Association Between the Medicare Advantage Quartile Adjustment System and Plan Behavior and Enrollment.

Importance: Medicare Advantage (MA) has grown in popularity, but critics believe that insurers are overpaid, partially due to the quartile adjustment system that determines plan benchmarks. However, elimination of the quartile adjustments may be associated with less generous benefits and fewer plan offerings, which could slow MA enrollment growth. Objective: To examine whether the quartile adjustment system is associated with differences in county-level benefits, insurer offerings, and MA enrollment. Design, Setting, and Participants: The quartile adjustments create discontinuous jumps in county-level base payments based on historical traditional Medicare spending. Data from January 2017 to December 2021 and a regression discontinuity design were used to examine changes in insurer behavior and MA enrollment between quartiles. The analytic sample included 1557 county observations. Main Outcomes and Measures: Study outcomes included monthly premiums, the share of plans charging premiums, primary care copayments, the share of plans using rebates to reduce Part B premiums, supplemental benefits, plan and contract availability, and MA enrollment. Results: Discontinuities were found in the quartile adjustments and benchmarks. A 1-percentage point (pp) increase in the quartile adjustment was associated with a $6.36 increase in monthly benchmarks (95% CI, 5.10-7.62), a $0.51 decrease in monthly premiums (95% CI, -0.96 to -0.07), and a 0.68 pp decrease in the share of plans charging premiums (95% CI, -1.25 to -0.10). Significant changes were not found in primary care copayments (-$0.04; 95% CI, -0.17 to 0.09), the share of plans using rebates to reduce Part B premiums (-0.17 pp; 95% CI, -0.34 to 0.01), supplemental benefits (eg, preventive dental coverage; 0.17 pp; 95% CI, -0.25 to 0.0), the number of plans (1.06; 95% CI, -3.44 to 5.57) or contracts (0.31; 95% CI, -0.18 to 0.81), or the MA enrollment rate (0.16 pp; 95% CI, -0.61 to 0.94). Conclusions and Relevance: The study results suggest that MA plans are not very sensitive to modest changes in payment rates. Modifications to the quartile adjustment system may generate savings without substantially affecting MA beneficiaries.

Favorable Selection In Medicare Advantage Is Linked To Inflated Benchmarks And Billions In Overpayments To Plans.

Increases in Medicare Advantage (MA) enrollment, coupled with concerns about overpayment to plans, have prompted calls for change. Benchmark setting in MA, which determines plan payment, has received relatively little attention as an avenue for reform. In this study we used national data from the period 2010-20 to examine the relationships among unobserved favorable selection, benchmark setting, and payments to plans in MA. We found that unobserved favorable selection in MA led to underpayment to counties with lower MA penetration and overpayment to counties with higher MA penetration. Because the distribution of MA beneficiaries has shifted over time toward counties that were overpaid, we estimate that plans were overpaid by an average of $9.3 billion per year between 2017 and 2020. Changes to risk adjustment in benchmark setting could likely mitigate the impact of favorable selection in MA.

Legislative and Regulatory Options for Improving Medicare Advantage.

The Medicare Advantage program was created to expand beneficiary choice and to reduce spending through capitated payment to private insurers. However, many stakeholders now argue that Medicare Advantage is failing to deliver on its promise to reduce spending. Three problematic design features in Medicare Advantage payment policy have received particular scrutiny: (1) how baseline payments to insurers are determined, (2) how variation in patient risk affects insurer payment, and (3) how payments to insurers are adjusted for quality performance. The authors analyze the statute underlying these three design features and explore legislative and regulatory strategies for improving Medicare Advantage. They conclude that regulatory approaches for improving risk adjustment and for recouping overpayments from risk-score gaming have the highest potential impact and are the most feasible improvement measures to implement.

Social Solidarity in Health Care, American-Style.

The ACA shifted U.S. health policy from centering on principles of actuarial fairness toward social solidarity. Yet four legal fixtures of the health care system have prevented the achievement of social solidarity: federalism, fiscal pluralism, privatization, and individualism. Future reforms must confront these fixtures to realize social solidarity in health care, American-style.

What States Can Do to Address Out-of-Network Air Ambulance Bills.

Out-of-network air ambulance bills are a pernicious and financially devastating type of surprise medical bill. Courts have broadly interpreted the Airline Deregulation Act to preempt most state attempts to regulate air ambulance billing abuses, so a federal solution is ultimately needed. However, in the absence of a federal fix, states have experimented with a variety of approaches that may survive preemption and provide some protections for their citizens.

Out-of-Network Air Ambulance Bills: Prevalence, Magnitude, and Policy Solutions.

Policy Points Out-of-network air ambulance bills are a type of surprise medical bill and are driven by many of the same market failures behind other surprise medical bills, including patients' inability to choose in-network providers in an emergency or to avoid potential balance billing by out-of-network providers. The financial risk to consumers is high because more than three-quarters of air ambulances are out-of-network and their prices are high and rising. Consumers facing out-of-network air ambulance bills have few legal protections owing to the Airline Deregulation Act's federal preemption of state laws. Any federal policies for surprise medical bills should also address surprise air ambulance bills and should incorporate substantive consumer protections-not just billing transparency-and correct the market distortions for air ambulances. CONTEXT: Out-of-network air ambulance bills are a growing problem for consumers. Because most air ambulance transports are out-of-network and prices are rising, patients are at risk of receiving large unexpected bills. This article estimates the prevalence and magnitude of privately insured persons' out-of-network air ambulance bills, describes the legal barriers to curtailing surprise air ambulance bills, and proposes policies to protect consumers from out-of-network air ambulance bills. METHODS: We used the Health Care Cost Institute's 2014-2017 data from three large national insurers to evaluate the share of air ambulance claims that are out-of-network and the prevalence and magnitude of potential surprise balance bills, focusing on rotary-wing transports. We estimated the magnitude of potential balance bills for out-of-network air ambulance services by calculating the difference between the provider's billed charges and the insurer's out-of-network allowed amount, including the patient's cost-sharing. For in-network air ambulance transports, we calculated the average charges and allowed amounts, both in absolute magnitude and as a multiple of the rate that Medicare pays for the same service. FINDINGS: We found that less than one-quarter of air ambulance transports of commercially insured patients were in-network. Two-in-five transports resulted in a potential balance bill, averaging $19,851. In the latter years of our data, in-network rates for transports by independent (non-hospital-based) carriers averaged $20,822, or 369% of the Medicare rate for the same service. CONCLUSIONS: Because the states' efforts to curtail air ambulance balance billing have been preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act, a federal solution is needed. Owing to the failure of market forces to discipline either prices or supply, out-of-network air ambulance rates should be benchmarked to a multiple of Medicare rates or, alternatively, air ambulance services could be delivered and financed through an approach that combines competitive bidding and public utility regulation.

The Web of Legal Protections for Participants in Genomic Research.

The identification and arrest of the Golden State Killer using DNA uploaded to an ancestry database occurred shortly before recruitment for the National Institutes of Health's (NIH) All of Us Study commenced, with a goal of enrolling and collecting DNA, health, and lifestyle information from one million Americans. It also highlighted the need to ensure prospective research participants that their confidentiality will be protected and their materials used appropriately. But there are questions about how well current law protects against these privacy risks. This article is the first to consider comprehensively and simultaneously all the federal and state laws offering protections to participants in genomic research. The literature typically focuses on the federal laws in isolation, questioning the strengths of federal legal protections for genomic research participants provided in the Common Rule, the HIPAA Privacy Rule, or the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act. Nevertheless, we found significant numbers and surprising variety among state laws that provide greater protections than federal laws, often filling in federal gaps by broadening the applicability of privacy or nondiscrimination standards or by providing important remedies for individuals harmed by breaches. Identifying and explaining the protections these laws provide is significant both to allow prospective participants to accurately weigh the risks of enrolling in these studies and as models for how federal legal protections could be expanded to fill known gaps.

The challenge of paying for cost-effective cures.

In this article, we consider the problem of financing highly effective and cost-effective prescription drugs within a value-based pricing system. Precisely because these drugs are highly effective, their value-based prices may be quite expensive; and moreover, the value-based price of a cure ought to be set high enough to create incentives for innovation, otherwise these beneficial therapies may be underdeveloped. However, in our fragmented health insurance system, where patients move frequently between payers, these payers generally lack the incentives to pay value-based prices for cures because they cannot ensure that they will reap the long-term economic benefits. Therefore, we argue that there is a need for mechanisms to spread the burden of financing of cures across payers to maximize patient access and the public good. We suggest that risk adjustment, reinsurance, and risk corridors are familiar policy options that merit consideration to address the problem and create incentives for value-based pricing.