Modal and amodal cognition: an overarching principle in various domains of psychology.

Accounting for how the human mind represents the internal and external world is a crucial feature of many theories of human cognition. Central to this question is the distinction between modal as opposed to amodal representational formats. It has often been assumed that one but not both of these two types of representations underlie processing in specific domains of cognition (e.g., perception, mental imagery, and language). However, in this paper, we suggest that both formats play a major role in most cognitive domains. We believe that a comprehensive theory of cognition requires a solid understanding of these representational formats and their functional roles within and across different domains of cognition, the developmental trajectory of these representational formats, and their role in dysfunctional behavior. Here we sketch such an overarching perspective that brings together research from diverse subdisciplines of psychology on modal and amodal representational formats so as to unravel their functional principles and their interactions.

No evidence for contextual cueing beyond explicit recognition.

Many studies claim that visual regularities can be learned unconsciously and without explicit awareness. For example in the contextual cueing paradigm, studies often make claims using a standard reasoning based on two results: (1) a reliable response time (RT) difference between repeated vs. new stimulus displays and (2) a close-to-chance sensitivity when participants are asked to explicitly recognize repeated stimulus displays. From this pattern of results, studies routinely conclude that the sensitivity of RT responses is higher than that of explicit responses-an empirical situation we call Indirect Task Advantage (ITA). Many studies further infer from an ITA that RT effects were driven by a form of recognition that exceeds explicit memory: implicit recognition. However, this reasoning is flawed because the sensitivity underlying RT effects is never computed. To properly establish a difference, a sensitivity comparison is required. We apply this sensitivity comparison in a reanalysis of 20 contextual cueing studies showing that not a single study provides consistent evidence for ITAs. Responding to recent correlation-based arguments, we also demonstrate the absence of evidence for ITAs at the level of individual participants. This lack of ITAs has serious consequences for the field: If RT effects can be fully explained by weak but above-chance explicit recognition sensitivity, what is the empirical content of the label "implicit"? Thus, theoretical discussions in this paradigm-and likely in other paradigms using this standard reasoning-require serious reassessment because the current data from contextual cueing studies is insufficient to consider recognition as implicit.

Is there hierarchical generalization in response-effect learning?

Ideomotor theory is an influential approach to understand goal-directed behavior. In this framework, response-effect (R-E) learning is assumed as a prerequisite for voluntary action: Once associations between motor actions and their effects in the environment have been formed, the anticipation of these effects will automatically activate the associated motor pattern. R-E learning is typically investigated with (induction) experiments that comprise an acquisition phase, where R-E associations are presumably learned, and a subsequent test phase, where the previous effects serve as stimuli for a response. While most studies used stimuli in the test phase that were identical to the effects in the acquisition phase, one study reported generalization from exemplars to their superordinate category (Hommel et al., Vis Cogn 10:965-986, 2003, Exp. 1). However, studies on so-called R-E compatibility did not report such generalization. We aimed to conceptually replicate Experiment 1 of Hommel et al. (Vis Cogn 10:965-986, 2003) with a free-choice test phase. While we did observe effects consistent with R-E learning when the effects in the acquisition phase were identical to the stimuli in the test phase, we did not observe evidence for generalization. We discuss this with regard to recent studies suggesting that individual response biases might rather reflect rapidly inferred propositional knowledge instead of learned R-E associations.

Grasping follows Weber's law: How to use response variability as a proxy for JND.

Weber's law is a fundamental psychophysical principle. It states that the just noticeable difference (JND) between stimuli increases with stimulus magnitude; consequently, larger stimuli should be estimated with larger variability. However, visually guided grasping seems to violate this expectation: When repeatedly grasping large objects, the variability is similar to that when grasping small objects. Based on this result, it was often concluded that grasping violated Weber's law. This astonishing finding generated a flurry of research, with contradictory results and potentially far-reaching implications for theorizing about the functional architecture of the brain. We show that previous studies ignored nonlinearities in the scaling of the grasping response. These nonlinearities result from, for example, the finger span being limited such that the opening of the fingers reaches a ceiling for large objects. We describe how to mathematically take these nonlinearities into account and apply this approach to our own data, as well as to the data of three influential studies on this topic. In all four datasets, we found that-when appropriately estimated-JNDs increase with object size, as expected by Weber's law. We conclude that grasping obeys Weber's law, as do essentially all sensory dimensions.

Neural mechanisms of response priming do not support veridical unconscious processing.

Studies using the priming paradigm often infer that unconscious processes have more veridical access to the world than conscious processes. These interpretations are based on a standard reasoning that erroneously infers good sensitivity of indirect measures from a clear priming effect. To correct for this fallacy, researchers should explicitly compute the sensitivities from indirect measures and compare them against the sensitivities of direct measures. Recent results suggest that indirect behavioral measures are not more sensitive than direct measures and challenge interpretations about veridical unconscious processing. We add to these behavioral results by focusing on neurophysiological indirect measures. In two EEG experiments, we investigate whether event related potentials (ERPs) are more sensitive to different visual stimuli than direct measures. The results show the opposite effect: higher sensitivities for direct than indirect measures. Therefore-contrasting commonly held belief-we find no evidence for more veridical unconscious than conscious processes in ERP measures.

Advancing research on unconscious priming: When can scientists claim an indirect task advantage?

Current literature holds that many cognitive functions can be performed outside consciousness. Evidence for this view comes from unconscious priming. In a typical experiment, visual stimuli are masked such that participants are close to chance performance when directly asked to which of two categories the stimuli belong. This close-to-zero sensitivity is seen as evidence that participants cannot consciously report the category of the masked stimuli. Nevertheless, the category of the masked stimuli can indirectly affect responses to other stimuli (e.g., reaction times or brain activity)-an effect called priming. The priming effect is seen as evidence for a higher sensitivity to the masked stimuli in the indirect responses as compared with the direct responses. Such an apparent difference in sensitivities is taken as evidence that processing occurred unconsciously. But we show that this "standard reasoning of unconscious priming" is flawed: Sensitivities are not properly compared, creating the wrong impression of a difference in sensitivities even if there is none. We describe the appropriate way to determine sensitivities, replicate the behavioral part of a landmark study, develop methods to estimate sensitivities from reported summary statistics of published studies, and use these methods to reanalyze 15 highly influential studies. Results show that the interpretations of many studies need to be changed and that a community effort is required to reassess the vast literature on unconscious priming. This process will allow scientists to learn more about the true boundary conditions of unconscious priming, thereby advancing the scientific understanding of consciousness. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

Card posting does not rely on visual orientation: A challenge to past neuropsychological dissociations.

A common set of tasks frequently employed in the neuropsychological assessment of patients with visuomotor or perceptual deficits are the card-posting and the perceptual orientation matching tasks. In the posting task, patients have to post a card (or their hand) through a slot of varying orientations while the matching task requires them to indicate the slot's orientation as accurately as possible. Observations that damage to different areas of the brain (dorsal vs. ventral stream) is associated with selective impairment in one of the tasks - but not the other - has led to the suggestion that different cortical pathways process visual orientation information for perception versus action. In three experiments, we show that this conclusion may be premature as posting does not seem to rely on the processing of visual orientation information but is instead performed using obstacle avoidance strategies that require an accurate judgement of egocentric distances between the card's and the slot's edges. Specifically, we found that while matching is susceptible to the oblique effect (i.e., common perceptual orientation bias with higher accuracy for cardinal than oblique orientations), this was not the case for posting, neither in immediate nor in memory-guided conditions. In contrast to matching, posting errors primarily depended on biomechanical demands and reflected a preference for performing efficient and comfortable movements. Thus, we suggest that previous dissociations between perceptual and visuomotor performance in letter posting tasks are better explained by impairments in egocentric and allocentric spatial processing than by independent visual processing systems.

Number processing outside awareness? Systematically testing sensitivities of direct and indirect measures of consciousness.

In priming research, it is often argued that humans can discriminate stimuli outside consciousness. For example, the semantic meaning of numbers can be processed even when the numbers are so strongly masked that participants are not aware of them. These claims are typically based on a certain pattern of results: Direct measures indicate no conscious awareness of the masked stimuli, while indirect measures show clear priming effects of the same stimuli on reaction times or neurophysiological measures. From this pattern, preserved (unconscious) processing in the indirect task is concluded. However, this widely used standard reasoning is problematic and leads to spurious claims of unconscious processing. Such problems can be avoided by comparing sensitivities of direct and indirect measures. Many studies are affected by these problems, such that a reassessment of the literature is needed. Here, we investigated whether numbers can be processed unconsciously. In three experiments, we replicated and extended well-established effects of number priming over a wide range of stimulus visibilities. We then compared the standard reasoning to a sensitivity analysis, where direct and indirect effects are compared using the same metric. Results show that the sensitivities of indirect measures did not exceed those of direct measures, thereby indicating no evidence for preserved unconscious processing when awareness of the stimuli is low. Instead, it seems that at low visibility there is residual processing that affects direct and indirect measures to a similar degree. This suggests that similar processing modes cause those effects in direct and indirect measures.

Group decisions based on confidence weighted majority voting.

BACKGROUND: It has repeatedly been reported that, when making decisions under uncertainty, groups outperform individuals. Real groups are often replaced by simulated groups: Instead of performing an actual group discussion, individual responses are aggregated by a numerical computation. While studies have typically used unweighted majority voting (MV) for this aggregation, the theoretically optimal method is confidence weighted majority voting (CWMV)-if independent and accurate confidence ratings from the individual group members are available. To determine which simulations (MV vs. CWMV) reflect real group processes better, we applied formal cognitive modeling and compared simulated group responses to real group responses. RESULTS: Simulated group decisions based on CWMV matched the accuracy of real group decisions, while simulated group decisions based on MV showed lower accuracy. CWMV predicted the confidence that groups put into their group decisions well. However, real groups treated individual votes to some extent more equally weighted than suggested by CWMV. Additionally, real groups tend to put lower confidence into their decisions compared to CWMV simulations. CONCLUSION: Our results highlight the importance of taking individual confidences into account when simulating group decisions: We found that real groups can aggregate individual confidences in a way that matches statistical aggregations given by CWMV to some extent. This implies that research using simulated group decisions should use CWMV instead of MV as a benchmark to compare real groups to.

Comparing Symbolic and Nonsymbolic Number Lines: Consistent Effects of Notation Across Output Measures.

The mental number line (MNL) is a popular metaphor for magnitude representation in numerical cognition. Its shape has frequently been reported as being nonlinear, based on nonlinear response functions in magnitude estimation. We investigated whether this shape reflects a phenomenon of the mapping from stimulus to internal magnitude representation or of the mapping from internal representation to response. In five experiments, participants (total N = 66) viewed stimuli that represented numerical magnitude either in a symbolic notation (i.e., Arabic digits) or in a nonsymbolic notation (i.e., clouds of dots). Participants estimated these magnitudes by either adjusting the position of a mark on a ruler-like response bar (nonsymbolic response) or by typing the corresponding number on a keyboard (symbolic response). Responses to symbolic stimuli were markedly different from responses to nonsymbolic stimuli, in that they were mostly powershaped. We investigated whether the nonlinearity could be explained by effects of previous trials, but such effects were (a) not strong enough to explain the nonlinear responses and (b) existed only between trials of the same input notation, suggesting that the nonlinearity is due to input mappings. Introducing veridical feedback improved the accuracy of responses, thereby showing a calibration based on the feedback. However, this calibration persisted only temporarily, and responses to nonsymbolic stimuli remained nonlinear. Overall, we conclude that the nonlinearity is a phenomenon of the mapping from nonsymbolic input format to internal magnitude representation and that the phenomenon is surprisingly robust to calibration.

The SNARC Effect in Chinese Numerals: Do Visual Properties of Characters and Hand Signs Influence Number Processing?

The SNARC effect refers to an association of numbers and spatial properties of responses that is commonly thought to be amodal and independent of stimulus notation. We tested for a horizontal SNARC effect using Arabic digits, simple-form Chinese characters and Chinese hand signs in participants from Mainland China. We found a horizontal SNARC effect in all notations. This is the first time that a horizontal SNARC effect has been demonstrated in Chinese characters and Chinese hand signs. We tested for the SNARC effect in two experiments (parity judgement and magnitude judgement). The parity judgement task yielded clear, consistent SNARC effects in all notations, whereas results were more mixed in magnitude judgement. Both Chinese characters and Chinese hand signs are represented non-symbolically for low numbers and symbolically for higher numbers, allowing us to contrast within the same notation the effects of heavily learned non-symbolic vs. symbolic representation on the processing of numbers. In addition to finding a horizontal SNARC effect, we also found a robust numerical distance effect in all notations. This is particularly interesting as it persisted when participants reported using purely visual features to solve the task, thereby suggesting that numbers were processed semantically even when the task could be solved without the semantic information.

The functional subdivision of the visual brain: Is there a real illusion effect on action? A multi-lab replication study.

It has often been suggested that visual illusions affect perception but not actions such as grasping, as predicted by the "two-visual-systems" hypothesis of Milner and Goodale (1995, The Visual Brain in Action, Oxford University press). However, at least for the Ebbinghaus illusion, relevant studies seem to reveal a consistent illusion effect on grasping (Franz & Gegenfurtner, 2008. Grasping visual illusions: consistent data and no dissociation. Cognitive Neuropsychology). Two interpretations are possible: either grasping is not immune to illusions (arguing against dissociable processing mechanisms for vision-for-perception and vision-for-action), or some other factors modulate grasping in ways that mimic a vision-for perception effect in actions. It has been suggested that one such factor may be obstacle avoidance (Haffenden Schiff & Goodale, 2001. The dissociation between perception and action in the Ebbinghaus illusion: nonillusory effects of pictorial cues on grasp. Current Biology, 11, 177-181). In four different labs (total N = 144), we conducted an exact replication of previous studies suggesting obstacle avoidance mechanisms, implementing conditions that tested grasping as well as multiple perceptual tasks. This replication was supplemented by additional conditions to obtain more conclusive results. Our results confirm that grasping is affected by the Ebbinghaus illusion and demonstrate that this effect cannot be explained by obstacle avoidance.

Using Key Distance to Clarify a Theory on the SNARC.

The most prominent explanation for the spatial numerical association of response codes (SNARC) effect is the direct mapping account (DMA). The DMA assumes that (a) numbers are represented on a mental number line, (b) this mental number line is mapped to external space, and (c) the better the mapping location corresponds to the response location, the faster the response. The DMA leaves open whether a variation of response locations can (ceteris paribus) influence the location to which numbers are mapped in external space. In order to investigate this question, we varied response key distance during a standard parity judgment and a magnitude judgment task. We found that even drastic manipulations of response key distance did not modulate the SNARC effect. Power and meta-analyses show that this null effect is not due to insufficient statistical power or a poor experimental setup. Thus, our results indicate that, in order for the DMA to explain the SNARC effect, it must assume that the mapping from the mental number line to external space is anchored to response location. For future research, our results suggest that it is not necessary to control the horizontal separation of the response keys in basic SNARC experiments.

Pointing and antipointing in Müller-Lyer figures: Why illusion effects need to be scaled.

It has been suggested that goal-directed actions performed under full vision are immune to certain visual illusions, while movements relying on perception-based visual information are deceived by them (Milner & Goodale, 1995). Consequently, pointing movements should be deceived by visual illusions when a delay is introduced (memory demands) or when antipointing (spatial imagery) is required. In 2 experiments, participants performed either propointing or antipointing movements to different versions of the Müller-Lyer illusion in 2 vision conditions (open-loop vs. delay). Apart from open-loop propointing, all conditions should rely on perceptual processing and should therefore yield similarly illusion effects. While we observed illusion effects in all conditions, their magnitude varied in unexpected ways. Most surprisingly, introducing a delay seemed to reduce illusion effects in antipointing. We show that this decrease can be explained by the fact that pointing after delay is less responsive to physical size changes. After correcting for this, illusion effects in antipointing were similar in both vision conditions but still twice as large as in the delayed propointing task. Our findings highlight the necessity of employing a correction procedure when comparing illusion effects across tasks and do not conform well to the predictions derived from the perception-action model.

Semantic grasping escapes Weber's law.

According to Weber's law, the just noticeable difference between stimuli increases proportionally with stimulus magnitude, suggesting that perception becomes more variable when a stimulus becomes larger. Surprisingly, this basic psychophysical principle appears to be violated in grasping because the variability of grasping movements does not increase with object size. This dissociation between perception and grasping has been interpreted either as evidence for different neuronal processing of real-time visual size information [Ganel, T., Chajut, E., Algom, D. (2008a). Current Biology, 18(14), R599-R601], or for the idea that grasping ignores stimulus size and is based on position information only [Smeets, J. B. J., and Brenner, E. (2008). Current Biology, 18(23), R1089-R1090]. Both accounts assume that it is the processing of visual information that leads to the absence of Weber's law in grasping. We show that even if neither visual nor any real-time sensory information about the stimulus is presented (but only abstract, semantic information about its size), grasping does not follow Weber's law. This indicates that other mechanisms must be responsible for the unexpected behavior of grasping.

Garner-Interference in left-handed awkward grasping.

The Perception-Action Model (PAM) claims to provide a coherent interpretation of data from all areas of the visual neurosciences, most notably data from neuropsychological patients and from behavioral experiments in healthy people. Here, we tested two claims that are part of the core version of the PAM: (a) certain actions (natural, highly practiced, and right-handed) are controlled by the dorsal vision for action pathway, while other actions (awkward, unpracticed, or left-handed) are controlled by the ventral vision for perception pathway. (b) Only the dorsal pathway operates in an analytical fashion, being able to selectively focus on the task-relevant dimension of an object (Ganel and Goodale, Nature 426(6967):664-667, 2003). We show that one of these claims must be wrong: using the same test for analytical processing as Ganel and Goodale (2003), we found that even an action that should clearly be ventral (left-handed awkward grasping) shows analytical processing just as a dorsal task does (right-handed natural precision grasping). These results are at odds with the PAM and point to an inconsistency of the model.