitive function and abilities in clinical populations often vary in administration duration, and subjectivity of scores. This study investigates associations between different measures of metacognition and their prediction of psychosis spectrum experiences using objective and self-report measures in a cross-sectional study of psychosis-spectrum disorder (PSD) participants and controls. METHOD: Twenty-three individuals with PSD and forty-four controls were recruited online and completed in-the-moment objective ratings of metacognitive accuracy (meta-Dots Task), and retrospective self-report of metacognitive self-reflection (Beck Cognitive Insight Scale) and abilities (Metacognition Self-Assessment Scale). RESULTS: There were group differences in self-reported metacognition, with PSD participants having lower scores of metacognitive ability, but no differences in self-reflectiveness or objective metacognitive accuracy. In the PSD group, only self-reported metacognitive ability was associated with and predicted distress about, and conviction in, delusional thoughts. CONCLUSIONS: The findings demonstrate group differences in some self-reported, but not objective, measures of metacognition, and highlight that prediction of PSD experiences depends on the metacognitive construct being measured, and the type of measurement used.