Excluding People With Disabilities From Clinical Research: Eligibility Criteria Lack Clarity And Justification.

The exclusion of people with disabilities from clinical research without appropriate justification is discriminatory, is counter to federal regulations and research guidelines, and limits study generalizability. This matter is understudied, and data on the disability status of trial participants are rarely collected or reported. We analyzed ninety-seven recent interventional protocols in four therapeutic areas registered on ClinicalTrials.gov. Eighty-five percent of protocols allowed broad investigator discretion to determine eligibility, whereas only 18 percent explicitly permitted people with disabilities to use forms of support (such as supported decision making or assistive devices) to facilitate study participation. Eligibility criteria affecting people with disabilities included exclusions for psychiatric (68 percent), substance use (62 percent), HIV or hepatitis (53 percent), cognitive or intellectual (42 percent), visual (34 percent), hearing (10 percent), mobility (9 percent), long-term care (6 percent), and speech and communication (3 percent) disability-related domains. Documented justification was provided for only 24 percent of these exclusions. We recommend greater scrutiny of study eligibility criteria, scientific or ethical justification of exclusions, and accessible study design.

Ethical and public health implications of genetic testing for suicide risk: family and survivor perspectives.

PURPOSE: Death from suicide has an estimated heritability of ~50%. Research may soon allow calculation of polygenic risk scores (PRS) for suicide death, which could be marketed directly to consumers. This raises ethical concerns. Understanding how consumers will utilize this information is urgent. METHODS: We conducted three focus groups involving suicide attempt survivors ("survivors") and family members of suicide decedents ("family members") to gauge their reactions to this technology. Questions focused on positive and negative implications of PRS results. Qualitative research methods were used to summarize studio results. RESULTS: Eight survivors and 13 family members participated. Both groups postulated benefits of suicide PRS, including prevention and reduced stigma. Their concerns ranged from increased stigma to adverse psychological effects. They suggested that suicide PRS should be accompanied by extensive education and counseling. Participants experienced no adverse effects. CONCLUSION: Many ethical, legal, and social implications of genetic testing for suicide risk are highly salient to community stakeholders. Our participants hoped that suicide PRS could have significant individual and community-level benefits, but had concerns about effects in several domains, including stigma, access to insurance and employment, and increased anxiety and depression.

When Is Age Choosing Ageist Discrimination?

When the Covid-19 pandemic reached the United States in spring 2020, many states and hospitals announced crisis standards of care plans that used age as a categorical exclusion criterion. Such age choosing was quickly flagged as discriminatory, and so some states and hospitals shifted to embedding age as a tiebreaker deeper in their plans. Different rationales were given for using age as a tiebreaker: that younger patients were more likely to survive than older patients, that saving younger patients would save more life years, and that younger patients deserved a chance to live through life's stages. We provide a critical analysis of these three rationales, noting the differences between them, and then questioning the ethical and legal justifications for such age choosing.

Protecting essential information about genetic variants as trade secrets: a problem for public policy?

In 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court held that naturally occurring human genes are not patentable subject matter. This decision, invalidating patents held by Myriad Genetics involving genes affecting breast cancer, appeared to further the constitutional policy behind intellectual property protection to promote scientific progress and to make genetic testing more readily available to patients. However, the decision's ironic aftermath is continuing assertion by genetic testing companies of trade secrets protections over information about the significance of genetic variants. This article analyzes possible approaches to the assertion of trade secret protections over information about the significance of genetic variants. Specifically, we consider five approaches: voluntary responses from the scientific community; Food and Drug Administration (FDA) or CMS regulation; creation of additional march-in rights as under the Bayh Dole Act; compulsory licensing as under patent law; and creation of a public policy exception to trade secret protection. We explore what each approach would require legally if applied to break trade secret barriers, together with their advantages and disadvantages. While our analysis concerns genetic information, we conclude with some thoughts about its relevance to other types of big data now protected by trade secrets such as information about innovations in quality of care.

Genomic knowledge sharing: A review of the ethical and legal issues.

The importance of genomic information for care of individual patients and for the development of knowledge about treatment efficacy is becoming increasingly apparent. This information is probabilistic and involves the use of large data sets to increase the likelihood of detecting low frequency events. Duties and rights of patients with respect to this information have been much discussed, including informed consent to the use of individual information, privacy and confidentiality, rights to know or not to know, and individual ownership of information about themselves. But this is only one side of the information equation. On the other side of the equation are duties of information holders: malpractice and duties to warn, responsibilities of data stewardship, intellectual property and ownership, reciprocity, and justice. This article argues that if we take duties of patients to share information seriously, we must also consider duties on the part of information holders about how they protect and use information.

You are born with your genes: justice and protection against discrimination in the use of genetic information.

Genetic information poses an apparent paradox for justice in health care. On the one hand, genetic information seems to be exactly the kind of information that it is unjust to take into account in the distribution of important goods. On the other hand, genetic information may increasingly become useful in individual patient care as evidence for personalized medicine increases. Although it is important to emphasize the difference between genetic information and the social construct of race, nonetheless, the historical interplay between discrimination based on assumptions about heritability and discrimination based on race are significant. Thus, this article defends the importance of paying very close attention to protections in the use of genetic information. Three current examples of inadequate protection are cited. First, informed consent to genetic testing should incorporate potential confidentiality risks raised by this information. Second, the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act is too porous to protect employees from their employers' possession of genetic information; if such information is used in discriminatory ways, burdens of seeking protection then fall on the employees. More stringent strategies for protecting information are thus desirable. Finally, current designs of interoperable health records fail to allow for the sequestration of genetic information. Efforts to develop such sequestration techniques should be encouraged; among other benefits, they would be helpful in shielding genetic information from employers.

Ethics, pandemics, and the duty to treat.

Numerous grounds have been offered for the view that healthcare workers have a duty to treat, including expressed consent, implied consent, special training, reciprocity (also called the social contract view), and professional oaths and codes. Quite often, however, these grounds are simply asserted without being adequately defended or without the defenses being critically evaluated. This essay aims to help remedy that problem by providing a critical examination of the strengths and weaknesses of each of these five grounds for asserting that healthcare workers have a duty to treat, especially as that duty would arise in the context of an infectious disease pandemic. Ultimately, it argues that none of the defenses is currently sufficient to ground the kind of duty that would be needed in a pandemic. It concludes by sketching some practical recommendations in that regard.

Should rapid tests for HIV infection now be mandatory during pregnancy? Global differences in scarcity and a dilemma of technological advance.

Since testing for HIV infection became possible in 1985, testing of pregnant women has been conducted primarily on a voluntary, 'opt-in' basis. Faden, Geller and Powers, Bayer, Wilfert, and McKenna, among others, have suggested that with the development of more reliable testing and more effective therapy to reduce maternal-fetal transmission, testing should become either routine with 'opt-out' provisions or mandatory. We ask, in the light of the new rapid tests for HIV, such as OraQuick, and the development of antiretroviral treatment that can reduce maternal-fetal transmission rates to <2%, whether that time is now. Illustrating our argument with cases from the United States (US), Kenya, Peru, and an undocumented Mexican worker in the US, we show that when testing is accompanied by assured multi-drug therapy for the mother, the argument for opt-out or mandatory testing for HIV in pregnancy is strong, but that it is problematic where testing is accompanied by adverse events such as spousal abuse or by inadequate intrapartum or follow-up treatment. The difference is not a 'double standard', but reflects the presence of conflicts between the health interests of the mother and the fetus--conflicts that would be abrogated by the assurance of adequate, continuing multi-drug therapy. In light of these conflicts, where they still occur, careful processes of informed consent are appropriate, rather than opt-out or mandatory testing.

How infectious diseases got left out--and what this omission might have meant for bioethics.

In this article, we first document the virtually complete absence of infectious disease examples and concerns at the time bioethics emerged as a field. We then argue that this oversight was not benign by considering two central issues in the field, informed consent and distributive justice, and showing how they might have been framed differently had infectiousness been at the forefront of concern. The solution to this omission might be to apply standard approaches in liberal bioethics, such as autonomy and the harm principle, to infectious examples. We argue that this is insufficient, however. Taking infectious disease into account requires understanding the patient as victim and as vector. Infectiousness reminds us that as autonomous agents we are both embodied and vulnerable in our relationships with others. We conclude by applying this reunderstanding of agency to the examples of informed consent and distributive justice in health care.

Are there characteristics of infectious diseases that raise special ethical issues?

This paper examines the characteristics of infectious diseases that raise special medical and social ethical issues, and explores ways of integrating both current bioethical and classical public health ethics concerns. Many of the ethical issues raised by infectious diseases are related to these diseases' powerful ability to engender fear in individuals and panic in populations. We address the association of some infectious diseases with high morbidity and mortality rates, the sense that infectious diseases are caused by invasion or attack on humans by foreign micro-organisms, the acute onset and rapid course of many infectious diseases, and, in particular, the communicability of infectious diseases. The individual fear and community panic associated with infectious diseases often leads to rapid, emotionally driven decision making about public health policies needed to protect the community that may be in conflict with current bioethical principles regarding the care of individual patients. The discussion includes recent examples where dialogue between public health practitioners and medical-ethicists has helped resolve ethical issues that require us to consider the infected patient as both a victim with individual needs and rights and as a potential vector of disease that is of concern to the community.