The economics of medical procedure innovation.

This paper explores the economic incentives for medical procedure innovation. Using a proprietary dataset on billing code applications for emerging medical procedures, we highlight two mechanisms that could hinder innovation. First, the administrative hurdle of securing permanent, reimbursable billing codes substantially delays innovation diffusion. We find that Medicare utilization of innovative procedures increases nearly nine-fold after the billing codes are promoted to permanent (reimbursable) from provisional (non-reimbursable). However, only 29 percent of the provisional codes are promoted within the five-year probation period. Second, medical procedures lack intellectual property rights, especially those without patented devices. When appropriability is limited, specialty medical societies lead the applications for billing codes. We indicate that the ad hoc process for securing billing codes for procedure innovations creates uncertainty about both the development process and the allocation and enforceability of property rights. This stands in stark contrast to the more deliberate regulatory oversight for pharmaceutical innovations.

Insurance access and demand response: Pricing and welfare implications.

We present a model in which health insurance allows liquidity-constrained patients access to otherwise unaffordable treatments. A monopolist's profit-maximizing price for an insured treatment is greater (for any cost sharing) than it would be if the treatment was not covered. Consumer surplus may also be less. These results are based on a different mechanism than would operate in a standard moral hazard model. Our model also provides an economic rationale for the common claim that pharmaceutical firms set prices that exceed the value their products create. We show this problem is exacerbated when health insurance covers additional monopoly-provided services.

The effect of hospital acquisitions of physician practices on prices and spending.

During the past decade, U.S. hospitals have acquired a large number of physician practices. For example, from 2007 to 2013, hospitals acquired nearly 10% of the practices in our sample. We find that the prices for the services provided by acquired physicians increase by an average of 14.1% post-acquisition. Nearly half of this increase is attributable to the exploitation of payment rules. Price increases are larger when the acquiring hospital has a larger share of its inpatient market. We find that integration of primary care physicians increases enrollee spending by 4.9%.

Physician Practice Consolidation Driven By Small Acquisitions, So Antitrust Agencies Have Few Tools To Intervene.

The growing concentration of physician markets throughout the United States has been raising antitrust concerns, yet the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission have challenged only a small number of mergers and acquisitions in this field. Using proprietary claims data from states collectively containing more than 12 percent of the US population, we found that 22 percent of physician markets were highly concentrated in 2013, according to federal merger guidelines. Most of the increases in physician practice size and market concentration resulted from numerous small transactions, rather than a few large transactions. Among highly concentrated markets that had increases large enough to raise antitrust concerns, only 28 percent experienced any individual acquisition that would have been presumed to be anticompetitive under federal merger guidelines. Furthermore, most acquisitions were below the dollar thresholds that would have required the parties to report the transaction to antitrust authorities. Under present mechanisms, federal authorities have only limited ability to counteract consolidation in most US physician markets.

The Impact of the ACA's Medicaid Expansion on Hospitals' Uncompensated Care Burden and the Potential Effects of Repeal.

ISSUE: By increasing health insurance coverage, the Affordable Care Act's Medicaid eligibility expansion was also expected to lessen the uncompensated care burden on hospitals. The expansion currently faces an uncertain future. GOAL: To compare the change in hospitals' uncompensated care burden in the 31 states (plus the District of Columbia) that chose to expand Medicaid to the changes in states that did not, and to estimate how these expenses would be affected by repeal or further expansion. METHODS: Analysis of uncompensated care data from Medicare Hospital Cost Reports from 2011 to 2015. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS: Uncompensated care burdens fell sharply in expansion states between 2013 and 2015, from 3.9 percent to 2.3 percent of operating costs. Estimated savings across all hospitals in Medicaid expansion states totaled $6.2 billion. The largest reductions in uncompensated care were found for hospitals in expansion states that care for the highest proportion of low-income and uninsured patients. Legislation that scales back or eliminates Medicaid expansion is likely to expose these safety-net hospitals to large cost increases. Conversely, if the 19 states that chose not to expand Medicaid were to adopt expansion, their uncompensated care costs also would decrease by an estimated $6.2 billion.

Uncompensated Care Decreased At Hospitals In Medicaid Expansion States But Not At Hospitals In Nonexpansion States.

One pillar of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) was its expected impact on the growing burden of uncompensated care costs for the uninsured at hospitals. However, little is known about how this burden changed as a result of the ACA's enactment. We examine how the Affordable Care Act (ACA)'s coverage expansions affected uncompensated care costs at a large, diverse sample of hospitals. We estimate that in states that expanded Medicaid under the ACA, uncompensated care costs decreased from 4.1 percentage points to 3.1 percentage points of operating costs. The reductions in Medicaid expansion states were larger at hospitals that had higher pre-ACA uncompensated care burdens and in markets where we predicted larger gains in coverage through expanded eligibility for Medicaid. Our estimates suggest that uncompensated care costs would have decreased from 5.7 percentage points to 4.0 percentage points of operating costs in nonexpansion states if they had expanded Medicaid. Thus, while the ACA decreased the variation in uncompensated care costs across hospitals within Medicaid expansion states, the difference between expansion and nonexpansion states increased substantially. Policy makers and researchers should consider how the shifting uncompensated care burden affects other hospital decisions as well as the distribution of supplemental public funding to hospitals.

Investment subsidies and the adoption of electronic medical records in hospitals.

In February 2009 the U.S. Congress unexpectedly passed the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act (HITECH). HITECH provides up to $27 billion to promote adoption and appropriate use of Electronic Medical Records (EMR) by hospitals. We measure the extent to which HITECH incentive payments spurred EMR adoption by independent hospitals. Adoption rates for all independent hospitals grew from 48 percent in 2008 to 77 percent by 2011. Absent HITECH incentives, we estimate that the adoption rate would have instead been 67 percent in 2011. When we consider that HITECH funds were available for all hospitals and not just marginal adopters, we estimate that the cost of generating an additional adoption was $48 million. We also estimate that in the absence of HITECH incentives, the 77 percent adoption rate would have been realized by 2013, just 2 years after the date achieved due to HITECH.

The economic downturn and its lingering effects reduced medicare spending growth by $4 billion in 2009-12.

Previous work has found a strong connection between the most recent economic recession and reductions in private health spending. However, the effect of economic downturns on Medicare spending is less clear. In contrast to studies involving earlier time periods, our study found that when the macroeconomy slowed during the Great Recession of 2007-09, so did Medicare spending growth. A small (14 percent) but significant share of the decline in Medicare spending growth from 2009 to 2012 relative to growth from 2004 to 2009 can be attributed to lingering effects of the recession. Absent the economic downturn, Medicare spending would have been $4 billion higher in 2009-12. A major reason for the relatively small impact of the macroeconomy is the relative lack of labor-force participation among people ages sixty-five and older. We estimate that if they had been working at the same rate as the nonelderly before the recession, the effect of the downturn on Medicare spending growth would have been twice as large.

Health spending slowdown is mostly due to economic factors, not structural change in the health care sector.

The source of the recent slowdown in health spending growth remains unclear. We used new and unique data on privately insured people to estimate the effect of the economic slowdown that began in December 2007 on the rate of growth in health spending. By exploiting regional variations in the severity of the slowdown, we determined that the economic slowdown explained approximately 70 percent of the slowdown in health spending growth for the people in our sample. This suggests that the recent decline is not primarily the result of structural changes in the health sector or of components of the Affordable Care Act, and that-absent other changes in the health care system-an economic recovery will result in increased health spending.

Hospital closure and economic efficiency.

We present a new framework for assessing the effects of hospital closures on social welfare and the local economy. While patient welfare necessarily declines when patients lose access to a hospital, closures also tend to reduce costs. We study five hospital closures in two states and find that urban hospital bailouts reduce aggregate social welfare: on balance, the cost savings from closures more than offset the reduction in patient welfare. However, because some of the cost savings are shared nationally, total surplus in the local community may decline following a hospital closure.

Does major illness cause financial catastrophe?

OBJECTIVE: We examine the financial impact of major illnesses on the near-elderly and how this impact is affected by health insurance. DATA SOURCES: We use RAND Corporation extracts from the Health and Retirement Study from 1992 to 2006.(1) STUDY DESIGN: Our dependent variable is the change in household assets, excluding the value of the primary home. We use triple difference median regressions on a sample of newly ill/uninsured near elderly (under age 65) matched to newly ill/insured near elderly. We also include a matched control group of households whose members are not ill. RESULTS: Controlling for the effects of insurance status and illness, we find that the median household with a newly ill, uninsured individual suffers a statistically significant decline in household assets of between 30 and 50 percent relative to households with matched insured individuals. Newly ill, insured individuals do not experience a decline in wealth. CONCLUSIONS: Newly ill/uninsured households appear to be one illness away from financial catastrophe. Newly ill insured households who are matched to uninsured households appear to be protected against financial loss, at least in the near term.

The revolution in health care antitrust: new methods and provocative implications.

CONTEXT: In recent years, federal courts have permitted hospital consolidations and other potentially anticompetitive actions by accepting hospitals' claims that they compete in expansive geographic markets. Recent events, including two actions by the U.S. Federal Trade Commission, suggest that antitrust is undergoing a sea change, thanks in part to new methods for defining geographic markets. This article reviews the recent history of hospital antitrust, describes the methods used to define markets, and illustrates the new methods by considering two consolidations recently proposed by a New York regulatory agency. METHODS: The new methods for defining geographic markets rely on estimates from conditional choice models using patient-level hospitalization data. These estimates are the raw material for computations of price effects derived from a theoretical model of hospital pricing in a managed care environment. FINDINGS: Applying these methods to two proposed consolidations in New York shows that one of the mergers would likely raise prices by a substantial amount without the promise of offsetting efficiencies but that the other would not have this effect. CONCLUSIONS: New methods for geographic market definition may fundamentally alter how courts will evaluate antitrust challenges. Although additional research is necessary to refine the predictions of these new methods, consolidating hospitals, as well as any other hospitals engaging in potentially anticompetitive conduct, can no longer anticipate a friendly reception in the courtroom.

Do report cards tell consumers anything they don't know already? The case of Medicare HMOs.

Estimated responses to report cards may reflect learning about quality that would have occurred in their absence ("market-based learning"). Using panel data on Medicare HMOs, we examine the relationship between enrollment and quality before and after report cards were mailed to 40 million Medicare beneficiaries in 1999 and 2000. We find consumers learn from both public report cards and market-based sources, with the latter having a larger impact. Consumers are especially sensitive to both sources of information when the variance in HMO quality is greater. The effect of report cards is driven by beneficiaries' responses to consumer satisfaction scores.

Start spreading the news: a structural estimate of the effects of New York hospital report cards.

Research on the effects of publicly reported hospital quality report cards on patient market shares is mixed. Higher-ranking hospitals do not consistently experience increases in market share. We argue that this may be because the report cards do not always convey "news" about quality; in some cases the rankings conform with prior beliefs about quality. We develop a structural model of the "news" in report cards and estimate the model using data from New York State in 1989-1991. We show hospitals with negative news in the original 1990 report cards experienced a decrease in market share, but that a misspecified model might continue to find no report card effect.

Is the impact of managed care on hospital prices decreasing?

Prior studies find that the growth of managed care through the early 1990s introduced a strong positive relationship between price and concentration in hospital markets. We hypothesize that the relaxation of constraints on consumer choice in response to a "managed care backlash" has diminished the price sensitivity of demand facing hospitals, reducing or possibly reversing the price-concentration relationship. We test this hypothesis by studying the price/concentration relationship for hospitals in California and Florida for selected years between 1990 and 2003, while addressing the potential endogeneity of concentration. We find an increasingly positive price/concentration in the 1990s with a peak occurring by 2001. Between 2001 and 2003, the growth in this relationship halts and possibly reverses.

Medical bankruptcy: myth versus fact.

David Himmelstein and colleagues recently contended that medical problems contribute to 54.5 percent of personal bankruptcies and threaten the solvency of solidly middle-class Americans. They propose comprehensive national health insurance as a solution. A reexamination of their data suggests that medical bills are a contributing factor in just 17 percent of personal bankruptcies and that those affected tend to have incomes closer to poverty level than to middle class. Moreover, for national health insurance to have an impact, it would have to define "medical" expenses in a much broader way than is now typical of either private or government-funded plans.